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Foreword
Over the last years a great deal of attention has been devoted to the administrative approach
at the European level, within the context of preventing and combating organised crime.
In fact, the Stockholm programme, the Internal Security Strategy and the COSI work
programme all view this approach as a useful supplement to the traditional judicial and
police approach against organised crime.
The administrative approach was already subject to a range of initiatives, among them
the delivery of different EU handbooks on complementary approaches and actions to
prevent and combat organised crime, and the establishment of the Informal Network of
contact points on the administrative approach.
In 2010, during the Belgian EU Presidency, the Council adopted conclusions in which
the Informal Network was requested to assess the possibilities to strengthen the exchange
of information between administrative bodies and traditional law enforcement organisa-
tions. To this end the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice (coordinator), together with
TilburgUniversity (theNetherlands) and theKULeuven –University (Belgium), supported
by the Belgian Home Affairs Ministry, applied for a grant at the Prevention of and Fight
against Crime Programme of the European Commission. In 2011, the European Commis-
sion awarded this ISEC grant to conduct a ‘study on the potential for information exchanges
between administrative bodies and traditional law enforcement organizations to support
the use of administrative measures within EU Member States and at EU level’. The under-
lying report is the result of this ISEC grant.
The study aims to contribute to the existing body of knowledge concerning an
administrative approach to crime in the European Union in the following manner. First,
it explored the legal options available to national administrative authorities in the selected
Member States. Options that prevent criminals from misusing the legal infrastructure,
such as licensing procedures or tender procedures. This resulted in ten separate country
reports (Chapters 2-11), as well as a comparison of those legal options in the ten Member
States (Chapter 12). Second, it considered the practical application of the legal options
available in the selected Member States. The results of this empirical study are reviewed
in Chapter 13. Chapter 14 explored the potential for information exchange between EU
Member States in support of an administrative approach to crime. Last, the conclusions
and the way forward were presented in part V of this study (Chapters 15 and 16).
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the researchers, professor Toine Spapens,
professor Dirk van Daele and Maaike Peters for their great work over the last two years in
carrying out this extensive study. Secondly I would like to thank the members of the
InformalNetwork for their active contribution in finding the right experts and researchers
vii
within the selected 10 EU Member States. Also, I would like to thank all the interviewed
persons, whom have made this research possible. Lastly, a special word of thanks to the
European Commission for financial supporting this project.
It ismy firm believe that the outcome of this report will highly contribute to the further
development of the administrative approach andmore important to the successful preven-
tion and repression of organised crime, both in EU Member States and at the EU level. In
view of the Dutch EU Presidency in 2016, I am confident that the recommendations of
this project will provide a solid basis for future actions and interventions at the Union
level to be taken by the Council and the European Commission.
Kees Riezebos
Ministry of Security and Justice
Director Department of Safety and Governance
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A.C.M. Spapens, M. Peters & D. Van Daele
1.1 Background of the research
Criminals and persons involved in serious and organized crime often do not limit their
activities to purely illegal ones such as drug trafficking, fraud or property crimes. They
also invest money in legal activities and businesses, for instance to exploit the revenues of
their crimes or to generate a legal income. Criminalsmay establish or take over a construc-
tion company and then tender for government contracts. The ‘business processes’ of most
types of organized crime also require legal facilities. Criminals who traffic illicit drugs or
weapons may need to organize a shipment of legal goods in which they can hide the con-
traband. That might require the cooperation of a regular trader, or the setting up of a
company as a front, for which they may also need assistance from legal advisers and
accountants. Finally, criminals can also acquire a public licence to run a bar or gambling
arcade and use it for criminal purposes, such as money laundering, tax fraud and drug
dealing. Even if criminals engage in businesses without using them to commit crimes, their
actions will still undermine the integrity of certain economic activities. For example, if a
business conflict occurs, criminals may easily revert to the violent methods common to
the underworld. When the involvement of criminals in a particular economic activity
becomes known, it may well destroy the public image of that entire sector, as happened
in the real property sector in theNetherlands. Finally, criminals who also have a substantial
illegal income and use their company partly for money laundering do not worry about
being as competitive as regular companies and may underbid contracts to outcompete
bona fide entrepreneurs.
Authorities thus have a particular interest in preventing criminals from either using
the economic infrastructure to acquire a legal income or from misusing businesses to
facilitate crimes and applying their criminal proceeds towards this purpose. Administrative
laws are of particular importance in this respect.
To begin, all governments in functioning democracies regulate economic activities to
some extent to ensure the safety of their citizens, economy and environment. Gambling,
for example, carries the risk of addiction and operators are therefore required to comply
with standards to minimize this risk. The same applies to the sale of alcohol, prescription
medicines and firearms. If a company wants to build a new chemical plant, it must comply
with numerous regulations to avoid damaging the environment. It is customary for regu-
3
lated business activities to be inaccessible to persons who have been convicted of crimes
that could affect their suitability to operate a certain type of business or to perform a certain
job. One example is a convicted paedophile who wants to start a day care centre for young
children or apply for a job in one. Second, when public authorities invite tenders or grant
subsidies, the applicants must meet requirements that allow officials to select the most
eligible and reliable candidate. Third, local and other authorities are empowered tomaintain
public order in their territory. This allows them to issue fines, but also to regulate activities
that may cause nuisance. Finally, they might even have the power to forfeit assets in the
scope of administrative proceedings.
An administrative approach applied in addition to or coordinated with the traditional
instruments of criminal law is a potentially powerful tool to prevent and combat serious
and organized crime. The European Commission strongly encourages the Member States
to apply such an approach and facilitates the Informal Network of Contact Points on the
AdministrativeApproach to Prevent and FightOrganizedCrime.However, the exact scope
and application of administrativemeasures in theMember States is still unclear. This study
aims to explore how and when such administrative measures can and are applied in the
context of serious and organized crime. Moreover, it aims to study whether such an
approach is possible in an international context, particularly the potential for exchanging
information between Member States. The latter aim is of major importance in preventing
displacement effects of serious and organized crime from one Member State to another
due to differences in the extent to which administrative measures are applied to prevent,
disrupt and repress crime.1
In 2011, the European Commission awarded an ISEC grant to the Dutch Ministry of
Security and Justice (coordinator) to conduct a ‘study on the potential for information
exchanges between administrative bodies and traditional law enforcement organizations to
support the use of administrative measures within EU Member States and at EU level’.
Tilburg University (the Netherlands) and the Catholic University of Leuven (Belgium)
conducted this research, supported by the Belgian Home Affairs Ministry. The underlying
report is the result of this ISEC grant.
1.2 Scope of the study and definition of ‘administrative approach’
1.2.1 Scope of the study
The present study covers three main areas. It first explores the applicable legislative
framework in ten selected EUMember States (see below) in order to present a comparative
1 See Van Daele et al. 2010.
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overview of the administrative laws that may be used in an administrative approach to
crime.
For practical reasons, the legal study is limited to four types of administrative regulations:
1. the preventive screening and monitoring of applicants (natural persons and legal
entities) for permits, tenders and subsidies;
2. the power to close or expropriate premises when public nuisance occurs in or around
those premises;
3. the possibility of seizing criminals’ assets within the framework of an administrative
procedure and outside the scope of criminal procedure;
4. other common methods that administrative authorities can use to tackle and prevent
crime.
The selection of the first type of administrative measure was based on the definition for-
mulated in the EU Handbook published during the Hungarian Presidency of the Council
of the EU in 2011.2 The second focus area was also based on the premise of the EU Hand-
book, which cites the ‘closing of criminal business’ as part of an administrative approach.3
To ensure that all relevant instruments were taken into accountwhen drafting the separate
country reports, the broader definition of ‘public nuisance’ was also chosen. The third
focus area of asset seizure was selected because the EU Handbook indicates that adminis-
trative measures are in place in some Member States for such purposes.4 The fourth focus
area ensured that administrative measures that are specific or idiosyncratic to certain
Member States were not excluded from the research. The legal study resulted in ten
country reports and a comparative report (Part II of this study).
The second part of our research concerned the practical application of the available
legislative framework within the context of serious and organized crime. For this purpose
we conducted empirical research in the ten selected Member States. This part explores the
practical application of the legal measures we have identified, as well as opportunities for
administrative authorities to cooperate with one another and with law enforcement
agencies and tax authorities, respectively (Part III of this study).
The third part of the project focuses on information exchange across national borders.
This specifically concerns criminal and fiscal information to be used in administrative
procedures, for instance licensing. Exchange of such information is essential because citizens
of the EU are free to move and find jobs or start a business in another Member State. The
same holds true for criminals (Part IV of this study).
2 10899/11 JAI 380 COSI 44 CRIMORG 77 ENFOPOL 179, p. 11.
3 10899/11 JAI 380 COSI 44 CRIMORG 77 ENFOPOL 179, p. 11.
4 10899/11 JAI 380 COSI 44 CRIMORG 77 ENFOPOL 179, p. 34. For instance in Italy.
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1.2.2 Definition of the concept ‘administrative approach’
At the start of this project, there was no clear definition of the concept of an ‘administrative
approach’. This is not surprising, as there is no universal definition of ‘administrative law’,5
or ‘administrative authorities’6 for that matter. To elaborate, in continental legal systems,
administrative law is conceived subject-specific (e.g. environment, spatial planning), based
on the national context. Hence, differences exist between the various continental legal
systems on administrative law. Also, in common law countries, administrative law regulates
the implementation of public administrative authorities, their functions and the control
over the legitimacy of the implementation, also called judicial review.7 The common law
conception of administrative law is therefore narrower than in the continental legal systems.8
Such ambiguity should be taken into account when studying an administrative approach
to crime.
Moreover, many different instruments may be viewed as part of an administrative
approach, for example the screening and monitoring of legal and natural persons, but the
same is true of penitentiary regulations, personal preventive measures, regulations to
prevent money laundering, and the seizure of assets.9 This has influenced the debate about
the application of an administrative approach to crime, as can be plainly seen in EU docu-
ments on this topic.10
The present study started with the following definition as a starting point for the legal
part of the research (Part II). The administrative approach, also known as the non-tradi-
tional approach or non-penal approach,11 was defined as follows:
An administrative approach to serious and organized crime involves preventing
the facilitation of illegal activities by denying criminals the use of the legal
administrative infrastructure.
However, to include the practice of the selected Member States, which use administrative
approaches to serious and organized crime not only to prevent but also to disrupt and
repress illegal activities, the following definitionwas used in the framework of the empirical
study (Part III):
5 For a comparison of definitions of ‘administrative law’, see Backaveckas 2014, p. 7-47.
6 See Klip & Vervaele 2002.
7 Backaveckas 2014, p. 236.
8 Backaveckas 2014, p. 243.
9 For example not permitting a person to possess more than one mobile phone.
10 See for instance: Handbook published during the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2011,
10899/11 JAI 380 COSI 44 CRIMORG 77 ENFOPOL 179.
11 These different definitions are based on the Handbook published during the Hungarian Presidency of the
Council of the EU in 2011, 10899/11 JAI 380 COSI 44 CRIMORG 77 ENFOPOL 179. An update of this
Handbook is now available, but it had not yet been published at the start of the underlying research.
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An administrative approach to serious and organized crime involves preventing
the facilitation of illegal activities by denying criminals the use of the legal
administrative infrastructure as well as coordinated interventions (‘working
apart together’) to disrupt and repress serious and organized crime and public
order problems.
Certain other terms frequently used in the research have also been defined. Competence
was formulated as ‘the power of administrative government to utilize the tools to deny
criminals the use of the legal infrastructure’. Administrative authority or government was
defined in this study as: ‘the Member State’s authorities, both on a central and local level,
i.e. the central state organs, but also municipalities, cities, provinces, etc.’12 Finally the term
‘legal infrastructure’ was defined as ‘tools for citizens to perform activities, such as permits,
licences, subsidies, grants, tenders, etc.’
At the start of the research, we decided to limit the study to measures which tackle
‘serious and organized crime’, defined as ‘offences committed by one or more persons for
a prolonged or indefinite period of time, which offences are punishable by deprivation of
liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty,
to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.’13 During the project
it became obvious thatwe could notmake a clear distinction between ‘serious and organized
crime’ and crime in general. We therefore chose to include all types of crime.
1.3 Methodology
The research was carried out between January 2013 and December 2014, a timeframe of
two years in total. During this timeframe, ten selected EU Member States were studied.
These are, in alphabetical order: Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (limited to England and
Wales).14
12 Previous studies indicate that the term ‘administrative authorities’ is particularly hard to define due to the
varying definitions of this term applied in the separate Member States. See for instance: Klip & Vervaele
2002.
13 Europol 2013, p. 41-42.
14 Owing to legislative differences between the four countries of the United Kingdom, we decided at the start
of the research to restrict the description of the legislative framework to England and Wales. In addition,
the organized crime policies of Scotland and Northern Ireland have been included in the country report. A
representative of Police Scotland was interviewed during the empirical phase to shed light on the Scottish
system. The organized crime policy of Northern Ireland was not included in the research.
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The selected Member StatesFigure 1.1
The above Member States were selected to represent the various legal systems and the
practical application of an administrative approach as it exists in Europe. We therefore
selected some traditional civil law systems (France, Germany) as well as the common law
system (England and Wales). Additionally, Italy and Spain were chosen to represent
SouthernEurope, andPoland and theCzechRepublic EasternEurope. Swedenwas included
to represent the Scandinavian legal systems. Finally, the Netherlands and Belgium were
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added because earlier studies in these countries had already produced useful material and
both countries have some experience workingwith the administrative approach and cross-
border cooperation in that context (see Part III of this study).15
The project began with exploratory research to map the current legal frameworks of
the ten selected Member States, and with a study of the legal potential for exchanging
information within the context of an administrative approach across national borders.
Second, it comprised a study of existing practices in the ten selected Member States. Each
of these phases involved two distinct methodologies that we will elaborate on below. This
does not mean that the legal and empirical phases were completely separate. Instead, the
legal reports served as a basis for the empirical fieldwork. Moreover, the empirical study
sometimes served to complement the legal reports, as respondents were able to shed more
light on the applicable framework.
1.3.1 Legal study
As explained in paragraph 1.2.2, the legal study started with the following definition on
the administrative approach to crime:
An administrative approach to serious and organized crime involves preventing
the facilitation of illegal activities by denying criminals the use of the legal
administrative infrastructure.
Based on this definition, the following methods were used to study the measures in the
selected Member States.
Country reports
To study the legal frameworks in the ten selected Member States, we had legal and other
experts write reports on the selected countries. To gain a preliminary understanding of
the legal frameworks in the selectedMember States and to identify experts and professionals
in the field, we asked the relevantmembers of the EU informal network on the administra-
tive approach to fill in an exploratory questionnaire (appendix 1). They completed the
questionnaire inMay and June of 2013. The questionnaire provided theworking definitions
applied in the research, as described above, and asked the respondents to confirm whether
there were instruments present in their national legal framework that fit these definitions.
Theywere also asked to provide a brief overview of the applicable legislation and to identify
experts in their Member State. Of the selected Member States, all but Germany responded
15 Van Daele et al. 2010.
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to the questionnaire. The questionnaire served as a starting point for the country reports
by the research team and the other experts.
The research teamwrote five of the legal country reports (Belgium, England andWales,
France, Germany and theNetherlands). Experts fromTilburgUniversity wrote the studies
on England andWales and theNetherlands. The reports on Belgium, France andGermany
were written by an expert from the Catholic University of Leuven. The decision to select
‘in-house’ experts for these reports was based on their previous research as well as their
knowledge of the relevant languages and legal systems.
The reports concerning the Czech Republic, Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden were
written by experts from these Member States employed at universities and, in the case of
Sweden, at the National Institute for Crime Prevention (Brå). The research team found
these experts through the EU informal network on the administrative approach, the EUCPN
network, and its own professional network. In order to support and explain the desired
content of the legal reports, members of the research team visited the experts between
October and November 2013. The Spanish experts were briefed by conference call. In
addition, team members visited Spain in June 2014 to discuss the content of the draft
report.
To prepare for the visit, the experts were given several tools to assist them in writing
the report. This included a preliminary topic list, consisting of an overview of the intended
content of the report and the study’s working definitions, the results of the exploratory
questionnaire, and the draft country report on the Netherlands as an example. The visit
itself included a presentation by the research team to explain the aim and scope of the
research and to clarify the concept of an administrative approach by giving several examples.
The specific purpose of these examples was to spark ideas with the experts. The above
procedure resulted in ten country reports.16
To further deepen their understanding of the legal frameworks and general trends that
can be found throughout the EU, the team made a legal comparison of the ten country
reports (Part II of the present report). The ten legal studies were scrutinized in-depth and
by topic in order to find general trends or striking exceptions to those trends. These findings
at first glance appear to relate only to trends in the selected Member States. However,
because the legal systems of continental Europe can to some extent be seen as similar,
some findings can be generalized to the other EU Member States.
Report on information exchange across borders
In addition, the research team drew up a report on the potential for international cooper-
ation in an administrative approach to crime. This report was based on a literature study,
16 We thank prof. T. (Tijs) Kooijmans (Tilburg University) for his review of and critical comments on the draft
reports (Chapter 2-11).
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including the European and regional legal instruments allowing for information exchanges
between administrative authorities and other authorities, particularly law enforcement
agencies and the tax authorities. Moreover, the team studied the existing international
infrastructure for information exchange in order to find channels to facilitate such an
exchange.17
1.3.2 Empirical study
Based on the legal framework in the ten selected countries, the research team carried out
empirical fieldwork, the aim being to substantiate and integrate the legal studywith current
practice. Another aim was to explore the needs of the professionals in the field. The
empirical study included interviews with professionals at the policy and practical levels in
the ten selected Member States, supplemented by project descriptions, presentation slides
and other relevant documents.
As referenced in paragraph 1.2.2, the following definition of an administrative approach
to crime was used to study the practice in the selected Member States:
An administrative approach to serious and organized crime involves preventing
the facilitation of illegal activities by denying criminals the use of the legal
administrative infrastructure as well as coordinated interventions (‘working
apart together’) to disrupt and repress serious and organized crime and public
order problems.
The research team conducted interviews in the ten selected Member States from March
to October 2014. It found respondents through the contact points of the EU informal
network on the administrative approach and also through the authors of the legal reports.
Obviously, where aMember State was far advanced in an administrative approach to crime,
it was not difficult to find professionals who could present practical cases. However, this
proved more difficult in other countries, where the concept of an administrative approach
to crimewas less well developed. The visits entailed semi-structured interviewswith around
100 respondents (sometimes in the formof group interviews).Moreover, the team attended
a seminar organized by the LIEC in the Netherlands on multi-agency collaboration sup-
porting an administrative approach to crime. In particular, they attended presentations
by Italian, French andBritish representatives. For a full overview of the persons interviewed
in each Member State, the composition of the interviews and the presentations that the
team attended, see appendix 2. Two topic lists were assembled in advance to provide a
guideline for the interviews. One topic list was intended for policymakers, and the other
17 The study by Van Daele et al. 2010 was used as a starting point.
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for practitioners (appendix 3). The topic list ensured that the interview addresses relevant
topics, but it also gave the interviewer enough freedom to diverge if a respondent turned
to another relevant topic.18 As not all professionals were experts in all relevant fields, this
allowed the interviewer to pay closer attention to the field in which the respondent did
have expertise. The interviews were recorded (at the interviewee’s consent) and the inter-
viewer took notes during the sessions. Moreover, several respondents were so kind as to
provide the team with presentations on their respective fields and additional policy and
other documents, which furnished further explanations and examples.
1.4 Structure of the report
This report consists of five parts and is structured as follows. Part II presents the results
of the legal studies in the ten selected Member States (Chapters 2–11) and the comparative
legal analysis (Chapter 12). Part III comprises the outcomes of the empirical study on the
practical application of an administrative approach in the selected countries (Chapter 13).
Part IV presents the results of the study on information exchange within the EU (Chapter
14). Finally, Part V addresses the conclusions of this study and recommendations for the
way forward (Chapters 15-16).
18 Davies 2007, p. 151ff; Flick 2009, p. 156ff.
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2 The administrative approach in Belgium
D. Van Daele
2.1 Introduction: the debate about the administrative approach to
combating organised crime in Belgium
In the second half of the 1990s, influenced in part by developments in the Netherlands,
Belgium too turned its attention to the role of administrative authorities in preventing and
tackling organised crime. In 1998 the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry onOrganised
Crime, which was set up in the Senate, pointed out the risk of criminal gangs exploiting
loopholes in the existing legislation. Not only did the commission think it recommendable,
therefore, that the issue of permits, licences and concessions be incorporated into a broader
policy, but it at the same time took the view that the fight against organised crime should
not only be waged through criminal law, but should also be one of the main responsibilities
of local, regional and federal governance.1 This recommendation was in line with the
Action Plan on Organised Crime, which the government had drafted in June 1996 and in
which it announced, among other things, the setting up of a Working Group for Admin-
istrative Enforcement within the Ministry of the Interior.
Almost two decades later, however, these plans have in fact hardly been implemented.
Belgiumdoes not as yet have a specific set of tools nor an institutional framework facilitating
an administrative approach to combating organised crime. This does not, however, imply
that the administrative authorities – and the municipalities in particular – have no role to
play in preventing and combating criminal issues of this kind. First of all, it should be
noted that the municipalities have always had a general policing task, in the sense that they
are required to maintain public order, public safety and public health. In Section 2.3 of
this country report, we shall examine whether and to what extent instruments directed at
preventing the disturbance of public order can be used against criminal groups. Special
attentionwill be given to theMayor’s power to order the closure of a place or establishment
by means of an administrative police measure.
Secondly, a system of municipal administrative sanctions was introduced by the Law
of 13 May 1999, through which the municipalities can develop an effective enforcement
policy to deal with breaches of their rules and regulations. This system, reformed by the
Law of 24 June 2013, gives the Board of Mayor and Aldermen under certain circumstances
the competence to suspend or withdraw a permit or licence on the one hand, and shut
1 Parl.St. Senaat 1998-99, nr. 1-326/9, p. 511-512.
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down an establishment temporarily or even permanently on the other. In Sections 2.2.3
and 2.3.2, we shall discuss the scope of these administrative sanctions and the conditions
under which they can be applied.
Thirdly, Belgian legislation provides a number ofmechanisms allowing administrative
authorities to screen and monitor persons and legal entities. Although these mechanisms
were not created to fight organised crime, they can be used in this context. In Section 2.2
of this report we shall demonstrate this by analysing the legal requirements for running a
pub, restaurant or hotel. Moreover, we will discuss the gaming licences, the regulation of
prostitution and the relevant aspects of public procurement law.
2.2 Instruments to screen and monitor persons and legal entities
2.2.1 The granting of licences by administrative authorities
Belgium does not have a general framework by which to refuse licences or subsidies if
there are indications of (organised) crime. Nonetheless, for many activities, a licence must
be issued by the competent administrative authorities and some form of applicant or
licence holder screening is possible in this context. Below, we look in detail at licences
needed to run a pub, restaurant or hotel on the one hand and gaming licences on the other.
2.2.1.1 Licences for pubs, restaurants and hotels
No general licence requirement applies in the hotel and catering industry, although the
Law of 28 December 1983 does impose restrictions on the serving of spirits. In drinking
establishments, spiritsmay not be sold or offered for consumption on the premises without
first obtaining a licence from the municipality.2 The municipality checks the application
to ascertain whether or not the drinking establishment operator is subject to any of the
legally defined exclusions. The operator of a drinking establishment is the natural person
or legal person who, in any capacity and for his own account, carries out an activity relating
in part or in full to the operation of a drinking establishment.3 The municipal authority
also checks any agents. The people who live with the operator or agent or live in the
establishment and participate in the drinking establishment’s operation are also checked.4
Persons convicted for a felony cannot become operators of a drinking establishment
in which spirits are consumed. The same is true for people convicted of handling stolen
goods or one of the offences listed in Chapters IV to VII of Title VII of Book II of the
2 Article 2 Act of 28 December 1983.
3 Article 1, 2° Act of 28 December 1983.
4 Article 3 § 1, 2° Act of 28 December 1983.
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Belgian Criminal Code. Grounds for exclusion also include convictions for running a
gaming house or brothel. If themunicipal authority refuses to grant the licence, the person
concerned can appeal to the Minister of Justice within thirty days. The Minister of Justice
or his representative will then judge the appeal.5
In regard to some pubs, restaurants and hotels, account should also be taken of the
regulations relating to environmental protection, which falls under the Regional compe-
tence. In the Flemish Region, this is chiefly the Decree of 28 June 1985 on Environmental
Licences, which has taken more specific form through the Decisions of the Flemish Gov-
ernment of 6 February 1991 (VLAREM I) and 1 June 1995 (VLAREM II). On the basis of
this legislation, establishments considered a nuisance to man and environment are divided
into three classes. The Flemish government determines the list and the class of establish-
ments according to the type and significance of the environmental effects associated with
the establishments.6 Whereas operation or modification of a class 3 establishment merely
requires that the Board of Mayor and Aldermen be notified in advance7, any operation or
modification of a class 1 or 2 establishment requires issue of a written licence by the com-
petent authority in advance8. Licence applications for first class establishments are assessed
in the first instance by the deputation of the provincial council.9 The Board of Mayor and
Aldermen assesses licence applications for class 2 establishments in first instance.10
However, an environmental licence can only be refused on the basis of objective
information relating to the nuisance or the risks to the local people and environment. An
uneasy feeling among local residents is not, therefore, enough.11 Concerns of a societal,
moral or social nature, or other reasons bearing no relation to the environment, are beyond
the discretion of the licensing authority’s scope for assessment.12 In assessing the licence
application, the competent authority may not be guided by economic motives – such as
anticipated competition – or urban development aspects which do not in themselves relate
to the establishment’s compatibility with the spatial designation of the area in question.13
5 Article 4 and Article 11 § 1 Act of 28 December 1983.
6 Article 3 Decree of 28 June 1985 (Flemish Region).
7 Article 4 § 2 and Article 9 § 7 Decree of 28 June 1985 (Flemish Region).
8 Article 4 § 1 Decree of 28 June 1985 (Flemish Region).
9 Article 9 § 2 Decree of 28 June 1985 (Flemish Region).
10 Article 9 § 3 Decree of 28 June 1985 (Flemish Region).
11 Raad van State, Verstappen, nr. 64.584, 18 February 1997.
12 Raad van State, Sint-Niklaas, nr. 71.375, 29 January 1998.
13 Somers 2005, p. 120.
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2.2.1.2 Gaming licences14
2.2.1.2.1 General principles
The Gaming Act of 7 May 1999 imposes a legal framework on games of chance, by which
an effective control of all game of chance activities is organised and the potential and
undesirable side effects – such as money laundering and forms of tax and financial fraud
– are not only identified, but also prevented and counteracted.15 According to Article 4
§ 1 of this Act, the operation of a game of chance or gaming facilities is forbidden without
first obtaining a licence from the Gaming Commission. This commission, chaired by a
magistrate16, was set up by the Ministry of Justice and acts as an advisory, decision-making
and supervisory body in the area of games of chance.17 TheGamingCommission supervises
implementation of and compliance with the Gaming Act and its implementing orders and
has the task of issuing the necessary licences.18 The prior, written and non-transferrable19
licence needed to operate a gaming facility is to be seen as a favour, of which the granting
and extension are subject to stringent conditions.20 If infringements are established, the
Gaming Commission may issue warnings, provided it states the reason; suspend or with-
draw the licence for a specified period; and impose a temporary or permanent ban on one
or more games of chance.21 Under certain conditions the Gaming Commission also has
to the authority to impose an administrative fine.22
Gaming establishments are divided into four classes according to: the type andnumber
of games of chance operable in the gaming facilities; the maximum stake, the players’ or
gamblers’ losses and winnings in each game; and the nature of the ancillary activities per-
missible in the establishment. This concerns casinos (class I), slot machine arcades (class
II), drinking establishments (class III) and the establishments exclusively intended for
betting (class IV).23 Since the casinos and slot machine arcades are the most important in
the administrative approach to organised crime, in the paragraphs below, we confine our
analysis to these gaming facilities.
14 For a detailed analysis, see Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 156-167.
15 Parl.St. Senaat 1997-98, nr. 1-419/4, 24-25.
16 Article 10 Act of 7 May 1999.
17 Article 9 Act of 7 May 1999.
18 See Article 20 and Article 21 Act of 7 May 1999.
19 Article 26 Act of 7 May 1999.
20 Parl.St. Senaat 1997-98, nr. 1-419/4, p. 25.
21 Article 15/2 Act of 7 May 1999.
22 See Article 15/3 Act of 7 May 1999.
23 Article 6 Act of 7 May 1999.
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2.2.1.2.2 The operation of a casino
Casinos are establishments in which on the one hand, games of chance authorized by the
King, automated or otherwise, are operated and on the other, socio-cultural activities, such
as exhibitions, congresses and catering activities are organised.24 In Belgium, permission
has been granted for only nine casinos.25 Given that casinos –with orwithout the operator’s
knowledge – offer potential as a target for money laundering and other dubious practices26,
their operation is permissible solely on the basis of a Class A Gaming Commission licence,
which is granted for renewable periods of fifteen years and can specify certain conditions.27
This type of licence can only be issued to a natural person who is a citizen of a Member
State of the European Union or to a legal person so defined by Belgian law or the law of
another Member State of the European Union.28
Natural persons must have full use of their civil and political rights and they must
conduct themselves in a manner that befits the requirements of the function. When it is
a legal person, these requirements apply to its directors and business managers.29 An
applicant who, in the three-year period preceding his application, has received an effective
or conditional prison sentence of sixmonths, does not, according to theGamingCommis-
sion, satisfy the requirements of the function. The same is true of the applicant who has
committed an offence in relation to games of chance. In these cases, the commission con-
siders it important that the applicant submit a request for legal rehabilitation before
applying for a licence.30
The applicant operator of a casino must produce for the Gaming Commission a con-
cession contract concluded with the municipality in question, under the condition that a
licence be obtained.31 Hemust also produce evidence of his credit worthiness and financial
means and is at all times obliged to give the Gaming Commission all the details needed to
check the transparency of the operation and the identity of the shareholders, and any later
changes to them.32 This must provide the Gaming Commission with the opportunity to
gain insight into the origin of the funds at the applicant’s disposal. Any non-accountable
origin of funds or doubtful financial operation can lead to a refusal to grant the licence.33
24 Article 28 Act of 7 May 1999.
25 See Article 29 Act of 7 May 1999.
26 Parl.St. Senaat 1995-96, nr. 1-419/1, p. 2.
27 Article 25, 1) Act of 7 May 1999.
28 Article 31, 1) Act of 7 May 1999.
29 Article 31, 2) Act of 7 May 1999.
30 De Smet & Callu 2008, p. 79.
31 Article 31, 3) Act of 7 May 1999.
32 Article 31, 4) Act of 7 May 1999.
33 Parl.St. Senaat 1995-96, nr. 1-419/1, p. 8.
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2.2.1.2.3 The operation of a slot machine arcade
Establishments in which only games of chance authorized by the King are operated are
Class II gaming establishments. The maximum number of these so-called slot machine
arcades is legally restricted to 180.34 This restriction is not inconsistent with theConstitution
according to the Constitutional Court. Since games of chance exploit a human weakness
that can have extremely serious consequences for some people and their families, and so
constitute a social hazard, restrictive measures in this area are easier to accept than permis-
sive measures. In the light of the objectives of the Gaming Act on the one hand, i.e. social
protection coupled with effective control, and in proportion to the size of the national
population and in view of profitability considerations on the other, the restriction of slot
machine arcades to 180 in number is not unreasonable.35
The operation of a slot machine arcade is subject to a Gaming Commission Class B
licence, which is issued for renewable periods of nine years and can specify certain condi-
tions.36 The requirements for obtaining a licence of this type are largely comparable with
the requirements for a Class A licence (supra, Section 2.2.1.2.2).37
A slot machine arcade is operated under a covenant agreed in advance between the
municipality in which it is established and the operator. The covenant specifies the slot
machine arcade’s place of establishment, governing conditions, opening and closing times
and opening and closing days. It also states who will exercise municipal supervision over
the establishment. Article 34, paragraph 3 of the Gaming Act states that the decision to
conclude a covenant falls under the municipality’s discretionary competencies. The con-
clusion of covenants of this type not only strengthens the supervision of these establish-
ments38, but also offers the municipalities a degree of policy latitude in relation to their
establishment.39 The Constitutional Court has ruled that this measure appears sufficient
to achieve the pursued objective and is not in itself, or in the light of freedom of trade and
commerce and freedom of establishment, inconsistent with Articles 10 and 11 of the
Constitution. It did, however, stipulate that a municipality’s discretionary competence in
concluding a covenant remains subject to the rules of supervision and that decisions to
grant or refuse a covenant can be legally challenged.40
34 Article 34 Act of 7 May 1999.
35 Arbitragehof nr. 52/2000, 3 May 2000, case nr. 1903. See also Arbitragehof nr. 74/2000, 14 June 2000, case
nr. 1941; Arbitragehof nr. 113/2000, 8 November 2000, case nrs. 1991, 1992 and 1998; Arbitragehof nr.
100/2001, 13 July 2001, case nrs. 1903, 1941, 1965, 1987, 1988, 1991, 1992, 1995 and 1998.
36 Article 25, 2) Act of 7 May 1999.
37 See Article 36 Act of 7 May 1999.
38 Parl.St. Senaat 1998-99, nr. 1-419/17, p. 138.
39 Parl.St. Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 1998-99, nr. 1795/5, p. 12.
40 Arbitragehof nr. 52/2000, 3 May 2000, case nr. 1903; Arbitragehof nr. 74/2000, 14 June 2000, case nr. 1941.
See also Arbitragehof nr. 113/2000, 8 November 2000, case nrs. 1991, 1992 and 1998; Arbitragehof nr.
100/2001, 13 July 2001, case nrs. 1903, 1941, 1965, 1987, 1988, 1991, 1992, 1995 and 1998.
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The municipality must apply its discretionary power separately for each case and must
take account of the information particular to the application. It must, therefore, assess the
specific and particular circumstances of the case, and cannot reach the general decision
that no covenants will be concluded.41 The municipality can, however, impose upon itself
a rule by which to set the principles it will follow in its assessment of covenant applications.
A code of conduct of this type can contribute to the uniform application of the discretionary
power, but should not become a fixed, absolutely binding rule. In such a case, the
requirement remains that each specific case be assessed separately and on its own merits.42
In exercising its competence, the municipality will take account of Article 36, 4) of the
Gaming Act. According to this provision, the applicant must ensure that the slot machine
arcade is not established in the vicinity of educational institutions, hospitals, places largely
frequented by young people, places where services are held, or prisons. The mere circum-
stance that a slot machine arcade would be established in the vicinity of such protected
places is sufficient for the municipality to refuse to conclude a covenant. There is therefore
no requirement whatsoever that the municipality demonstrate that the gaming establish-
ment constitutes a real danger.43
The municipal discretionary competence provided for in Article 34, paragraph 3 of
the Gaming Act is subject to a number of restrictions. On the one hand, it can relate only
to aspects which (continue to) resort under municipal competence, particularly the
maintenance of public order. Since the Gaming Act gives exhaustive regulations on games
of chance, themunicipalities no longer have the competence tomake decisions themselves
based on societal, social or ethical considerations.44 On the other hand, the municipality’s
freedom of assessment is bound by reasonableness and by how it exercises its discretionary
competence in comparable cases.45
2.2.2 The regulation of prostitution
2.2.2.1 Municipal regulations
To assure public decency and public peace, the municipal council can, on the basis of
Article 121 of the New Municipality Act, establish regulations in addition to the Act of
21 August 1948 abolishing the official regulation of prostitution. The offences determined
by these regulations fall under the jurisdiction of the police court.
41 Raad van State, N.V. Pac Man, nr. 100.379, 26 October 2001. See also Raad van State, N.V. Eurogaming, nr.
100.396, 26 October 2001; Raad van State, N.V. Charleroi Automatique, nr. 107.948, 18 June 2002.
42 Raad van State, N.V. Meesy’s, nr. 104.314, 5 March 2002.
43 Raad van State, N.V. M.G.C.I., nr. 153.735, 13 January 2006.
44 De Smet & Callu 2008, p. 84-85.
45 Raad van State, N.V. Pac Man, nr. 120.646, 17 June 2003. See also Raad van State, N.V. Eurogaming, nr.
111.892, 24 October 2002.
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The municipal council can, for example, impose certain standards on the premises in
which prostitutes carry out their activities by means of by-laws. The situation that prosti-
tution can no longer be practised in the same way as previously and/or is subject to certain
conditions has no effect on the legality of these regulations. Since a potential disturbance
of public decency and public peace is sufficient, there is no requirement that public order
already be seriously disrupted as the result of the prostitution.46 The municipal council
also has the competence to determine by means of a municipal police regulation that
window prostitution shall be permitted only in a particular territorial area. Furthermore,
amaximumnumber of “prostitutionwindows” can be determined.47 Such a policy approach
allows the municipalities to attempt to restrict to a minimum the types of nuisance and
crime that go hand in hand with prostitution.
Article 121 of the New Municipality Act detracts nothing from the authority to impose
tax that is accorded to the municipal council under Article 170 § 4 of the Constitution.
Provided the legislator does not prevent the municipalities from levying certain taxes, the
municipality may also adopt a regulation by which a tax is imposed on the operators and
owners of for example, bars, sex shops or peepshows. Although the primary aim of this
tax must be a budgetary measure, it may at a secondary level – taking into account the
freedom of trade and commerce – have a discouraging effect on establishments of this
kind.48
2.2.2.2 The sale of alcohol in brothels
The sale of food or drinks in brothels is punishable under Article 11 of the Legislative
Decree of 14 November 1939 by imprisonment of 8 days to 2 months and a fine of 100 to
500 euros. The Mayor can also forbid any sale of alcohol in the houses inhabited by one
or more people evidently involved in prostitution, or who have been found guilty of one
of the indecency offences provided for in Articles 379 to 382 of the Belgian Criminal Code.
Such a ban is effective for two years, but is renewable. Any breach carries a fine of € 50.
Repeated breaches carry a prison term of 8 days to 1 month and a fine of € 200.
There is no requirement that the person involved in prostitution be recorded in the
municipal register at the address of the premises in question. It is sufficient that this person
actually stays at the premises. Nor is there a requirement for the person who operates the
establishment to be resident there. Article 11 of the Legislative Decree of 14 November
46 Hof van Cassatie 9 januari 1996, Rechtskundig Weekblad 1996-97, 356, with a case note by M. GELDERS.
47 Raad van State, Vereecke, Manfroid, Busschaerts and cons., nr. 97.535, 6 July 2001; Raad van State B.V.B.A.
Piraeus, nr. 97.515, 6 July 2001. See also Lambotte, Muller & Ramelot 2004, p. 64-65; Lust 25 September
2002, p. 14.
48 Raad van State, V.Z.W. Espace P, De Ridder and cons., nr. 114.119, 23 December 2002; Raad van State,
Vandenplas, Vanhoegaarden and Eggermont, nr. 129.174, 12 March 2004. See also Lambotte, Muller &
Ramelot 2004, p. 73-74.
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1939 merely provides the basis on which to ban the sale of alcohol and does not allow
municipal authorities to ban all commercial activity in the premises in question.49
Cases of urgency aside, the ban on the sale of alcohol can only be imposed after the
person in question has been given the opportunity to state this arguments. It does not
necessarily follow from this that the Mayor must hear a statement from the person in
question. It is sufficient that he be aware of the position taken by the person in question.
If the ban is based on the conclusion that the house in question is inhabited by one ormore
people evidently involved in prostitution, the Mayor need not, for that matter, withhold
his decision until a verdict has been given regarding charges made against the person in
question.50
2.2.3 The suspension and withdrawal of licences as administrative sanctions
2.2.3.1 Legal basis
By virtue of Articles 2 § 1 and 4 § 1, 2° and 3° of the Act of 24 June 2013 concerning
municipal administrative sanctions, the municipal council can determine that a breach of
a municipal rule or municipal regulation is sanctioned, on the one hand, by the adminis-
trative suspension of a permit or licence issued by the municipality or, on the other, by
the administrative withdrawal of any such permit or licence. However, in this context the
term “withdrawal” (intrekking) is rather an unfortunate choice, because under Belgian law
it refers to the implicit or explicit legal act by which an administrative authority rescinds
its own decision ab initio and with retroactive effect. The permit or licence is then consid-
ered never to have existed, which is certainly not the intention here. This is because
imposing a sanction retroactively is inconsistent with the ban on giving administrative
measures retroactive effect. Moreover, it is impossible to see how someone might be
sanctioned for a period in which no breach was committed, or at least alleged. Hence, it
is not a withdrawal, but a revocation (opheffing) of a permit or licence granted, by which
it loses its legal authority in the future, yet the legal consequences of the past continue to
exist.51
The suspension and revocation of a permit or licence are administrative sanctions. It
is a legally defined measure of a repressive nature, imposed by an administrative body by
means of a unilateral, individual administrative measure, in response to a breach of a legal
standard.52 Application of these sanctions implies that the activity to which the permit or
activity relates must cease, either temporarily (in the case of suspension) or permanently
49 Raad van State, D’Haese, nr. 86.128, 21 March 2000.
50 Raad van State, D’Haese, nr. 86.128, 21 March 2000.
51 Boes 2000, p. 124-125.
52 Put 2001-2002, p. 1196. See also Veny, De Geyter & Vandendriessche 1999-2000, p. 159.
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(in the case of revocation).53 These sanctions are imposed by the Board of Mayor and
Aldermen.54
The Board of Mayor and Aldermen will not be able to proceed preventively with the
suspension or revocation of a licence or permit. There will have to have been, therefore,
a breach of a municipal rule or municipal regulation, where it is also a requirement that
the rule or regulation in question state these sanctions explicitly.
2.2.3.2 Scope
The suspension and revocation are applied to a permit or licence granted by the munici-
pality. A licence can be described as an administrative decisionwith individual effect which
is made by request and by which an exception is made to a general ban established on the
strength of regulations. In many cases a licence can be dependent on certain conditions
to be satisfied by the holder. Non-compliance with these conditions can be a good reason
for suspending or revoking the licence. This does, however, raise the question of what
exactly distinguishes a licence on the one hand from a permit or permission on the other.
Indeed, a permit or permission seems also to concern a decision by which, in an individual
case, an exception is made to a general ban.55
Suspension and revocation can only be applied to licences and permits that have their
legal basis in amunicipal rule ormunicipal regulation. The Board ofMayor andAldermen
does not have the competence to revoke licences which, though issued bymunicipal bodies,
have their legal basis in a non-municipal regulation. The municipality cannot, for example,
suspend or revoke an environmental licence that it has granted, because the licence is given
by virtue of the Decree of 28 June 1985 on Environmental Licences.56
2.2.3.3 Procedure
2.2.3.3.1 Prior notice
TheAct of 24 June 2013 contains no fully developed procedure covering the administrative
suspension or revocation of a permit or licence granted by the municipality. It does,
however, specify that these administrative sanctions are imposable only after the offender
has received notice containing a statement of the relevant passages from the rule or regu-
lation that was breached.57 This gives the offender the opportunity to remediate the situa-
tion, and the time that he is given must be sufficient for him to comply. The length of this
53 Billiet 2005, p. 102-103.
54 Article 45 Act of 24 June 2013.
55 Billiet 2005, p. 102.
56 For other examples, see Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 207.
57 Article 45 Act of 24 June 2013.
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period will depend on the nature of the breach and the time reasonably needed by the
party in question to rectify the situation at reasonable cost.
There is provision, for the remainder, that themunicipal councilmay decide themethod
by which the person in breach is notified of the suspension or revocation of the licence or
permit.58 Although no further regulations are specified on the right of the person in question
to present a defence, account should be taken of the general principles of good governance,
in the light of the case law of the Council of State. This aspect is discussed in the paragraphs
that follow.
2.2.3.3.2 Hearing of the person concerned59
Before the Board of Mayor and Aldermen suspends or revokes a licence or permit, it is
required to grant the holder a hearing. According to theCouncil of State, the administration
cannot take a serious measure against anyone that is based on their personal conduct and
that seriously affects their interests, before first giving them the opportunity to effectively
make their position known. This obligation to grant a hearing affords the person concerned
the opportunity to put forward his arguments in relation to the facts and the proposed
measure and so prevent the making of a decision that would disadvantage him. The obli-
gation to grant a hearing is also in the best interests of the administration. In this sense,
the obligation rests on the principle of carefulness in examining the facts, according to
which the administration may only reach a decision after an adequate examination of the
case and having appraised all the relevant information.60
Although the scope of the obligation to grant a hearing depends on the factual circum-
stances of the case, the administrative authority will naturally invite the person concerned
to state his case. Since the person concerned requires knowledge of the facts to defend his
interests, he must be informed beforehand of the essential information on which the
administration will base its decision. The administration must, for example, notify the
person concerned of themeasure it proposes to take against him, in which case the circum-
stantial and legal basis for the measure must be clearly stated. The charges must also be
stated fully and precisely.61 The person concernedmust, therefore, be given the opportunity
to make known his position on the specific circumstances that gave rise to the proposed
measure. In cases where the administration has a choice between different measures, it is
additionally required that the person concerned be given a hearing on the nature and
stringency of the measure under consideration. This will afford him the opportunity to
58 Article 45 Act of 24 June 2013.
59 For a detailed analysis, see Mareen 2005, p. 189-197.
60 Opdebeek 2006, p. 235-236 and 242.
61 See Opdebeek 2006, p. 264-268.
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attempt to persuade the administration to take a less drastic measure than the one under
consideration.62
When preparing his defence, the person in question has, in principle, the right to view
the entire case file, and so he must also be given a reasonable period of time in which to
prepare his defence. This is assessed on a case-by-case basis, in which account must be
taken of matters such as the complexity of the case, the gravity of the measure under con-
sideration and the urgency of the intervention.63 Although the obligation to grant a hearing
does not extend to allowing the person in question to demand the right to consult a lawyer
and, in so doing, to postpone the decision by that amount of time, this does not alter the
fact that hemust be given at least the time needed to form an opinion on all the information
that the administration has brought to his attention. Depending on the urgencywithwhich
the administration wishes to make a decision, it can keep this term short, provided it gives
prior notice to the person concerned.64
The person concerned is entitled to assistance or representation by a lawyer during his
oral hearing. To prevent disputes, it is recommended that the administration keeps a report
of the hearing and asks the person concerned to sign it as true. Contrary to what the term
‘obligation to grant a hearing’ might lead us to believe, the person concerned need not
necessarily be heard orally. It is sufficient that he be given the opportunity to state his case
in writing. It is, however, a requirement that the adjudicating body be in a position to take
cognisance of the viewpoint of the person concerned at the time of taking the decision.
The final decision can, therefore, refer to written documents provided by the person con-
cerned.65
Finally, it should be noted that the obligation to grant a hearing does not always apply
as a matter of course. A departure can be made from the obligation, for example, if the
person concerned cannot be contacted within a reasonable period of time. This unavail-
abilitymust, however, be demonstrated by specific indications. Furthermore, the obligation
to grant a hearing does not apply where the circumstances allow a direct, straightforward
establishment of the facts by the administration and, therefore, no further examination is
required. Indeed, hearing the person concerned might not, in such a case, contribute to
the meticulousness with which the facts are examined. If, in the case of firmly established
facts, the administration has a choice between different measures, it will, however, be
obliged to hear the person concerned on the subject of the measure it proposes to take.66
Therefore, the administration is only released from the obligation to grant a hearing if the
62 Raad van State, De Proft, nr. 78.360, 26 January 1999.
63 See Opdebeek 2006, p. 269-271.
64 Raad van State, Van Trappen, nr. 84.551, 6 januari 2000. See also Raad van State, Burhanettin, nr. 91.803,
21 december 2000.
65 Opdebeek 2006, p. 269 and 271-273.
66 See Opdebeek 2006, p. 250-254 and 272.
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circumstances on which the measure rests are well grounded and the disadvantageous
measure is the logical consequence of this.67 Finally, the person in question need not be
granted a hearing if he has already been heard in respect of an earlier decision or by another
administrative authority, and no new circumstances have since then arisen.68
2.2.3.3.3 Proportionality principle
When imposing an administrative sanction, the Board of Mayor and Aldermen must bear
in mind the proportionality principle, which is a specific application of the more general
principle of reasonableness69 and relates to the result of the authority’s weighing up of the
interests. The restriction or sanction imposed on the person concerned must not, for
example, be disproportionate to the charge made against him or the envisaged purpose of
the standard applied in the specific case.70
2.2.3.3.4 Duty to state grounds71
The administration must give the grounds for its decisions, so that the person concerned
understands the underlying motives and is in a position to investigate the regularity of the
administrative measure. This duty to state grounds is also in the best interests of the
administration, since it guarantees a thorough and careful investigation and enhances the
quality of the decision-making.72 There are two aspects to the duty to state grounds. On
the one hand, there is the material obligation to provide grounds of justification, meaning
that every administrative measure must rest on sound reasoning. It must rest on grounds
whose circumstantial existence is adequately demonstrable and that provide a legal basis
for the legal action in question. On the other hand, there is the formal obligation set out
in the Act of 29 July 1991, under which the material grounds must be stated in the
administration’s decision. Unilateral legal actions issued by an administration, which have
an individual effect and purport to have legal consequences for one or more governed
person,must be explicitly reasoned. This justificationmust state the legal and circumstantial
considerations underpinning the decisions and must also be conclusive.73
2.2.3.4 Legal remedies
The decision by the Board of Mayor and Aldermen to administratively suspend or revoke
a licence or permit is enforceable immediately and is presumed legal. The Act of 24 June
2013 provides no specific appeal procedure in relation to this decision. On the grounds of
67 Raad van State, De Proft, nr. 78.360, 26 January 1999.
68 See Opdebeek 2006, p. 254-255.
69 Boes 1993, p. 104.
70 Berx 2000, p. 386-387.
71 For a detailed analysis, see Mareen 2005, p. 165-188.
72 Berx 2000, p. 424-425.
73 See Mareen 2006, p. 140-141.
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a breach of substantive forms or forms prescribed under penalty of nullity, breach of power
or abuse of power, the person concerned can, however, appeal to the Administrative Liti-
gation Section of the Council of State to have the decision annulled.74 If an action by an
administrative authority is liable to annulment, it is the Council of State that is authorised
to order suspension of the enforcement. A suspension of this type will only be possible,
however, on the condition that serious arguments have been put forward that couldwarrant
the decision’s annulment on the one hand, and that its immediate enforcement could cause
the person concerned a serious disadvantage that would be difficult to remedy on the
other.75
2.2.4 The suspension of a licence as an order preservation measure
In some cases, the failure to observe the conditions of the licence can take on such propor-
tions that rapid action is needed. In such emergencies, there is no need towait for a decision
by the Board ofMayor andAldermen, for the competence to act is invested in theMayor.76
If the conditions of a licence are not fulfilled, the Mayor can temporarily suspend the
licence on the grounds of Article 134ter of the New Municipality Act. This is not an
administrative sanction, but an order preservation measure, which is not designed to
penalise the person concerned, but to maintain order.77
This competence is not restricted to licences granted by the municipality, but may also
apply when an establishment is operated under a licence issued by another authority.78 It
is the case, however, that the Mayor may only act if the competence to order a temporary
licence suspension does not fall to another authority by special regulation.
The temporary suspension of a licence is only possible if any further delay might cause
serious harm. This serious harm should be understood as a serious disturbance of public
order caused because the person concerned did not abide by the regulations applicable to
him.79 The offendermust also first be given the opportunity to present his defence. Although
this has no legal grounding, it can be assumed that the Mayor’s decision must be in writing
and bear his signature. The decision must then be handed to the person concerned or sent
by registered letter.80 Account must also be taken of two restrictions. Firstly, the suspension
lapses immediately if not ratified at the nextmeeting of the Board ofMayor andAldermen.
74 Article 14 § 1 Council of State Act of 12 January 1973.
75 See Article 17 Council of State Act of 12 January 1973.
76 Parl.St. Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 1998-99, nr. 2031/1, p. 7.
77 Parl.St. Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 2002-2003, nr. 2366/001 en 2367/001, p. 22.
78 Point 46 Circular OOP 30bis from 3 January 2005.
79 Vandendriessche 2001, p. 186.
80 See point 45 Circular OOP 30bis from 3 January 2005.
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Secondly, the suspension is imposable for a maximum of three months. When this term
expires, the Mayor’s decision ceases to have legal effect.
2.2.5 Public procurement law
Article 45, paragraph 1 ofDirective 2004/18/EC, which provides several cases ofmandatory
exclusion from participation in a procurement procedure, and so aims to prevent govern-
ment contracts from being awarded to contractors who have been involved in organised
crime or found guilty of certain other offences, was transposed into Belgian law by Article
20 of the Act of 15 June 2006 on government contracts and certain public works, supply
and services contracts. Access to government contracts is thus denied to any candidate or
applicant who has been convicted for participation in a criminal organisation, corruption,
fraud or money laundering. It is, however, a requirement here that the conviction rest on
a final court judgement of which the contracting authority is aware. This raises the question
of how the contracting authority can be aware of that judicial decision. Belgian law only
provides in this regard that – if there is doubt on as to the personal situation of the contrac-
tor, supplier, or service provider – the contracting authority can request information from
the competent Belgian or foreign authorities.
The mandatory exclusion may be departed from on grounds in the general interest. In
some situations, such as when a monopoly exists, the contracting authority may, for
example, be forced to award a contract to a company in default, to prevent even greater
harm.81
Account must further be taken of Article 4 § 1, 4°, a) of the Act of 20 March 1991
concerning the regulation of the accreditation of works contractors. According to this
provision, a contractor can only obtain accreditation if he has not been convicted, by final
judgement, of one of the four criminal offences listed above, of a terrorist offence or of
any other offence that breaches his professional ethics. To obtain accreditation the contrac-
tor must also have fulfilled his social security and tax obligations.82
81 Parl.St. Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 2005-2006, nr. 2237/001, 36; Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 168.
82 Article 4 § 1, 7° Act of 20 March 1991.
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2.3 Instruments directed at preventing the disturbance of public
order
2.3.1 Municipalities and the maintenance of public order
At the municipal level, the municipal council is entrusted with the statutory power in
relation to the maintenance of public order. According to Article 119, paragraph one of
the New Municipality Act, the municipal council creates the municipal rules of internal
governance and the municipal by-laws. These rules and regulations have general scope
and apply across the territory of themunicipality.83 Whereas the rules of internal governance
relate to the internal organisation of municipal services and the material interests of the
municipality, the by-laws relate to the maintenance of public order and affect the general
interest.84 The by-laws are essentially preventive measures to preserve public order in the
municipality and are therefore designed to prevent the disturbance of public order and/or
to restore order. These measures can also include rules – including prohibitive orders –
in relation to activities performed outside the public domain.85 Themunicipal council will,
however, in its by-laws, have to indicate clearly and precisely the measures required to
maintain public order.86
Since municipal rules and regulations must not be inconsistent with the higher legal
standards, the municipal council’s statutory competence is not in any sense unrestricted.
Firstly, the municipal council does not have statutory competence (any longer) when a
higher authority has legislated in a specific matter with a view to preserving public peace,
safety or health87, unless this special legislation leaves explicit or implicit room for action
at the municipal level. When a higher authority issues a systematic, conclusive and
exhaustive regulation, the municipalities themselves no longer have any power of enact-
ment.88 Secondly, the municipal council cannot overrule or abolish a constitutional or
legally guaranteed right. It can, however, subject the exercise of such a right to certain
restrictions, if so required to maintain public order. But when drafting by-laws, the
municipal council does have to weigh up the interests of individual freedom against the
83 Van Speybroeck 2005, p. 19.
84 Lambrechts 1962-63, p. 572; Muylle & Serlippens 1998, p. 47.
85 Raad van State, B.V.B.A. Ramses, nr. 83.940, 7 December 1999; Raad van State, De Proft, nr. 90.369,
24 October 2000.
86 Raad van State, B.V.B.A. Golf Practice Club, nr. 58.673, 20 March 1996.
87 Van Speybroeck 2005, p. 18.




maintenance of order. This weighing up of interests may then be examined by the Council
of State in specific cases.89
When examining the compatibility of a municipal by-law with individual freedom, the
Council of State first ascertains whether there is any specific information to demonstrate
that public order has actually been disturbed or is in danger of being disturbed, in which
context it also looks at how serious the disturbance is and precisely where it is taking place.
The Council of State then looks at the actual by-law and considers three questions. In the
first place, there is the requirement that the by-law tie in with the category of measures
employable to counter the dreaded disturbance of public order. Secondly, from the wider
perspective of all methods available to the municipality for the maintenance of public
order, the by-law must be necessary or indispensable, i.e. the least drastic. And thirdly,
freedom must not be interfered with any more than is necessary. No needless restriction,
disproportionate to the gravity of the disturbance of public order, is to be placed on the
people who are to bear the weight of the measure.90
2.3.2 The closure of an establishment as an administrative sanction
The municipal council can determine that a breach of a municipal rule or municipal regu-
lation is sanctioned by the establishment’s temporary, even permanent closure.91 This
administrative sanction is imposed by the Board of Mayor and Aldermen.92
An establishment can only be closed if it is operated contrary to either the conditions
stipulated in the licence or permit issued by the municipality, or – beyond any licence or
permit – the conditions directly imposed by a municipal rule.93 In the first case, the licence
or permit will naturally be suspended or revoked (supra, Section 2.2.3), meaning that the
licensed establishment or activity will in any case have to be closed or discontinued. The
sanction of closure will, therefore, only be necessary in the case of establishments that are
operated without a municipal licence or permit, but are subject to a municipal rule.94
In terms of procedure the same rules apply as those for the suspension and revocation
of a licence as an administrative sanction (supra, Section 2.2.3.3). The temporary or per-
manent closure of an establishment is only possible, therefore, following prior notification.
89 Raad van State, B.V.B.A. Ramses, nr. 83.940, 7 December 1999; Raad van State, De Proft, nr. 90.369,
24 October 2000. See also Raad van State, Snellings and Agalev, Gemeentelijke groep Leuven, nr. 103.730,
19 February 2002.
90 Raad van State, B.V.B.A. Ramses, nr. 83.940, 7 December 1999; Raad van State, De Proft, nr. 90.369,
24 October 2000. See also Raad van State, Snellings and Agalev, Gemeentelijke groep Leuven, nr. 103.730,
19 February 2002.
91 Article 2 § 1 and Article 4 § 1, 4° Act of 24 June 2013.
92 Article 45 Act of 24 June 2013.
93 Parl.St. Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 1998-99, nr. 2031/4, 18; De Somere et al. 2005, p. 96.
94 Boes 2000, p. 126.
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The obligation to grant a hearing, the proportionality principle and the obligation to state
the grounds must also be honoured. Furthermore, an appeal against the closure decision
can be lodged with the Administrative Litigation Section of the Council of State.
2.3.3 The closure of a place or establishment as an administrative police
measure
Rapid action may be recommended when it comes to the closure of an establishment. In
this case, account should be taken of a range of powers accorded to the Mayor, which we
will analyse in the following paragraphs.
2.3.3.1 Non-fulfilment of operating conditions
2.3.3.1.1 Scope
If an establishment’s operating conditions are not fulfilled, the Mayor can, on the grounds
of Article 134ter of theNewMunicipality Act, proceedwith the closure of the establishment
in question. These operating conditions may have been determined by the municipality
or by another authority.95 But a closure is only possible if any further delay could cause
serious harm. There must, therefore, be reason to assume a serious disturbance of public
order, arising from the circumstance that the person involved has not fulfilled the regula-
tions applicable to him.96
2.3.3.1.2 Procedure
The provisional closure of an establishment on the grounds of Article 134ter of the New
Municipality Act is an order preservation measure which envisages no more than the
maintenance of public order and is not designed to be punitive to the person concerned.
It is not, therefore, an administrative sanction97, but a specific competence of the Mayor,
which can be distinguished from his general authority to maintain public order in specific
cases.98 In contrast to an administrative sanction, the measure can be taken at any time
and there is no requirement that it be covered by a by-law.99
Prior to a closure decision, the offender must be offered the opportunity to present his
defence. The temporary closure decision should be preferably made in writing and signed
by the Mayor. Given that this decision is an administrative act in the sense of the Act of
29 July 1991, it must be materially and formally reasoned (supra, Section 2.2.3.3.4). The
95 Astaes et al. 2003, p. 272; Van Bol 2002, p. 25.
96 Vandendriessche 2001, p. 186.
97 Parl.St. Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 2002-2003, nr. 2366/001 en 2367/001, p. 22.
98 Raad van State, B.V.B.A. Horex, nr. 82.188, 6 September 1999.
99 Van Garsse 2001, p. 145.
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decision is handed to the person in question or sent to him by registered letter. The tem-
porary closure must also be ratified at the next meeting of the Board of Mayor and Alder-
men. Otherwise, the measure lapses with immediate effect.
2.3.3.1.3 Duration of the closure
On the grounds of Article 134ter of the New Municipality Act, an establishment can be
closed down for a maximum term of three months. When this term expires, the Mayor’s
decision ceases to have legal effect.
2.3.3.2 Disturbance of public order around an establishment
2.3.3.2.1 Scope
By virtue of Article 134quater of the New Municipality Act, the Mayor can, under certain
conditions, proceed to the temporary closure of an establishment that is open to the public,
such as a café, a discotheque or a late night shop. Since this competence is limited to places
that are open to the public, it does not give grounds to clear and close a private residence.100
It should be stated here that the hotel room in which a person is staying does indeed have
the character of a residence, in the sense of the legislation on house searches and Article
26 of the Police Service Act, but that from this it does not follow that the hotel as a whole
must be considered as a residence. Hotel rooms rented for a few hours, or even for long
periods, with a view to prostitution – and so not for real residence – are not in any way,
therefore, excluded from the scope of Article 134quater of the New Municipality Act. The
circumstance that customers can only enter after ringing the bell, and that they pay for
the room in advance, does not alter this.101
A closure is possible if a disturbance of public order around a publicly open establish-
ment is the result of conduct in that establishment. The requirement here is that the dis-
turbance of public order takes place outside the establishment, i.e. on the public highway.
If it is only a matter of a disturbance in – and therefore not outside – the establishment,
this competence cannot be put to effect.102
Although it is not necessary for the conduct to be illegal in character103 or for the
operator of the establishment to have committed an offence themselves104, a literal inter-
pretation of Article 134quater of the New Municipality Act implies that a closure can only
be applied in cases where the disturbance of order results from conduct that takes place
in the establishment itself. Consider, for example, cases of excessive noise or disturbing
100 Parl.St. Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 1998-99, nr. 2031/4, p. 11.
101 Raad van State, Van Trappen, nr. 85.022, 1 February 2000.
102 Point 49 Circular OOP 30bis from 3 January 2005.
103 Point 50 Circular OOP 30bis from 3 January 2005.
104 Boes 2000, p. 141.
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rays of light from a discotheque.105 If the disturbance of the public order is not related to
conduct in the establishment – for example the noise caused by private individuals entering
or leaving the establishment – it would not be possible to proceed with a closure.106
Nonetheless, the Council of State interprets the requisite link between disturbances of
the public order and conduct inside the establishment broadly and accepts that the Mayor
may close an establishment if he is able to demonstrate, firstly, that the public order in a
given neighbourhood is disturbed and, secondly, that the cause of the disturbance can be
traced to activities in the establishment concerned.107 Since this type of link will suffice, it
is not necessary for the disturbance of public order to have actually arisen from conduct
in the establishment. A neighbourhood’s public order can therefore be disturbed, for
example, by the presence of prostitutes who recruit their customers on the street before
taking them to a hotel. Although in this case the disturbance of the public order does not
arise from the activities in the hotel itself, the Mayor can, nonetheless, close down such a
hotel. This is because there is a link between the hotel and the disturbance of the public
order.108 It must, however, be an actual disturbance of the public order as such. A limited
public nuisance will not suffice.109
2.3.3.2.2 Procedure
The closure of an establishment that is open to the public is an order preservation measure
and not an administrative sanction. Indeed, the final outcome of themeasure is tomaintain
the public order and in no sense whatsoever to sanction the person concerned.110 Here
once again, there is an obligation to grant a hearing, meaning that the Mayor will first have
to give the person concerned the opportunity to present his defence. The person concerned
must therefore be given the opportunity to put forward his arguments, in writing or orally,
to the Mayor or an official delegated by the latter.111 In an urgent case, it is also acceptable
that the Mayor temporarily close down an establishment open to the public without first
granting the operator concerned a hearing. In this case the closure must, however, be
confined to a few hours.112
It is recommended that the Mayor gives his decision in writing and lend his signature
to it. The decision must them be handed to the person concerned or sent to him by regis-
105 For other examples, see Goffaux & Gosselin 2007, p. 356-357.
106 Point 49 Circular OOP 30bis from 3 January 2005.
107 Raad van State, Van Trappen, nr. 85.022, 1 February 2000.
108 Boes 2000, p. 143.
109 Point 49 Circular OOP 30bis from 3 January 2005.
110 Parl.St. Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 2002-2003, nr. 2366/001 en 2367/001, p. 22. See also Goffaux
& Gosselin 2007, p. 353; Plas 1999, p. 53; Van Garsse 2001, p. 145.
111 Point 51 Circular OOP 30bis from 3 January 2005. See also Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 234-235.
112 Point 51 Circular OOP 30bis from 3 January 2005.
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tered letter.113 As an administrative act in the sense of the Act of 29 July 1991, the Mayor’s
decisionmust satisfy thematerial and formal obligation to state the grounds for the decision
(supra, Section 2.2.3.3.4). The temporary closure of the establishment concerned must be
clearly reasoned, on the basis of a properly substantiated file of complaints in relation to
the disturbance of the public order. In this perspective, it is recommended that the Mayor
have a report compiled by a police service or other service, on which to base the public
order disturbance.114 The mere statement of a breach in a police report will not necessarily
suffice as proof of the breach. The Mayor must also check whether the person in question
is aware of the police report and must moreover give him the opportunity to put forward
his case.115 This does not alter the fact, however, that an administrative measure to restore
the public peace and order – such as an order to shut down a public house – can in fact
be implemented on the basis of police reports on which the criminal court has not yet
passed judgement. In such a case, it is up to the Mayor himself to decide the value to be
placed on the observations of the officials who have submitted the reports.116
Since the power of closure rests directly on Article 134quater of the New Municipality
Act, it is not a requirement that the infringement or conduct leading to theMayor’s decision
be covered by a police regulation.117 But the decision must be ratified at the next meeting
of the Board of Mayor and Aldermen. Otherwise, the measure ceases with immediate
effect.118
2.3.3.2.3 Duration of the closure
The closure of the establishment is only temporary and applies for the term set by the
Mayor, on the understanding that the maximum term shall be three months. On expiry
of this term the Mayor’s decision is rescinded by law.119 It cannot be ruled out, however,
that on expiry of the term of closure, the Mayor issues a new closure order. Needless to
say, it will have to be demonstrated that the maintenance of the public order still requires
such a measure.120
The proportionality principle (supra, Section 2.2.3.3.3) implies that the duration of the
closure must be proportionate to the nuisance caused, and the assessment of this must be
clear from the formal statement of the grounds for the decision.121 There is nothing to say
113 See point 45 Circular OOP 30bis from 3 January 2005.
114 Points 51-52 Circular OOP 30bis from 3 January 2005.
115 Raad van State, Athanassiadis, Pavlidis and S.P.R.L. Taverne Restaurant Champs Elysées, nr. 78.834,
19 February 1999.
116 Raad van State, Gryspeerdt en B.V.B.A. Cavalli Jewels, nr. 68.125, 16 September 1997.
117 Raad van State, Daems, nr. 161.353, 14 July 2006.
118 Article 134quater, paragraph 2 New Municipality Act.
119 Article 134quater, paragraph 1 and 3 New Municipality Act.
120 Vandendriessche 2001, p. 187.
121 Raad van State, Vandenoord, nr. 132.094, 8 June 2004.
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that the Mayor would always opt for the maximum duration of three months closure.122
The fear that the disturbance of public order would reoccur after a short closure and that
as a consequence theMayorwould not have shownhimself to be firm enough is insufficient
in any case. If an initial closure does not have the desired effect, there is nothing to prevent
the Mayor from immediately ordering a new closure.123 Furthermore, the Mayor will also
have to give adequate justification of his choice of a full closure – as the strictest possible
measure – and why a less radical measure, that would allow the operator to continue to
operate without causing a public nuisance, would not be sufficient.124 These less radical
measures might entail increasing the frequency of police checks, giving the operator a
warning or imposing an imposed reduction of the opening hours.125
TheMayormust also take account of the establishment operator’s (lack of) cooperation
and any initiatives already taken or planned by the latter to restore the public order.126 If,
however, there is however considerable disorderliness around a drinking establishment,
and the Mayor can demonstrate that every other means possible – such as prevention,
supervision, consultation and a closing time – has been employed to improve the situation
without the desired effect, a closure of three months may well be seen as a proportionate
measure.127
2.3.3.3 Disturbance of public order in an establishment
Article 134 quater of theNewMunicipality Act, whichwe analysed in the paragraph above,
was introduced by the Act of 13 May 1999. Whereas prior to this Act, the Mayor could
close an establishment that is open to the public on the basis of the general power to
maintain public order128 invested in him under Articles 133 and 135 § 2 of the New
Municipality Act, his power on this point is currently more limited, contrary to the Legis-
lator’s intentions.129If the Mayor wishes to close down an establishment open to the public
due to a disturbance of public order that takes place around this establishment and is
caused by conduct in the establishment, he must by necessity rely on Article 134quater of
the New Municipality Act. The strict conditions in this provision can therefore not be
122 Point 52 Circular OOP 30bis from 3 January 2005.
123 Raad van State, Ketelaars, nr. 138.582, 16December 2004. See also Raad van State, Boone, nr. 132.280, 10 June
2004.
124 Raad van State, B.V.B.A. Horex, nr. 82.276, 16 September 1999. See also Raad van State, GCV Jogy, nr.
143.310, 18 April 2005.
125 Steelandt 1988, p. 82; Vander Beken 1993-94, p. 744.
126 Raad van State, B.V.B.A. Hereijgers and De Villa, nr. 183.750, 3 June 2008. See also Raad van State, Daems,
nr. 161.353, 14 July 2006.
127 Raad van State, Burhanettin, nr. 91.803, 21 December 2000.
128 See Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 214-215.
129 Bouvier 2007, p. 341-342; Goffaux & Gosselin 2007, p. 354-356.
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circumvented by drawing on the general competence to maintain order.130 In this sense,
Article 134quater of the New Municipality Act must also be considered as a lex specialis,
which limits Articles 133 and 135 § 2 of the New Municipality Act as lex generalis.131
In other respects, the Mayor’s general competence continues to apply. In the cases that
do not fall under the scope of Article 134quater of the New Municipalities Act, the Mayor
can still close down an establishment that is open to the public on the basis of his general
power. This would include the situation in which the public order is disturbed only inside
– and not around – the establishment.132 It would also include cases in which there is
merely a potential – and not an actual – disturbance of public order around the establish-
ment.133 In such cases, the Mayor is not bound by the strict conditions in Article 134quater
of the New Municipality Act and can, for example, impose a closure longer than three
months. The principle of reasonableness involves, however, that the Mayor must weigh
up public interests against the interests of the operator in keeping the business open.134
Furthermore, Articles 133 and 135 § 2 of the New Municipality Act offer no basis for a
closure by way of sanction.135
2.3.3.4 Infringements of the drug legislation
2.3.3.4.1 Scope
On the basis of Article 9bis of the Drugs Act of 24 February 1921, the Mayor may decide
to close a place which is private, yet open to the public. Given the effect of this closure
measure on the operator in question’s freedom of trade and commerce, its application
must be confined to cases of serious violations of the drug legislation. This is aimed at
pubs, bars, discotheques and other places of entertainment in which drugs are trafficked
repeatedly and on a considerable scale.136
The closure will only be possible if there are serious indications that repeated illegal
activities relating to the sale, supply or facilitation of the use of drugs are taking place in
the premises concerned. Furthermore, these activities must also constitute a threat to
public safety and peace. In practice, the serious indications required will often come to
130 Raad van State, B.V.B.A. Horex, nr. 82.188, 6 September 1999. See also Raad van State, V.Z.W. Integratiecen-
trum Het Zand Lokeren, nr. 134.006, 19 July 2004; Raad van State, B.V.B.A. Benstime, nr. 134.007, 19 July
2004.
131 Boes 2000, p. 145.
132 De Somere et al. 2005, p. 106; Van Speybroeck 2005, p. 26.
133 Astaes et al. 2003, p. 275; De Somere et al. 2005, p. 106.
134 Raad van State, Rosciano, nr. 119.016, 6 May 2003; Raad van State, Rosciano, nr. 133.645, 8 July 2004. See
also Raad van State, B.V.B.A. El Gringo, nr. 112.581, 15 November 2002.
135 Raad van State, Sicurella, nr. 64.452, 7 February 1997.
136 Parl.St. Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 2005-2006, nr. 2518/001, p. 45-46.
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light as a result of large-scale police operations, in the form of raids, house searches and
seizures. They may also arise, however, from successive, smaller checks.137
2.3.3.4.2 Procedure
A premises is closed under Article 9bis of the Drugs Act from a preventive point of view.
It is, therefore, an administrative police measure ordered by the Mayor and not an
administrative sanction.
So as not to jeopardise a criminal investigation138, consultation must take place prior
to the closure between the Mayor and the Public Prosecutor. In this perspective, Article
9bis of the Drugs Act offers a legal basis for the exchange of judicial information with the
Mayor, although this exchange is only possible in a specific case where there are already
indications of illegal activities taking place. The information exchange cannot therefore
take place on a preventive basis.139
Prior to the decision to close, the Mayor must hear the defence of the person in charge
of the premises in question. To prepare for the hearing he could draft a provisional closure
decision, which need not necessarily be passed on the operator concerned. It is sufficient
that the latter is able to put forward his arguments at the hearing and that the Mayor is
able to take them into account when eventually making his decision.140
2.3.3.4.3 Duration of the closure
The closure applies for the duration determined by the Mayor, on the understanding that
this measure will cease to have effect if it is not ratified at the next meeting of the Board
of Mayor and Aldermen and not brought before the next session of the municipal council.
In principle, the closure measure has a maximum duration of six months. Subject to
approval by the municipal council, a single extension of the same period will, however, be
possible if, after the initial decision, similar new circumstances arise, or if similar circum-
stances have since come to light. Whereas the latter certainly could arise in practice, the
former is difficult to imagine. The establishment is after all by definition closed, so there
it is questionable how similar new circumstances could arise.141
When premises are closed on the basis of Article 9bis of the Drugs Act, account must
likewise be taken of the proportionality principle (supra, Section 2.2.3.3.3).142 Hence, the
closure must result from a weighing up, with a sense of proportion, of all the information
and interests, and in which context special attention must be paid to the operator’s efforts
137 Parl.St. Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 2005-2006, nr. 2518/001, p. 46.
138 Parl.St. Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 2005-2006, nr. 2518/021, p. 27.
139 De Buysscher 2007, p. 54.
140 Raad van State, Van Den Borre, Moreels and B.V.B.A. Kings, nr. 188.765, 12 December 2008.
141 Parl.St. Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 2005-2006, nr. 2518/001, p. 360.
142 Parl.St. Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 2005-2006, nr. 2518/001, p. 360.
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to tackle the drug problem identified.143 The Mayor, who closes a discotheque for two
months, while the operator has taken every step to tackle the drug problem and is also
extremely cooperative, will have to give adequate reasons as to why a less radical measure
would not have sufficed. Themere circumstance that theMayor could order amuch longer
closure does not at all suffice in this perspective.144 If however the operator of a discotheque
that had been closed for four months does not apply an anti-drugs policy on reopening
his business and does not complywith the agreementsmadewith the administration, while
drugs are again repeatedly trafficked and used in the discotheque, this may justify a new
four-month closure.145
2.3.3.5 Indications of trafficking or smuggling in human beings
2.3.3.5.1 Scope
Article 134quinquies of the New Municipality Act relates to the policing competence of
the Mayor in the fight against trafficking and smuggling in human beings.146 To tackle
such phenomena administratively, the Mayor has been given the authority to close down
establishments under certain conditions. A closure order can be issued if there are serious
indications that incidents of human trafficking or migrant smuggling are taking place in
the establishment concerned. Whereas Article 9bis of the Drugs Act, as analysed above,
refers to private premises which are open to the public, Article 134quinquies of the New
Municipality Act gives no further qualification of the establishments. It could be argued
that on the basis of the latter provision the Mayor can also close down premises that are
not open to the public. On this point, this competence would be broader than the afore-
mentioned competence to temporarily close an establishment open to the public by virtue
of Article 134quater of the New Municipality Act.
A decision to close can only be made if the human trafficking or migrant smuggling
offences actually take place in the establishment concerned, meaning that the mere use of
this establishment to enable or facilitate trafficking or smuggling in human beings is not
sufficient. Given the gravity of the crimes, however, a one-time determination of the serious
indications required is sufficient to close the establishment down.147
143 Raad van State, N.V. Fievez-Cadet, nr. 166.335, 29 December 2006; Raad van State, B.V.B.A. Beverly’s, nr.
187.355, 24 October 2008; Raad van State, Cigna, nr. 192.904, 30 April 2009.
144 Raad van State, N.V. Fievez-Cadet, nr. 166.335, 29 December 2006. See also Raad van State, Cigna, nr.
192.904, 30 April 2009.
145 Raad van State, Van Den Borre, Moreels and B.V.B.A. Kings, nr. 188.765, 12 December 2008.
146 For a detailed analysis, see Van Daele 2013, p. 286-298.
147 Parl.St. Senaat 2010-2011, nr. 5-455/3, p. 6.
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2.3.3.5.2 Procedure
The competence to close the establishment down is exclusive to the Mayor148, who may
act on his own authority and need not obtain the consent of the Board of Mayor and
Aldermen, or of the municipal council. The Mayor will, however, have to notify the
municipal council of the closure decision. If the obligation to give notification is not hon-
oured, this does not, however, have as a consequence that the closure decision is ineffective.
This administrative competence invested in the Mayor does not affect the authority of
the Public Prosecutor to initiate a criminal investigation and to prosecute the offenders.149
The competencies of the examining magistrate in the framework of a judicial inquiry also
apply without restriction. So as not to impede the criminal investigation in any way, the
Mayor will consult the judicial authorities beforehand and, in doing so, inform the Public
Prosecutor of his intention to close down an establishment and ask whether there are any
objections to this.150 If the Public Prosecutor – in consultation if needs be with the exam-
ining magistrate – is of the opinion that, in the light of an ongoing criminal investigation
or judicial inquiry, objections exist, he will make this viewpoint and the reasons for it
known to the Mayor. In this sense, Article 134quinquies, paragraph one of the New
Municipality Act provides a legal basis for an exchange of judicial information with the
Mayor, although the Public Prosecutor may not wish to enter into detail about the ongoing
criminal investigation.Moreover, the provision of information is only allowable in a specific
case in which there are already serious indications of human trafficking or migrant
smuggling taking place in the establishment concerned. Therefore, also in this case, the
information exchangemay not have a preventive basis. For thatmatter, it should be stressed
that the judicial authorities do not have the right of veto. The raising of objections from a
criminal law perspective does not prevent the Mayor from closing the establishment
down.151
Prior to the closure decision, the Mayor must hear the defence of the person in charge
of the establishment concerned. Logically, this will take place following the consultations
between the Mayor and the judicial authorities. It cannot be ruled out that, on the basis
of this consultation, the Mayor may decide to abandon his former decision to close the
establishment,meaning that there is no need to hear the person concerned. The obligation
to grant a hearing applies not only to the owner of the establishment in question, but, when
the occasion arises, to its tenant. We might consider, for example, the case in which an
unsuspecting landlord rents a premises in good faith to a person whose actions in that
148 Parl.St. Senaat 2010-2011, nr. 5-455/3, p. 7.
149 Parl.St. Senaat 2010-2011, nr. 5-455/1, p. 2
150 Parl.St. Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 2010-2011, nr. 53-1468/002, p. 3-5 and 7. See also Parl.St.
Senaat 2010-2011, nr. 5-455/3, p. 3-4.
151 Parl.St. Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 2010-2011, nr. 53-1468/002, p. 5-6.
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premises qualify as human trafficking. In practice, there may also be cases in which the
landlord is not entirely unaware of the actions in question.152
Although not explicitly required by Article 134quinquies of the New Municipality Act,
it is recommended that the Mayor make the decision to close an establishment in writing
and sign it, then hand the decision to the person in question or send it by registered letter.
As an administrative act in the sense of the Act of 29 July 1991, the closure decision must
be materially and formally reasoned (supra, Section 2.2.3.3.4).
2.3.3.5.3 Duration of closure
The closure of an establishment on the basis of Article 134quinquies of the New Munici-
pality Act applies for the duration set by the Mayor, on the understanding that this term
will be a maximum of six months. At the end of the term the Mayor’s decision expires by
law. The legislation does not provide for the option of extending the closure measure. A
new closing order can only be issued at the end of the term if this measure is part of a new
case153, in which there are new serious indications of human trafficking or migrant smug-
gling at the same establishment.
If compliance with the closure decision is not forthcoming, the Mayor can put the
establishment under seal. This includes non-compliance with the closure decision on the
part of the establishment’s operator or another person.154
2.4 The information position of the administrative authorities
Effective and efficient use of the competence invested in the Board ofMayor andAldermen
either to suspend or revoke a licence, or to close down an establishment by means of an
administrative sanction, is only possible if this body has adequate information at its disposal.
The same applies for the Mayor seeking to use an order preservation measure to suspend
a licence or close down premises or establishments. On the one hand, the Board and the
Mayor can make use of the reports of the administrative police, as well as any information
voluntarily provided at the hearing by the person concerned.On the other hand, this raises
the question of to what extent municipal authorities have access to judicial information,
data regarding criminal convictions or tax information.
On the basis of Article 44/1, § 4 of the Police Service Act, judicial information can be
passed on to the administrative police authorities if there is a functional link between this
152 Parl.St. Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 2010-2011, nr. 53-1468/002, p. 3-4 and p. 6-7.
153 Parl.St. Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 2010-2011, nr. 53-1468/002, p. 8.
154 Parl.St. Senaat 2010-2011, nr. 5-455/3, p. 6.
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information and the maintenance of public order.155 If, while performing their judicial
police duties, information comes to the attention of the police services that is likely to be
of value in administrative policing and could lead to administrative policing decisions,
they will inform the competent administrative police authorities of this immediately.
However, this obligation does not apply if provision of the information could prove dam-
aging to criminal proceedings, although even then measures must be able to be taken that
are necessary in the event of a serious and immediate danger to people, public safety or
public health. If there is doubt as to whether or not a threat to criminal proceedings exists,
the police service can only pass on the judicial information to the administrative authorities
with the consent of the competent magistrate.156
In addition, any person who does not have a “direct interest” in the sense of Article
21bis, paragraph 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can ask the Public Prosecutor’s office
to allow them to consult the criminal file or to provide a copy of the file.157 The Mayor can
also make such a request. The decision to allow access to or provide a copy of the records
of a criminal case falls exclusively to the Public Prosecutor. It should be remembered here,
however, that this legal regulation merely gives the right to make a request and so does
not create a right to view or copy a criminal file.158 The competent prosecutor will assess
any request at his own discretion, taking into account the criteria set by the Board of
Procurators General. Consent to view and/or copy the file will not be given, for example,
if so necessitated in the interests of the criminal proceedings; if viewing would constitute
a danger to certain persons or a serious violation of privacy; or if the requestor provides
no justifiable reason to consult the file.
When screening applicants for licences and grants or participants for tenders, it is
recommendable that the administrative authorities have access to the criminal record of
the person in question. The information required is available from the Central Register of
Criminal Records, which is maintained by the Minister of Justice.159 With a view to
applying administrative measures that call for knowledge of the criminal records of the
persons to whom they relate, most of the information contained in this register can be
made available to the administrative authorities determined by the King.160 Although some
tax officials and some officials from the Immigration Affairs Service have access to the
Central Register of Criminal Records161, this has not been the case formunicipal authorities
155 De Buysscher 2007, p. 51; Van Heddeghem & Vander Beken 2002, p. 237; Van Heddeghem et al. 2002,
p. 137-138.
156 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 332.
157 Article 21bis, paragraph 2 Code of Criminal procedure.
158 Parl.St. Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 2011-2012, nr. 2429/001, p. 15 and 18.
159 See the Article 589 and Article 590 Code of Criminal Procedure.
160 Article 589, paragraph 2, 2° and Article 594 Code of Criminal Procedure.
161 See Royal Decree of 19 July 2001.
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to date. It goes without saying that this seriously hampers any administrative approach to
organised crime at the municipal level.162
Under Belgian law as it stands, municipalities and other administrative authorities do
not have access to tax information, which equally limits the options available to an
administrative approach to organised crime. However, a form of cooperation is possible
between the judicial authorities and the tax administration. Tax officials can, for example,
on their own initiative, or by request, provide tax information to the Public Prosecutor or
examining magistrate. It should be remembered, however, that tax officials can be sum-
moned as witnesses in preliminary criminal investigations, but that theymay not cooperate
with a preliminary criminal investigation in any other way.163
162 See Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 341-345.
163 For a detailed analysis, see Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 354-364.
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3.1.1 Approach to serious and organized crime and measures outside the
scope of criminal law in the Czech Republic
3.1.1.1 Context
We begin this country report by emphasizing that the ‘administrative approach’ as a sys-
temic alternative approach to crime control outside the criminal justice system does not
as yet exist in the Czech Republic. This is true across the board, from the legal tools (where
legislation regulatesmeasures designed to combat crime almost exclusively as instruments
of penal law) to practice (where administrative tools are not used systematically to control
crime) and policy (where the ‘administrative approach’ is not part of official conceptual
or strategic documents in the area of crime control).1
Nevertheless, this does not imply there are no administrative tools available in the
Czech legal system that can be used to combat crime, including organized crime, in the
sense of creating obstacles to using the legal administrative infrastructure for criminal
activities. This country report therefore follows the structure and definitions designated
for this project and presents a summary of these measures or tools in the context of Czech
administrative law.
The fact that the administrative approach is not systematically applied to crime control
in the Czech Republic means that the legislation that can be used in this area is fragmented
in nature. Unlike the Netherlands, there is no unified and integrated legislation for proving
the personal integrity of applicants for different licences, subsidies or tenders (nothing
like BIBOB, Wjsg or Wcp), or providing grounds for revoking them. The conditions are
mainly set separately for different licences in special laws, with some basic general principles
and procedures of administrative law applying. The procedures for granting or revoking
licences, subsidies or tenders are administrative proceedings and if separate special laws
1 Although the current Strategy to Fight Organized Crime states that attention must go to the administrative
approach in this area (see Section 3.1.1.2).
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do not contain special provisions, the general procedural provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act apply (see below).
To make the following parts of this country report easier to understand, we briefly
discuss administrative law in the Czech Republic and its relationship to penal law. Czech
administrative law consists of a set of public law regulations that govern the organization
and functioning of public administration. Unlike civil or penal law, administrative law is
not codified (i.e. there is no single ‘Administrative Code’); it is enshrined in a large number
of different sources of legal authority (including sources of European Community law).2
Administrative law also regulates the response to public law offences that are not
criminal offences. The principle nullum crimen sine lege applies in the Czech Republic and
it is expressed explicitly in Article 39 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms3
and in Article 1 of the Penal Code4. Public law offences consist of two subsets, criminal
offences and administrative offences. Administrative offences can be defined as acts violating
or threatening the interests of society that the law labels ‘administrative offences’, unless
they are criminal offences. This definition describes the relationship between criminal
offences and administrative offences, which is based on the principle of penal repression
as a means of ultima ratio: the penal code sets out an exhaustive list of criminal offences,
while other public law offences are considered administrative offences.
Generally, an administrative offence is an unlawful act whose elements are defined in
law, and for which an administrative sanction may be imposed by an administrative
authority. The administrative offences are usually divided into misdemeanours, adminis-
trative offences by legal entities or natural persons conducting entrepreneurial activities,
disciplinary administrative offences, procedural administrative offences, and ‘other’
administrative offences committed by natural persons or legal entities.5 Administrative
sanctioning, i.e. decisions by administrative authorities as to guilt and the sanctions imposed
for an unlawful act of an administrative nature, is applied on a large scale in the Czech
Republic. This can be illustrated by the fact that the Czech legal system containsmore than
200 different laws that define what is meant by an administrative offence.6
At the end of this section, we point out that – besides administrative sanctions –
administrative authorities can wield a number of other powers to enforce legal obligations,
to prevent violations of such obligations, or to correct an unlawful situation (e.g. coercive
measures, the power to prohibit certain activities etc.). The decision to impose an admin-
istrative sanction for an administrative offence and the decision to take one of the above-
2 Hendrych 2012, p. 18.
3 Constitutional Act no. 2/1993 Coll., as amended.
4 Act no. 40/2009 Coll., as amended.
5 Hendrych 2012, p. 429.
6 Hendrych 2012, p. 417.
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mentioned measures are different and self-sufficient legal instruments. This is why their
concurrent use does not constitute a breach of the ne bis in idem principle.7
Public administration comes under the supervision of the administrative authorities,
which can be divided into state administrators and local administrators (i.e. regional8 and
municipal authorities). But besides administrating their own matters (‘separate compe-
tence’), local authorities also execute that part of the state administration delegated to them
as a ‘delegated competence’. State administration can be conferred on local authorities
only by special laws and the local authorities (municipalities, regions) are given funds to
cover the costs of exercising a delegated competence from the state budget.9 Competence
is very often delegated in the Czech legal system if state administration is to be exercised
at the local level. For instance, the Trades Licensing Offices or the Building Offices at the
municipal (regional) level are the municipal (regional) authorities that exercise a relevant
part of state administration as a delegated competence.10
3.1.1.2 Historical background to the approach to organized crime in the Czech
Republic
Large-scale and more developed forms of organized crime were unknown in the former
Czechoslovakia11 before 1989. Criminal activities typical of organized criminal groups
were rare because of the massive presence of repressive bodies of the state and minimum
demand for illegal goods and services as a consequence of the low purchasing power of
citizens. It was too risky and unprofitable to engage in organized crime in such conditions.12
After the transformation of the political system in 1989 towards an open democratic
society and after all the far-reaching changes in the economy, state administration, justice
system, social structure and culture, the situation changed fundamentally. The country
experienced the free movement of goods, investments and capital, and the conditions for
travel changed. However, at the same time the movement of illegal goods, services and
people increased as well. The possibility of abusing the open borders for criminal purposes
has been boosted by the advantageous geographical location of the Czech Republic in the
centre of Europe. Illegal migration has increased and different international criminal
groups have established themselves in the country.13 Other reasons for the sharp rise in
7 Hendrych 2012, p. 422.
8 The Czech Republic is geographically divided into 14 regions for administrative purposes.
9 Article 105 of the Constitution (constitutional Act no. 1/1993 Coll., as amended); Chapter III (Article 61 –
66c) of Act no. 128/2000 Coll., on municipalities, as amended; Article 29 – 30 of Act no. 129/2000 Coll., on
regions, as amended.
10 Article 6 par. 3 of Act no. 570/1991 Coll., on trades licensing offices, as amended; Article 6, 7 of Act no.
183/2006 Coll., on spatial planning and building regulation, as amended.
11 Czechoslovakia split peacefully into two separate countries – the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic
– on 1 January 1993.
12 Cejp 2010, p. 13.
13 Cejp 2010, p. 13.
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registered crime in the early 1990s were the headlong pace of the transition process,
enormous shifts of property from state to private persons and the related growing socio-
economic divide, the transformation of the legal system, the temporary weakening of the
police and justice system, the weakened moral and legal consciousness of the inhabitants,
and the fact that a large population of people born in the 1970s had reached the most
productive age for criminal activity.14
Together with other influences from abroad, the types and forms of crime that had
previously occurred only rarely in the country now emerged in the Czech Republic as well.
This included drug trafficking, economic crime, trafficking in human beings, and other
kinds of organized crime. Beyond the above-mentioned factors, the response to these
problems has been complicated by the fact that the police and the judiciary did not have
any experience of these types and forms of crime, and needed a specific approach and
measures.
Originally, organized crime was perceived as a foreign element coming from abroad
and was attributed to the invasion of foreign criminal groups. The danger of domestic
forms of organized crimewas rather underestimated and not given proper attention. Some
criminal activities of Czech offenders with the characteristic features of organized crime
(tax evasion, bank fraud, bankruptcy offences etc.) were therefore not presented as such
in the first half of 1990s. Recognition of the risk of organized crime has gradually emerged,
influenced by new findings by the law enforcement system and criminological research,
and also under pressure by the international community. International efforts have led to
the adoption of some important international agreements and their related obligations,
which the Czech Republic had to satisfy as part of the process of accession to the EU, for
example.15,16 The process of adopting international standards in the approach to organized
crime recently culminated in the ratification of the 2000 UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, which came into force in the Czech Republic on
24 October 2013.17
The first government ‘Strategy to Fight Organized Crime’ was adopted in 1996 and
subsequently updated in 1997 and 2000. The second Strategy for 2008 – 2011 was adopted
by the government in 2008.18 At present the basic strategy document in this area is the
Strategy to Fight Organized Crime for the years 2011 – 2014.19 Tools and measures against
organized crime have been introduced as part of this development but they almost exclu-
sively relate to the criminal prosecution of organized criminal activity. Even thosemeasures
14 Cejp 1999.
15 Cejp 2009, p. 61.
16 The Czech Republic joined European Union on 1 May 2004.
17 Announcement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs no. 75/2013 Coll.int.c.
18 Government resolution no. 64/2008 of January 23, 2008.
19 Government resolution no. 598/2011 of August 10, 2011.
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that have an impact beyond the criminal justice system (e.g. the banking system) aremainly
intended to provide the criminal justice system with information and other grounds for
criminal proceedings.
For instance the Measures against Legalizing Proceeds of Crime and Financing Terrorism
Act obliges enumerated financial institutions and other persons conducting entrepreneurial
activities in specified cases to perform identity checks on clients, tomonitor the circumstances
of transactions and to report any ‘suspicious trade’ to the Financial Analytical Unit of the
Ministry of Finance. If the Ministry finds facts indicating the criminal offence has been
committed in the framework of suspicious trade, it notifies the police or the public prosecutor
and provides themwith all the relevant information for the purpose of criminal proceedings.20
The current Strategy makes reference for the first time to the necessity of using means and
procedures other than only criminal ones in the battle against organized crime, but it does
so for the future and without other specification:
In the future, it will be necessary to dedicatemore attention to the administrative
approach to the fight against organised crime. This approach should consist
of cooperation (particularly the exchange of information) of all central
administrative authorities and local government authorities, government
department and state funded organisations with law enforcement authorities
as ameans of fighting organised crime through a concerted effort. This requires
that employees of the above-mentioned bodies are duly informed and appro-
priately responsive to the(latent) manifestations of organised crime.21
3.2 Existing measures on screening and/or monitoring the past and
present criminal activities of natural persons
Asmentioned in the previous section, there is no unified system for screening ormonitoring
whether natural persons or legal entities satisfy the requirements for a licence or a public
subsidy or tender in the Czech Republic. The separate special laws regulating certain
activities usually also define prerequisites for carrying out these activities – to obtain a
licence, to draw a public subsidy or to participate in tenders. The following sections explain
how the administrative authorities in the Czech Republic actually assess applicants for a
licence, a subsidy or a tender, rather than describe the (non-existent) system.
20 Articles 2, 7-15, 18, 32 of Act no. 253/2008 Coll., on some measures against legalising proceeds of crime and
financing terrorism, as amended.
21 Strategy to Fight Organized Crime for the years 2011-2014, p. 20.
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This part of the country report focuses on screening andmonitoring the characteristics
of natural persons or legal entities for possible involvement in criminal activities. In this
regardCzech law uses the term ‘unimpeachable character’ (bezúhonnost). Unimpeachable
character can be defined roughly as quality, meaning that the person in question has not
been punished in a specified way for specified offences during a specified period before
an assessment. The laws identify unimpeachable character as one of the eligibility criteria
for carrying out certain activities. They generally use the term in three different ways:
(a)Most frequently, the laws specify unimpeachable character as an eligibility criterion
and then explicitly define who is considered to be of unimpeachable character for their
purposes.
For instance according to the Road Act, the Ministry of Transport will issue a licence to
audit the safety of roads to an applicant who is of unimpeachable character and has proven
professional capacity. A person is not of unimpeachable character if he/she was convicted
of an intentional criminal offence and received an unconditional sentence of imprisonment
for at least one year.22
(b) The second group consists of laws that refer to another regulation in which there is an
exact definition.
For example the Commercial Code identifies unimpeachable character within the meaning
of the Trades Licensing Act as one of the eligibility criteria for carrying out the function of
a member of the board of directors in a joint-stock company (i.e. the person is considered
to be of unimpeachable character if he/she fulfils the conditions of unimpeachable character
defined in the Trades Licensing Act).23
(c) The third group consists of laws that identify unimpeachable character as an eligibility
criterion without defining the term. This is an undesirable approach because it does not
meet the requirements of the principle of legal certainty for participants in administrative
relationships. In this case unimpeachable character should be interpreted as the absence
of any conviction (according to the grammatical and systematic interpretation), which is
a very strict condition. Even the Czech Constitutional Court has criticized this concept of
unimpeachable character in the past.24 This is why the latest interpretation of the term in
22 Article 18h paragraph 1, 2, 4 of Act no. 13/1997 Coll., on roads, as amended.
23 Article 194 paragraph 7 of Act no. 513/1991 Coll., commercial code, as amended.
24 E.g. in 2009 the Constitutional Court found a discrepancy between the Charter of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms and the Trades LicensingAct, whichmaintains a very broad definition of unimpeachable character
as one of the eligibility criteria for carrying out a trade (the absence of a conviction for any intentional
criminal offence if the applicant received an unconditional sentence of imprisonment for at least one year,
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such cases involves the criminal (but also moral) integrity of a person, primarily in relation
to the activity for which his or her character is being assessed.25 The laws in this group
have however been gradually amended to providemore accurate definitions of unimpeach-
able character, so such cases are only rare at present.
For example one of the prerequisites for entry into the list of barristers (Bar members)
according to the Bar Act is that the applicant is of unimpeachable character, but the term is
not defined in the law in any way.26
Moreover some laws identify the absence of previous convictions for certain offences as
an eligibility criterion for carrying out certain activities without using the term ‘unimpeach-
able character’. For instance according to the Bank Act, a person convicted in the past of
a property offence or an offence related to banking or to business cannot act as a bank
manager.27
The official outputs of the Penal Register (Rejstřík trestů, PR) serve as an instrument to
establish a person’s unimpeachable character. The PR is a government institution under
the Ministry of Justice that keeps records of natural persons and legal entities (‘persons’)
convicted by the courts in criminal proceedings and of other important facts for criminal
proceedings. The records can be used for criminal, civil or administrative proceedings as
well as for proving a person’s unimpeachable character. The organization and functioning
of the PR are governed by the Penal Register Act.28
There are two basic outputs of the PR: a copy of the PR records (opis z evidence Rejstříku
trestů, CPR) and an extract from the PR records (výpis z evidence Rejstříku trestů, EPR).
The CPR is a public document29 containing a comprehensive list of records kept on a
given person or entity in the PR. It contains all the records on every conviction of the
natural person or legal entity in question, on all records on the course of the execution of
or if the offence was committed in relation to trading). The Constitutional Court stated that ‘The reason and
purpose of the requirement of unimpeachable character is the protection of the basic rights and freedoms of
other people, which could be affected by a trade carried out in violation of the law and good manners. This
requirement however needs to meet the criteria that the principle of proportionality brings to the evaluation
of the regulation ensuring one basic right or freedom but limiting another’. Constitutional Court judgment
no. Pl. ÚS 35/08.
25 E.g. the decision of the District Court in Prague 1 no. 11 C 25/2000, of 13 March 2001.
26 Article 5 paragraph 1 item d) of Act no. 85/1996 Coll. on the Bar, as amended.
27 Article 4 paragraph 7 of Act no. 21/1992 Coll., on banks, as amended.
28 Act no. 269/1994 Coll, on the Penal Register.
29 In Czech law, the term ‘public document’ means a document issued by a public authority within its compe-
tence or identified as a ‘public document’ by special law (Article 567 of Act no. 89/2012 Coll., civil code).
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punishments and protective measures,30 and on expunged convictions (natural persons)
or the ‘cessation of conviction effects’ (legal entity).31 The CPR also contains other facts
important for criminal proceedings (records on diversion – e.g. conditional suspension
of prosecution, out-of-court settlement, conditional deferral of a petition for sentencing).32
The CPR can only be issued on application:
a. to bodies acting in criminal proceedings and to the Ministry of Justice, for the purpose
of those proceedings;
b. to the Office of the President of the Czech Republic, for the purpose of proceedings on
a petition for a pardon or the assessment of candidates for certain functions;
c. to other authorities where stipulated by law or by binding international treaty.
Besides for criminal proceedings and to the Office of President of the Czech Republic, the
CPR can therefore be issued only to other authorities specified in a special law (e.g. for
purposes of information gathering by the intelligence services). To prove unimpeachable
character, this can be for the purpose of obtaining a licence for an activity of a pronounced
public nature (e.g. the unimpeachable character of an applicant for a firearms licence
according to the Firearms Act,33 or for the adoption of an child according to the Social and
Legal Protection of Children Act34), or to apply for a certain function or occupation of a
public nature (e.g. the unimpeachable character of an applicant for admission to theCzech
Army according to the Career Soldiers Act35). In these cases, it is the authority assessing
unimpeachable character that requests the CPR. The CPR cannot be issued to the person
who is the subject of the CPR records – this person can only inspect the CPR on application
(or he/she can request an EPR – see below).36 As described above, theCPR serves exclusively
30 By the “course of the execution of punishment and protective measures” is meant: the information on
important facts that occured during the execution of punishment or during the execution of a protective
measure. E.g. the date of conditional release from imprisonment, the date of payment of a fine, the date of
change of in-patient protective treatment to out-patient protective treatment etc.
31 Czech penal law recognizes certain cases where earlier convicted subject (either natural person or legal entity)
is considered “as not being convicted”. These are cases where the effects of conviction is expunged and the
fact of previous convictions cannot be taken into account anymore – e.g. for the purpose of assessing re-
offending in the criminal proceedings. The cessation of conviction effects is generally connected either with
the expiry of a specific time after the execution of punishment (“deletion of conviction” in case of natural
person and “cessation of conviction effects” in case of legal entity) or with the successful execution of certain
punishments (see footnote 38). So the term “cessation of conviction effects” means in the Czech law either
(a) in general, the situation where earlier convicted subject is considered “as not being convicted” henceforth;
or (b) the equivalent of the term “deletion (expungement) of conviction” in cases of legal entities (because
the term “deletion of conviction” can be used only in respect of natural persons).
32 Article 10 paragraph 5 of Act no. 269/1994 Coll., on the Penal Register, as amended.
33 Article 22 paragraph 4 of Act no. 119/2002 Coll., on firearms and ammunition, as amended.
34 Article 27 paragraph 3 of Act no. 359/1999 Coll., on the social and legal protection of children, as amended.
35 Article 4 paragraph 3 of Act no. 221/1999 Coll., on career soldiers, as amended
36 Article 10 paragraph 4 of Act no. 269/1994 Coll., on the Penal Register, as amended.
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in the case of criminal proceedings or certain administrative procedures of a pronounced
public nature. This is why it can be issued only to the authorities specified in a special law.
The content of the EPR ismore limited. This public document contains all convictions,
including records on sentences and protective measures if the offender is not considered
as having been convicted.37 The difference between theCPR and the EPR is that the former
contains all the records included in the EPR and records on expunged convictions whose
effects have ceased (as well as records on other facts important for criminal proceedings
as stated by law and not included in the EPR, e.g. information on diversion – see above).
The EPR can be issued at the request of the natural person to whom the records relate.
The EPR on a legal person can be issued to any applicant.38 It can also be issued at the
request of a court or public prosecutor for other than criminal proceedings and on the
application of an administrative authority for administrative procedures. For any other
purpose, the EPR can be issued only if permitted by special law.39
Only the PR may issue the CPR and the person entitled to inspect the CPR may only
peruse it at the PR’s main office. The EPR may either be issued by the PR (in physical form
or in electronic form following submission of an electronic application with an electronic
signature) or obtained at the public administration contact point (i.e. Czech POINT).40
The tasks of Czech POINT are carried out, for example, by public notaries, regional or
municipal authorities, post offices and some banks.41 TheCzech POINTnetwork currently
consists of more than 7000 branches.
An administrative fee is paid to inspect theCPRor obtain an EPR.42 The fee is currently
CZK 20 (approx. EUR 0.75) to inspect the CPR and CZK 100 (approx. EUR 3.70) to obtain
an EPR. Public authorities do not have to pay the fee.
Besides the concept of unimpeachable character, some laws also use the term ‘reliability’
(spolehlivost) as an eligibility criterion. Even this term is not used uniformly in the various
laws, however. This requirement relates not only to the criminal history of an applicant,
but also concerns eventual unlawful behaviour as an administrative offence, unlawful
behaviour generally, or behaviour that is not unlawful but is undesirable in the relevant
context. Some laws use reliability as a parallel feature to unimpeachable character; others
use it as a broader, superior term that includes the concept of unimpeachable character.
37 The conditions for the cessation of conviction effects are set by criminal law. Such effects may cease if a
conviction is expunged from the criminal record (after a specified time has elapsed), a sentence of community
service or a prohibition on engaging in a certain activity has been executed, or a sentence has been suspended
owing to the offender’s having served his or her punishment during a probationary period.
38 Article 11 paragraph 1 of Act no. 269/1994 Coll., on the Penal Register, as amended.
39 Article 12 of Act no. 269/1994 Coll., on the Penal Register, as amended.
40 Article 11a paragraph 1 of Act no. 269/1994 Coll., on the Penal Register, as amended.
41 Article 8a paragraph 2 of Act no. 365/2000 Sb., on information systems of public administration, as amended.
42 Article 14 paragraph 1 of Act no. 269/1994 Coll., on the Penal Register, as amended.
59
3 The administrative approach in the Czech Republic
For instance the eligibility criteria for issuing a firearms licence according to the Firearms
Act include both unimpeachable character and the reliability of the applicant. The applicant
is not considered to be reliable if he/she is likely to drink alcohol to excess or use other
addictive substances, or presents a serious threat to public order and safety.43 In this case the
information on the potential excessive use of addictive substances is obtained from the local
police authority and not frommedical facilities such as addiction centres. The ‘excessive use’
of addictive substances does not require a person to be an addict; it means use beyond the
limits of common consumption, leading to social, mental, labour etc. problems and raising
doubts about the ability of an individual to obey the law and to use a firearm without
threatening values protected by the law (life, health, property etc.). It is the task of the
authority deciding on the application (a specified police detail) to consider all the information
gathered and to assess the reliability of an applicant.
According to the Fuels Act, an applicant for a licence to distribute fuels can obtain the
necessary approval of the Customs office only if he/she fulfils the requirement of reliability.
A person is considered to be reliable if he/she has an unimpeachable character and has not
violated tax or customs regulations in any serious manner in the past three years.44
The special laws that take a person’s reliability as an eligibility criterion provide their own
definition of reliability, set out how reliability is to be proven, and specify the body that is
to assess reliability (as a rule it is the authority that grants or revokes the relevant licence).
3.2.1 Licences
Certain activities and professions that are, for different reasons, subject to the supervision
of the public authorities are regulated by separate special laws in the Czech Republic. This
is based on the Czech Constitution, which stipulates that the authority of the state serves
all citizens and can be exercised only in cases and manners and subject to the limits set by
law.45 The relevant laws thus state whether the approval of a public authority – i.e. a licence
– is necessary to carry out certain activities or professions. They define which authority is
competent to decide on a licence and set the eligibility criteria. They also set the require-
ments of a satisfactory criminal history (unimpeachable character) or reliability. In other
words, there is no single general law regulating the assessment of applicants for licences;
assessment is regulated separately for each licence in different laws, although the conditions
and requirements are in some cases very similar.
43 Article 18 paragraph 1, Article 23 paragraph 1 of Act no. 119/2002 Coll., on firearms and ammunition, as
amended.
44 Article 6a paragraph 2, Article 6b paragraph 1 of Act no. 311/2006 Coll., on fuels and petrol stations, as
amended.
45 Article 2 paragraph 3 of the Constitution (constitutional Act no. 1/1993 Coll., as amended).
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The basic legislative act for business is the Trades Licensing Act46 (živnostenský zákon,
TLA), which regulates the conditions of trade and monitoring of compliance. Although
the TLA does not apply to a number of professions and business activities, which are reg-
ulated by special laws (e.g. physicians, barristers, auditors, public notaries, tax consultants
etc.), it can be labelled as a general trade regulation. TheTLAdivides trades into ‘notification
trades’, which can be carried out on the basis of simple notification, and ‘concession trades’,
which require a special kind of licence (i.e. concession).47 In the latter case, trade can only
be conducted by the holder of a trade licence (živnostenské oprávnění, TL).48
State administration in the area of trade is exercised by Trades Licensing Offices
(živnostenské úřady, TLO).49 The TLOs act at themunicipal level (trades licensing divisions
of municipal offices), at the regional level (trades licensing divisions of regional offices);
at the central level, there is a Czech Trades Licensing Office. Municipal and regional TLOs
exemplify the devolution of competence in state administration.
The TLA has specified two main sets of requirements for granting TLs, general and
special. The special requirement is professional competence to carry out the trade in
question, which is assessed according to criteria fixed by law (e.g. a certain level of education,
sufficient practice in a given branch of business, a special certificate of professional com-
petence, etc.). The general requirements to carry out a trade are: (a) the age of 18 or more,
(b) competence to carry out legal acts, (c) an unimpeachable character. A person is not
considered to have an unimpeachable character if he/she has been convicted of an inten-
tional criminal offence committed in relation to the business activities or the subject of
the trade for which he/she has applied, unless he/she is considered to have not been con-
victed of this offence. The EPR must produce evidence of the applicant’s unimpeachable
character. The TLO is authorized to ask the PR for an EPR in electronic form in order to
assess the applicant’s unimpeachable character. It is also authorized to ask a court for a
copy of its decision. If the decision does not contain facts decisive for the assessment, the
TLO is authorized to look into the criminal court file concerning these facts.50
It should be noted that the administrative approach to the process of proving different
facts about citizens, if such information is available in an official register, has been changing
in the Czech Republic. Until recently, as a rule, the applicant had to submit records taken
from the relevant official register (e.g. the PR) along with his/her application proving that
he/she met the eligibility criteria. As part of the process of taking public administration
online in the Czech Republic (e-government), this task is being transferred from the
applicant to the authority deciding on the application. This is the case for the EPR with
46 Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on trading.
47 Article 9 of Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on trading, as amended.
48 Article 10 paragraph 1 of Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on trading, as amended.
49 Their organization and competences are regulated by Act no. 570/1991 Coll., on trades licensing offices.
50 Article 6 of Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on trading, as amended.
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respect to assessing unimpeachable character – today it is the authority deciding on the
applicationwho asks the PR for an EPR, and it does so on the basis of authorization granted
in the law regulating the relevant area. In other words, if a certain law currently requires
an applicant to have an unimpeachable character before he/she can be granted a licence,
it also entitles the authority that grants the licence to ask the Penal Register for the appli-
cant’s EPR, so that the applicant does not need to present the EPR him/herself (the same
applies to all cases where a public authority requires information from the PR on a person
for a decision taken in administrative proceedings – not only to licence procedures). As
for TL applications, this change occurred with effect from 1 July 2008, on the basis of Act
no. 130/2008 Coll. amending the TLA. Since then, all official documents (applications,
requests, statements etc.) can be delivered to the TLOs through Czech POINT.51
3.2.2 Subsidies
There is no unified legislation on the assessment of applicants for a subsidy in the Czech
Republic. The coordinating authorities are the Ministry of Agriculture (for agriculture,
forestry and fishery) and the Office for the Protection of Competition (Úřad pro ochranu
hospodářské soutěže, OPC). Special laws have established several funds at the national level
that provide money for public aid in specific areas (e.g. the State Agricultural Intervention
Fund,52 the State Fund for Transport Infrastructure,53 the State Environmental Fund of
the Czech Republic,54 etc.).
The Public Aid Act55 and the Transparency Act56 have a more general impact on public
aid, but do not cover the assessment of applicants; instead, they regulate certain issues of
competence and organization under EU legislation.57 Public aid is thus defined as aid
specified in Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,58 i.e. any
aid granted by a state or through state resources in any form whatsoever that distorts or
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of
certain goods.59
If public aid is granted directly through the state budget, the provisions of the Budgetary
Rules Act, which regulates the funding of programmes and the provision of grants and
51 Article 72 paragraph 1 of Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on trading, as amended.
52 Act no. 256/2000 Coll., on the State Agricultural Intervention Fund.
53 Act no. 104/2000 Coll., on the State Fund for Transport Infrastructure.
54 Act no. 388/1991 Coll., on the State Environmental Fund of the Czech Republic.
55 Act no. 215/2004 Coll., on regulation of certain relations in the area of public aid.
56 Act no. 319/2006 Coll., on certain measures to make financial relations in the area of public aid more
transparent.
57 Janků & Mikušová 2012, p. 21-29.
58 Article 2 item a) of Act no. 215/2004 Coll., on regulation of certain public aid relations, as amended.
59 Article 107 paragraph 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
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financial assistance through the state budget, apply.60 Regional and local authorities are
authorized to regulate the granting of subsidies from their own budgets.
The conditions of individual public aid programmes, including the assessment of
applicants for a subsidy, are defined separately in special regulations. Czech regulations
must also respect EU legislation in this field.61
An applicant’s possible criminal background is not screened directly – the eligibility
criteria relatemainly to the purpose forwhich the subsidywill be granted or to transparency
in drawing the subsidy. The emphasis is on compliance with the binding EU legislation.
The applicant in the subsidy procedure therefore usually presents information on his/her
legal identity (an extract from the Commercial Register, a deed of establishment, statutes,
by-laws etc.), on his/her financial, tax or administrative situation, as well as other informa-
tion specified separately for the given subsidy. This applies for public aid granted by the
state as well as through other public sources such as regional or municipal budgets. Mon-
itoring after public aid has been granted usually focuses on compliance with the conditions
under which the aid was granted.
However, it should be noted that the relevant laws stipulate that an applicant must
have an unimpeachable character in order to carry out a trade, to act as a statutory body
or authorized representative of a company, or to carry out certain specific activities (see
above). By defining the eligible applicant and the eligible contractor (e.g. persons carrying
out a trade, persons authorized for a certain activity etc.), the regulations relating to subsi-
dies usually – although indirectly – take the criminal context into account (they exclude
persons who do not meet the requirement of unimpeachable character).
60 Article 12-19 of Act no. 218/2000 Coll., on budgetary rules, as amended.
61 In particular Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; Council Regulation (EC)
No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty;
Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No
659/1999 laying downdetailed rules for the application ofArticle 93 of the ECTreaty; CommissionRegulation
(EC) No 271/2008 of 30 January 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 implementing Council Reg-
ulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty;
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1147/2008 of 31 October 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 794/2004
of 21 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the
application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, as regards Part III.10 of its Annex 1; Council Regulation (EC) No
994/98 of 7 May 1998 on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community to certain categories of horizontal State aid; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1998/2006 of
15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid; Commission
Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the
common market in application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block exemption Regulation).
63
3 The administrative approach in the Czech Republic
3.2.3 Tenders
The basic law governing public procurement in the Czech Republic is the Public Procure-
ment Act (zákon o veřejných zakázkách, PPA).62 The PPA incorporates the relevant EU
legislation63 and regulates public procurement procedures, design competitions, supervision
of compliance with the Act, and the conditions for keeping and the purpose of the list of
qualified suppliers and the system of certified suppliers.64
The conditions and the procedure for concluding concession contracts as part of the
cooperation between public contracting authorities and other persons are governed by the
ConcessionAct (koncesní zákon, CA).65 The concession contract obliges the concessionaire
to provide the public contracting authority with services or to carry out work for the
public contracting authority, and it obliges the public contracting authority to enable the
concessionaire to benefit fromproviding services or to benefit from thework,where relevant
along with a partial pecuniary payment.66
Public procurement according to the Public Procurement Act is an act of procurement
carried out under a contract concluded between the contracting entity and one or more
suppliers, the subject of which is the provision of supplies or services or construction work
for a pecuniary interest.67 The contracting entity in a public contract can be entities that
manage the public resources listed in Article 2 of the PPA (mainly the state and state
allowance organizations, local government units and their allowance organizations, the
62 Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement.
63 In particular Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service
contracts; Directive 2005/75/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2005 cor-
recting Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts,
public supply contracts and public service contracts; Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and
of theCouncil of 31March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in thewater,
energy, transport and postal services sectors; Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the
coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review
procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts; Council Directive 92/13/EEC of
25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application
of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport
and telecommunications sectors; Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the
effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public contracts; Directive 2009/81/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award
of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in
the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC; Commission
Directive 2005/51/EC of 7 September 2005 amending Annex XX to Directive 2004/17/EC and Annex VIII
to Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on public procurement.
64 Article 1 of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
65 Act no. 139/2006 Coll., on concession contracts and concession procedure.
66 Article 16 paragraph 1 of Act no. 139/2006 Coll., on concession contracts and concession procedure, as
amended.
67 Article 7 paragraph 1 of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
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person awarding public contracts of whichmore than 50% is funded frompublic resources,
etc.). Depending on their subject, public contracts are divided into public supply contracts,
public service contracts, and public works contracts. Based on their estimated value they
are divided into above-the-threshold public contracts, below-the-threshold public contracts,
and minor public contracts.68
Chapter Five of the PPA is devoted to the qualification requirements that suppliers
under public contract must meet. The qualification requirements should not be confused
with the contract award criteria. The PPA explicitly states that a supplier’s qualifications
must not be the subject of contract award criteria.69 Suppliers qualify70 for a public contract
if they:
a. comply with the basic qualifications;
b. comply with the professional qualifications;
c. submit an affidavit of their economic and financial capacity to carry out the public
contract; and
d. comply with the technical qualifications.71
The contracting authority sets out the conditions for proving compliance with the qualifi-
cation requirements in the notice or invitation to commence an award procedure (a tender).
A detailed description of these conditions can be given in the qualification documentation
or in the tender documentation. For this country report, it is important to focus on some
of the basic qualifications, a list of which is included inArticle 53 of the PPA. The suppliers
comply with the basic qualifications if they (among other requirements):
(a) have not been convicted of the following: offences committed for the benefit of or
participation in a criminal conspiracy, legalising the proceeds of criminal activities, being
an accessory, accepting bribes, bribery, indirect bribery, fraud, loan fraud, including
preparing for, attempting to or participating in these offences, or if their conviction for
these offences has been expunged; in the case of legal persons, the legal person, the statutory
body and each member of the statutory body must meet these qualifications; if a legal
person acts as the statutory body or a member of the statutory body of a supplier, the
statutory body and each member of the statutory body of the legal person must meet these
qualifications; if a tender or request to participate is submitted by a foreign legal person
via its branch, the above persons as well as the head of the branch must meet these qualifi-
68 Article 7 paragraphs 2, 3 of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
69 Article 50 paragraph 5 of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
70 The PPA has amended the qualification requirements for certain special categories of contracting entity (a
sector contracting entity) or for public contracts (a below-the-threshold public contract). These amendments
are not significant for this country report, however.
71 Article 50 paragraph 1 of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
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cations; the supplier both in the Czech Republic and in the country of its registered office,
place of business or residence must meet these basic qualifications;
(b) have not been convicted of offences the facts of which, under special legal regulations,
concern the business area of the supplier, or if their conviction for these offences has been
expunged; in the case of legal persons, the legal person, the statutory body and each
member of the statutory body must meet these qualifications, and if a legal person acts as
the statutory body or a member of the statutory body of a supplier, the statutory body and
each member of the statutory body of the legal person must meet these qualifications; if a
tender or request to participate is submitted by a foreign legal person via its branch, the
above persons aswell as the head of the branchmustmeet these qualifications; the supplier
both in the Czech Republic and in the country of its registered office, place of business or
residence must meet these basic qualifications.72
For a public defence or security contract, the suppliers must meet the above basic qualifi-
cations but also not have been convicted of committing a terrorist attack, or of theft,
blackmail, or counterfeiting and altering public documents in order to allow or facilitate
the terrorist attack, including preparing for, attempting to or participating in such an
offence, or their conviction for these offences must have been expunged; in the case of
legal persons, the legal person, the statutory body and each member of the statutory body
must meet these qualifications, and if a legal person acts as the statutory body or a member
of the statutory body of a supplier, the statutory body and each member of the statutory
body of the legal personmustmeet these qualifications; if a tender or request to participate
is submitted by a foreign legal person via its branch, the above persons as well as the head
of the branch must meet these qualifications; the supplier both in the Czech Republic and
in the country of its registered office, place of business or residence must meet these basic
qualifications.73
The suppliers prove compliance with the above basic qualification requirements by
submitting an EPR.74 The other basic qualification requirements relate to the suppliers’
duties regarding economic competition, taxes, public health insurance and social security
insurance, labour market etc. and to their not being listed in the Register of entities pro-
hibited from carrying out public contracts (REPPC).75 The REPPC is a public register
containing records of persons that have received an administrative sanction prohibiting
them from carrying out public contracts. This sanction can be imposed for the administra-
tive offence of submitting, as proof of compliance with the qualifications, false information
72 Article 53 paragraph 1 items a), b) of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
73 Article 53 paragraph 2 item b) of the Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
74 Article 53 paragraph 3 item a) of the Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
75 Article 53 paragraph 1 items c) – k) of the Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
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or documents which have affected or could affect the assessment of the supplier’s qualifi-
cations.76
These PPA provisions also apply for the assessment of suppliers and their exclusion
from the procedure for concluding concession contracts.77
3.2.4 Screening and/or monitoring procedure and permitted information
sources
As this section will look at information sources that can be used in screening applicants
for a licence, subsidy or tender, we begin by briefly describing the issue of personal data
protection in the Czech Republic.
Given the history of the state abusing personal data during the communist period, the
issue of personal data protection is a very sensitive one in the Czech Republic. As a result,
the first regulation concerning personal data protection was adopted in 1992,78 replaced
in 2000 by the Personal Data Protection Act (zákon o ochraně osobních údajů, PDPA).79
The PDPA strictly regulates the conditions for collecting and processing personal data,
with an especially strict regime for ‘sensitive’ data, e.g. data on convictions for a criminal
offence.80 Generally, personal data may only be processed with the consent of the data
subject. The PDPA provides for exceptions where processing is permitted even without
such consent. One of the exceptions – which also applies for sensitive data – is data pro-
cessing in the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of criminal offences,
and in the search for people.81 There is no similar general exception when it comes to
assessing the integrity of applicants for licences, subsidies and tenders. When assessing
the integrity of an applicant, the relevant authority can therefore only ask for data for
which it has been authorized by a special law. This is the case for the Trades Licensing
Offices, which assess the unimpeachable character of an applicant for trade licensing pur-
poses based on an extract from the Penal Register records – they are entitled to ask the PR
for an EPR only because the Trades Licensing Act explicitly authorizes them to do so (see
also Section 3.2.1). The police and other law enforcement agencies can also provide other
authorities or institutions with information about criminal proceedings only on the basis
of a special legal mandate.82
76 Article 144 paragraph 1, Article 120a paragraph 1 item a) of theAct no. 137/2006Coll., on public procurement,
as amended.
77 Article 7 paragraph 3 of the Act no. 139/2006 Coll., on concession contracts and concession procedure, as
amended.
78 Act no. 256/1992 Coll., on the protection of personal data in information systems.
79 Act no. 101/2000 Coll., on personal data protection.
80 Article 4 item. b) of Act no. 101/2000 Coll., on personal data protection, as amended.
81 Article 9 item i) of Act no. 101/2000 Coll., on personal data protection, as amended.
82 Article 8a, 8b of Act no. 141/1961 Coll., on criminal procedure, as amended.
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3.2.4.1 Licences
As mentioned above, there is no unified regulation for screening applicants for different
licences for their involvement in serious or organized crime. The qualification requirements,
the assessment as to whether they have been met, and the competence of the relevant
authorities in the assessment process are all governed by separate laws regulating the
licensed activity in question. These special laws also state what information sources should
be used by the competent authorities. The procedure for granting a trade licence is a good
example.
The Trades Licensing Act regulates this procedure separately for notification trades
and concession trades. The relevant person notifies the Trades Licensing Office of his
intention to carry out a notification trade. As mentioned above, the TLO is authorized to
ask the Penal Register for an electronic EPR on the applicant in order to assess his unim-
peachable character (as a general requirement for granting a TL). It is also authorized to
ask a court for a copy of its decision, where relevant. If the decision does not contain facts
decisive for the assessment, the TLO is authorized to inspect the criminal court file dealing
with these facts.83 The TLA also governs how foreigners and legal persons with registered
offices outside the Czech Republic can prove unimpeachable character.84
If the applicant meets all the conditions, the TLO enters him into the Register of Trade
Licences within five working days of notification.85 If the notification does not meet all the
requirements, the TLO invites the applicant to remedy the shortcomings and sets a time
limit (of at least 15 days) for this. The time limit can be extended repeatedly if the applicant
indicates that there are serious reasons for doing so. If the applicant remedies the short-
comings before expiry of the prescribed time limit, the notification is considered perfect.
If he/she does not, the TLO institutes proceedings and decides that the trade licence will
not be issued. The same applies if the applicant does not meet the conditions prescribed
by the TLA (including the unimpeachable character requirement).86
Apersonwhowishes to carry out a concession trade applies to theTLO.87 The procedure
for proving unimpeachable character is similar to the procedure for the notification trades.
However if the TLA or special laws require a special permit, authorization, or the opinion
of any other administrative authority to carry out a specific concession trade, the TLO
submits an application for a concession with the necessary documents to this authority,
which is obliged to give an opinion within 30 days. Its opinion is binding on the TLO.88 If
83 Article 6 of Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on trading, as amended.
84 Article 46 of Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on trading, as amended.
85 Article 47 paragraph 1 of Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on trading, as amended.
86 Article 77 paragraphs 4, 5, 6 of Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on trading, as amended.
87 Article 50 paragraph 1 of Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on trading, as amended.
88 Article 52 paragraph 1 of Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on trading, as amended.
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all the requirements are met, the TLO grants the concession and enters the applicant into
the Register of Trade Licenses within five working days of the decision.
The TLA also regulates the grounds for the TLO revoking a trade licence.89 Among the
reasons for revoking a trade licence, the following are relevant for this country report:
a. an entrepreneur has ceased to meet the requirement of unimpeachable character;
b. an entrepreneur is in serious breach of the conditions set by the decision granting the
concession or by the legal regulations – the TLO can decide on revocation on its own
initiative or on the motion of the administrative authority that previously issued a
binding opinion in the concession application procedure;
c. an entrepreneur is not fulfilling his/her obligations towards the state – the TLO decides
on a motion of the social security authority;
d. there are ‘obstacles to carry out trades’.
These obstacles are listed in Article 8 of the TLA and include a court sentence or adminis-
trative sanction that prohibits the person (an applicant, an entrepreneur) from engaging
in an activity related to a trade in the given or in a similar branch of business. The person
is not allowed to carry out these trades for the duration of the prohibition. The EPR proves
the non-existence of such an obstacle. The TLO is authorized to ask the PR for an electronic
EPR about the person in question.90
As for the information sources that can be used to assess the unimpeachable character
of an applicant, the basic source is the EPR, which the TLOs are authorized to obtain from
the PR themselves. Another source is information provided by the applicant him/herself
or requested from the applicant by the TLO. However the TLO can only request the
information prescribed by the law. This also applies for the information from other public
administration authorities. This information can be opinions on an application, findings
of the relevant authorities’ monitoring activities, etc. The TLA states in this respect that
the authorities monitoring according to special laws should cooperate with one another
and if they detect a serious violation of the regulations by the entrepreneur, they should
send a written decision on this matter to the appropriate TLO within 30 days. They should
simultaneously report to the TLO on ascertained cases of unauthorized trading. The TLO,
on the other hand, should notify the relevant authorities within 30 days (especially
authorities supervising compliance with sanitary, safety and fire regulations) of violations
of the relevant regulations by persons carrying out trades.91
89 Article 58 of Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on trading, as amended.
90 Article 8 paragraph 5 of Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on trading, as amended.
91 Article 68 of Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on trading, as amended.
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For example, the Czech Trade Inspection Authority (Česká obchodní inspekce, CTIA) is
the administrative government authority thatmonitors and inspects businesses and individ-
uals who supply goods to or sell goods on the Czech market, provide services or similar
activities on the domesticmarket, provide consumer credit, and operatemarketplaces, unless,
as a result of special legislation, these activities fall under the authority of another adminis-
trative institution. If the CTIA finds facts demanding special measures that fall within the
competence of another authority, it notifies this authority of these findings.92
The TLO can of course use information from open sources on its own initiative. However,
we must realize that this information could be important for the TLO’s decision only if it
proves that the applicant fulfils some of the prescribed conditions for carrying out a trade
– and there are other ways of doing this, as described in the TLA. This means, for instance,
that if there are media reports on the possible involvement of an applicant in criminal
activities, the TLO is not authorized to refuse to grant him a trade licence (given that the
applicant still meets the condition of unimpeachable character in terms of the TLA).
3.2.4.2 Subsidies
Section 3.2.2 explained that the subsidy procedure does not assess the applicant’s potential
criminal background directly even though it takes that background into account indirectly
because an eligible applicant must usually hold a licence that requires an unimpeachable
character (e.g. a trade licence). As a result, for subsidies we refer to the previous section
on granting licences.
3.2.4.3 Tenders
In public procurement procedures, a contracting authority is obliged to require proof that
the suppliers comply with the qualification requirements, with a few exceptions identified
in the PPA.93 If a public contract is to be carried out jointly by several suppliers that submit
or intend to submit a joint tender, each supplier has to prove full compliance with the
basic qualification requirements.94 Asmentioned above, the suppliers prove such compliance
by submitting an EPR.95 In this case it is not a contracting authority who asks the PR for
an EPR, but the supplier that is obliged to submit it. If the supplier no longer meets the
qualifications before the tender decision is issued, it must notify the contracting authority
of this in writing not later than within seven working days.96
92 Article 2 paragraph 1, Article 13 paragraph 4 of Act no. 64/1986 Coll., on the Czech Trade Inspection
Authority, as amended.
93 Article 51 paragraph 1 of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
94 Article 51 paragraph 5 of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
95 Article 53 paragraph 3 sub a of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
96 Article 58 paragraph 1 of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
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A public contracting authority assesses a supplier’s compliance with the qualification
requirements in view of the PPA requirements. It may appoint a special committee to
assess qualifications. The public contracting authority may require the supplier to explain
in writing any information or documents it has submitted, or to submit other information
or documents proving compliance with the qualification requirements. The supplier is
obliged to comply with this obligation within a reasonable time, as set by the contracting
authority. The public contracting authority reports on its assessment of qualifications,
identifying those suppliers whose qualifications have been assessed, furnishing a list of the
documents used by the tenderers to prove their technical qualifications, and providing
information about whether the tenderer had proved or failed to prove compliance with
the qualifications. After the qualification assessment, the public contracting authoritymust
immediately allow all suppliers whose qualifications have been assessed to inspect the
qualifications assessment report and produce an extract or copy of it.97 The contracting
authority excludes suppliers that have failed to comply with the qualifications as required
from the award procedure. The contracting authority must notify these suppliers without
delay and in writing about its decision to exclude them from the award procedure, giving
the reasons.98
A contracting authority assesses tenderers only against the criteria prescribed by law
or specified in its own notice or invitation to commence an award procedure. The basic
qualification requirements, i.e. those proving unimpeachable character, are defined in
Article 53 para. 1 items a), b), 53 para. 2 item b) of the PPA, and they are shown by the
EPR. As mentioned above, unlike the CPR, the EPR offers only a limited summary of a
person’s criminal history (it does not contain records of convictions for which a person is
considered not to have been convicted – see above). A contracting authority is therefore
advised to ask the supplier to confirm that there are no convictions beyond those displayed
in the EPR, at least through an affidavit.
The supplier can prove compliance with the other basic qualification requirements by
submitting either a certificate issued by the relevant authority (e.g. the TaxOffice’s certificate
showing no tax debt) or its own affidavit (e.g. declaring that the supplier has not engaged
in unfair competition by means of bribery in the past three years). The supplier is obliged
to submit both kinds of documents, i.e. the contracting authority is not allowed to ask the
other relevant authority for a certificate itself. Even the basic requirement that the supplier
is not listed in the REPPC (see Section 3.2.3)must be proven by the supplier’s own affidavit.
Because the REPPC is an open public register, available without restriction on the internet,
the contracting authority can verify compliance with this requirement at any time.
97 Article 59 paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 8 of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
98 Article 60 of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
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Where required by the PPA and the contracting authority, foreign suppliersmust prove
their compliance with the qualification requirements according to the laws of the country
of their registered office, place of business or place of residence. If a particular document
is not available pursuant to those laws, the foreign supplier must prove compliance with
the relevant qualifications by affidavit. Documents proving foreign suppliers’ compliance
with the qualification requirementsmust be submitted in their original language, complete
with a certified translation into Czech, unless the contracting entity’s tender requirements
or an international treaty binding on the Czech Republic state otherwise. The obligation
to attach a certified translation in Czech does not apply for documents in Slovak.99
3.2.5 Legal protection for a screened and/or monitored person
3.2.5.1 Licences
Because the criteria of unimpeachable character are generally precisely defined in special
laws that take unimpeachable character as a qualification requirement, and because
unimpeachable character relates to the absence of a conviction for specified criminal
offences, it is obvious that compliance with this requirement can be easily determined
from the EPR and that the applicant does not have much scope to question its assessment.
The applicant can theoretically object that his/her records in the PR are incorrect (e.g.
incorrect length of sentence), which would result in an incorrect EPR, or that the EPR
contains (otherwise correct) records from the PR database that should only be displayed
in the CPR (e.g. expunged convictions). In that case the PR reviews the matter and if the
applicant’s objection is justified, a new and correct EPR is issued.
It is also worth mentioning that the Czech Constitutional Court has ruled against an
unreasonably broad definition of ‘unimpeachable character’ in an individual law100 (see
Section 3.2), which can be seen as a kind of legal protection for citizens against insufficiently
strict legal requirements for licences. This is why the following text briefly summarizes the
main features of legal protection for applicants or holders of licences in the Czech
Republic.
Decisions on granting or revoking a licence are administrative decisions (administrative
acts) in the Czech Republic, with the relevant proceedings being governed by the Code of
Administrative Procedure (správní řád, CAP).101 The only instances inwhich the provisions
of the CAP do not apply are when special laws have self-contained special regulations or
exclude the application of the CAP for certain issues.102
99 Article 51 paragraph 7 of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
100 Constitutional Court judgment no. Pl. ÚS 35/08; Constitutional Court judgment no. Pl.ÚS 38/04.
101 Act no. 500/2004 Coll., the code of administrative procedure.
102 Jemelka, Pondělíčková & Bohadlo 2008, p. 1-8.
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The applicant for a licence acts or may act at several stages of the proceedings. The
administrative authority must allow the person to exercise their rights and protect their
justified interests.103 Everyone has the right to explain his/her views on a matter relating
to them personally, as well as to the documents and other materials that the administrative
authority assesses, and to propose other documents or materials.104 The CAP also imposes
a duty on the administrative authority to instruct persons adequately as to their rights and
duties and, where needed, about the nature of the administrative act and the person’s
personal situation.105
The application procedure is governed by Section VI of the CAP, which describes the
commencement and the course of the proceedings in detail. The procedure is initiated on
application, which must, inter alia, state clearly the purpose of the person’s application.106
It should be mentioned that the trend is to create uniform application forms (that can be
completed online), so there is not much room for an applicant to express opinions beyond
the necessary prerequisites of the application form. If the application does not contain all
the necessary prerequisites or if it has other shortcomings, the administrative authority
must help the applicant to eliminate them immediately or invite the applicant to eliminate
them in good time.107 As a rule, a decision on an application is issued in writing.108 The
applicant (and other interested persons) is notified of thewritten decisionwhen it is handed
to them.109
TheCAP allows the applicant to appeal against a decision on an application. The appeal
procedure is governed by Section VIII of the CAP. The appeal must provide information
on the decision against which it is directed and the alleged contravention of the relevant
regulation or the alleged defect in the decision or procedure.110 In the appeal procedure,
the appellate administrative authority can take new facts and evidence into account only
if the applicant was unable to present or suggest them before the decision was made.111
The appeal must be lodged within 15 days after notification of the decision, unless a special
law states otherwise.112 The CAP also governs the course of the appeal procedure and the
appeal decision. The specific remedy against a decision issued by the central administrative
authority, the Minister, the State Secretary or the head of another central administrative
103 Article 4 paragraph 4 of Act no. 500/2004 Coll., the code of administrative procedure, as amended.
104 Hendrych 2012, p. 362.
105 Article 4 paragraph 2 of Act no. 500/2004 Coll., the code of administrative procedure, as amended.
106 Article 45 paragraph 1 of Act no. 500/2004 Coll., the code of administrative procedure, as amended.
107 Article 45 paragraph 2 of Act no. 500/2004 Coll., the code of administrative procedure, as amended.
108 Article 67 paragraph 2 of Act no. 500/2004 Coll., the code of administrative procedure, as amended.
109 Article 72 paragraph 1 of Act no. 500/2004 Coll., the code of administrative procedure, as amended.
110 Article 82 paragraph 2 of Act no. 500/2004 Coll., the code of administrative procedure, as amended.
111 Article 82 paragraph 4 of Act no. 500/2004 Coll., the code of administrative procedure, as amended.
112 Article 83 paragraph 1 of Act no. 500/2004 Coll., the code of administrative procedure, as amended.
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authority acting as the body of first instance is the rozklad. The Minister or head of another
central administrative authority decides on the rozklad.113
CAP also provides remedies against a decision that has already become final. They are
the review procedure (Section IX) and recommencement of a procedure (Section X). In
the review procedure, the administrative authority reviews final decisions ex officio in cases
where there is a reasonable doubt that the decision is in accordance with the legal regula-
tions.114 Recommencement of a procedure comes into play if:
a. unknown facts or evidence has emerged that existed at the time of the previous proce-
dure, but the applicant was unable to present or suggest them or the evidence presented
proved to be false;
b. the decision that was used as the basis for the appeal has been revoked or changed;
c. and the new situation could lead to a different resolution of the issue that was the
subject of the decision-making.115
If the decision has become final and there is no question of a review procedure or recom-
mencement of the procedure, the applicant can refer thematter to a court. The proceedings
before the administrative courts are governed by the Code of Administrative Courts Pro-
cedure (soudní řád správní, CACP).116 The administrative courts decide, among other
things, on legal actions against decisions taken in public administration by the administra-
tive authority, including the administrative authorities of local government units.117 The
regional court usually acts in these proceedings. The decision of a regional court becomes
final when the written decision is delivered to the parties in the proceedings.118 The CACP
offers two remedies against decisions by administrative courts, the nullity plea and the
recommencement of a procedure (Section III). In the nullity plea, the applicant can request
revocation of a final decision of a regional administrative court.119 The Supreme Adminis-
trativeCourt (Nejvyšší správní soud, SAC) decides on the nullity plea. The recommencement
of a procedure comes into play if facts or evidence emerge that the applicant, through no
fault of his own, could not present or suggest in the previous procedure, or if a decision
on the preliminary question was changed and the result of the recommenced procedure
could be more favourable to him.120
113 Article 152 of Act no. 500/2004 Coll., the code of administrative procedure, as amended.
114 Article 94 paragraph 1 of Act no. 500/2004 Coll., the code of administrative procedure, as amended.
115 Article 100 paragraph 1 of Act no. 500/2004 Coll., the code of administrative procedure, as amended.
116 Act no. 150/2002 Coll., the code of administrative courts procedure.
117 Article 4 paragraph 1 item a) of Act no. 150/2002 Coll., the code of administrative courts procedure, as
amended.
118 Article 7 paragraph 1, Article 54 paragraph 5 of Act no. 150/2002 Coll., the code of administrative courts
procedure, as amended.
119 Article 102 of Act no. 150/2002 Coll., the code of administrative courts procedure, as amended.
120 Article 111 of Act no. 150/2002 Coll., the code of administrative courts procedure, as amended.
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We conclude this section by mentioning the means of legal protection available to a
licence holder in relation to the monitoring (inspection) authorities. These means are
usually defined in laws regulating the conditions for obtaining and retaining the licence
in question. They include the direct rights of a licence holder in the monitoring process
as well as limitations on the powers of monitoring authorities. Their main goal is to avoid
the unlawful revocation of a licence.
For example when carrying out theirmonitoring tasks, the employees of TLOsmust identify
themselves by presenting a special card or bywritten authorization to carry out the inspection.
The entrepreneur has the right to ask for a third person chosen by him/her to be present
during the inspection.121
3.2.5.2 Subsidies
Chapter 3.2.2 explained that there is no direct screening of an applicant’s potential criminal
background in the subsidy procedure. As for the general means of legal protection offered
to subsidy applicants, the question is whether the subsidy should be granted through the
state budget. If so, the Budgetary Rules Act excludes the application of the CAP’s provisions
for granting a subsidy, including the subsidy decision, meaning that the legal protection
provided by the CAP and described above does not apply. However, any procedure
involving the withdrawal of a subsidy granted earlier is governed by the CAP, including
the remedies provided by the CAP. If the subsidywas granted through public sources other
than the state budget, the CAP is applicable, with possible exceptions or modifications
designated by special laws for individual public aid programmes. Note that the related
legal regulations usually state that there is no automatic legal claim to an award of public
aid.
3.2.5.3 Tenders
The specific means of legal protection for suppliers are set in the PPA, which distinguishes
between the supplier’s objections122 and a review of the conduct of a contracting authority.123
The supplier that is – or was – interested in obtaining a particular public contract and
whose rights are being or have been harmed due to an alleged breach of the legislation by
the conduct of the contracting authority is free to submit justified objections to that
authority. Objections can be submitted against all of the contracting authority’s conduct,
including a decision by the contracting authority to exclude the supplier from the award
procedure.124 A contracting authority reviews such objections to the full extent and sends
121 Article 60b, 60c of Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on trading, as amended.
122 Article 110, 111 of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
123 Article 113-119 of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
124 Article 110 of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
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the complainant a written decision, with reasons, within ten days of receipt. If the contract-
ing entity upholds the objections, it will also include a decision on the remedy. If the con-
tracting authority does not uphold the objection, it will notify the complainant in writing
of the latter’s right to petition the Office for the Protection of Competition (OPC) to
commence proceedings reviewing the conduct of the contracting entity (a complainant
who does not opt to submit objections may not refer the same matter to the OPC).125
A supplier may petition the OPC to review any acts on the part of the contracting
authority that have caused harm or that risk causing harm to the rights of the petitioner,
e.g. the tender requirements, exclusion from an award procedure, the decision on themost
suitable tender etc.126 The PPA also governs the OPC’s assessment of the conduct of a
contracting authority as well as how the OPC rules on a petition.127 A participant in a
concession procedure has similar legal protection.128
The final decision in a public contract or a concession procedure is subject to review
by the administrative courts129 (see Section 3.2.5.1).
3.2.6 Existing measures on screening and/or monitoring legal persons
There are no special administrative measures in the Czech Republic on screening or
monitoring legal persons for possible involvement in a criminal activity. Administrative
law regulations govern the functioning of legal persons (including their responsibility for
administrative offences), usually together with natural persons or with natural persons
conducting entrepreneurial activities. They often impose a duty on legal persons and nat-
ural persons (entrepreneurs) in the same provision, and levy the same sanctions for violating
this duty, regardless of the nature of the legal person.
Wemustmention that Czech law recognizes the criminal responsibility of legal persons,
introduced bymeans of the Legal Persons Criminal Responsibility Act130 of 1 January 2012.
TheAct governs the conditions of criminal responsibility of legal persons, the punishments
and protective measures applicable to them, and proceedings against them.131 One of the
consequences is that a legal person’s conviction for a criminal offence is recorded in the
PR, which makes it possible to assess whether a legal person applying for a certain licence,
125 Article 111 of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
126 Article 114 of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
127 Article 115-119 of Act no. 137/2006 Coll., on public procurement, as amended.
128 Article 12 paragraph 3, Article 24a-26 of Act no. 139/2006 Coll., on concession contracts and concession
procedure, as amended.
129 Jurčík 2007, p. 449-450.
130 Act. no. 418/2011 Coll., on criminal responsibility of legal persons and proceedings against them.
131 Fenyk & Smejkal 2012.
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public aid or public contract has an unimpeachable character, as in the case of a natural
person.
3.3 Instruments directed at preventing the disturbance of public
order
3.3.1 Legal framework
Beyond the realm of criminal law, public order in the Czech Republic is protected through
administrative law. In general terms, the basic preventive tool of public authority in the
field of public order is legislation, which sets conditions for undertaking different activities
in the public space that eliminate the chance of public order being disturbed as much as
possible.While the state and its administrative bodies are usually the competent authorities
to grant licences etc. (when regional or local authorities are involved in granting licences,
they have delegated competence to do so), the role of municipalities in protecting public
order is very important. TheMunicipalities Act132 givesmunicipalities separate competence
to impose duties through their own form of legal regulation, the generally binding decree
(obecně závazná vyhláška, GBD).133 The municipalities are entitled to impose duties in a
GBD:
a. to maintain local public order; for example by determining which activities that could
disturb public order in the community or be contrary to good morals, safety, health
and property can only be carried out at a place and time designated by the generally
binding decree or by determining that such activities are prohibited in some public
areas in the municipality;
b. to organize, conduct, and terminate publicly accessible sporting and cultural events,
including dances and discotheques, by setting binding conditions to the extent necessary
to ensure public order;
c. to ensure the cleanliness of streets and other public spaces, environmental protection,
green spaces in urban and other public green spaces, and the use of community facilities
that serve the needs of the public;
d. if stipulated by a special act.134
132 Act no. 128/2000 Coll., on municipalities.
133 The power of municipalities to issue generally binding decrees also stems from Article 104 paragraph 3 of
the Czech Constitution. Pavlíček & Hřebejk 1994, p. 254-256.
134 Article 10 of Act no. 128/2000 Coll., on municipalities, as amended.
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The capital city of Prague has the same powers as stipulated in the Capital City of Prague
Act.135
The municipalities make extensive use of the GBD, with GBDs meant to maintain
public order being plentiful. Municipalities most often issue GBDs to protect public order
from prostitution,136 excessive alcohol consumption,137 begging,138 and noisy cultural
events,139 with some of them issuing more comprehensive GBDs concerning multiple
problems at once.140 In the past few months, many municipalities have decided to regulate
gambling in their area through GBDs.141
The increasing awareness of negative phenomena connected with gambling contributed to
this development, but as has also the resolution of fact that just recently the question of as
to whether municipalities are entitled to use limit through the GBD to limit in their area the
running the operation of all types of gamingmachines (including so called interactive video-
lottery terminals, IVTs) has been solvedin their area. Gambling is governed by a special
Lotteries and Similar Games Act (zákon o loteriích a jiných podobných hrách, LSGA), which
gives municipalities special powers to issue GBDs stipulating that certain betting games
(including gaming machines) can be operated only in certain places and at certain times, or
to prohibit the operation of such games in their area completely.142 Until the end of 2011,
the relevant provision of the LSGA referred only to regulating ‘gaming machines’. Since the
LSGA defines gaming machines more narrowly in the section on authorizing the operation
of gaming machines, with IVTs not being included in this definition,143 it was not clear
whether the special municipal powers could be applied to IVTs. The Constitutional Court
later explained that the narrower definition should be applied only in the authorization
135 Article 44 paragraph 3 of Act no. 131/2000 Coll., on the capital city of Prague, as amended. As the capital,
Prague has a specific position. From an administrative perspective it is a region, divided into individual
municipal districts. At the same time its separate competence is in some ways similar to the separate compe-
tence of municipalities – for instance the power to issue a GBD.
136 E.g. Generally binding decree of the capital city of Prague no. 20/2007, to protect public order from the offer
and provision of sexual services in public places. Prostitution is not regulated in the Czech Republic – it is
neither prohibited nor recognized as a legitimate business.
137 E.g. Generally binding decree of the city of Tábor no. 6/2012, on the prohibition of alcohol consumption in
public spaces.
138 E.g. Generally binding decree of the city of Plzeň no. 10/2006, on the delimitation of public spaces where
begging is prohibited.
139 E.g. Generally binding decree of the city of Brno no. 12/2011, on the regulation of a public performance of
music for the purpose of ensuring public order.
140 E.g. Generally binding decree of the city of Klášterec nad Ohří no. 3/2012, on measures to limit activities
disturbing public order.
141 E.g. Generally binding decree of the capital city of Prague no. 10/2013, determining places and times where
lotteries and other similar games can be run, and determining measures to limit their propagation.
142 Article 50 paragraph 4 of Act no. 202/1990 Coll., on lotteries and other similar games, as amended.
143 Article 17 paragraph 1 of Act no. 202/1990 Coll., on lotteries and other similar games, as amended.
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procedure, and that otherwise a broader definition must be applied that includes IVTs.144
Consequently, the LSGA has been amended to explicitly delegate power to municipalities
to regulate the operation of gaming machines, IVTs and some other betting games.145
The Ministry of the Interior and the Constitutional Court have played an important role
in developing these local tools for maintaining public order. Although municipalities have
separate competence to issue GBDs, the GBD must nevertheless be in accordance with the
law. If a GBD contravenes a law, the Ministry of the Interior calls on the municipality to
rectify the problem. If the municipality does not address the shortcomings within 60 days,
the Ministry will decide whether to suspend the effects of the GBD. If there is an obvious
contradiction of human rights and basic freedoms, the Ministry can decide to suspend the
GBDwithout prior warning. Themunicipality is entitled to object to a decision to suspend
a GBD by rozklad in an administrative procedure (see Section 3.2.5.1). If the municipality
eliminates the shortcomingswithin the prescribed time, theMinistry will lift its suspension.
Otherwise the Ministry will petition the Constitutional Court to cancel the GBD.146 The
Constitutional Court then assesses whether the GBD is compatible with the law and if it
finds that the GBD contradicts the law, it can cancel the GBD or part of it.147
3.3.2 Administrative offences against public order
Disturbances of public order that do not qualify as criminal offences are subject to sanc-
tioning in administrative proceedings. For the purposes of this country report, administra-
tive offences against public order can be categorized by perpetrator and by whether the
disturbance violates national or local legislation.
TheMisdemeanoursAct (zákon o přestupcích, MA) governsmisdemeanours by natural
persons. A misdemeanour is culpable behaviour violating or threatening the interests of
society that is explicitly labelled a misdemeanour by law, provided that it is not another
administrative or criminal offence.148 Administrative authorities are allowed to impose a
sanction or protective measure on the perpetrator of a misdemeanour. Sanctions are: (a)
awarning; (b) a fine; (c) a prohibition on undertaking the specified activity; (d) the forfeiture
of an item; (e) residence prohibition. Protective measures are: (a) a limiting measure (i.e.
prohibition on being in certain public places where alcoholic drinks are served or where
144 Constitutional Court judgment no. Pl.ÚS 29/10, of 14 June 2011.
145 Act. no. 300/2011 Coll.
146 Article 123 of Act no. 128/2000 Coll., on municipalities, as amended.
147 E.g. Constitutional Court judgment no. Pl. ÚS 58/05, of 8 June 2010, on cancelling part of the GBD of the
city of Česká Velenice no. 2/2005, on measures to ensure local public order.
148 Article 2 paragraph 1 of Act no. 200/1990 Coll., on misdemeanours, as amended.
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public sports or cultural events are held); (b) the confiscation of an item. The MA describes
in detail the conditions for imposing sanctions and protective measures.149
The MA contains a list of misdemeanours, including those against public order.150 A
person commits a misdemeanour against public order if he/she:
a. disobeys the instructions of a public officer exercising public authority;
b. causes a disturbance at night;
c. raises a public scandal;
d. pollutes public spaces, a public building or a public utility device151, or neglects the
duty to clean public places;
e. intentionally destroys, damages or otherwise unlawfully disposes of a tourist mark or
other orientation sign;
f. breaches conditions imposed tomaintain public order during public sporting or cultural
events or at recreational or tourist places;
g. attends an organized sportsmatchwith his/her face covered in such away as to impede
identification;
h. damages or unlawfully occupies public spaces, a public building or a public utility
device;
i. creates a dumping ground without authorization or spreads rubbish beyond places
reserved for this purpose.
A breach of the duty to maintain public order stipulated in a municipal GBD constitutes
a separatemisdemeanour against order in local governmentmatters.152 Themunicipalities
in which public order was disturbed are authorized to deal with both kinds of misde-
meanours, i.e. against public order and against order in local government matters.
Moreover the Municipalities Act (as well as the Capital City of Prague Act) empowers
municipalities to impose fines on legal persons and on natural persons conducting
entrepreneurial activities for the administrative offence of breaching a duty imposed by
local regulations, including a GBD issued to maintain public order.153
The role of the municipal police should be mentioned in this respect. The Municipal
Police Act (zákon o obecní policii, MPA) empowers municipalities to establish a municipal
police force mainly to ensure that local public order is preserved within the jurisdiction
of the municipality. The municipal police should:
a. contribute to the protection and safety of persons and property;
149 Article 11-18 of Act no. 200/1990 Coll., on misdemeanours, as amended.
150 Article 47 of Act no. 200/1990 Coll., on misdemeanours, as amended.
151 “Public utility device” means a public apparatus, facility, system, machine etc., that serves to broad public.
Examples are telecommunications, traffic lights, power station, signal post etc.
152 Article 46 of Act no. 200/1990 Coll., on misdemeanours, as amended.
153 Article 58 paragraph 4 of Act no. 128/2000 Coll., on municipalities, as amended; Article 29 paragraph 1 of
Act no. 131/2000 Coll., on the capital city of Prague, as amended.
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b. ensure compliance with the rules of civil coexistence;
c. ensure compliance with generally binding decrees and orders of the municipality;
d. participate in maintaining the safety and flow of traffic on the road;
e. help ensure compliance with legislation governing public order and make provision
for resuming compliance if breached;
f. contribute to crime prevention in the community;
g. supervise compliance with standards of cleanliness in public places in the municipality;
h. revealmisdemeanours and other administrative offences that fall within the jurisdiction
of the municipality;
i. provide information about the municipal police at the request of the Ministry of the
Interior for statistical data-processing purposes.154
As for the legal protection afforded to a person found guilty of an administrative offence,
the remedies in cases of misdemeanours are governed partly by the MA and partly by the
general provisions of the CAP; and in cases of other administrative offences, the CAP’s
general provisions on remedies apply (see Section 3.2.5.1).
Administrative offences against public order do not result in the revocation of a licence
or disqualification from participating in a subsidy or tender procedure. The loss of unim-
peachable character that can lead to these consequences (because compliance with the
qualification requirements ceases) follows from a final conviction for certain criminal
offences, not from administrative offences. However, it should be noted that some laws
stipulate compliance with the rules of public order as one of the conditions for carrying
out certain activities.
For instance, the LSGA stipulates that authorization to operate a lottery or other similar
game will be issued only if this operation takes place in accordance with legislation and does
not disturb public order.155 Nevertheless, a breach of the conditions for operating such games
is punishable only by a fine.
3.3.3 Closure and/or expropriation of premises owing to a disturbance of
public order
As indicated above, administrative offences against public order in the Czech Republic
are punishable mainly by a fine, a warning (for misdemeanours committed by natural
154 Article 1 paragraph 2, Article 2 of Act no. 553/1991 Coll., on municipal police, as amended.
155 Article 4 paragraph 2 of Act no. 202/1990 Coll., on lotteries and other similar games, as amended.
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persons), the forfeiture of an item, or a residence prohibition156 (a prohibition on under-
taking a certain activity cannot be imposed for misdemeanours according to Article 46
para. 2 and Article 47 of the MA). The closure or expropriation of premises owing to a
disturbance of public order is out of the question.
The TLAbestows special powers associatedwith trade carried out in business premises.
The Trade Licensing Office is entitled to suspend trade in certain business premises if
duties set out in the TLA or special laws were violated or are being violated there in the
course of trade. The TLO may suspend trade for a certain amount of time, but not longer
than one year.157 If the entrepreneur does not improve the situation, the TLO can initiate
proceedings to revoke his or her trade licence (see Section 3.2.4.1).
It should be noted that the issue of expropriating buildings or corporations is very
sensitive in the Czech Republic owing to the violent expropriation of private property in
the early years of the communist regime. As a consequence, the instrument of expropriation
is only allowed in a very limited range of situations. According to the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights and Freedoms, the expropriation or compulsory limitation of ownership is
only possible in the public interest, on the basis of a law and with compensation.158 The
Expropriation Act stipulates that expropriation is permitted only if it is set out in a special
law and only if the public interest in attaining the purpose of the expropriation prevails
over the preservation of the owner’s rights.159 Different special laws govern situations where
expropriation can be executed in the public interest (public utility constructions, public
utility measures on protecting inhabitants and property, defence and security facilities
etc.).160
3.4 Seizing of assets
As in the Netherlands, the seizing of assets in connection with criminal activities is mainly
the domain of penal law in the Czech Republic. However, procedures in which the state
deprives a natural or legal person of assets because of an unlawful act can also be found
156 A residence prohibition consists of an order banning a perpetrator from the territory of a municipality or
its borough where he/she has repeatedly committed a misdemeanour for a period of time specified in the
relevant decision. Generally the perpetrator must leave the relevant municipality and is not allowed to re-
enter it for a specified period. If the municipality in question is a perpetrator’s place of permanent residence,
he/she must still leave it, but the municipal authority can grant him/her short-term residence permission
for serious personal reasons (a medical examination, a visit to the public authority etc.).
157 Article 58 paragraphs 4, 6 of Act no. 455/1991 Coll., on trading, as amended.
158 Article 11 paragraph 4 of the Charter of basic rights and freedoms.
159 Article 3 paragraph 1 of Act no. 184/2006 Coll., on deprivation or limitation of the ownership of a land or
building, as amended.
160 E.g. Article 170 of Act no. 183/2006 Coll., on spatial planning and building regulation, as amended.
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in administrative law. Such procedures need not be connected with any criminal activity
by the person in question, because they apply generally.
Loss of property can be imposed on natural persons as a sanction in misdemeanour
proceedings. As mentioned above (Section 3.3.2), one of the sanctions available is the
forfeiture of an item.161 Such forfeiture can be imposed if the itembelongs to the perpetrator
and (a) was used or designed to commit a misdemeanour, or (b) was obtained by commit-
ting a misdemeanour or acquired for an item obtained by a misdemeanour. The forfeiture
of an item cannot be imposed if the value of the item is obviously disproportionate to the
nature of the misdemeanour. Besides the sanction of forfeiture, the MA also recognizes
the protective measure of confiscation.162 This relates to items that meet the criteria for
forfeiture but for which the sanction of a forfeiture cannot be imposed because (a) the
item belongs to a perpetrator who cannot be prosecuted for a misdemeanour (e.g. due to
his or her age), (b) some or all of the item does not belong to the perpetrator, or (c) the
item’s owner is unknown. Such an item can be confiscated if the safety of persons or
property or any other common interest requires it. The forfeited or confiscated item falls
to the state.
Other examples of assets being seized in an administrative procedure due to a breach
of a legal duty relate to the protection of markets, consumers or public health. These are
governed by special laws for specific areas. For instance the inspectors of the Czech Trade
Inspection Authority are obliged to seize products or goods found during inspection that
do not comply with the legal regulations and to store them out of reach of the person being
inspected. The Director of the relevant Inspectorate of CTIA then decides on the sanction
for the administrative offence of offering, selling or storing noncompliant products or
goods. The sanction is a fine and forfeiture of the products or goods (or their confiscation,
e.g. if they do not belong to the sanctioned person). The forfeited or confiscated products
or goods go to the state and are either destroyed or used for humanitarian purposes.163
Moreover, the CTIA inspector is entitled to order the immediate or later destruction of
the products or goods if it is obvious or proven that they are dangerous to human health.164
A similar situation applies to agricultural products, food or tobacco products where
the Czech Agriculture and Food Inspection Authority (Státní zemědělská a potravinářská
inspekce, CAFIA) acts as monitoring body. The CAFIA Act assigns monitoring powers to
CAFIA and defines the administrative offences, consisting of breaches of legal regulations
governing the production and distribution of agricultural products, food or tobacco
products.165 The basic sanction for these offences is a fine, but the CAFIA Act also allows
161 Article 15 of Act no. 200/1990 Coll., on misdemeanours, as amended.
162 Article 18 of Act no. 200/1990 Coll., on misdemeanours, as amended.
163 Article 7b of Act no. 64/1986 Coll., on the Czech Trade Inspection Authority, as amended.
164 Article 7 paragraph 2 of Act no. 64/1986 Coll., on the Czech Trade Inspection Authority, as amended.
165 Article 11 of Act no. 146/2002 Coll., on the Czech agriculture and food inspection authority, as amended.
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the forfeiture or confiscation of agricultural products, food or tobacco products. The
conditions and procedure are similar to those of the CTIA Act.166
Some other special laws also allow the forfeiture or confiscation of certain items (goods)
if the relevant person produces, distributes etc. such items (goods) in a way that breaches
legal duty in the area governed by these special laws.167
3.5 Other relevant measures
Previous sections of this country report have explained that the administrative approach
is not used systematically to combat crime in the Czech Republic. One outcome of this is
that there is no unified and integrated legal framework for using administrative procedures
to control crime. Administrativemeasures that could be used for this purpose in theCzech
Republic are therefore fragmented; they are governed by a number of different laws that
usually only concern a specific area of public administration.
This is why there are other tools in the Czech legal system that the administrative
authorities can wield to prevent criminal organizations from using the legal administrative
infrastructure for their criminal activities. Legal regulation of these tools is also very frag-
mented, however, and they are primarily designated for other purposes. This section gives
some examples of these tools.
1) Under the CTIA Act, a CTIA inspector who finds a violation of a legal duty that could
threaten the life or health of consumers has the power to prohibit the given activity or
order the closure of the business premises for up to two working days. If the observed
shortcomings are not eliminated within this time, the closure can be prolonged until they
have been resolved (without final time limit).168 The CTIA Act also identifies the powers
of CTIA inspectors when carrying out inspections – the power to enter into business
premises, to verify the identity of the person subject to inspection, to ask for documents,
materials or explanations from these person, etc.169 Other special laws define similar con-
ditions for the inspection activities and related powers of employees of other government
inspection authorities in the Czech Republic – e.g. the StateOffice for Labour Inspection,170
166 Article 11a-11c ofAct no. 146/2002Coll., on theCzech agriculture and food inspection authority, as amended.
167 For instance Act no. 119/2002 Coll., on firearms and ammunition; Act no. 634/1992 Coll., on consumer
protection; Act no. 13/1993 Coll., on customs; Act no. 167/1998 Coll., on addictive substances etc.
168 Article 8 of Act no. 64/1986 Coll., on the Czech Trade Inspection Authority, as amended.
169 Article 4 of Act no. 64/1986 Coll., on the Czech Trade Inspection Authority, as amended.
170 Act no. 251/2005 Coll., on labour inspection.
84
P. Zeman
the Czech Environmental Inspectorate,171 and the Czech Agriculture and Food Inspection
Authority.172
2) The Building Act entitles the Building Office to apply different measures when the
owner or user of a building seriously breaches his or her duties or when an urgent interest
so requires (e.g. the protection of the life and health of people, the environment, public
safety etc.).173 These measures include the power to order: the removal of a building (i.e.
the forced demolition of a building),174 the immediate removal of a building and the nec-
essary securing work,175 the necessary modification of a building,176 maintenance of a
building,177 or eviction from a building (by issuing an eviction order, the Building Office
can force all persons dwelling in the building to vacate it immediately if the building’s state
of repair poses an imminent threat to the life or health of people or animals, or if the Office
intends to issue an order for the immediate removal of a building or for the necessary
securing work).178 The employees of the Building Office have the power to enter grounds
and buildings to assess their state of repair or to gather evidence and other materials for
administrative proceedings.179
At the end of April 2012 a new nightclub opened in the centre of Prague that led to strong
emotions. Such clubs are not unknown in the Czech Republic, including in Prague, but in
this case prostitutes lured clients by posing in windows half-naked. Moreover, the club was
located in the middle of a residential district and near a kindergarten, so it became the subject
of many complaints from local residents. Given the fact that prostitution is not regulated in
the Czech Republic, the municipality did not have any direct tool available to shut down the
club. However, in May 2012 employees of the Building Office of Prague inspected the club
and found that construction work had been carried out without a permit and that the
building was not being used for the purpose for which it had been approved. They decided
to order an immediate eviction from the building. Although the appellate authority later
revoked this decision for procedural reasons, the building’s owner did not conclude a new
171 Act no. 282/1991 Coll., on the Czech environmental inspectorate and its competence in forest protection.
172 Act no. 146/2002 Coll., on the Czech agriculture and food inspection authority.
173 Hegenbart & Sakař 2008, p. 351-367.
174 Article 129 of Act no. 183/2006 Coll., on spatial planning and building regulation, as amended.
175 Article 135, 136 of Act no. 183/2006 Coll., on spatial planning and building regulation, as amended.
176 Article 137 of Act no. 183/2006 Coll., on spatial planning and building regulation, as amended.
177 Article 139 of Act no. 183/2006 Coll., on spatial planning and building regulation, as amended.
178 Article 140 of Act no. 183/2006 Coll., on spatial planning and building regulation, as amended.
179 Article 172 of Act no. 183/2006 Coll., on spatial planning and building regulation, as amended.
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tenancy contract with the club operator, and the building is now being turned to offices and
a musical centre.180
3) The Public Health Protection Act gives public health protection authorities the power
to decree extraordinary measures, e.g. concerning hazardous products. They can, for
instance, prohibit the distribution of certain products.181 The Regional Hygiene Stations
of a given region have the same power.182 The Act also governs the powers of employees
of public health protection authorities, including the power to enter business premises or
other buildings, to make visual records, to inspect documents, etc.
3.6 Conclusion
This country report identifies administrative measures that can be used in the Czech
Republic to prevent the operation of criminal groups within the legal administrative
infrastructure. In classifying these measures, this report has respected the structure deter-
mined by the researchers conducting the study. It is obvious that despite the absence of
an ‘administrative approach’ in form of systematic administrative measures and activities
in relation to serious and organized crime, there are a number of potential tools available.
The problem is that the efficient use of these fragmented tools, which are only partly fit
for purpose, demands a high level of expertise and commitment by public administrators.
Since these tools have been established by a number of different laws, the officials
responsible for an administrative approach would need to have extensive knowledge of
the content and application of different regulations inmany different areas of administrative
law. In the current situation, where officials usually specialize only in a specific area related
to the competence of the authority for which they work, this is not realistic. The solution
may be to assemble multi-agency teams under the leadership of, for instance, the officials
responsible for coordinating crime prevention. Methodological guidance by the state
administrative authorities (the ministries, etc.) would also be of great importance. They
could provide public administrators at regional and local level with instructions on which
tools can be used for a given purpose in specific situations.
A second problem is that the law does not explicitly impose a duty on officials to actively
search for and use these ‘non-standard’ instruments. The extent towhich these instruments
180 See e.g.Místo nevěstince budují Ve Smečkách hudební dům(http://www.novinky.cz/domaci/283600-misto-
nevestince-buduji-ve-smeckach-hudebni-dum.html); Úředníci nařídili vyklidit nevěstinec Ve Smečkách
(http://www.novinky.cz/domaci/268549-urednici-naridili-vyklidit-nevestinec-ve-smeckach.html).
181 Article 95 of Act no. 258/2000 Coll., on public health protection, as amended.
182 Article 85 of Act no. 258/2000 Coll., on public health protection, as amended.
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are used in practice thus depends vitally on the motivation and activity of the individual
officials or individual administrative authorities.
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4 The administrative approach inEngland
andWales
M. Peters & A.C.M. Spapens
4.1 Introduction
In 2009 the Netherlands distributed a questionnaire exploring which instruments other
EuropeanUnionMember States employ as non-penalmeasures to prevent criminals from
using legal infrastructures.1 The questionnaire and the subsequent Hungary Handbook
revealed that the United Kingdom uses alternative instruments to tackle crime, including
some administrativemeasures.2 In this country report, wewill focus on England andWales.
It has been completed in January 2014. The following main question is posed:
which possibilities exist in England and Wales to prevent the use of legal infras-
tructures by serious and organized criminals?3
For the substantial instruments, focus will lie completely on the territory of England and
Wales.4 However, the discussions on general administrative law and criminal policy also
include thewhole of theUnitedKingdom, as these regulations (wholly or partly) encompass
further territories than just England andWales in theUnitedKingdom.Wewill first discuss
the limitations of the report further with respect to the administrative authorities and the
geographical limitations in this Section. We then contemplate the administrative powers
of government in England and Wales (Section 4.2) and current policy on serious and
organized crime in the UK, including Scotland and Northern Ireland (Section 4.3). Finally,
we consider the substantive instruments related to an administrative approach to crime
(Section 4.4).
1 5655/09 CRIMORG 10, p. 4.
2 Home Office 2004; Cabinet Office 2009.
3 Serious crime: offences committed by one or more persons for a prolonged or indefinite period of time,
which offences are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four
years or a more serious penalty, to obtain, directly or indirectly a financial or other material benefit. Europol
2013, p. 41-42.
4 The reader should bear in mind that the instruments as described below are not always primarily meant to
prevent organized crime from infiltrating into the legal infrastructure, but can have other purposes as well.
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Limitations to the research
The legal system of the UK, i.e. common law, posed certain issues for this country report.
What follows is a working definition of administrative law and administrative authorities
and then a description of the administrative measures on which this report will focus.
The common law and the definition of administrative law and administrative authorities
Until fairly recently, there was no real distinction in the UK between public and private
law.5 According toCane, no “consciously articulated distinction” between public and private
law existed in theUKuntil the 1970s. This absence of distinctionwas influenced byDicey,6
until certain procedural changes occurred. These changes led in 2001 to the establishment
of the Administrative Court for England & Wales.7
The UK does not have general legal codes on administrative law or consistent legal
principles applicable to administrative actions, sanctions or bodies.8 For historical reasons,
e.g. as a legacy of the industrial revolution, administrative bodies cannot be typically clas-
sified: “the circumstances surrounding the creation of the agency or administrative decision-
maker very often may determine the range of remedies that are available. Many adminis-
trative bodies utilize economic instruments or fiscal arrangements to implement their
policies.”9
Furthermore, there are neither codes governing conduct by administrative authorities
nor legal principles governing their actions, and there is no general description of what
constitutes an administrative decision-maker. For the purposes of this country report, we
must identify what should be classified as:
1. administrative law;
2. administrative authorities.
Our definition of administrative law and consequentially the administrative authorities
acting through it is based on the book Administrative Law by Cane.10 With regard to the
substance of administrative law, a distinction can bemade in theUnitedKingdombetween
an institutional and functional approach.11 The institutional approach focuses on the
actions of the bodies and agencies of local and central government.12 The functional
approach,which is themain approach in theUnitedKingdom, focuses onwhoever performs
5 Cane 2004, p. 11-12; McEldowney 2013, p. 603.
6 Cane 2004, p. 11-12.
7 Cane 2004, p. 12; http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/rcj-rolls-building/administrative-court.
8 McEldowney 2013, p. 603.
9 McEldowney 2013, p. 603.
10 Other terminology exists as well, see Craig 2003, p. 96ff. The distinction made by Cane is however the most
workable for the purposes of this country report.
11 Cane 2004, p. 2-3.
12 Cane 2004, p. 3.
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the functions of government.13 In the functional approach, there are two types of govern-
ment. They are the ‘core public authorities’, i.e. government entities performing government
functions, and ‘hybrid public authorities’, consisting of non-government entities performing
government functions.14 This distinction was brought about in part by the reform of many
government functions under Thatcher in the 1980s.15 For this report, we will focus on
instruments and authorities that fall under both ‘core public authorities’ and ‘hybrid
public authorities’. This means that we define administrative law and administrative
authorities broadly.
Administrative measures
The foregoing implies that those bodies that we classify under the above definition as
administrative authority can apply a wide variety of measures. These measures can be
based on criminal law,16 but civil-law instruments can also be used to enforce actions.17 In
this country report, however, we concentrate solely on the options open to administrative
authorities to perform actions in line with the definition of the ‘administrative approach’
adopted in this study. We refer to the general introduction to this research.
Using this definition, we quickly discovered that theUK legal systemhas an abundance
of regulatory bodies, inspectorates, and so on.18 For practical reasons, we have selected
certain administrative bodies based on a questionnaire sent to the UK representative to
the EU’s ‘Informal network on the administrative approach’, who gave us a list of the most
relevant administrative bodies and their respective powers. The completed questionnaire
and the list of administrative bodies have been added as Annex I.
4.2 Administrative authorities and their powers – an overview
Types of public authorities
Asmentioned above, the privatization of government functions– a process that commenced
in the 1980s – has left theUnitedKingdomwith awide variety of government institutions.19
The privatization process involved reviewing the proper functions of local government,
the general theme being that these functions should be opened up to market forces and
13 Cane 2004, p.4-5; R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex p. Datafin Plc [1987] QB 815.
14 Cane 2004, p. 5-6.
15 Cane 2004, p. 5-6.
16 For instance the by-laws can be enforced through criminal law. McEldowney 2013, p. 592. See also the
Regulation Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008.
17 McEldowney 2013, p. 587. See also the Regulation Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008.
18 McEldowney 2013, p. 590-591 and 603.
19 See for instance Craig 2003, p. 117-120 and Craig 2008, p. 169ff.
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efficiency, resulting in services being put out to competitive tendering and outsourcing.20
Local government is basically viewed as a service enabler, not as a service provider.21 The
distinction between private institutions and government institutions is hence not always
perfectly clear.22 Moreover, many traditional functions of local government have been
transferred to numerous agencies with responsibility across a wide spectrum of subjects,
such as social security, customs and excise and the prison service.23 The growth of different
government bodies has resulted in the Public Bodies Act 2011. This Act allows ministers
to abolish or merge governmental bodies with the intention to cut costs.24
Local authorities are elected directly by the public and – apart from the process of pri-
vatization – carry out a wide range of government functions.25 Nowadays this includes
public-sector housing, schools, public health and sanitation, welfare services, and town
and country planning.26 Local governments fall under the Department for Communities
and Local Government27 and are created by Acts of Parliament.28 Their powers and duties
can be scrutinized by the courts through judicial review,29 which will be discussed in the
final part of this section. The structure of local government is not straightforward, since
there have been recent radical changes to that structure, topped by many different forms
of authorities, such as County Councils, metropolitan districts, district councils, the unitary
authorities and the Greater London Authority along with London boroughs.30 However,
it is beyond the scope of this report to discuss these changes and different forms.
Powers of public authorities and enforcement
Public authorities, i.e. specialized bodies and local government, can implement statutes
adopted by the UK Parliament.31 Local authorities have the power to make by-laws.32
Furthermore, branches of government are allowed to inspect the manner in which a par-
ticular activity has been carried out and whether statutory standards have been complied
with.33 Local and central government can also be subject to financial inspection.34
20 Craig 2008, p. 175.
21 Craig 2008, p. 175-176.
22 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 185.
23 Thompson & Jones 201, Craig 2008 p. 186; Craig 2003, p. 54-58 and p. 91ff. In March 2000, about 1035 non-
departmental public bodies were counted. See Craig 2003, p. 95. Craig 2008, p. 169.
24 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 187; McEldowney 2013, p. 586.
25 Craig 2008, p. 180-182.
26 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 188.
27 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 185.
28 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 187.
29 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 187.
30 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 187.
31 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 190-192.
32 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 190-192.
33 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 194.
34 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 194.
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Public authorities furthermore have the power of licensing. These licences are commonly
issued at the local level.35 Licences can be used as an instrument to enforce or maintain
standards, raise revenue or to regulate the sheer number of persons engaged in a certain
activity.36 Licensed activities at a local level include the provision of taxi services, the selling
of alcohol and the running of a public cinema, theatre or sex shop. Drivers’ licences and
permits for the operation of air passenger routes are issued at the national level.37 A special
case concerns environmental licences, which are issued by both local and central authorities
as well as by the Environment Agency.38
Licencesmay impose conditions on the applicant concerning standards to bemet prior
to the issuing of the licence as well as the manner in which the licensed activity may take
place.39 If a licence application is refused, an applicant may appeal or ask for judicial
review.40 The legislation on which licensing is based usually contains enforcement provi-
sions, such as prosecution for criminal offences, powers of closure regarding licensed
premises and the power to revoke a licence.41 Important for this country report is the fact
that these powers depend on the underlying legislation and can therefore differ per statute
and its underlying subject. Public authorities enforce statutory standards, which mainly
fall within the competence of the local authorities.42 The authority has the discretion to
decide which steps to take in an individual case, within the limits of their statutory powers.
As previously mentioned, some statutes require the local authority to inspect whether the
statutory standard has been upheld, for instance with respect to housing conditions.43
The following procedure applies when the authorities discover that a statutory standard
has not been upheld.44
1. The findings (based upon inspection or otherwise) are reported to the local authority;
2A. The local authority (members), a designated committee or officer with delegated
powers takes a decision. Normally this implies notifying the person concerned that he
must comply with the relevant standards.
2B. Some statutes allow for immediate criminal proceedings; however, usually an informal
warning is issued first.
35 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 195.
36 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 195.
37 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 195.
38 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 195.
39 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 195.
40 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 195.
41 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 195.
42 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 198. E.g. the Environmental Protection Act 1990 imposes a duty on local
authorities to take action when premises are ‘in such state as to be prejudicial to health or a nuisance’.
43 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 198-199.
44 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 198-201.
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3. If the authority chooses to notify, the officer responsible will prepare the notice either
in writing or in the form the relevant statute prescribes.45 The statutory procedures
must be followed correctly, since failure is likely to invalidate the decision.46 The notice
states the rights of appeal when provided for.47 When the notice requires action on the
part of the person notified, only the minimum action necessary to comply with the
statutory standards may be specified in the notice,48 as well as a reasonable time to
carry out the work.
4A. If the notice is not complied with, the local authority has the power to act in default of
the relevant party. Before doing so, the local authority needs to respect the timeframe
given in the notice. Furthermore, it may only carry out the minimum work required
to comply with the terms of the notice. Normally, the local authority can recover the
costs incurred as a civil debt in summary proceedings before the local magistrates or
alternatively before the ordinary civil courts.49
4B. The local authority may also be empowered by the specific statute to prosecute the
offender for not complying with the statutory standard. Sometimes it may even be
possible to start criminal proceedings in parallel with notification. This is allowed in
– for example – Section 290 (6) of the PublicHealth Act 1936.50 In other cases, criminal
proceedings become possible when the person notified fails to comply in time with the
statutory notice, for example as under the Environmental Protection Act 1990, Section
80.51
When exercising the power of notification and the power to act in default, local authorities
are also empowered to enter private property when necessary for public officials to carry
out their duties.52 Local authorities are also allowed to ask the court for private law
injunctions in the public interest53 in order to prevent the infringement of the public’s
rights, for instance public nuisance affecting the health of the district or the continued
flouting of a by-law or other legislation.54 Alternatively, the local authority may acquire
45 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 199.
46 E.g. Bexley London Borough v. Gardner Merchant PLC [1993] COD 383.
47 Rayner v. Stepney Corporation [1911] 2 Law Report Chancery Division 312.
48 Welton v. North Cornwall District Council [1977] 1 WLR 570.
49 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 199.
50 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 199.
51 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 200.
52 Entry into private property is strictly regulated in England. See Entick v Carrington [1765] 19 State Trails
1030.
53 Section 222 Local Government Act 1972: For the promotion or protection of the interests of the inhabitants
of their area.
54 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 200.
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standing by acting in conjunction with the Attorney-General.55 If an injunction is ignored,
this is regarded as contempt of court, for which a person can be fined or imprisoned.56
Judicial review
Apart from non-judicial review,57 government decisions can be subject to judicial review.58
It is beyond the remit of this report to discuss the full extent of the judicial review process,
but some general remarks are appropriate here regarding this process and its meaning in
the scope of UK administrative law.
The Administrative Court59 is a branch of the High Court and consists of judges spe-
cializing in administrative law. Its jurisdiction is to ensure that public bodies observe the
law, fulfil their public duties and do not act beyond the scope of their powers.60 Rulings of
theAdministrativeCourt are an extension of the supremacy of Parliament, which is doctrine
in the UK. When the Administrative Court holds that a local authority has exceeded its
powers, it ismerely enforcing thewill of Parliament.61 After all, Parliament has only allowed
the authority to apply the power to the extent that Parliament itself has envisaged.
Judicial review must not be confused with appeal against an administrative or other
decision. Review concerns the lawfulness of decisions rather than their factual merits.62
Review is also a last resort remedy. If a statute allows an appeal to be lodged with a higher
authority than the initial decision-making authority, this may affect the availability of
judicial review.63
When administrative law refuses or grants a judicial review, appeal is normally possible
before the Court of Appeal at the Civil Division. Appeal against the decision of the Court
of Appeal may be lodged with the Supreme Court.64 In rare cases, the Court of Appeal can
be trumped and the claimant can appeal directly before the Supreme Court.65 For each
appeal, permission or leave is necessary either from the court that issued the relevant
decision, or from the court to which the appeal will be submitted.66
55 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 200.
56 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 200.
57 Ombudsmen and tribunals, see Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 201-206.
58 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 206-230. See also: Marique 2013.
59 Established in 2000.
60 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 206.
61 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 207.
62 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 207-208. Kemper Reinsurance Company v. Minister of Finance [2001] 1 AC 1
at 14-15.
63 R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Preston [1985] AC 835 at 852.
64 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 208-209.
65 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 208-209.
66 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 208-209.
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The procedural rules for filing a claim regarding the review of the lawfulness of an
enactment or decision, action or failure to act in the exercise of a public functions are
found in Part 54 of the Civil Procedure Rules.
When the Administrative Court upholds a claim, it may impose a number of discre-
tionary remedies, three of which are unique to public law.67 To begin with, the Court may
quash the order, where another ‘inferior court, person or body exercising powers of a
judicial or quasi-judicial nature is ordered to have its decision quashed.’ Second, the Court
can issue a prohibition order, but only as a temporary measure. The order can be issued
together with a quashing order, for instance to simultaneously quash a previous decision
and to prevent future decisions. Third, the Court may issue a mandatory order to a person
or body to carry out a public duty.68 Remedies outside public law are the granting of
injunctions or declarations. The Court can also grant damages, restitutions and the
recovery of a sum of money, although this is not common practice and such grants cannot
be the sole claim at the stage of judicial review.69
The grounds on which judicial review can take place are divided into three main cate-
gories, namely the illegality, or unlawfulness of a decision,70 the irrationality or unreason-
ableness of a decision71 and procedural impropriety.72 We will not discuss these grounds
here.
Now that we have briefly explored the scope of administrative law in the United
Kingdom, we will turn to the background of its approach to serious and organized crime
as a whole.
4.3 Background of the current policies on serious and organized
crime in the United Kingdom
This section describes the background of the policies on serious and organized crime in
the United Kingdom. Administratively, the nation comprises four countries: England,
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Each country has adopted its own policy towards
serious and organised crime.
England & Wales
In England & Wales, several policy papers have been published to guide the workings of
the former Serious and Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) and its successor, the National
67 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 210.
68 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 210.
69 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 210-211. This would be a matter for an ordinary private law claim.
70 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 220-222.
71 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 222-226.
72 Thompson & Jones 2012, p. 226-230.
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Crime Agency (NCA). To begin with, in 2004, the white paper One step ahead was pub-
lished. The paper marked the establishment of the SOCA as well as Her Majesty’s Revenue
andCustoms (HMRC) and theUKBorder Agency (UKBA).73 Thewhite paper introduced
new powers and regulations for law enforcement, such as asset recovery and Serious Crime
Prevention Orders (SCPO).74 Furthermore, it called for law enforcement agencies to
improve their collective understanding of organized crime by establishing the UK Threat
Assessment and Police Regional IntelligenceUnits.75 In 2009 theUKgovernment published
the policy document Extending our Reach.76 Chapter 2 of Extending our Reach called for
expansion of the traditional law enforcement instruments used in the battle against orga-
nized crime to include other tools, such as administrative, regulatory and tax tools.
According to the policy, government departments throughout the entire public sector
should cooperate closely. Chapter 6 of Extending our Reach is highly relevant for the pur-
poses of this country report. It describes the tools and instruments available to create ‘a
hostile environment for serious and organized criminals’. This includes criminal and civil
law as well as administrative means to disrupt crime activities.77 The approach aims to
target the environment in which criminals operate by shutting off opportunities for them
to exploit.78 The policy paper underlines that organized criminals interact with government
agencies and the legitimate economy, more specifically at the local level.79 The government
should therefore focus on these local interactions by using local sources of intelligence to
create a hostile environment for organized crime.80 In 2011, a subsequent strategy, Local
to Global, also stressed the importance of using the full range of government powers to
tackle and disrupt criminal activities.81
Research by Levi shows that the non-traditional approach in the United Kingdom can
be divided into three main categories, namely: 1) community approaches,82 2) regulatory
73 Cabinet Office 2009, p. 1.
74 Cabinet Office 2009, p. 1.
75 Cabinet Office 2009, p. 2.
76 Cabinet Office 2009, p. 1.
77 Cabinet Office 2009, p. 45.
78 Cabinet Office 2009, p. 4.
79 Cabinet Office 2009, p. 43-44.
80 Cabinet Office 2009, p. 43-44.
81 HM Government 2011.
82 Including the types of intervention: (1) community crime prevention, (2) passive citizen participation and
(3) active citizen participation.
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disruption and non-justice system approaches83 and 3) private-sector approaches.84,85
Within these three categories, sixteen ‘types of interventions’ or instruments can be iden-
tified.86 However, when reviewing these types of interventions in detail, only a small portion
can be described as ‘administrative’ as defined in this research. Instead,most interventions
refer to civil proceedings, community policing and citizen involvement.87 The same applies
to the policy document Extending our Reach.88 It too emphasizes civil recovery and fiscal
strategies. Nevertheless, besides the use of civil and fiscal powers, the local regulatory
authorities’ powers are also used to disrupt criminal activity,89 although their inclusion is
kept to a minimum.90
In October 2013 the NCA replaced the SOCA, following the Crime and Courts Act
2013.91 The NCA (unlike the SOCA) is an operational crime-fighting agency with broad
tasks relating to tackling organized crime, strengthening the UK borders, fighting fraud
and cybercrime and protecting children.92 It has both a crime-reduction function93 and a
criminal intelligence function.94 Coinciding with the launch of the NCA, the Serious and
Organized Crime Strategy (hereafter: NCA Strategy)95 outlines the UK’s current approach
to organized crime.96 The NCA Strategy is based on four pillars: ‘pursue’, ‘prevent’97,
83 Including the types of intervention: (1) regulatory policies, programmes and agencies (domestic and foreign),
(2) faster customs and other regulatory treatment for firms and countries that have instituted approved
internal compliance programmes, (3) Routine and suspicious activity reports as investigative triggers for
illegal drug precursors and money laundering, (4) tax policy and programmes, (5) civil injunctions and other
sanctions, (6) military interventions, (7) security and secret intelligence services and (8) foreign policy and
aid programmes.
84 Including the types of intervention: (1) individual corporate responses, (2) professional and industry associ-
ations, (3) special private-sector committees, (4) anti-ID fraud andmoney laundering software and (5) private
policing and forensic accounting.
85 Levi & Maguire 2004, p. 411.
86 Levi & Maguire 2004, p. 411.
87 Levi & Maguire 2004, p. 411.
88 Cabinet Office 2009, particularly Chapter 6.
89 Levi & Maguire 2004, p. 413. Also, a (then) SOCA officer mentioned in a telephone interview that as a term,
‘administrative’ entails more or less the powers of local authorities in the United Kingdom.




93 Article 1 paragraph 4 and 6 to 11 Crime and Courts Act 2013.
94 Article 1 paragraph 5 Crime and Courts Act 2013.
95 HM Government October 2013.
96 HM Government October 2013.
97 Mainly focused on tools for education and deterring people already engaged in organized crime (including
lifetime management), such as Serious Crime Prevention Orders, Travel Restriction Orders etc. This falls
outside the scope of this country report. One interesting aspect however is the introduction of licences for
Private Detectives. This regime will be rolled out from the autumn of 2014 onwards and can therefore not
yet be discussed in this report. HM Government October 2013, p. 10-11 and 48-52.
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‘protect’, and ‘prepare’,98 for which strategic objectives have been listed.99 The first two
pillars aim to reduce crime threats, whereas the latter two aim to reduce vulnerability to
crime.100
The NCA Strategy emphasizes once again the importance of collaboration between
government bodies.101 This ‘partnershipworking’ throughCommunity Safety Partnerships
(CSPs) will be discussed at length in Section 4.4. TheNCAStrategy also addresses the need
for better data-sharing between government departments and agencies, such as the Trading
Standards and the Environment Agency, through the existing Regional Organized Crime
Units (ROCUs) and the strategic Government Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN).102
TheROCUs andGAIN are primarily law enforcement agencies, but collaboratewith other
government agencies, such as the Environment Agency.103 Again, these organizations and
local cooperative bodies will be discussed in Section 4.4. The NCA Strategy further calls
for legislation to create new powers for the seizing of criminal assets.104
The ‘protect’ pillar of the NCA Strategy underlines – among other things105 – the pro-
tection of the national and local government against serious and organized crime.106 This
entails tackling fraud in the public sector107 as well as the misuse of public procurement
activities at the local level.108 The latter will be addressed by implementing the European
Directive on public procurement and additional legislation directed at ensuring the
appropriate checks to exclude companies involved in organized crime.109 Part of the ‘protect’
pillar is also the notion that certain professions, including within government and law
enforcement, can be subject to corruption or bribery. The Bribery Act 2010 was adopted
as part of the anti-corruption policy.110 One measure meant to tackle corruption is the
development of a stronger system for vetting police officers when hired or promoted.111
The substantive strategies and instruments will be addressed below in Section 4.4.
98 This pillar focuses on emergency services, vulnerable communities and victims of crime. This falls outside
the scope of this report. HM Government October 2013, p. 11-12.
99 HM Government October 2013, p. 7-8.
100 HM Government October 2013, p. 25.
101 HM Government October 2013, p. 9, 25 and 28.
102 HM Government October 2013, p. 9 and 29.
103 HM Government October 2013, p. 29.
104 HM Government October 2013, p. 9.
105 Other policy initiatives within the ‘protect’ pillar include physical protection against crime, strengthening
borders, the containment of fraud and cyberattacks against government and identity theft. These policies
fall outside the scope of this report. HM Government October 2013, p. 11.
106 HM Government October 2013, p. 53.
107 HM Government October 2013, p. 53.
108 HM Government October 2013, p. 11 and 53.
109 HM Government October 2013, p. 11 and 53.
110 HM Government October 2013, p. 59-60.
111 HM Government October 2013, p. 59-61.
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Scotland
In Scotland, the SeriousOrganizedCrime Taskforce (SOCT) published the strategy Letting
our communities flourish. A strategy for tackling serious organized crime in Scotland in June
2009.112 The SOCT cooperates with the (former) SOCA,113 the HMRC114 and other bodies.
The strategy emphasizes the role of the SOCT, but at the same time calls on other public
agencies, business and individuals to take responsibility.115 Substantively, the focus is on
reducing the harm caused by crime and on turning Scotland into a hostile environment
for criminals.116 Four objectives are identified, namely ‘divert’, ‘disrupt’, ‘deter’ and
‘detect’.117 One of the key elements of the strategy is “Going beyond law enforcement –
involving business, local authorities and communities.”118
While there is nomention of an ‘administrative approach to crime’ per se in the strategy,
intrinsically the strategy is aimed at such an approach, stating: “This is not just a role for
law enforcement agencies. Local authorities, professional bodies and others can make a
crucial difference by spotting and reporting suspicious activity, or using their own powers
(italics added) to help disrupt serious organized crime.” The strategy continues by saying
that local authorities in particular have powers to issue (and revoke or refuse) licences in
such areas of business as taxis, pubs, restaurants, night-clubs, and can furthermore use
powers in their capacity as landlords and revenue collectors.119 The strategy also stresses
the central role of organizations such as the NCA, HMRC and the UK Border Agency in
accessing information.120
A new agency, the Serious Organized Crime & Procurement Sub Group, was also
founded to ensure that government tenders are not granted to companies linked to crime.121
So far, the Group has established an intelligence sharing service for public sector agencies
and assisted in identifying the sectorsmost vulnerable to serious organized crime.122 Finally,
the strategy envisages more information exchange and collaboration between law
enforcement, business, local government and others.
112 The Serious Organised Crime Taskforce 2009.
113 Now NCA.
114 The Serious Organised Crime Taskforce 2009, p. 3.
115 The Serious Organised Crime Taskforce 2009, p. 3.
116 The Serious Organised Crime Taskforce 2009, p. 4.
117 The Serious Organised Crime Taskforce 2009, p. 4.
118 The Serious Organised Crime Taskforce 2009, p. 4.
119 The Serious Organised Crime Taskforce 2009, p. 14.
120 The Serious Organised Crime Taskforce 2009, p. 14. As well as their enforcement powers.
121 The Serious Organised Crime Taskforce 2009, p. 17; http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2010/06/
01111748/1; The Serious Organised Crime Taskforce 2010.
122 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2010/06/01111748/1; The Serious Organised Crime Taskforce
2010.
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Northern Ireland
In Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Assembly has had the power to regulate most
of the criminal justice functions since April 2010.123 Here we will discuss its policy on
organized crime. In 2000, the Organized Crime Task Force in Northern Ireland (OCTF
N-I) was established in which agencies participate on a voluntary basis.124 Its most recent
strategy paper concerns the period of 2012-2014.125 The OCTF N-I advocates a multi-
agency approach and includes the UK central government, the Northern Ireland Govern-
ment, law enforcement, prosecutors, communities and businesses.126 It has incorporated
the UK’s national strategy as published by the SOCA, but at the same time focuses on its
specific local issues.127 The strategy has three core objectives, namely: (1) make Northern
Ireland a hostile environment for organized criminals, (2) inform the public of organized
crime trends and report on the work of the Organized Crime Task Force, (3) support
Northern Ireland communities affected by organized crime.128 The partners should share
and analyse relevant information, taking into account the issue of sensitive information.129
Another objective is to update and amend the existing legislation where necessary because
of the devolution process.130 Although the strategy does not explicitly mention local
authorities or the application of administrative instruments to tackle or prevent crime, it
is clear that this is part of the strategy. However, because of the on-going process of devo-
lution and transfer of powers, the strategy is still developing.
Comparison
On policies concerning serious and organized crime, the four countries in the UK have
similar approaches. These include a partnership approach involving law enforcement
agencies as well as other public agencies, communities and businesses. Furthermore, the
focus lies on sharing intelligence between these agencies as well as on creating a hostile
environment for organized criminals. The strategies in England & Wales and Scotland
explicitlymention the option of an administrative approach to crime, whereas theNorthern
Ireland strategy does not. This can be explained by devolution and the reliance on the
SOCA strategy, which indirectly introduces an administrative approach into the strategy
of Northern Ireland.
In conclusion, it is clear that a policy encompassing the use of administrative instruments
in the fight against organized crime has started to develop in the United Kingdom. The
123 Organised Crime Task Force Northern Ireland 2012, p. 10.
124 http://www.octf.gov.uk/, Organised Crime Task Force Northern Ireland 2012, p. 3
125 Organised Crime Task Force Northern Ireland 2012.
126 Organised Crime Task Force Northern Ireland 2012, p. 3-4 and 11-12.
127 Organised Crime Task Force Northern Ireland 2012, p. 5.
128 Organised Crime Task Force Northern Ireland 2012, p. 6.
129 Organised Crime Task Force Northern Ireland 2012, p. 9.
130 Organised Crime Task Force Northern Ireland 2012, p. 10.
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substantive nature of these instruments will be discussed further in the next section. For
practical reasons, we limit our description to the instruments applicable in England &
Wales. The instruments specifically applicable inNorthern Ireland and Scotland fall outside
the scope of this report.
4.4 Substantive instruments
As explained above, the UK has a wide range of administrative instruments that can be
applied in the context of preventing and tackling serious and organized crime. In the
context of this report, it was necessary to narrow down the overview to the most relevant
instruments. We consequently took the Hungary Handbook as our starting point.131 The
European Commission published the Handbook in 2009, based on self-reports by the
Member States regarding administrative approaches to crime.
The UK report identified substantive instruments in civil law, tax law, new branches
of criminal law and administrative law without making a clear distinction between the
different fields. This obviously follows on from the fact that UK law draws no clear distinc-
tion between public and private law, as discussed in Section 4.2. Second, we received an
overview of the administrative authorities with which the NCA cooperates as well as the
underlying legislation. The list is based on the SOCA compendium,132 which presents an
overview of the different instruments the SOCA (and now the NCA) uses to fight serious
and organized crime.133 The compendium itself is classified and could not be obtained for
the purposes of this study. Finally, the UK representative to the EU’s informal network on
the administrative approach completed a specific questionnaire (see Annex I).
This section first discusses the instruments for preventive screening and monitoring
of persons, including the options of disclosure and barring of persons (Section 4.4.1.1)
and the screening of persons in the context of money-laundering regulations (Section
4.4.1.2). Second, we describe the regulations that enable the national and local authorities
to access information for screening purposes, i.e. the relevant provisions of the Crime and
Courts Act (Section 4.4.2.1), the Suspicious Activity Report System (Section 4.4.2.2) as
well as the conditions under which local government can apply multi-agency approaches
to tackle crime problems (Section 4.4.2.3). Third, we explore the statutory possibilities for
closing premises (Section 4.4.3) and for seizing assets outside the scope of a criminal pro-
cedure (Section 4.4.4). Last, we discuss other regularly used tools (Section 4.4.5).
131 10899/11 JAI 380 COSI 44 CRIMORG 77 ENFOPOL 179.
132 http://www.soca.gov.uk/about-soca/how-we-work/new-approaches.
133 Hereafter, we will use the abbreviation NCA instead of the (former) SOCA to prevent confusion, unless
otherwise and specifically indicated.
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4.4.1 Possibilities for screening and monitoring of persons
4.4.1.1 Disclosure and barring of persons
This section discusses the main instruments for vetting persons in England & Wales. The
procedure refers to the vetting of persons in the context of licences and tenders as well as
the screening of potential employees, with the focus being on the latter.134
England & Wales introduced procedures for vetting employees as early as in 1750.135
At that time Henry Fielding developed a Universal Register Office, giving employers access
to the backgrounds and character references of potential employees.136 Since then, the
vetting and screening of applicants and employees by employers, particularly thoseworking
with vulnerable adults and children, has been expanded vastly.137 The establishment of the
Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) is the most recent and relevant development.
The Disclosure and Barring Service
TheDBS started operating on 1December 2012 and provides a proportional central vetting
service for the UK, with the exception of Scotland.138 It includes the former Criminal
Records Service (CRS) and the Independent Safeguarding Authority (ISA). The former
CRS was responsible for checking a person’s criminal record, while the ISA vetted and –
if necessary – barred persons who applied for jobs involving working with children and
other vulnerable groups.139 The DBS can only require registration of persons who are
involved in ‘regular activity’ with vulnerable groups.
A DBS check is requested as part of a pre-recruitment check, regarding an offer of
employment, volunteer positions or for specific licences.140 It can also be included in a
tender procedure.141 The primary objective of the DBS is to help employers make safer
recruitment decisions, to prevent unsuitable people fromworkingwith vulnerable persons,
and to make safer licensing and tender decisions. In doing so, the DBS allows employers
and other organizations to request criminal record checks (including cautions, reprimands
and final warnings) on potential employees.142
134 See for instance: Levi & Maguire 2004
135 Mustafa, Kingston & Beeston 2012, p. 16. See also: Thomas & Hebenton 2013, p. 228-234.
136 Mustafa, Kingston & Beeston 2012, p. 16.
137 For a full overview of the development of vetting and screening in England andWales, please refer toMustafa,
Kingston & Beeston 2012, p. 15-30.
138 www.gov.uk, underHomeOffice; Cabinet Office 2011. https://www.gov.uk/government/organizations/dis-
closure-and-barring-service. In comparisonwith – apparently – the ISA.Disclosure Scotland has jurisdiction
in Scotland. For Northern Ireland, the criminal records disclosures are managed by the AccesNI, the DBS
has a function as making the barring decisions regarding Northern Ireland.
139 Cabinet Office 2011.
140 DBS eligibility guidance version 2.2 (November 2013), p. 1. Via www.gov.uk.
141 Cabinet Office 2011.
142 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a.
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In principle, ‘spent’ convictions cannot be used as a ground for refusing to employ a
person, since this is unlawful under s. 4 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act (ROA)
1974.143 A conviction is ‘spent’ after a person has served the sentence and a rehabilitation
period.144,145 However, certain areas of employment are exempted from the principle rule
that spent convictions cannot be taken into account, as specified in the ROA 1974
(Exceptions) Order 1975.146 This includes professionals and volunteers working with
children and vulnerable adults, and persons working in educational positions, in certain
legal professions, in professions in the penal sector, in positions at the Royal Society for
the Prevention of Cruelty against Animals (RSPCA) and in professions at financial institu-
tions.
It also applies to persons seeking to carry arms, people or organizations seeking to
apply for tenders,147 football stewards, commissioners for the Gambling Commission and
police and Crime Commissioners.148
It furthermore applies to the following licences: taxi driver and private hire vehicle
licences; National Lottery licences; licences issued under Section 25 of the Children and
Young Persons Act 1993;149 licences issued under section 8 of the Private Security Industry
Act 2001; personal or operating licences under Part 5 or 6 of the Gambling Act 2005 and
licences under Regulation 5 of the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001, Article 3 paragraph
2 of Regulation 2004/273/ EC or Article 6 paragraph 1 of Regulation 2005/111/EC.150
The organization requesting the DBS to check a person’s background must ensure that
it is eligible to do so under the current legal provisions, i.e. the Exceptions Order 1975.151
The most important legal provisions providing eligibility are summed up in the DBS guide
to eligibility for criminal records checks.152 The minimum age for a person to be screened
by the DBS is 16 years.153
There are currently two types of DBS checks available to employers and organizations
granting and revoking licences:
143 Section 1 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974.
144 This rehabilitation period differs per offence. Recently, changes have been made to the rehabilitation period
in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. For instance if the original sentence
was a prison sentence of more than 30 months, the conviction can never be spent. On the other hand if the
person has served a prison sentence shorter than six months, the rehabilitation period is seven years. Thomas
& Hebenton 2013, p. 238.
145 Thomas & Hebenton 2013, p. 237.
146 DBS eligibility guidance version 2.2 (November 2013), p. 1. Via www.gov.uk.
147 This will be discussed under Section 4.4.1.3.
148 DBS eligibility guidance version 2.2 (November 2013), p. 3-6. Via www.gov.uk.
149 By which is meant persons under the age of 18 travelling abroad for the purpose of performing or being
exhibited for profit.
150 DBS eligibility guidance version 2.2 (November 2013), p. 6. Via www.gov.uk.
151 DBS eligibility guidance version 2.2 (November 2013), p. 1. Via www.gov.uk.
152 Via www.gov.uk.
153 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a.
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1. Standard checks. A standard DBS check is based on the Rehabilitation of Offenders
Act 1974 (ROA) (Exceptions) Order 1975 and includes details of all spent and unspent
convictions, cautions, reprimands and final warnings as found in the Police National
Computer and which have not been filtered154 in line with legislation;155
2. Enhanced checks156
a. Enhanced checks (normal). Whether a position is eligible for an enhanced DSB
check is determined by its inclusion in both the ROA Exceptions Order and the
Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records) Regulations 2002. Examples are volunteers157
and professionals caring for, training, supervising or being in charge of children,
specified activities with adults who receive health care or social care services, and
applicants for gaming and lottery licences.158 An enhanced check is based on the
same records as the standard check, but supplementedwith information held locally
by police forces.159
b. Enhanced checks with children’s and/or adults’ barred list checks. A position is eligible
for this type of check when the Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records) Regulations
2002 specifically and explicitly permits the barred lists to be checked.160 This includes,
for example, people who apply for Taxi and Private Hire Vehicle (PHV) licences.
This screening also includes the children’s and/or adults’ barred lists. Any informa-
tion that comes to the DBS regarding these extensive checks needs to be considered
by the DBS, as this is its statutory duty.161 The decision to be placed on the child
barred list and/or adult barred list lies with expert caseworkers.162 These process
referrals, made by employers or organizations, about individuals believed to pose
a future risk to children and/or vulnerable groups.163 There is a duty to refer on the
part of regulated activity suppliers and personnel suppliers.164 In addition, the fol-
lowing groups have the power to refer to the DBS under the Safeguarding Vulner-
able Groups Act 2006: local authorities; education and library boards; health and
154 Since 29 May 2013 certain old and minor offences will not be mentioned on criminal record certificates
anymore. Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a.
155 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a.
156 Home Office Framework Document, p. 3.
157 As specifically defined in Section 2 of the Police Act 1997 (Criminal Records) Regulations 2002.
158 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a.
159 Home Office Framework Document, p. 3; Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a.
160 These lists include persons barred fromworkingwith children or vulnerable adults. HomeOffice Framework
Document, p. 3.
161 DBS eligibility guidance version 2.2 (November 2013), p. 1. Via www.gov.uk. Moreover: Disclosure and
Barring Service 2013a. The person will be notified if he or she is affected by certain information.
162 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013b. This decision can be automatic for certain offences. See: Home Office
Framework Document, p. 4.
163 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013b.
164 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013b.
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social care trusts;165 keepers of registers, such as the General Medical Council and
the Nursing and Midwifery Council; and supervisory authorities such as the Care
Quality Commission.166
An interim option exists with regard to persons applying to work with vulnerable adults
(under supervision). This is the ‘DBS adult first check’, which allows for a provisional
assessment of a person’s criminal records.167 The option is available to organizations
requesting a check of the DBS adult barred list, albeit under strict criteria.168 One possible
outcome is an order to await the full assessment, in which case a match with the adult
barred list may have been found. Another outcome is that there is no match for the person
on the adult barred list, in which case that person can start working provisionally.169 It is
unlawful to knowingly employ a barred person, either paid or as a volunteer, to engage in
a regulated activity with a group from which they are barred. Conversely, a barred person
breaks the law if they seek, offer or engage in regulated activity with a group from which
they are barred.170
Furthermore, the DBS is in the process of developing a new type of check, the ‘basic
check’. This check will encompass convictions and conditional cautions that are unspent
under the ROA 1974.171 Persons may apply for a basic check directly and use it for several
purposes, including employment but also certain licensing and insurance purposes.172
The DBS vetting procedure is intended for employers (and contracting parties, as dis-
cussed in the next section). The registered employer can – as part of its recruitment pro-
cess – require a criminal records check, the intensity being dependent on the type of work
as specified in the categories above. The employer must provide the candidate with a DBS
application form, which the candidate must then complete and return to the employer.173
The applications for DBS checks always need to take place via a registered body. Under
certain circumstances,174 employers may become ‘registered bodies’ themselves175 or can
lodge their applications via so-called ‘umbrella bodies’176, which are in turn registered
165 For Northern Ireland specifically.
166 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013b.
167 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a.
168 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a.
169 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a.
170 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013b.
171 Home Office Framework Document, p. 3.
172 Home Office Framework Document, p. 3.
173 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a.
174 They have to lodge more than 99 DBS checks a year and be able to ask questions that fall under the ROA
1974 (Exception) Order 1975.
175 For which conditions and fees apply, see: Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a. Employers that lodge at
least 1500 applications a year may use an automated system, i.e. the ‘e-bulk service’.
176 The employer must be able to ask exempted questions but does not need to lodge more than 99 applications
a year.
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bodies.177 In the latter option, an employer asks an umbrella body178 to undertake the
application process; the umbrella body needs to be satisfied that the request for Disclosure
is justified. Once it is, it sends out application forms to the individual concerned, including
identification checks, and it countersigns the application for Standard Disclosure. The
Standard Disclosure is sent to both the umbrella body and the individual applicant within
two weeks. The latter forwards the Standard Disclosure to the employer or contracting
authority. The umbrella body destroys its copy after six months.179 An umbrella body
therefore provides non-registered bodies access to DBS checks. A list of umbrella bodies
is provided on the website of the DBS.180
The employer can also registerwith the competent authority, i.e. theDSB, as a ‘registered
body’ and submit the application itself. It then sends out the application forms to the
individual concerned, checking the identification documents and countersigning and
forwarding the complete application to the competent authority, after which the registered
body and the individual concerned receive their own copies.181
After countersigning, theDBS searches thePoliceNationalComputer.Where applicable,
the children’s and adults’ barred lists are searched, after which the records held by the local
police are searched. Enhanced checks are sent by secure, electronic means to the police
for an additional check of local records. After these police checks, a DBS certificate is
printed.182 The certificate includes the time at which it was issued and it has no official
expiry date.183 Certificates become invalid when the status of a person changes due to – for
instance – police information.184 After a thorough check of the identity of the applicant,
employers are allowed to accept a DBS check issued previously, but they need to consider
that the person may have been subject to new convictions. In addition, the earlier DBS
check probably concerned a different position.185 Since 2013, theDBShas anUpdate Service,
which allows new relevant information to be added. Individuals can subscribe voluntarily
for this service.186
The checks may also involve overseas applicants, although the DBS cannot access
overseas criminal records directly. According to the DBS, the Police National Computer
177 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a.
178 These are: “organizations registered by the competent authorities to process Standard Disclosures on behalf
of other organizations.” Cabinet Office 2011.
179 Cabinet Office 2011.
180 https://dbs-ub-directory.homeoffice.gov.uk.
181 Cabinet Office 2011.
182 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a.
183 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a. However, for certain positions a new check or periodic checks may
be required.
184 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/100000-subscribers-take-advantage-of-dbs-update-service.
185 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a.
186 Home Office Framework Document, p. 3.
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also holds a small number of criminal records from overseas.187 When there are no records
available, the DBS directs the employer to the relevant embassies or High Commission for
further enquiries. The DBS however plays no role in the foreign procedure.188 The same
is true for any questions regarding foreign certificates of good conduct.189 Regulations
concerning the criminal records checks can be found on the Home Office website, listed
by country in alphabetical order.190
Employers receiving certificates from theDBS based on standard and enhanced checks
must comply with the Code of Practice as (CoP) laid down in s. 122 paragraph 2 of the
Police Act 1997.191 The CoP requires the correct storage of the information, usage of the
information only for the purposes for which it was distributed, and a basic retention period
of 6 months, after which the information should be destroyed.192
Certain groups may dispute DBS certificates if they contain errors or irrelevant or
inaccurate information.193 First, the individual applicantmay dispute the certificate. Second,
persons who have a legitimate interest in the accuracy of the certificate, including the
countersignatory, the employer or a licensing authority, may dispute it.194 The latter must
discuss the reasons for the dispute with the applicant.195 There are two types of disputes:
a. a profile dispute. This is when incorrect personal information appears on the DBS
certificate;196
b. a disclosure dispute. This may involve the following situations: disclosed conviction
information does not relate to the applicant; details of the applicant’s disclosed convic-
tion information are incorrect; information approved by the police for disclosure is
considered inaccurate or irrelevant.
The DBS will investigate the dispute itself and if it rules in favour of the applicant, a
replacement certificate is issued.197
In relation to enhanced certificates, an Independent Monitor has been established for
the DBS to provide applicants of such certificates with the right of appeal.198 This appeal
can only be lodged against the content of the ‘additional information’ section of the
187 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a.
188 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a.
189 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a.
190 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/criminal-records-checks-for-overseas-applicants.
191 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/143662/cop.pdf.
192 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013a.
193 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013b.
194 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013b.
195 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013b.
196 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013b.
197 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013b.
198 Home Office Framework Document, p. 12; Disclosure and Barring Service 2013b.
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enhanced certificate as obtained via the police forces.199 Disputes regarding errors or
inaccuracies need to be lodged with the DBS, disputes arising from data incorporated into
other parts of the certificates than the ‘additional information’ section need to be referred
to the police force in question.200 The Independent Monitor only assesses referrals when
the applicant believes that the additional information is not relevant to the job or position
applied for or should not be included in the certificate.201
The DBS cooperates with the police, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO),
the Department for Education, Department of Health, a private company responsible for
the administration’s infrastructure and the registered bodies.202 TheDBS, theHomeOffice,
theDepartment for Education and theDepartment ofHealth have concluded a framework
document (hereafter: Home Office Framework Document) that aims primarily to set the
parameters for cooperation between the concluding parties.203,204 Indicated (additional)
partners in the Home Office Framework Document are the Department for Business
Innovation and Skill, HM Passport Office, the police and other government departments
and the devolved administrations.205 No further specifications are made with regard to the
sharing of information with these parties.
In conclusion, England and Wales have a standardized procedure for the vetting of
persons. However, the information on which this vetting is based consists mainly of
criminal records, or – in certain cases – police information and/or a check against a list of
barred persons.
Specific regulation for screening related to the procurement of government contracts
Public procurement is regulated in the Public Contracts Regulations 2006 (as amended),206
which applies to contracting authorities in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.207 The
Regulations implement Directive 2004/18/EC208 of the European Parliament and Council
199 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013b.
200 Disclosure and Barring Service 2013b.




204 Home Office Framework Document, p. 1.
205 Home Office Framework Document, p. 12.
206 Last amended in 2009 by The Public Contracts (Amendment) Regulations 2009, which also implements
Article 1 of Directive 2007/66/EC (see also its subsequent Explanatory Note), and in 2011 by the Public
Procurement (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2011, which changed a number of Acts involving
time limits for starting court proceedings and updating the number of offences for which an economic
operator can be rejected according to Regulation 23 (see hereafter).
207 At the same time the Utilities Contracts Regulations 2006 (as amended) was also introduced. These two
regulations are similar. Unless otherwise indicated, reference will be made only to the Public Contracts
Regulations 2006.
208 O.J. L 134, p. 114.
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of 31st March 2004 on the co-ordination of procedures for the award of public works
contracts, public supply contracts and public services contracts.209
Regulation 3 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2006 states what is understood under
contracting authority, including the Ministers of the Crown, government departments,
the House of Commons and the House of Lords, local authorities210 and fire and police
authorities. Other bodies meeting needs in the public interest may also be subject to the
Regulations, according to provision 3 paragraph 1 under w.
Regulation 8 determines when the Public Contracts Regulations 2006 applies, i.e. in
four different procedures, namely the negotiated procedure (Regulations 13, 14 and 17),211
the open procedure (Regulation 15),212 the restricted procedure (Regulation 16)213 and the
competitive dialogue procedure (Regulation 18).214,215
Part 4 of the legislation states the provisions for the selection of economic operators
by contracting authorities. Economic operators are defined as ‘a contractor, a supplier or
a services provider’.216
Regulation 23 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2006 (as amended)217 allows the
contracting authority the right to either exclude economic operators from a contracting
procedure (paragraph 1) or declare them ineligible or decide not to select the economic
operator (paragraph 4). Economic operators can be excluded from the tender procedure
if they or their directors or any other person who has powers of representation, decision
or control of the economic operator are convicted of:
– conspiracy under s.1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977, where that conspiracy relates to
participation in a criminal organization as defined in Article 2 paragraph 1 of Council
Joint Action 98/733/JHA or Article 9 or 9A of the Criminal Attempts and Conspiracy
(Northern Ireland) Order 1983(b), where that conspiracy relates to participation in a
criminal organization as defined in Article 2 of Council Framework Decision
2008/841/JHA(c);
– corruption under s. 1 of the Public Bodies Corruption Practices Act 1889 or s. 1 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act 1906;
209 See Explanatory Note to the Public Contracts Regulations 2006.
210 Which are further defined in Regulation 3 paragraph 2.
211 The authority negotiates the terms of contract with selected contracting parties. Craig 2008, p. 152.
212 Any interested party is able to submit a bid. Craig 2008, p. 152.
213 The authority selects parties to place bids. Craig 2008, p. 152.
214 Used for complex contracts. A limited number of parties are allowed to engage in competitive dialogue.
Craig 2008, p. 152.
215 Craig 2008, p. 152-153.
216 Regulation 4 paragraph 1 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2006.
217 Identical to provision 26 of theUtilities Contracts Regulations 2006. See: CabinetOffice 2011, viawww.gov.uk.
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– bribery, where the offence relates to active corruption218 or within the meaning of
Section 1 or 6 of the Bribery Act;
– fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Communities under Article 1 of
the Convention relation to the protection of the financial interests of the European
Union, within the meaning of:
– the offence of cheating the Revenue;
– the offence of conspiracy to defraud;
– fraud or theft within the meaning of the Theft Act 1968 and the Theft Act 1978,
the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 or the Theft (Northern Ireland) Order 1978;
– fraudulent trading within the meaning of s. 458 of the Companies Act 1985, Article
451 of the Companies (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 or s. 993 of the Companies
Act 2006;
– fraudulent evasion under s. 170 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979
and s. 72 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994;
– an offence in connection with taxation in the European Community within the
meaning of s. 71 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993;
– destroying, defacing or concealing documents or procuring the extension of a
valuable security within the meaning of s. 20 of the Theft Act 1968 or s. 19 of the
Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969;
– fraud according to s. 2, 3 or 4 of the Fraud Act 2006 or making adapting supplying
or offering to supply articles for use in frauds within the meaning of s. 7 of the
Fraud Act 2006;
– money laundering within the meaning of s. 340 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002,
including an offence in connection with the proceeds of criminal conduct within the
meaning of s. 93A, 93B or 93C of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, or Article 45, 46 or 47
of the Proceeds of Crime (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 and an offence in connection
with the proceeds of drug trafficking within the meaning of s. 49, 50 or 51 of the Drug
Trafficking Act 1994;
– any other offence within the meaning of Article 45 paragraph 1 of the Public Sector
Directive as defined by the national law of any relevant State.
The Public Procurement (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2011 has updated the
list of offences, including the relevant offences created or consolidated since the making
218 ‘Active corruption’ means corruption as defined in Article 3 of the Council Act of 26 May 1997(n) or Article
3(1) of Council Joint Action 98/742/JHA.
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of the regulations.219 These are included in the list above. The Regulations of 2011 also
included debt relief orders and debt relief restriction orders.220
According to paragraph 4, a contracting authority may also declare an economic
operator ineligible or decide not to select them based on the ground of risks of bankruptcy
or insolvency of an individual (under a), partnership (under b) or company (under c).
Furthermore, reasons include the conviction of an economic operator for a criminal offence
related to his business or profession (under d), the operator having committed an act of
grave misconduct in the course of his business or profession (under e), the operator having
not fulfilled obligations relating to payment of social security contributions (under f) or
taxes (under g). Other reasons are that the operator is guilty of misrepresentation of
information as required under the Public Contracts Regulations 2006, has failed to provide
the information requested (under h), is not properly licensed in the State in which he
should be licensed (under i) in relation to procedures for the award of public contracts,
and last, is not registered under the relevant professional or trade register in the relevant
State in accordance with paragraph 7, 8 and 9 of Regulation 23.
The list of offences and reasons for ineligibility or a decision not to select an economic
operator reflect the provisions of Directive 2004/18/EC.
According to paragraph 5 of Regulation 23, the contracting authority may request the
information from the economic operator necessary to decide on the grounds for exclusion,
ineligibility or reasons not to select an economic operator. As conclusive evidence, the
contracting authority accepts:
a. an extract from a judicial record or where judicial records are not maintained in the
relevant State, a document issued by the relevant judicial or administrative authority
of that State;221
b. in relation to the payment of social security or taxes, a certificate issued by the relevant
competent authority;
c. where the documents under a and b are not issued in the relevant State, a declaration
on oath made by the economic operator before the relevant222 judicial, administrative
or competent authority or a relevant notary public or Commissioner for oaths.
If the contracting authority requires further information on the economic operator and
its relevant convictions as determined by paragraph 1, it may request such information
from the competent authority.223 Under Regulation 26, supplementary or clarifying
219 As well as inserting offences relevant to Northern Ireland.
220 These are orders which help people pay their debts under certain conditions. Regulation 15, 22 and the
ExplanatoryNote to thePublic Procurement (MiscellaneousAmendments)Regulations 2011. Seewww.gov.uk.
221 For the grounds specified in paragraph 1 and 4 under a, b, c or d.
222 In this context relevant means: an authority designated by, or a notary public or Commissioner for oaths in
the relevant State in which the economic operator is established. See Regulation 23 paragraph 6.
223 Regulations 23 paragraph 3.
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information may be requested relating, for example, to information obtained under Regu-
lation 23. Regulation 23 paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 stipulate when a foreign economic operator
is regarded as registered under a relevant trade register. Foreign trade registers accepted
as appropriate are listed in Schedule 6. For the purpose of this research, only trade registers
in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden are named as
appropriate registers. This means that the trade registers in Poland and the Czech Republic
are not listed as relevant trade registers.
The Cabinet Office has released guidelines for contracting authorities that include
provisions on which information can be collected from an economic operator for
mandatory exclusion from the procurement procedure.224 The steps the contracting
authorities need to take in order to obtain information from tenderers are the following:
1. as a minimum requirement,225 a statement from the economic operator needs to be
obtained declaring that he has not been convicted of any of the offences listed in Reg-
ulation 23 paragraph 1. There are standardized forms for such declarations;226
2. if the contracting authority is not satisfied with the statement, it can ask for clarification
from the economic operator first. If this is still insufficient, the contracting authority
can apply for further information from the relevant competent authority in the form
of a Disclosure, as described previously.227 The competent authority for England and
Wales is the DSB.228 When the competent authority is foreign, contact information on
that authority can be requested via the Public Procurement Network, an EU-wide
informal network of and for public procurement authorities.229
Paragraph 2 of Regulation 23 states that a contracting authoritymay disregard convictions
for the list of offences regulated by paragraph 1 if it is satisfied that there are ‘overriding
requirements in the general interest’ that justify disregarding these prior convictions. In
such cases, the approval of the Accounting Officer or Minister must be sought.230 Other
information sources, such as information from the Tax Authority, Land Registry or the
British Chamber of Commerce, are (apparently) not used in this screening process.
224 Cabinet Office 2011.
225 The guidelines state that the contracting authorities should apply discretion, as obtaining information from
each individual economic operator would be too burdensome.
226 Cabinet Office 2011. This form, however, is not intended to include the preferred subcontractors. Also,
parent companies convicted of the offences listed in Regulation 23 are not taken into account, unless they
exercise direct control over the first company. The guidelines suggest legal advice in such situations.
227 Cabinet Office 2011.
228 Formerly the Criminal Records Service, www.gov.uk, under the Home Office; Cabinet Office 2011.
229 CabinetOffice 2011. See also: http://www.publicprocurementnetwork.org. This informal cooperationnetwork
on public procurement includes the European Union Member States, candidates and potential candidates
to the European Union, EEA countries and Switzerland.
230 Cabinet Office 2011.
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Part 9 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2006 (as amended) allows an aggrieved
economic operator to lodge an application to the courts if the contracting authority fails
to comply with the regulations. Under Regulation 47, the contracting authority has a duty
to the economic operator not to breach the provisions as stated in the regulation. These
proceedings are held before the High Court.231 Under circumstances, it is possible to use
the procedure of judicial review on grounds of breaches of the regulations.232
4.4.1.2 Screening of persons in scope of the Money Laundering Regulations
Certain businesses are monitored by supervising bodies under the Money Laundering
Regulations 2007 (as amended).233 These regulations aim to protect the financial system
of the United Kingdom. Regulation 3 determines which kind of businesses fall under the
scope of the regulations. These include credit institutions, financial institutions, auditors,
tax advisers, high value dealers, casinos and other businesses linked to financial transactions.
Regulation 4 lists the exemptions to the regulations, including several government institu-
tions and persons who have incidental engagement in financial activities. Regulation 23
lists the supervisory authorities. This includes the Financial Services Authority (FSA), Her
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the Department of Enterprise, Trade and
Investment in Northern Ireland (DETI), the Gambling Commission, the Office of Fair
Trading (OFT) as well professional bodies regulating a particular profession as listed in
Schedule 3 of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007.
In general, the supervisory authorities must monitor the activities of the persons
managing the types of businesses assigned to them and secure compliance with the regu-
lations.234 Moreover, if they suspect a person of money laundering or terrorist financing,
they must inform the (former) SOCA promptly.235
The HMRC is assigned to maintain a mandatory register of high value dealers, money
service businesses and trust or company service providers for which they are the assigned
authority.236 Unless persons are registered as an aforementioned business or provider, they
may not act as such.237 TheHMRC refuses to register a person238 as amoney service business,
trust or company service provider or cancels such a registration239 if that person fails the
231 Neill 2012, p. 63.
232 Neill 2012, p. 63-69.
233 Last amended by the Money Laundering (Amendment) Regulations 2012.
234 Regulation 24 paragraph 1 of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007.
235 Regulation 24 paragraph 2 of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007. At the time of writing, this had not
yet been changed to the NCA.
236 Regulation 25 paragraph 1 of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007. See also the Explanatory Note to the
Money Laundering Regulations 2007.
237 Regulation 26 of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007.
238 Regulation 28 of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007.
239 Regulation 30 of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007.
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‘fit and proper’ test.240 Regulation 28 paragraph 2 specifies the situations when this test has
been failed. That is in the event of convictions for offences under the Terrorism Act 2000;
offences under paragraph 7(2) or (3) of Schedule 3 to the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001; offences under the Terrorism Act 2006; offences under Part 7 (money
laundering) of, or listed in Schedule 2 (lifestyle offences: England and Wales), 4 (lifestyle
offences: Scotland) or 5 (lifestyle offences: Northern Ireland) to the Proceeds of Crime Act
2002; offences under the Fraud Act 2006 or, in Scotland, the common law offence of fraud;
offences under Section 72(1), (3) or (8) of theValueAddedTaxAct 1994; and the common
law offence of cheating the public revenue (sub a). The person also fails the test if: he has
been declared bankrupt or the sequestration of his estate has been awarded and he has not
been discharged (sub b); he is subject to a disqualification order under the Company
Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (sub c); he is or has been subject to a confiscation
order under the Proceeds of Crimes Act 2002 (sub d); he has consistently failed to comply
with the Money Laundering Regulations of 2001, 2003 and/or 2007 (sub e); he has consist-
ently failed to comply with Regulation 2006/1781/EC (sub f); he has effectively directed a
business falling under sub e or f (sub g); or he is otherwise deemed not to be a fit and
proper person for reasons ofmoney laundering or terrorist financing (sub h). If a conviction
is spent under the ROA 1974, as discussed above, such a conviction should be disregarded.
Persons can apply online to be registered andmust provide theHMRCwith information
while doing so.241 The information provided by the applicantmust include business details,
personal information, identification details242, contact details and the position in the
business he holds or intends to hold.243 The HMRC checks the information provided by
the applicant against the HMRC records, records held by other regulatory authorities,
government, law enforcement organizations and commercial organizations.244 This
information includes information on whether the application must be refused under
Regulation 28, for instance because there are criminal convictions present.245 If the appli-
cation for registry is refused, the applicant can appeal this decision.246
The FSA,247 OFT248 and HMRC249 may decide whether they will install registers for
certain groups not supervised by the Secretary of State, DETI or professional supervisory
240 Regulation 28 paragraph 1 of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007.
241 www.hmrc.gov.uk.
242 Documents confirming the identity andhome address of non-UK residentsmust be issued.www.hmrc.gov.uk.
243 www.hmrc.gov.uk. Form MLR101.
244 www.hmrc.gov.uk.
245 Regulation 27 of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007.
246 www.hmrc.gov.uk.
247 This concerns Annex I (on financial institutions) to the Money Laundering Regulations.
248 Consumer credit financial institutions and estate agents.
249 Auditors, external accountants and tax advisers.
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bodies.250 If such a register is established, the persons concerned are required to register if
they are to perform the relevant activities for more than six months.251
Regulation 24A was inserted under the Money Laundering (Amendment) Regulations
2012. This article allows the various supervisory authorities to disclose information to one
another.252 Such information may not be disclosed further, but serves only to enable the
supervisory authorities (both the disclosing and receiving authority) to exercise their tasks
for purposes of criminal law or other enforcement proceedings, and as otherwise required
by law.253
4.4.2 Access to relevant information by government institutions
In this section we first discuss the possibility of information exchange on serious and
organized crime between national agencies under the Crime andCourts Act 2013 (4.4.2.1).
Next, we address how government can obtain information on legal entities by means of
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) (4.4.2.2). Finally, we look at how local bodies may
cooperate in partnerships that facilitate information exchange for combatting crime
(4.4.2.3).
4.4.2.1 The Crime and Courts Act 2013 – the NCA as information gateway
The Crime and Courts Act 2013 (hereafter: CCA) gives the NCA a key position in the
United Kingdom as an information gateway for combatting serious and organized crime.
As discussed in Section 4.3, the NCA has a crime reduction function,254 a criminal
intelligence function255 and other assigned functions.256 The Explanatory Note to the CCA
illustrates the scope of its crime reduction function. It “relates to securing that efficient
and effective activities to combat organized crime and serious crime are carried out (whether
by the NCA, other law enforcement agencies, or other persons).”257 The NCA is able to
undertake activities under the scope of this function to detect, prevent, investigate, or
otherwise reduce serious and organized crime.258 Section 1 paragraph 11 CCA and Section
250 Regulation 32 paragraph 1-4 of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007.
251 Regulation 33 of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007.
252 Regulation 24A of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 (as amended).
253 Regulation 9 of theMoney Laundering (Amendment) Regulations 2012. The ExplanatoryNote to theMoney
Laundering (Amendment) Regulations 2012 is rather brief in its discussion of this new power and only
mentions that exchange is now possible under certain conditions, without specifying what those conditions
are.
254 Section 1 paragraph 4 of the CCA.
255 Section 1 paragraph 5 of the CCA.
256 Section 1 paragraph 3 of the CCA.
257 Explanatory Notes to the Crime and Courts Act 2013, via www.legislation.gov.uk, p. 18 (hereafter:
Explanatory Notes CCA).
258 Explanatory Notes CCA, p. 18.
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5 of Schedule 1, however, broaden this to ‘any kind of crime’, implying that the NCA has
further powers to combat crime, not only serious and organized crime.259 Furthermore,
the crime reduction function also involves cooperation with law enforcement agencies
and others.260
The criminal intelligence function is defined in Section 1 paragraph 5CCAand includes:
gathering, storing, processing, analysing anddisseminating information relevant
to combating serious and organized crime as well as activities to combat any
other kind of crime […].
The scope of both of these functions is broad, based on their respective definitions.
Section 5 of the CCA arranges the general relationship of theNCAwith other agencies.
The relationship between the NCA and different police authorities is arranged under
Section 5 paragraph 1 to 9 of the CCA. Paragraph 10 effectuates Schedule 3 of the CCA.
Section 1 of Schedule 3 emphasizes the NCA’s duty to cooperate for the purpose of
assisting the following persons: (a) constables in UK police forces; (b) Officers of Revenue
and Customs; (c) immigration officers; (d) designated customs officials; (e) members of
the Serious Fraud Office and (f) any other persons operating in England, Scotland,
Northern Ireland or Wales, charged with the duty of investigating organized crime or
serious crime.261 The above-listed persons, as well as the members of Her Majesty’s armed
forces and her Majesty’s coast guard, have a reciprocal duty of cooperation for the purpose
of assisting the NCA.262
Part II of Schedule 3 of the CCA arranges information exchange to and from the NCA.
The duty to keep the Director General of the NCA informed as well as to be informed by
the Director General is applicable to ‘police forces’263 and ‘specified bodies’.264 The term
‘police forces’ refers to chief officers of police forces in England andWales, Northern Ireland
and Scotland, the British Transport Police,Ministry ofDefence Police and theCivil Nuclear
Constabulary.265 ‘Specified bodies’ are the Secretary of State, the Director of the Border
Revenue and the Director of the Serious Fraud Office.266 The police forces’ duty to keep
259 Explanatory Notes CCA, p. 18.
260 Explanatory Notes CCA, p. 18-19.
261 Section 1 paragraph 1 and 3 Schedule 3 of the CCA.
262 Section 1 paragraph 2 and 3 Schedule 3 of the CCA. See also: Explanatory Notes CCA, p. 23.
263 Section 3 and 4 Schedule 3 of the CCA.
264 Section 5 – 7 Schedule 3 of the CCA.
265 Explanatory Notes CCA, p. 23.
266 Article 7 Schedule 3 of the CCA. The latter is not required to disclose information obtained under Sections
2 paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987, meaning information obtained by the Director of the
SFO that a natural person is required to produce. This provision emphasises the nemo tenetur principle.
Section 34 of Schedule 3 allows the list of specified bodies to be amended for the purpose of adding more
persons to it.
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the NCA informed consists of ‘any information held by that police force, which appears
to the chief officers to be relevant to the exercise by the NCA of the crime reduction
function, the criminal intelligence function or functions conferred by the Proceeds of
Crime Act 2002.’267 However, the same duty is incumbent on the specified bodies only in
connection with ‘the exercise of a relevant function of that body’.268 Any information
requested by the NCA must be disclosed when there is a duty to inform.269 Vice versa, the
NCA has to inform the chiefs of police of each UK police force and each specified body
of ‘any information obtained by the NCA in the exercise of any NCA function which
appears to the Director General to be relevant to the exercise…of any (relevant270) func-
tions.’271 There is no obligation to inform when the information is obtained, either directly
or indirectly, from the other bodies.272
In addition to the above bodies’ duty to exchange information with the NCA, Section
7 paragraph 1 of the CCA provides the broad and general option of disclosing information
to the NCA:
A person may disclose information to the NCA if the disclosure is made for
the purposes of the exercise of any NCA function.273
The Explanatory Notes show that this paragraph is intended as a broad information gate-
way.274 The only exclusions are persons working in Security Service (MI5), Secret Intelli-
gence Service (MI6) or the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).275
When theNCAhas obtained information based on one of its functions, it can be utilized
for any other of its functions.276 This implies that when information is obtained under the
‘criminal intelligence’ function, this information can be used for the purposes of ‘crime
reduction’.277 Additionally, the NCA is allowed to disclose information gathered in the
267 Section 3 paragraph 1 Schedule 3 of the CCA.
268 Section 5 paragraph 1 Schedule 3 of the CCA.
269 Section 3 paragraph 2 and 5 paragraph 2 Schedule 3 of the CCA.
270 The word ‘relevant’ only appears in Section 6 paragraph 1 Schedule 3 of the CCA.
271 Section 4 paragraph 1 and 6 and paragraph 1 Schedule 3 of the CCA. The wording of the two articles differs
slightly.Where the provision on the exchange of informationwith police forces addresses the overall functions
of the police force, Article 6 paragraph 1 refers to the relevant function of the specified body for the purposes
of carrying out activities to combat crime. Obviously, this can be explained by the fact that the specified
bodies have functions other than just combating crime, whereas that is the police’s main function.
272 Section 3 paragraph 3, Section 4 paragraph 2, Section 5 paragraph 3 and Section 6 paragraph 2 Schedule 3
of the CCA.
273 Explanatory Notes CCA, p. 26.
274 Explanatory Notes CCA, p. 26.
275 Section 7 paragraph 2 CCA and Explanatory Notes CCA, p. 26. Information disclosure for these persons is
regulated under Section 7 paragraph 10 CCA.
276 Section 7 paragraph 3 CCA.
277 Explanatory Notes CCA, p. 26.
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exercise of one of its functions when there is a ‘permitted purpose’.278 According to Section
16 paragraph 1:
[…]‘permitted purpose’ means any of the following purposes:
a. the prevention or detection of crime, whether in the United Kingdom or
elsewhere;
b. the investigation or prosecution of offences, whether in theUnitedKingdom
or elsewhere;
c. the prevention, detection or investigation of conduct for which penalties
other than criminal penalties are provided under the law of any part of the
United Kingdom or the law of any country or territory outside the United
Kingdom;
d. the exercise of any NCA functions (so far as not falling within any of para-
graphs (a) to (c));
e. purposes relating to civil proceedings (whether or not in the United King-
dom) which relate to a matter in respect of which the NCA has functions;
f. compliance with an order of a court or tribunal (whether or not in the
United Kingdom);
g. the exercise of any function relating to the provision or operation of the
system of accreditation of financial investigators under section 3 of the
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;
h. the exercise of any function of the prosecutor under Parts 2, 3 and 4 of the
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;
i. the exercise of any function of:
the Director of Public Prosecutions,i.
ii. the Director of the Serious Fraud Office,
iii. the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland, or
iv. the Scottish Ministers,
under, or in relation, to Part 5 or 8 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;
j. the exercise of any function of:
an officer of Revenue and Customs,i.
ii. a general customs official,
iii. a customs revenue official,
iv. an immigration officer,
v. an accredited financial investigator, or
vi. a constable,
under Chapter 3 of Part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;
278 Section 7 paragraph 4.
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k. investigations or proceedings outside the United Kingdom which have led,
or may lead, to the making of an external order (within the meaning of
section 447 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002);
l. the exercise of any function of any intelligence service (within the meaning
of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000);
m. the exercise of any function under:
Part 2 of the Football Spectators Act 1989, ori.
ii. sections 104 to 106 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009;
n. the exercise of any function relating to public health;
o. the exercise of any function of the Financial Services Authority;
p. the exercise of any function designated by the Secretary of State by order,
but a function may be designated under paragraph (p) only if the function
appears to the Secretary of State to be a function of a public nature […].
The ExplanatoryNotes give the following example to illustrate the above power to disclose.
The NCA is allowed to disclose information on criminal or suspected criminal activity,
for instance by the disclosure of financial information received in a Suspicious Activity
Report,279 to a person or organization outside the NCA, such as a financial institution, for
the purpose of preventing or detecting crime.280 Paragraph 8 of Section 7 furthermore
allows police, law enforcement, banks and other financial institutions to share information
without breaching an obligation of confidence.281
Limitations to disclosure are twofold. First, Section 7 paragraphs 5 to 7 limit the power
to disclose by an NCA officer in the context of information obtained under the Proceeds
of Crimes Act 2002. This information can only be disclosed if the information had been
obtained under the function of the NCA as conferred on it by the Proceeds of Crimes Act
2002.282 Information obtained under Part 6 of the Proceeds of Crimes Act may not be
disclosed283 unless it concerns persons listed in paragraph 7 of Section 7.284 Second, Section
7 paragraph 9 and Section 12 paragraph 1 effectuate Schedule 7. Schedule 7 puts restrictions
279 See paragraph 4.4.2.2.
280 Explanatory Notes CCA, p. 26.
281 Explanatory Notes CCA, p. 27.
282 Section 7 paragraph 5 of the CCA. Section 1 paragraph 3 confers the functions under the Proceeds of Crimes
Act 2005 and ‘other’ functions conferred in the CCA and by further law enactments.
283 Section 7 paragraph 6 of the CCA.
284 This includes (a) the Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, (b) the Lord Advocate for
the purposes of the exercise by the Lord Advocate of the Lord Advocate’s functions under Part 3 of PCA
2002 (confiscation: Scotland), (c) any person for purposes relating to civil proceedings (whether or not in
the United Kingdom) which relate to a matter in respect of which the NCA has functions, or (d) to any
person for the purposes of compliance with an order of a court or tribunal (whether or not in the United
Kingdom).
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on the disclosure of information relating to the criminal intelligence function of theNCA.285
This schedule regulates any duty to disclose information by an NCA officer or powers to
disclose information given to an NCA officer as enforced under the CCA.286
Schedule 7 specifies the following restrictions. Part I involves statutory restrictions.
Disclosure of information under Part I of the CCA, particularly Section 6 and 7, cannot
be in contravention with the Data Protection Act 1998 or Part I of the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000.287
For the restrictions as encompassed in Part II to IV as discussed hereafter, ‘consent’ is
vital. Section 11 of Schedule 7 determines consent to be:
A consent to disclosure of information under any provision of this Schedule
may be given in relation to:
a. a particular disclosure, or
b. disclosures made in circumstances specified or described in the consent.
Part II of Schedule 7 regulates restrictions on the disclosure on three particular types of
information. Firstly, HMRC information,288 personal customs information289 and personal
customs revenue information290 cannot be disclosed unless the relevant authority291 has
given consent.292 Secondly, social security information293 cannot be disclosed unless a rel-
evant authority294 has given consent.295 Lastly, intelligence service information296 cannot
be disclosed unless a relevant authority297 has given consent.298 Further disclosure of these
three types of information is prohibited unless the relevant authority has again given
285 Section 12 paragraph 2 of the CCA.
286 Section 12 paragraph 3 of the CCA. Explanatory Notes CCA, p. 35.
287 Explanatory Notes CCA, p. 35.
288 Section 2 paragraph 3 of Schedule 7 of the CCA.
289 See section 15 paragraph 4 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. Section 2 paragraph 3 of
Schedule 7 of the CCA.
290 See section 15 paragraph 4 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. Section 2 paragraph 3 of
Schedule 7 of the CCA.
291 The Commissioners or an officer of Revenue and Customs, the Secretary of State or a designated general
customs official or the Director of Border Revenue or a designated customs revenue official. Section 2
paragraph 3 of Schedule 7 of the CCA.
292 Section 2 paragraph 1 Schedule 7 of the CCA.
293 Section 3 paragraph 3 Schedule 7 of the CCA.
294 Including the Secretary of State and the Department for Social Development in Northern Ireland. Section
3 paragraph 3 Schedule 7 of the CCA.
295 Section 3 paragraph 1 Schedule 7 of the CCA.
296 Whichmeans: information obtained froman intelligence service or a person acting on behalf of an intelligence
service. Section 4 paragraph 3 Schedule 7 of the CCA.
297 Section 4 paragraph 3 Schedule 7 of the CCA.
298 Section 4 paragraph 1 Schedule 7 of the CCA.
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consent.299 Part III and IV of Schedule 7 specify when a person may disclose information
that he has received from a NCA officer (‘the original recipient’). In principle, further
disclosure is prohibited300 unless it is for a purpose connected to the functioning of the
original recipient or for a permitted purpose as defined under Section 16 paragraph 1
CCA301 and the Director General has given prior consent.302 Again exceptions apply when
the information concerned has been obtained and disclosed under the Proceeds of Crimes
Act 2002.303
Lastly, Schedule 7 establishes offences in the event of wrongful disclosure of information
by NCA officers or other persons in Part V.
Based on the foregoing, we can conclude the following. First, the scope of when infor-
mation can be disclosed to the NCA is extremely broad based on Section 7 CCA. Basically,
this can include information held by anyone – inside or outside the UK – relating to the
functions of the NCA. These functions in itself are also broadly defined.304 Moreover, for
certain government authorities, such as the chiefs of police, an obligation exists to keep
the NCA informed. Thus, in theory the NCA has access to all relevant information for the
purposes of crime reduction and criminal intelligence. As can be shown by the list provided
by an NCA representative in Annex I, the NCA does in fact cooperate with many admin-
istrative and other government agencies, ranging from local authorities to the National
Fraud Authority and the Gambling Commission. This suggests that in practice, the NCA
indeed serves as a hub for input of information. Second, the NCA is allowed to disclose
information to parties within and outside the UK within the scope of its – again broadly
defined – functions or when there is a permitted purpose. This power to disclose, albeit
limited in some instances, is also extensive. These powersmake theNCAa true information
gateway.
For the purposes of researching an administrative approach to crime, including the
possibilities for information exchange, the CCA provisions offer many opportunities to
factually receive and retrieve information from the NCA by other EU Member States.
4.4.2.2 Suspicious Activity Reports – information on legal entities
According to individual responses by the United Kingdom to the 2009 questionnaire dis-
tributed on behalf of the European Commission,305 the monitoring of legal entities and
299 Section 2 paragraph 2, section 3 paragraph 2 and section 4 paragraph 2 Schedule 7 of the CCA.
300 Section 6 paragraph 1 Schedule 7 of the CCA.
301 Section 6 paragraph 1 Schedule 7 of the CCA.
302 Section 6 paragraph 2 Schedule 7 of the CCA.
303 Section 7 and 8 Schedule 7 of the CCA.
304 Explanatory Notes CCA, p. 18.
305 Summarised in 5655/09 CRIMORG 10 concerning the analysis Administrative/Non-Penal Instruments in
various Member States & Proposal Future Steps.
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information exchange on legal entities is limited to Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs).
This was not mentioned in the 2013 self-report questionnaire.
The implementation of the Third Money Laundering Directive ensured a reporting
system under Sections 330 to 334 of the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002.306 When a
bank (employee) suspects unusual activity regarding money transfers, he is obliged to file
a report with the NCA regarding that suspicious activity.307 The POCA goes above and
beyond the Directive in that it has adopted an ‘all-crimes’ approach, instead of only an
obligation to report the proceeds of serious crimes.308 Moreover, it has introduced criminal
liability for failure to report suspicious activity.309 Section 330 requires four elements for
reporting suspicious activity:
1. where a person knows or suspects or has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting
that another person is engaged in money laundering, he must make a disclosure;
2. the information on which the knowledge or suspicion is based must have come to that
person in the course of a business in the regulated sector;
3. he must be able to identify the whereabouts of the person or laundered money, or he
must believe, or it must be reasonable to expect him to believe, that the information
may assist in identifying the person or the laundered property;
4. the person needs to make a disclosure as soon as it is reasonably practicable to do so.310
According to Goldby, larger banks more often use automated systems to monitor transac-
tions and to pick up on unusual ones.311 When reports on suspicious activity reach the
NCA, intelligence products, such as ‘alerts’ are developed. These alerts constitute warnings
for business, financial institutions and the industry on serious organized crime and are
meant to get the reporting sector to focus on current threats and to review processes and
procedures.312 The SARs output is directed not only at the reporting sector but also at the
law enforcement authorities and government departments and agencies,313 such as Her
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC).314 The policy document Extending our Reach
includes theDepartment forWork and Pensions, theDriver andVehicle LicensingAgency
(DVLA) and the UK’s Fraud Prevention Service (CIFAS) as government organizations
which are able to access information coming fromSARs and compare this with information
306 Goldby 2013, p. 2-3.
307 Goldby 2013, p. 8. See also: www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk; https://www.ukciu.gov.uk/(azakul2rvy-
wuqertvfcxvf45)/saronline.aspx.
308 Goldby 2013, p. 2.
309 Goldby 2013, p. 2.
310 See also Goldby 2013, p. 3.
311 Goldby 2013, p. 7.
312 Goldby 2013, p. 9.
313 Goldby 2013, p. 9-10.
314 Goldby 2013, p. 19.
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that the agencies hold themselves as well as law enforcement information, in order to
identify opportunities for action against organized crime.315 InlandRevenue also has routine
access to SARs.316
4.4.2.3 Possibilities for local information exchange: partnership working
Varied forms of partnership – ormulti-agency – approaches to tackling crime and disorder
in England and Wales have been implemented since the 1960s.317 Partnership approaches
in England and Wales are built on the premise that no government agency is able to tackle
a complex problem, such as crime and disorder, on its own; instead, agencies need to
cooperate with other government agencies.318 Berry et al. describe ‘partnership approach’
broadly as: “a co-operative relationship between two or more organizations to achieve a
common goal.”319
The publication of the Morgan Report in 1991320 led to the wide-scale voluntary
adoption of one form of partnership working: the Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs)
in England and Wales on the local level.321 Currently, the partnerships differ per region,322
and have different names, such as CSPs,323 Crime and Disorder Partnerships (CDRPs)324
andGangManagementUnits.325 Although the nature andoperation of the local partnerships
differ per area, they aim to apply the various instruments available to the participating
agencies to tackle and disrupt crime.326 We will use the abbreviation CSP in this report,
referring to all types of partnerships, unless otherwise indicated.
The CSPs are local bodies specifically established for the purpose of organized crime
reduction through data-sharing, cooperation and implementation of strategies by local
agencies.327 The main purpose of such partnerships is thus to tackle crime and anti-social
behaviour more effectively,328 resulting in a close connection between partnership working
and crime prevention.329 The introduction of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 constituted
315 Cabinet Office 2009, p. 47.
316 Levi & Maguire 2004, p. 414.
317 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p 1; Berry et al. 2011, p. 2.
318 Berry et al. 2011, p. 1 and 2.
319 Berry et al. 2011, p. 1.
320 Safer Communities: The local Delivery of Crime Prevention through the Partnership Approach.
321 Berry et al. 2011, p. 2.
322 E.g. Cooper et al. 2009; Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 2. This is also addressed in the
current NCA Strategy, in which it is implied that this benefits the local situation. HM Government October
2013, p. 30.
323 HM Government October 2013, p. 30.
324 Harvie & Manzie 2011, p. 84; Cooper et al. 2009.
325 HM Government October 2013, p. 30.
326 HM Government October 2013, p. 29-31.
327 Steel, Ward & Diamond 2010, p. 1; Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. vi.
328 Harvie & Manzie 2011, p. 80.
329 Harvie & Manzie 2011, p. 80.
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a key component of the UK’s modernization policy,330 and met the policy objective of
gaining efficiency by combining resources and expertise and sharing good practices.331
Sections 5 to 7 of the Crime & Disorder Act 1998 give statutory significance to the
CSPs.332 In practice, this means that local authorities (or established local community
groups therein) are obliged to collaborate with statutory agencies.333 Although the Crime
and Disorder Act 1998 gives statutory significance to partnership working in the local
areas, there is no obligation for the local authorities to establish such bodies.334 Thus,
cooperation can also take place without an established partnership body.
Sections 5 and 6 (particularly paragraphs 4 and 5) require that local governments
implement a crime and disorder strategy, including cooperation with other persons and
bodies. Section 17 paragraph 1 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 requires the following
of the police and local authority:
without prejudice to any other obligation imposed on it, it shall be the duty of
each authority to which this section applies to exercise its various functions
with due regard to…the need to do all that it reasonably can to prevent, crime
and disorder in its area.
In the paper Extending our Reach, the Cabinet Office suggested tackling organized crime
via local partnership working (more specifically a CSP), which involves the sharing of
information between the partnering agencies.335 CSPs consist (but not necessarily exclu-
sively) of representatives from the police, the local council and the fire, health and probation
departments336 as well as youth justice.337 Other authorities involved are rescue authorities
and Departments for Work and Pension, Children’s Services and Trading Standards.338
TheNCA indicates that immigration authorities and education authorities should become
involved in the local partnerships.339 The foregoing suggests that the local partnerships are
meant to utilize not only administrativemeasures but also other types ofmeasures, ranging
330 Harvie & Manzie 2011, p. 80.
331 Harvie & Manzie 2011, p. 80.
332 Berry et al. 2011, p. 2; Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 1; Harvie & Manzie 2011, p. 80.
333 Harvie & Manzie 2011, p. 80. See also: Burnett & Appleton 2004; Millie et al. 2005.
334 Harvie & Manzie 2011, p. 84.
335 Cabinet Office 2009, p. 46-49; Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 1.
336 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. vi; Cooper et al. 2009, p. 15-16; https://www.gov.uk/
government/policies/reducing-and-preventing-crime--2/supporting-pages/community-safety-partnerships.
337 Harvie & Manzie 2011, p. 84.
338 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 5. A whole list of authorities involved in partnerships in
12 different areas in England&Wales can furthermore be found inVan Staden, Leahy-Harland&Gottschalk
2011, p. 17ff.
339 HM Government October 2013, p. 30.
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from offender management to ASBOs.340 Local partnership working has also been used to
address problems with licensed businesses run by criminals, which makes it possible for
local authorities to take administrative measures, such as planning matters, trade refuse
agreements and other trading matters.341 In the current NCA Strategy, local partnerships
are seen as essential for the success of the strategy.342 The authorities involved should be
able to make full use of their powers in the context of the partnership.343 The NCA Strategy
stresses, however, that the main assigned authority for tackling crime remains the police.344
Even so, the Strategy also proposes the instalment of new local ‘organized crime partnership
boards’,345 again in order to include local authorities and agencies so as to combine available
information.346
Previous research indicates that the agreements on information sharing between the
various authorities in local partnerships are personalized per partnership.347 Multi Agency
RiskAssessment Conferences (MARACs),Multi Agency Public ProtectionArrangements
(MAPPAs), Prolific and Priority Offender (PPO) schemes348 and information-sharing
protocols349 are examples of such agreements. The types of information shared and to
which sensitivity level are decided locally.350 The information-sharing protocols are
developed broadly in two distinctmanners:351 use of existing protocols, based on the Crime
and Disorder Act, along with a memorandum of understanding,352 and the setting up of
newprotocols,mostly when there are concerns that the existing protocols are insufficient.353
Types of information shared within the partnerships include personal information
(name, address, vehicles, businesses, etc.) shared by police with the partners. This informa-
tion can be cross-referenced with information from the different partners, including
background information (education, previous convictions), general lifestyle information
(housing, family and friends, generalmovements, vehicles, etc.), financial activity (benefits,
business, financial transactions), recent criminal activity, previous and current enforcement
and investigations.354 Previous research by the Home Office into partnership working pilot
projects suggests that the foremost obstacle to information sharing in the start-up phase
340 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 3.
341 Cabinet Office 2009, p. 48-49.
342 HM Government October 2013, p. 30.
343 HM Government October 2013, p. 30.
344 HM Government October 2013, p. 10 and 30.
345 HM Government October 2013, p. 10.
346 HM Government October 2013, p. 10.
347 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 2.
348 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 2.
349 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 8.
350 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 8.
351 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 22.
352 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 22.
353 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 22.
354 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 23.
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was variation in deciding whether to share information.355 The decision whether or not to
share information depended on individual organizations or individuals in those organiza-
tions, resulting in differences between and within partnerships.356 Another hurdle was the
realization that simply sharing information is not enough; a beneficial partnership depends
on understanding which information is needed for what measure and by which partner.357
In a more advanced stage of the pilots, other obstacles to partnership working were iden-
tified, i.e. sanitized information, lack of trust and understanding as to what information
could and should be shared and how it would be used.358
The procedure for taking action against individuals consists of the following elements.
Usually, the police share (initial) information on individuals – persons who have also been
identified by the police as targets for the partnership – with the other partners, after which
those partners share their information with the police authorities.359 Thereafter, the com-
bined information is analysed and the relevant tools of the separate partners are applied
against the individual.360 Afterwards, the enforcement is reviewed and possible new
information updated in the relevant databases of the partners.361 The police therefore
continue to play a dominant role in the partnerships.362
Lastly, on a regional level, Regional Organized Crime Units (ROCUs) are exchanging
information with one another and with the Government Agencies Intelligence Network
(GAIN) with the aim of working across local police boundaries. GAIN is made up of tra-
ditional law enforcement authorities and agencies such as the Trading Standard and the
Environment Agency, which can invoke administrative measures.363 Both the ROCUs and
GAIN are to be expanded and collaborate closely with the NCA regional offices.364 Since
theNCAStrategy implies that regional collaboration between the ROCUs,NCA’s regional
offices and GAIN focuses predominantly on criminal procedure, these offices will not be
explored in-depth here.
355 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 24.
356 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 24.
357 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 24.
358 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 24.
359 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 9.
360 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 9.
361 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 9.
362 Van Staden, Leahy-Harland & Gottschalk 2011, p. 8-9.
363 HM Government October 2013, p. 29.
364 HM Government October 2013, p. 29.
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4.4.3 Closing or expropriating housing
In England & Wales, administrative or law enforcement authorities have various options
available for closing licensed or other premises. We briefly discuss these powers below,
focusing primarily on the scope of these instruments and the relevant competent authorities.
The Licensing Act 2003
The Licensing Act 2003 modernized and integrated several existing licences relevant for
the alcohol and entertainment sector in England and Wales following the publication of
a white paper in April 2000.365 It moved the responsibility of the alcohol and entertainment
licensing policy from the Home Office to the Department for Culture, Media and Sport.366
The Act provides for ‘licensing activities’, such as the sale and supply of alcohol, designed
to attain four fundamental objectives.367 These four objectives include:
1. the prevention of crime and disorder;
2. public safety;
3. the prevention of public nuisance and;
4. the protection of children from harm.368
Four types of licences exist, namely the personal licence,369 the premises licence,370 the club
premises certificates371 and temporary event notices.372 These licences are granted by the
licensing authorities as specified in Section 3 of the Act, which in most cases will be the
local authority373 or, when personal licences are concerned, the authorities in the applicant’s
place of residence.374 These authorities can, for the purpose of attaining the premises and
club premises licence objectives, review, suspend or revoke a licence, exclude activities or
modify the operating conditions of a licence.375
365 Explanatory Notes to the Licensing Act 2003, p. 1. via www.legislation.gov.uk. Hereafter: Explanatory Notes
Licensing Act. Simultaneously repealing and replacing several other Acts. See Explanatory Notes Licensing
Act 2003, p. 3-4.
366 Explanatory Notes Licensing Act, p. 1.
367 Section 1 of the Licensing Act 2003; Explanatory Notes Licensing Act, p. 1.
368 Section 4 paragraph 2 of the Licensing Act 2003 and Explanatory Notes Licensing Act, p. 1-2 and 5-6.
369 Part 6 of the Licensing Act 2003.
370 Section 2 of the Licensing Act 2003 and Part 3 of the Licensing Act 2003.
371 Section 2 of the Licensing Act 2003 and Part 4 of the Licensing Act 2003.
372 Section 2 of the Licensing Act 2003 and Part 5 of the Licensing Act 2003.
373 Explanatory Notes Licensing Act, p. 2.
374 Explanatory Notes Licensing Act, p. 2.
375 Explanatory Notes Licensing Act, p. 3.
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When an application ismade to obtain or renew a personal licence, a ‘relevant unspent376
or comparable foreign377 conviction’378 is reason for the licensing authority to consult the
police on those convictions.379 Section 6 of the Licensing Act 2003 (Personal Licences)
Regulations 2005 determines that an applicant must submit either a criminal conviction
certificate in some form or a declaration of no convictions with his application. Examples
of relevant offences are theft, robbery, financial crimes, drug crimes etc.380 When the chief
officer of police determines that the granting of the licence in combinationwith the relevant
unspent or comparable foreign convictionwould undermine the crime prevention objective
of the Licensing Act, he is obliged to send the licensing authority an ‘objection notice’
within 14 days which must also include the reasons that have led to this conclusion.381 If
he fails to deliver the objection notice within that period, or subsequently withdraws it,
the licensing authority must grant the application.382 If an objection notice is given, the
licensing authority must organize a hearing,383 unless all the parties involved agree that
this is unnecessary and withdraw the application if the licensing authority accepts that
rejection is necessary for the purpose of crime prevention.384 In any other case, the licence
must be granted.385 The applicant for the personal licence (or licence renewal), must inform
the licensing authority of convictions during the application period. Failure to do so is
considered an offence.386 If such convictions should come to light after the licence has been
granted, the licence may be revoked under the same conditions as described in Section
120.387 When a personal licence holder is charged with a relevant offence as described in
Schedule 4, he must notify the court of this licence.388 The court is able to order forfeiture
of the licence or suspend the licence for up to six months.389 When the court convicts a
personal licence holder, it is obliged to notify the relevant licensing authority of that con-
viction.390
376 See Section 114 of the Licensing Act 2003.
377 This means outside England and Wales, see Section 113 and Explanatory Notes Licensing Act, p. 30-31.
378 For the exact meaning of relevant offence see Section 113 and Schedule 4 of the Licensing Act 2003.
379 Section 120, paragraph 2 under d and paragraph 4 of the Licensing Act 2003. See also Section 133, which
determines that regulations prescribe the documents and information that should accompany an application.
These are the Licensing Act 2003 (Personal Licences) Regulations 2005.
380 See Schedule 4 to the Licensing Act 2003.
381 Section 120, paragraph 5 of the Licensing Act 2003.
382 Section 120, paragraph 6 of the Licensing Act 2003.
383 As regulated by the Licensing Act 2003 (Hearings) Regulations 2005.
384 Section 120, paragraph 7 of the Licensing Act 2003.
385 Section 120, paragraph 7 of the Licensing Act 2003.
386 Section 123 of the Licensing Act 2003.
387 Section 124 of the Licensing Act 2003.
388 Section 128 of the Licensing Act 2003.
389 Section 129 of the Licensing Act 2003.
390 Section 131 of the Licensing Act 2003.
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Premises licences allow the holder of that licence to perform licensed activities on the
designated premises. For example, alcohol may be sold by individuals holding a personal
licence.391 Club premises certificates allow qualifying clubs, which usually undertake non-
profit activities from private premises,392 to use club premises for such activities, which
are a subset of the licensable activities.393 The regulation that any member or employee
must be a holder of a personal licence does not apply to club certificate holders.394 The
LicensingAct 2003 (Premises Licences andClub Premises Certificates) Regulations 2005395
regulates which documents should be filed along with an application for a premises licence
or club premises certificate. These do not include information on the applicant’s previous
convictions.
Persons can ask to perform temporary activities at premises. So-called permitted tem-
porary activities applications can be filed by persons holding a personal licence, as well as
by persons who do not hold a personal licence. Such activities may concern an application
to serve alcohol during a wedding at a venue that does not have a licence to sell alcohol.396
No reference is made to information on the applicant’s previous convictions.
In general, Section 179 provides that police officers and other authorized persons (as
defined in Section 13) may enter premises to check whether the licensed activities are
appropriately carried out. Section 180 provides that police officers may enter and search
premises on suspicion of an offence committed or about to be committed under the Act.
The power of entry and search is meant specifically for situations in which it is suspected
that an offence in respect of controlled drugs has been or will be committed. In such cases,
Section 97 allows constables to enter and search club premises. Premises may also be
entered by a constable or authorized person before the granting of a licence or club certifi-
cate relating to those premises, or in the event of a review,397 according to Sections 59 and
96 of the Licensing Act 2003.
Moreover, the police can apply to the area’s magistrates’ court to reactively or preven-
tively close licensed premises or premises holding licences with a temporary event notice
when disorderly behaviour and excessive noise occurs for a period of 24 hours.398 It is
possible to appeal to the Crown Court in such cases.399 The police inform the local
authority of a closure of licensed premises, and this obliges the authority to review the
391 Explanatory Notes Licensing Act, p. 2.
392 Explanatory Notes Licensing Act, p. 19.
393 Explanatory Notes Licensing Act, p. 2.
394 Explanatory Notes Licensing Act, p. 19.
395 Last amended by the 2012 regulations, no. 955.
396 Explanatory Notes Licensing Act, p. 26.
397 In such cases, reasonable force may be used by the constable and/or authorized person. See Explanatory
Notes Licensing Act, p. 18-19.
398 See the questionnaire 2013 in Annex I and Section 160ff of the Licensing Act 2003; Explanatory Notes
Licensing Act, p. 3.
399 Section 166 of the Licensing Act 2003.
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premises licence.400 Possible outcomes of such a review are modifications of the licence,
the exclusion of a licensable activity, the removal of the designated supervisor from the
licence, the suspension of the licence for no longer than three months or the revocation
of the licence.401 Appeal against the decision is possible, and there is the option of contin-
uing the closure during the appeal.402 During appeals, premises must stay closed (even if
the licence remains in force), but a magistrates’ court may order re-opening during the
appeal.403
Enforcement in the event of nuisance caused by tenants
The Housing Act 1988 and the subsequent Housing Act 1996 as amended by the Anti-
social Behaviour Act 2003 provides several options for landlords to regain possession of
premises in cases of criminal or anti-social behaviour.
First, under Section 6A of the Housing Act 1988 in conjunction with Section 153a or
153b of the Housing Act 1996, a social landlord can apply to the county court for a
demotion order for their tenants if they exhibit anti-social behaviour or use premises for
unlawful purposes. The demotion order was introduced by Section 14 paragraph 4 of the
Anti-Social BehaviourAct 2003. The demotion order terminates the assured tenancy from
the date of the order and if the tenant remains in the ‘dwelling-house’,404 the tenancy
becomes a demoted tenancy.405
Second, Section 7 of the Housing Act 1988 allows courts to issue a possession order
for the premises when the grounds set out in Schedule II of the Act apply. This possession
order basically means that the assured tenancy ends and that the landlord takes possession
of the premises.406 Schedule II lists several grounds, including non-payment of rent. The
discretionary power of the court to impose a possession order407 on ground 14 is of partic-
ular importance in the context of this report.408 This applies when:
400 Section 167 paragraph 1 and 2 of the Licensing Act 2003.
401 Section 167 paragraph 6 of the Licensing Act 2003; see also Explanatory Notes Licensing Act, p. 41-42.
402 Section 168 in conjunction with 181 and Schedule 5 of the Licensing Act 2003; Explanatory Notes Licensing
Act, p. 52.
403 Section 167 and 168 in conjunction with Schedule 5 of the Licensing Act 2003; Explanatory Notes Licensing
Act, p. 52.
404 Section 45 paragraph 1 of the Housing Act 1988 provides a definition of a ‘dwelling-house’: ‘a house or part
of a house’.
405 Section 6A paragraph 3 of the Housing Act 1988. A demoted tenancy reduces the security of a tenant for 12
months, reducing the tenancy to the same position as introductory tenancies, which can be defined as a ‘trial
period’. Section 124 of the Housing Act 1996 and https://www.gov.uk/council-housing/types-of-tenancy.
See for information on introductory tenancies: Hunter 2006, p. 138ff and p. 142.
406 Section 5.
407 Section 7 paragraph 4 of the Housing Act 1988.
408 This ground is also extended to secure tenancies in Section 144 of theHousingAct 1996 and assured tenancies
in Section 148 of that same Act.
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[…] the tenant, a person residing or visiting in the dwelling-house,
a. has been guilty of conduct causing or likely to cause a nuisance or annoyance
to a person residing, visiting or otherwise engaging in a lawful activity in
the locality or;
b. has been convicted of
using the dwelling-house or allowing it to be used for immoral or illegal
purposes, or;
i.
ii. an indictable offence committed in, or in the locality of, the dwelling
house.
Ground 15 encompasses the possibility of issuing a possession order when there is evidence
of violence or threats of violence against spouses.409
Apart from immediately effective possession orders, the courtmay also issue suspended
possession orders to allow the tenant to improve the situation causing the nuisance. Courts
can only grant a suspended possession order if there is good reason to do so, such as a
mental illness.410 Suspended possession orders are an alternative to demoted tenancies as
discussed above.411
In the case of Knowsley Housing Trust v. Prescott,412 a tenant who had been convicted
and sentenced to eight years of imprisonment for conspiracy to supply cocaine and
amphetamine also received a possession order (at first postponed, later immediate) based
on ground 14 of Schedule II of the Housing Act 1988. The trial judge surmised that the
tenant dealt drugs on an ‘industrial scale’, not fromhis own home, but from another house
in the vicinity. Furthermore, the possession order also included the convicted person’s
wife. These two facts – among others – were disputed and the decision was appealed.
Regarding the matter that the person’s house was not the premises in which the actual
offence was committed, the judge ruling on appeal considered:
[…]the criminal conduct need not have been carried on in the house in question.
This appears from the language of ground 14 in Schedule 2 Housing Act 1988,
which distinguishes between convictions of the tenant (or a person residing in
or visiting the house) as a ground for possession in two types of instance. These
are convictions for (i) using the dwelling house or allowing it to be used for
immoral or illegal purposes, or, (ii) an indictable offence committed in, or in
the locality of, the dwelling house. The second instance is the relevant one in
the present case. …[T]he potentiality of damage in this case is manifest. In
409 See also Sections 145 and 149 of the Housing Act 1996.
410 Wright 2011, p. 38.
411 Wright 2011, p. 38.
412 [2009] EWHC 924 (QB).
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those circumstances, in agreement with the Housing Trust, and in respectful
disagreement with Judge MacMillan, it does not appear to me that the fact that
Mr. Prescott was careful to keep his own house free from drug dealing reduces
the seriousness of the offences in the context of the making of an immediate
possession order where the drugs factory was maintained in the locality.413
With regard to the involvement of Mrs. Prescott, the judge contemplated:
Third, it is submitted that the judge made no findings about Mrs. Prescott’s
case as to her knowledge of her husband’s activities. A significant part of the
Housing Trust’s case was that it was ‘clear beyond peradventure that (i) she
knew what was going on; and (ii) she benefited knowingly and willingly from
the illegal activity’. The judge accepted the second point, but as appears from
the passage from his reasons quoted above, discounted it as a relevant factor.
He made no findings in respect of the first point. Mrs. Prescott’s response is
that he had the skeleton argument inwhich theHousing Trustmade this point.
That is certainly true, but the question of her knowledge about the drug dealing
is relevant on the postponement issue, where the cases show that the court
requires a clear assurance as to future conduct. The inference to be drawn from
Mrs. Prescott’s decision not to give oral evidence is that she did not consider
that her denials in this respect would stand the scrutiny of cross examination.
Nor is there any reason to suppose that they would have done so in circum-
stances in which her witness statements provide no explanation of how her
family’s lifestyle was supported if not from the proceeds of drug dealing. It was,
in my view, a relevant matter which pointed towards the making of an imme-
diate possession order, but which the judge does not appear to have taken
account of.414
In summary, the above ruling implies that possession orders can be imposed even if the
criminal conduct did not take place in the dwelling-house itself and be extended to persons
living in the house who were not involved (at least directly) in the criminal activity.
Third, the Housing Act 1996415 allows for injunctions. Local authorities can apply for
an injunction order with a county judge or the High Court in cases of anti-social behaviour
according to Section 152ff of the Housing Act 1996. An injunction prohibits a person
from:
413 [2009] EWHC 924 (QB), under 20-21.
414 [2009] EWHC 924 (QB), under 22.
415 As amended by the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003.
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a. engaging in or threatening to engage in conduct causing or likely to cause a nuisance
or annoyance to a person residing in, visiting or otherwise engaging in a lawful activity
in residential premises to which this section applies or in the locality of such premises,
b. using or threatening to use residential premises towhich this section applies for immoral
or illegal purposes, or
c. entering residential premises to which this section applies or being found in the locality
of any such premises.416
The same types of measure – possession orders and injunctions – apply for private land-
lords, but they cannot rely on the statutory provisions. Instead, breaches of standards of
behaviour encompassed in the contract allow the private landlord to apply for a possession
order or injunction.417 Obviously, social landlordsmay also respond to breaches of standards
of behaviour by applying for an injunction or possession order.418
Lastly, the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 permits police to ask the court for a closure
order, after they have submitted a closure notice. Although closure orders are classified
as a police power, not regarded as an official tool to combat organized crime419 and not as
a power that can be used by an administrative authority, we elaborate on them briefly
because in practice they are also used to combat crime.420 Furthermore, the application
process does involve consulting the relevant local authorities.
Article 1 paragraph 1 of theAct permits the issuing of a ‘closure notice’ and subsequent
‘closure order’ in respect of premises if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
premises:
have been used in connection with the unlawful use, production or supply of
a Class A controlled drug, and that the use of the premises is associated with
the occurrence of disorder or serious nuisance to members of the public.421
Before the police can issue the notice, they must consult the relevant local authority.422
The notice itself results in the temporary closure of the premises to all but the persons who
own them and those who habitually live there.423 Within a time-window of 48 hours after
the police have issued the notice, a magistrates’ court must decide whether to issue a sub-
416 Section 152 paragraph 1 of the Housing Act 1996.
417 Wright 2011, p. 20.
418 Wright 2011, p. 36.
419 Levi 2004, p. 832-834.
420 See Annex I.
421 Section 1 paragraph 1 of the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003. See also Annex I.
422 Section 1 paragraph 2 of the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003.
423 Explanatory Note to the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, p. 2. Via www.legislation.gov.uk. Hereafter:
Explanatory Note ASBA.
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sequent closure order.424 The test to which the court must adhere is the following. First,
the court must be convinced that the premises have indeed been employed for using,
supplying or producing aClass A prohibited drug. Second, the premisesmust be associated
with serious nuisance or disorder, and third the court must be satisfied that the order will
prevent future nuisance or disorder.425 The court can decide to close the premises for up
to threemonths to all persons.426 It is not necessary for those persons to have been convicted
of an offence related to the production, use or supply of a controlled drug.427
4.4.4 Tools for seizing assets outside the scope of criminal procedure
According to Levi, financial agencies are seen as potential contributors to controlling the
risk of organized crime.428 However, the legislation in England & Wales does not include
administrative tools. For reasons of completeness, we present a brief overview of the four429
basic tools available.430
1. The first is the possibility of removing assets by means of ‘criminal confiscation’. This
involves issuing a confiscation order to someone who has been convicted by a criminal
court for a particular crime or ‘lifestyle’ crime, which means that any crime can be the
basis for a confiscation.431
2. A civil court can recover the proceeds of crime in the context of a ‘civil recovery’ under
the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Parts 5 and 6. No criminal conviction is necessary.
The civil standard of proof432 was introduced as a threshold for this purpose, for which
a criminal conviction is not necessary.433 Since this is considered a drastic means, only
the NCA and the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) are authorized to use these powers in
England & Wales.434
3. The NCA is also authorized to use tax powers to recover alleged proceeds of crime.
This approach is used if the authorities lack the means to prove that certain assets are
ill gained.435 Extending our Reach mentions that the government intends to use tax
investigations more often.436 In its NCA Strategy, the HM Government mentions that
424 Section 2 paragraph 2 of the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003.
425 Section 2 paragraph 3 of the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003.
426 Section 2 paragraph 4 of the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003.
427 Section 2 paragraph 8 of the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003. Explanatory Note ASBA, p. 3.
428 Levi 2004, p. 832-834.
429 Sproat 2012, p. 149ff; Doubourg & Prichard 2007, p. 58.
430 10899/11 JAI 380 COSI 44 CRIMORG 77 ENFOPOL 179, p. 44.
431 Sproat 2012149ff; Doubourg & Prichard 200758.
432 Levi 2004, p. 832-834; Bell 2003, p. 134ff.
433 www.soca.gov.uk.
434 Sproat 2012, p. 149ff.
435 Sproat 2012, p. 149ff.
436 Cabinet Office 200943ff.
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the HMRC used tax interventions to tackle the finances of organized and other crimi-
nals.437
4. Last, police and other law enforcement agencies are authorized to seize cash. The seized
cash is then secured for civil proceedings in a magistrates’ court.438
The former SOCA mentions in its policy document that the use of these powers all entail
going to court.439 This means that the process is rather slow. Instead, the SOCA can also
use other powers to frustrate criminals’ finances. These are:
1. The Financial Reporting Orders (FROs).440 These are orders applied for by the prose-
cutor under the Serious Organized Crime and Police Act 2005 Articles 76ff, following
the conviction of certain offences by a court, such as offences under the Theft Act 1968
or a ‘lifestyle offence’ under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. According to Article 79,
the person is then obliged to report on their financial activities for a period of up to
twenty years. The orders can be applied in England & Wales (Article 76), Scotland
(Article 77) and Northern Ireland (Article 78).
2. The Serious Crime Prevention Orders.441 These orders entail civil proceedings under
the Serious Crime Act 2007 applicable for England & Wales (Article 1) and Northern
Ireland (Article 3). The prosecutors or the Director of the SFO can make applications
to theHighCourt or theCrownCourt for which a person has been convicted of serious
crimes in England&Wales andNorthern Ireland or elsewhere. Themeaning of ‘serious
crime’ has been specified in Schedule 1 of the Act and encompasses drug trafficking,
human trafficking, arms trafficking and several financial crimes either fully completed
or inchoate. According to Article 16, an order can last up to five years, with the possi-
bility of issuing a subsequent order when the older one lapses. Article 2 in conjunction
with 5 gives a non-exhaustive list of types of orders, entailing prohibitions, restrictions
or requirements aimed at preventing, restricting or disrupting serious crime. Examples
are restrictions, requirements or prohibitions on travelling,442 on the usage of items
(such as mobile phones),443 on premises, associated persons or working arrangements.
As can be derived from the description, the SCPOs can also be used for frustrating other
aspects of a person’s life than just their finances.
437 HM Government October 2013, p. 35.





443 10899/11 JAI 380 COSI 44 CRIMORG 77 ENFOPOL 179, p. 22 and 36.
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4.4.5 Other tools
Based on the questionnaire we sent out in 2013,444 other instruments can be identified
which the administrative authoritiesmay use to disrupt criminal activities. Thesemeasures
relate to the misuse of drugs or prescription drugs and the licences that are required by
companies to import or export such drugs or precursor chemicals.
Section 3 paragraph 2 – or under certain circumstances Section 7 paragraph 1 – of the
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 regulates that the prohibition on importing and exporting
controlled drugs does not apply when the Secretary of State has issued a licence for such
activities. TheMisuse of Drugs Regulations 2001 introduces a licensing scheme. Schedules
1 to 5 of the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001 specify to which types of controlled drugs
the Regulation applies. See also the responses to the 2013 questionnaire in Annex I.
Parallel to the licensing system for controlled drugs is a licensing and fee system for
chemical precursors. These chemicals are frequently used to produce controlled drugs
unlawfully.445 TheControlledDrugs (Drug Precursors) Community External Trade Regu-
lations 2008 and the Controlled Drugs (Drug Precursors) Intra-Community Trade Regu-
lations 2008 enact provisions for the licensing of such chemicals. TheUK intra-community
Regulations implementRegulation 2004/273/ECand theUKexternal regulations implement
Council Regulation 2005/111/EC.446 Even though the EU Regulations have direct effect in
the UK, the UK regulations are meant to support them in providing the powers and
penalties as required by the EU Regulations.447 Under the Regulations, the Secretary of
State issues a licence that may not exceed three years.448 For internal trade, special licences
can also be issued to specific persons, such as pharmacists, veterinary surgeons, chief
officers of police etc. in accordance with Article 3 paragraph 6 of the 2004 EU Regulation
which allows for special licences for certain professionals, if the precursors are used in the
context of their official activity. For external trade, a licence is issued in accordance with
Article 6 of the 2005 EU Regulation. The Controlled Drugs (Drug Precursors) (Intra-
Community Trade and Community External Trade) Regulations 2010 introduce fees for
444 See Annex I.
445 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Controlled Drugs (Drug Precursors) (Intra Community Trade
andCommunity External Trade) Regulations 2010, p. 1. Viawww.legislation.gov.uk.Hereafter: Explanatory
Memorandum 2010 Regulations.
446 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Controlled Drugs (Drug Precursors) Intra-Community Trade
Regulations 2008 and the Controlled Drugs (Drug Precursors) Community External Trade Regulations
2008, p. 2. Via www.legislation.gov.uk. Hereafter: Explanatory Memorandum to the 2008 Regulations.
447 Explanatory Memorandum to the 2008 Regulations, p. 2.
448 Section 4 of the Controlled Drugs (Drug Precursors) Community External Trade Regulations 2008 and
Section 4 of the Controlled Drugs (Drug Precursors) Intra-Community Trade Regulations 2008.
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licences, registrations and authorizations regarding precursor chemicals.449 It is hoped that
the introduction of licences will act as a deterrent in certain cases.450
449 Explanatory Memorandum 2010 Regulations, p. 1.
450 See Annex I, the 2013 questionnaire.
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Annex
I. Questionnaire – responses based on the definition of ‘administrative approach’
as used in this research.451
1. the preventive screening and monitoring of applicants (persons and legal entities) for
permits, tenders and subsidies;
Drugs: We operate a risk-based licensing regime in respect of persons (individuals
and/or companies) operating at specific premises in the UK (with the exception of
Controlled Drugs in Northern Ireland- this power is delegated). For Controlled Drug
licences (domestic and import/export) the regime exists with reference to the Misuse
of Drugs Act (MDA) 1971 (which lists what is prohibited and provides for regulations
to be made to enable) and the associated Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001 (enabling)
underwhich the systemof domestic ControlledDrug licensing operates. Import/export
authorizations aremade solely with reference to theMDA1971. None of this legislation
sets out how the licensing regime is to be operated, in terms of processes, visits etc.
That is a matter of policy. Focusing on domestic licensing, we assess applications on
the basis of the individuals, their competence, any convictions/ cautions/ bankruptcy
etc. We consider the companies activities, processes, physical security, environmental
risk, supply chain, cognisancewith process.Weuse soft intel (internet, satellitemapping,
cross referencing information) and also seek Police ‘Intel’.
– We require, referencing SI (Statutory Instrument)1818/2009 all persons named to
have an enhanced Disclosure and Barring Service (Criminal Record) check.
– For Precursor Chemicals, pretty similar considerations are under EU Regulations
(273/2004, 111/2005), enacted to domestic law by two SI.
– Fees are levied for licences (acts as a deterrent in some cases) under the Misuse of
Drugs (Fees) Regulations 2010.
2. the power to close or expropriate premises when public nuisance occurs in or around
those premises;
– The LicensingAct 2003 extended police powers to seek court orders to close licensed
premises in an area experiencing or likely to experience disorder and to close down
instantly licensed premises that are disorderly, likely to become disorderly, or are
causing nuisance as a result of noise from the premises.
– The Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003 introduced the power to close premises which
are concerned in the production, consumption or supply of Class A drugs and
which are causing disorder or serious nuisance to the public.
451 See Section 4.1.
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– the possibility of seizing criminals’ assets in the framework of administrative pro-
cedure, outside the scope of a criminal procedure;
Section 2A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 created 4 asset recovery regimes:
Confiscation;
Confiscation follows conviction for an offence. In making an order the court must decide
whether the defendant has a ‘criminal lifestyle’, based on a number of legislative triggers,
including specific types of offences. Where the offender fails to pay the confiscation order
they may be subject to a sentence of imprisonment. This is not an alternative to paying
the order
Civil recovery;
Civil recovery is a form of non-conviction-based asset forfeiture which allows for the
recovery in civil proceedings before the High Court of property which is, or represents,
property obtained through unlawful conduct. Importantly, the proceedings are against
the property itself (in rem) rather than against an individual (in person). These proceedings
are civil litigation and the civil standard of proof (the balance of probabilities) applies.
Cash forfeiture;
Cash forfeiture generally provides a simple and speedy non-conviction-based magistrates’
court procedure for recovering seized criminal cash. Any party wishing to contest the
forfeiture must demonstrate to the court that the cash comes from a legitimate source.
Criminal taxation;
Criminal taxation is also a non-conviction-based power, but it does not result in criminal
property being recovered. Instead it allows tax to be charged on a person’s income, profits
or gains where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that they arise or accrue from
criminal conduct on the part of that person or another.
(4) other regularly appliedmethods open to administrative authorities to tackle and prevent
crime.
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Wehave a new approach to fighting crime that involves a shift of power fromWhitehall
to local communities. The police will be given far greater freedom to do their jobs, and the
public more power to hold them to account.
We will judge our success on whether crime has fallen.
We’re reducing crime by:
– creating community triggers to deal with persistent antisocial behaviour
– using community safety partnerships, and police and crime commissioners, to work
out local approaches to deal with issues, including antisocial behaviour, drug or alcohol
misuse and re-offending
– establishing the national referralmechanism (NRM), tomake it easier for all the differ-
ent agencies that could be involved in a trafficking case to cooperate, share information
about potential victims and get access to advice, accommodation and support
– setting up the National Crime Agency (NCA), which will be a new body of operational
crime fighters
– creating street-level crime maps to give the public up-to-date, accurate information
on what is happening on their streets so they can challenge the police on performance
And we’re trying to prevent crime by:
– creating the child sex offender disclosure scheme, which allows anyone concerned
about a child to find out if someone in their life has a record for child sexual offences
– legislating against hate crime
– using football banning orders to stop potential troublemakers from travelling to football
matches – both at home and abroad
– legislating to prohibit cash payments to buy scrap metal and reforming the regulation
of the scrap metal industry to stop unscrupulous dealers buying stolen metal
Latest relevant bills and legislation; Crime and Courts Act http://services.parlia-
ment.uk/bills/2012-13/crimeandcourts.html
Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime andPolicing Bill http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2013-
14/antisocialbehaviourcrimeandpolicingbill.html
II. List of administrative authorities received from UK representative
Business / ServiceAdministrative Body
The Insolvency Service, disqualification of
Company Directors
BIS – Department of Business, Innovations and
Skills
Driving licence registration, vehicle registration
and vehicle excise duty
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA)
Employment records, benefits and allowances
records including Disability benefit
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP)
147
4 The administrative approach in England and Wales
Business / ServiceAdministrative Body
Regulation, licensing, permits in relation to pol-
lution and waste related treatment and disposal
matters; e.g. Car Washes
Environmental Agency
Regulation, Licensing and compliance, e.g. Tan-
ning Salons, Nail Bars, Restaurants and Cafes
Environmental Health
Counterfeiting, copyright and trademark
infringements
Federation Against Copyright Theft (i.e. FACT)
Regulate most financial services markets,
exchanges and firms
Financial Services Authority
Regulation of fire safety orders applicable to
commercial property and places of assembly (i.e.
churches)
Fire and Rescue Service
Regulate gambling in Great Britain as a co-regu-
lator with local authorities.
Food Standards Agency
Licensing and registration ofGangmasters oper-
ating in Agriculture, Horticulture and Shellfish
industries
Gangmasters Licencing Authority
Protect the health, safety and welfare of people
at work, and to safeguard others, mainly mem-
Health and Safety Executive
bers of the public, who may be exposed to risks
from the way work is carried out
Income Tax, Corporation Tax, VAT and Tax
credits
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC)
Registering and regulation of births, deaths and
marriages; council tax and benefits
Local Authorities (i.e. City Councils)
Regulates and licensing ofmedicines andmedical
devices to ensure they work and are acceptably
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory
Agency (MHRA)
safe, e.g. tackle illegal supply, counterfeiting,
theft, diversion, etc.
Build awareness of fraud, improve support vic-
tims; coordinate efforts of counter-fraud commu-
nity
National Fraud Authority
Maintain records and regulate to counter fraud
and corruption
National Health Service
Powers tomanage tenancy and tackle anti-social
behaviour through e.g. ASBOs, CRASBOs,
injunctions, demoted tenancies and evictions
Registered Social Landlords / Housing Trusts
Regulate the private security industry; license
operatives and manage the voluntary Approved
Contractor Scheme
Security Industry Authority
Regulate and license those involved in Betting,
Casinos, Gaming machines, etc.
The Gambling Commission
Responsible for enforcing a wide range of laws
designed to promote a fair, safe and honest
Trading Standards Agency
trading environment for both consumers and
the business community; e.g. ensure compliance
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Business / ServiceAdministrative Body
with Licensing Act and the Gambling Act and a
number of other legislative areas; e.g. inspect
Pubs, Clubs and Taxi companies
Maintain a record of licensed and unlicensed
addresses in the UK
TV Licensing
Provides a range of licensing, testing and
enforcement services with the aim of improving
Vehicle and Operator Services Agency (VOSA)
the roadworthiness standards of vehicles ensuring
the compliance of operators and drivers, e.g.
Haulage Firms and Taxi Companies
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5 The administrative approach in France
D. Van Daele
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 French administrative organisation
The FrenchRepublic, which has elements of both a presidential and a parliamentary system,
is often considered to be one of the most centralized European countries. Even though,
since 20031, Article 1 of the French Constitution stipulates that France shall be organised
on a decentralised basis, the central State is currently still in charge ofmost public interests
and public decisions.2 At central level, the executive power is first and foremost entrusted
to the directly elected President of the Republic (Président de la République), who presides
over the Council of Ministers. The President has both personal powers, which he exercises
in an autonomous way, and shared powers, which are characterised by the fact that they
require the countersignature of the prime minister and, usually, the ministers involved in
the preparation and implementation of the decision concerned.With regard to these shared
powers, the role of the President is assumed preponderant. The government is regarded
as the agency that implements the general policy defined by the President and defends it
in Parliament. Hence, in practice, the scope for governmental policy-making is less signif-
icant than suggested by the Constitution.3
Article 34 of the Constitution exhaustively lists the areas in which Parliament is
empowered to legislate via statutes (lois). The implementation of these statutes is the
responsibility of the prime minister4, who has the power to issue decrees in all cases in
which statutes either refer to executive decisions or require implementation without an
explicit reference.5 According to Article 37 of the Constitution, matters other than those
that fall within the scope of statutory law are determined by regulation. This regulatory
power is also exercised by the prime minister.6 In practice, however, the Parliament quite
frequently adopts statutory provisions outside the scope of Article 34 of the Constitution.
Furthermore, parliamentary legislative powers are derived not only from Article 34 of the
1 Chrétien & Chifflot 2012, p. 125-126.
2 Auby & Cluzel-Métayer 2012, p. 9.
3 Kortmann 2004, p. 249, 251, 254 and 257-259.
4 Article 21, first paragraph Constitution.
5 Kortmann 2004, p. 269-270.
6 Article 21, first paragraph Constitution.
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Constitution, but also from other constitutional provisions and general legal principles.
As a consequence, the scope of these legislative powers is rather uncertain and a clear limit
has not yet been established.7
It is important to note that the regulatory power of the prime minister is subject to
Article 13 of the Constitution. According to this provision, the President signs the ordi-
nances and decrees deliberated upon by theCouncil ofMinisters. In that regard, the French
system is characterised as a ‘bicéphalisme administratif’, meaning that regulatory power
is divided between the President and the prime minister.8 Thus, the President is actively
involved in the exercise of rule-making power and can also hinder the passage of ordinances
and decrees.9 While ordinances, given their nature10, are always enacted by the Council of
Ministers11 – and thus require the consent of the President –, this is not the case for decrees.
Although there are not that many legal provisions that require a deliberation in the
Council of Ministers12, in practice, the most important decrees are discussed there and
submitted to the President for approval.13 Nonetheless, the majority of regulatory decrees
are enacted by the prime minister.14
The traditional centralisation of the French state is reflected in the rather complicated
organisation of the central administration consisting of ministries, central services,
inspectorates, and other institutions.15 However, the French administrative organisation
is also based on the principles of decentralisation and deconcentration. In this respect, the
collectivités territoriales de la République are entrusted with the exercise of certain admin-
istrative powers. These territorial communities of the Republic are legal persons of public
law with constitutionally and legally defined territorial and substantive competence.16 The
most important territorial communities are the regions, departments and municipalities.17
One the one hand, according to the principles of decentralisation and subsidiarity18, these
communities can take decisions in all matters that can best be handled at their level.19 In
7 Kortmann 2004, p. 269-270.
8 Chrétien & Chifflot 2012, p. 122.
9 Kortmann 2004, p. 255.
10 According to Article 38 of the Constitution, the Government can be authorised by Parliament to take
measures by ordinance that are in principle a matter of statute. Such a delegation of legislative power is only
permitted for a limited period of time.
11 Article 38, second paragraph Constitution. See also the Articles 47, 47-1 and 74-1 of the Constitution.
12 For some examples, see Frier & Petit 2013, p. 95.
13 Waline 2012, p. 71 and 74.
14 Maillard Desgrées Du Loû 2011, p. 254. It is worth noting that the President usually also signs regulatory
decrees enacted by the prime minister. In that case, the presidential signature is merely symbolic (Chrétien
& Chifflot 2012, p. 183).
15 Kortmann 2004, p. 262.
16 Truchet 2013, p. 92.
17 Furthermore, special-status communities and overseas territorial communities are also considered to be
territorial communities. See Article 72, first paragraph Constitution.
18 Kortmann 2004, p. 292.
19 Article 72, second paragraph Constitution.
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this context, Article 72, third paragraph, of the Constitution stipulates that the territorial
communities are self-governing through elected councils and have the power to make
regulations in their spheres of competence. In reality, however, their normative powers
are rather limited.20 On the other hand, the territorial communities are also entrusted with
the exercise of deconcentrated powers.21 To that end, there is a State representative in each
territorial community. Representing each of the members of the government, this State
representative is responsible for national interests, administrative supervision, and com-
pliance with the law.22
The regions, which were created in 1982 and started functioning in 198623, are the
largest territorial units. Currently, there are 22 regions in mainland France – this number
will be reduced in the near future to 1324 – and 4 regions in the overseas territories. In their
capacity as territorially decentralised authorities, the regions mainly deal with socio-eco-
nomicmatters. In this respect, the directly elected conseil régional promotes the economic,
social, health, cultural and scientific development of the region and takes measures con-
cerning territorial planning.25 As indicated above, the regions are also units of deconcen-
trated national administration. In that context, the préfet de région, who is appointed by
the government and whose powers are regulated in Decree n° 2004-374 of 29 April 2004,
represents the government and manages the deconcentrated national services in the
region.26 It should be noted that the regional prefect is also appointed as prefect of the
department in which the capital of the region is located.27
The territory of France has been divided into departments since the French revolution.
Whereas the departments traditionally rendered the basic level of deconcentrated national
services, the regions nowperform this function. Similar to the regions, the 101 departments
are both territorially decentralised and deconcentrated administrative entities.28 The key
figure is the préfet de département. As a representative of the government, he implements
the national policy and exercises administrative supervision over the department, the
municipalities, the local public authorities, and the interdepartmental public authorities
that have their seat in the department. As we discuss in Section 5.4 of this report, the prefect
of the department is also responsible for maintaining public order in his department.29
20 Hertzog 2012, p. 211.
21 Kortmann 2004, p. 292.
22 Article 72, sixth paragraph Constitution.
23 For a discussion of the historical background, see Waline 2012, p. 164-167.
24 See http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/L-actu-du-Ministere/L-Assemblee-nationale-adopte-une-carte-
a-13-regions.
25 Article L. 4221-1 Code général des collectivités territoriales (CGCT).
26 Kortmann 2004, p. 292.
27 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 385.
28 Waline 2012, p. 92 and 148-149.
29 See the Articles 9, 10 and 11 of Decree n° 2004-374 of 29 April 2004.
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The 36.680 municipalities are the level of government closest to the people. They are
ruled by a directly elected municipal council (conseil municipal)30, which elects the mayor
(maire)31. Since the municipalities are mainly decentralized administrative units32, the
mayor is first and foremost entrusted with municipal responsibilities and acts as the
executive armof themunicipality. In that capacity, themayor heads the local administration,
prepares the meetings of the conseil municipal – over which he also presides33 – and
implements its decisions.34 In addition to his local responsibilities, the mayor – under the
authority of the prefect of the department – acts in a limited number of matters as an agent
of the State.35 For example, the mayor is responsible for the civil registration and issuing
of certain building permits.36 As we discuss further in Section 5.4 of this report, this dual
capacity is also reflected in police matters. On the one hand, the mayor, as the highest-
ranking officer in the municipal government, is in charge of the municipal police.37 As an
agent of the state on the other hand, the mayor is entrusted with various administrative
functions, which he carries out under the authority of the prefect of the department.38
Although the municipalities have a number of important powers with regard to, inter
alia, economic and social matters39, it should be noted that many of them are too small40
to operate efficiently.41 Indeed, the most characteristic feature of the French municipal
system is its fragmentation42, which is why various mechanisms for cooperation between
municipalities have been developed.43 First, municipalities – and especially those in rural
and semi-urban areas – can join forces as a communauté des communes. This allows them
to develop and implement joint initiatives with regard to, inter alia, economic development
and spatial planning.44 Second, there are cooperative structures that have been specifically
developed for the most important municipalities. In urban agglomerations, consisting of
a central city of at least 15.000 inhabitants and its peripheral municipalities, the joint
management of for instance urban development and spatial planning projects can be
30 See Waline 2012, p. 127-141.
31 Article L. 2122-4 CGCT.
32 Waline 2012, p. 97.
33 Article L. 2121-14 CGCT.
34 See Article L. 2122-21 CGCT.
35 For a general overview, see Cassia 2004, p. 245-259.
36 Waline 2012, p. 97.
37 Article L. 2212-1 CGCT.
38 Maillard Desgrées Du Loû 2011, p. 415.
39 According to Article L. 2121-29 CGCT, the conseil municipal regulates all matters of the municipality.
40 For specific details, see Waline 2012, p. 123.
41 Auby & Cluzel-Métayer 2012, p. 10.
42 Hertzog 2012, p. 207.
43 For a discussion on the cooperation between municipalities, see Frier & Petit 2013, p. 193-199; Hertzog
2012, p. 216-219; Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 172-177; Waline 2012, p. 229-238.
44 See Article L. 5214-1 et seq. CGCT.
154
D. Van Daele
entrusted to a communauté d’agglomération.45 On a larger scale, a common policy and
approach can be developed within the context of Urban Communities (communautés
urbaines), regrouping severalmunicipalities. The regroupedmunicipalities should consist
of more than 250.000 inhabitants. The regulatory powers of the Urban Communities
include, among others, those relating to economic, social, and cultural development.46
Finally, it should be noted that Paris is a municipality as well as a department, meaning
that the council and the mayor have authority in both legal capacities. Moreover, internal
security and police matters are dealt with by the prefect of police, who is formally placed
under the authority of the Minister of the Interior47, but who in practice has a considerable
degree of autonomy (infra, Section 5.4.3).48
5.1.2 The administrative approach to combating organised crime in the
context of organised crime policy in France
Organised crime and the responses to it became a focal point of French criminal policy at
the beginning of the 1990s.49 Remarkably, this did not result in an official legal definition
of organised crime. Instead, French criminal law uses a variety of concepts referring to
collective behaviour aimed at committing serious offences with the help of an organised
structure.50 The most important provisions in this respect are Article 450-1 of the Criminal
Code, dealing with the offence of criminal conspiracy (association de malfaiteurs), i.e. the
conspiracy aimed at preparing a criminal offence, andArticle 132-71 of the Criminal Code,
which defines an organised gang (bande organisée) as any group formed or any agreement
established with a view to the preparation, characterised by one or more material facts, of
one or more criminal offences. The fact that an offence is committed by an organised gang
is considered an aggravating circumstance leading to more severe punishment.51
Title XXV of Book IV of the French Code of Criminal Procedure contains specific
provisions relating to the procedure applicable to the investigation, prosecution and trial
of organised crime and delinquency, which is outlined bases on an extensive list of serious
crimes. This Title governs not only investigative powers, such as surveillance, infiltration,
the interception of telecommunications and the freezing of property, but also the jurisdic-
tion of specialised courts.52 It should be noted that specialised units were also set up within
45 See Article 5216-1 et seq. CGCT.
46 See Article 5215-1 et seq. CGCT.
47 Hertzog 2012, p. 214.
48 Mouhanna 2010, p. 30 and 33.
49 Godefroy 2004, p. 764.
50 Hagedorn & Bigo 2002, p. 209.
51 See Lemoine 2012, p. 25-34; Rassat 2011, p. 63-65 and 991-1002.
52 See De Monjour 2012, p. 138-155; Gentil 2012, p. 183-198.
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the public prosecution service53, the national police54 and the Gendarmerie Nationale55.
Furthermore, a number of other government agencies are involved in the fight against
organised crime. These include the Customs and Excise administration and TRACFIN56,
a financial intelligence unit set up within the Ministries of Economics and Finance.57 In
this respect, reference must also be made to the ability of the public prosecutor, and even
the obligation of the judicial authorities, to provide the tax authorities with any relevant
information concerning tax fraud. This information can be used for further fiscal investi-
gations, even if the documents transmitted are subsequently be declared inadmissible by
a criminal court.58
This multi-agency approach aside, France currently has neither a specific set of tools
nor an institutional framework to facilitate an administrative approach to combating
organised crime. However, administrative authorities can, to some extent, play a role in
preventing and combating crime in general and organised crime in particular. In this
report, we examine four separate methods that could, if implemented, be applied in a
French administrative approach to crime. First, France has a long-standing tradition of
administrative sanctions. These sanctions can be defined as non-criminal sanctions of a
punitive nature that can be imposed by administrative authorities. In Section 5.2.3.2, we
discuss the scope of these administrative sanctions and the conditions under which they
can be applied.
Second, the repeal of an administrative act can be a useful instrument in the context
of an administrative approach to combat (organised) crime. As we will see, a distinction
must be made between the revocation and the withdrawal of individual administrative
acts. In addition, different rules apply depending on whether or not the administrative act
creates rights (infra, Section 5.2.4).
Third, French lawprovides a number ofmechanisms allowing administrative authorities
to screen and monitor persons and legal entities. Although these mechanisms were not
created to fight organised crime, they could be used in this context. In Section 5.3 of this
report we demonstrate this by analysing the legal requirements for running a pub or
restaurant and for casino licences. We also discuss the regulation of prostitution and the
relevant aspects of public procurement law.
Finally, the prefect of the department and the mayor are entrusted with the task of
preventing and averting dangers to public order and security. In Section 5.4 we examine
53 See Chausserie-Laprée 2012, p. 167-183.
54 See Godefroy 2004, p. 777-780; Hagedorn & Bigo 2002, p. 222-228.
55 See Galtier 2012, p. 117-138.
56 TRACFIN is an abbreviation of “Traitement du renseignement et action contre les circuits financiers clandes-
tins”.
57 Godefroy 2004, p. 781-782.
58 Bienvenu & T. Lambert 2010, p. 127.
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whether and to what extent instruments directed at preventing the disturbance of public
order could be used to prevent and combat (organised) crime problems.
5.2 Essential characteristics of French administrative procedure
5.2.1 Types of administrative decisions
As an essential feature of administrative law, administrative authorities are authorised to
take unilateral decisions imposing obligations upon citizens. This authorisation is based
on statutes and regulations that define the scope of administrative decisions issued by
various administrative authorities.59 A distinction must be made between regulatory,
individual, and specific administrative decisions.
A regulatory decision (décision réglementaire) has no precise addressee and contains
legal norms that apply to all persons who find themselves in the situation referred to in
the decision. It does not confer rights to individuals vis-à-vis the administration. In contrast,
an individual administrative decision has only one addressee (décision individuelle), while
a specific administrative decision is addressed to a particular group of persons (décision
particulière). Although individual or particular administrative decisions usually confer
rights to individuals – e.g. the issuing of a permit –, this will not always be the case. For
example, declaratory decisions or decisions conferring recognition do not confer rights.60
In that case rights are conferred by statute or regulation and the administrative decision
only ‘translates’ them into practice.61 Furthermore, conditional administrative decisions62
or administrative decisions obtained by giving false information or by any other form of
deception or contrivance do not create rights.63
5.2.2 Due process in administrative proceedings
5.2.2.1 General principles
Traditionally, French law strongly emphasises administrative effectiveness and the protec-
tion of the prerogatives and discretionary powers of administrative authorities.64 This
partly explains why France, unlike some othermember states of the EuropeanUnion, does
not have comprehensive legislation on administrative proceedings. As a result, citizens’
59 Auby & Cluzel-Métayer 2012, p. 11.
60 Auby & Cluzel-Métayer 2012, p. 13-14; Truchet 2013, p. 239-240 and 242-243.
61 Schwarze 2006, p. 877.
62 Schwarze 2006, p. 877.
63 Auby & Cluzel-Métayer 2012, p. 13.
64 Schwarze 2000, p. 164 and 174.
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rights in non-contentious administrative proceedings are based on general principles of
law and some specific laws.65
In this context, the obligation to respect the rights of the defence is considered a general
principle of law. According to the Constitutional Council, this principle has constitutional
status.66 With regard to the legislation, particular reference should be made to Act n° 78-
753 of 17 July 1978 laying down various measures to improve relations between the
administration and the public67, Act n° 79-587 of 11 July 1979 concerning the obligation
to state grounds for administrative acts68 and Act n° 2000-321 of 12 April 2000 concerning
the rights of citizens in their relations with public administrations69.
5.2.2.2 Hearing of participants
The audi alteram partem rule is a recognised general principle of French (administrative)
law. Thismeans that administrative authorities cannot take an unfavourable decision prior
to giving the person concerned the opportunity to effectively make his position known.70
This implies that the administration has to inform the person concerned about the intended
decision and must give him the opportunity to consult the file.71 In this manner, the person
concerned can state his arguments relating to the facts and the proposed measure and so
can try to prevent the making of a decision that would disadvantage him. Additionally,
hearing participants in administrative proceedings is in the best interests of the adminis-
tration. The audi alteram partem rule ensures that the case is adequately examined and
that all of the relevant information is assessed.
Whereas the audi alteram partem principle was based on the case law of the Council
of State for decades72, it is currently regulated by Article 24 of Act n° 2000-321 of 12 April
2000. As a general rule73, individual decisions that must be substantiated under Articles 1
and 2 of Act n° 79-587 of 11 July 1979 (infra, Section 5.2.2.4) can only be taken after the
person concerned has been afforded the opportunity to submit his opinion in writing and,
when appropriate and upon request, orally. The person concerned has the right to be
assisted by a lawyer or to be represented by a proxy of his choice.
65 Waline 2012, p. 423.
66 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 351.
67 Loi n° 78-753 du 17 juillet 1978 portant diverses mesures d’amélioration des relations entre l’administration
et le public et diverses dispositions d’ordre administratif, social et fiscal.
68 Loi n° 79-587 du 11 juillet 1979 relative à lamotivation des actes administratifs et à l’amélioration des relations
entre l’administration et le public.
69 Loi n° 2000-321 du 12 avril 2000 relative aux droits des citoyens dans leurs relations avec les administrations.
70 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 423.
71 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 352; Truchet 2013, p. 245.
72 Waline 2012, p. 423.
73 There are a number of specific procedures dealing with the hearing of participants. Article 24 of Act n° 2000-
321 of 12 April 2000 does not apply to these procedures.
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It should be noted that Article 24 of Act n° 2000-321 of 12 April 2000 does not apply
to an administrative decision on an application submitted by the person concerned. In
such cases, however, the applicant submits a file which allows him to communicate all
relevant information.74 Furthermore, the right to be heard is not an absolute right. First,
this right does not apply in cases of emergency or under exceptional circumstances. Second,
the person concerned will not be afforded the opportunity to express his opinion if doing
so would be likely to prejudice public order or the conduct of international relations.
Finally, an administrative authority is not obliged to respond to requests that are abusive,
taking into account their number and their repetitive or systematic nature.75
5.2.2.3 Access to the file
As indicated above, the right of access to the file forms part of the rights of the defence in
administrative proceedings. Additionally, administrative authorities76 are obliged to disclose
official documents upon request. No justification is needed for such a request.77 This right
of disclosure only applies to finalised documents, not to preparatory documents.Moreover,
the right can no longer be exercised once the documents are made public.78
Again, the administration is not obliged to respond to requests that are abusive, taking
into account their number and their repetitive or systematic nature.79 Furthermore, Article
6 of Act n° 78-753 of 17 July 1978 contains important restrictions on the right of disclosure.
For example, documents will not be communicated or made accessible if this would prej-
udice secrecy necessitated by national defence, French foreign policy, state security, public
safety or the safety of persons.
5.2.2.4 Duty to state grounds
As a general rule, every administrative decision must be based on solid, adequately
demonstrable factual and legal grounds that provide a legal foundation for the decision in
question. Nevertheless, this general principle of administrative law is limited to the content
of an administrative decision and does not imply the obligation to inform the person
concerned of the grounds considered. A distinction is thus made between the grounds for
a decision and the disclosure of those grounds.80 In that respect, it is remarkable that French
74 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 351; Truchet 2013, p. 154.
75 Article 24, second paragraph Act n° 2000-321 of 12 April 2000.
76 See Article 1 Act n° 78-753 of 17 July 1978.
77 Truchet 2013, p. 153.
78 Article 2 Act n° 78-753 of 17 July 1978.
79 Article 2, last paragraph Act n° 78-753 of 17 July 1978.
80 Chrétien & Chifflot 2012, p. 515-516; Frier & Petit 2013, p. 354; Truchet 2013, p. 160 and 250; Waline 2012,
p. 428.
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administrative authorities have traditionally regarded the duty to state grounds as a threat
to the effective execution of the law.81
Although theoretically there is still no general obligation to inform the person concerned
of the grounds underlying an administrative decision82, the aforementioned Act of 11 July
1979 requires the administration to inform the applicant in writing of the legal and factual
considerations underpinning the administrative decisions dealt with in articles 1 and 2.83
First, grounds must be stated for all individual administrative decisions that deviate from
the general rules laid down by law or regulation.84 Second, natural and legal persons have
the right to be informed of the grounds underlying certain adverse administrative decisions.
These decisions are listed exhaustively in Article 1 of the Act of 11 July 1979. In the context
of this report it is particularly important to note that grounds must be stated for decisions
restricting civil liberties, constituting a police measure or imposing a sanction. This also
applies to permit refusals and to decisions that impose restrictions or constraints on the
granting of a permit. Furthermore, there must be justification for the withdrawal or revo-
cation of an individual administrative decision creating rights.
Non-compliance with the duty to state grounds will result in the invalidity of the
administrative act concerned.85 Nevertheless, the duty to state grounds is not without
exceptions. The grounds for a permit refusal need not be stated in cases in which disclosure
of the grounds could undermine one of the secrets or interests protected by Article 6,
second to fifth paragraphs, of Act nr. 78-753 of 17 July 1978 (supra, Section 5.2.2.3).86
Moreover, the administration can refrain from giving reasons in the rare87 cases of extreme
urgency, although in such cases the grounds underlying the decision must still be commu-
nicated when so requested by the person concerned.88
5.2.3 The execution of administrative decisions
5.2.3.1 General principles
A unilateral administrative act decided upon by a competent administrative authority and
creating rights or obligations for citizens, is an enforceable legal decision. This implies that
the administrative act, from its entry into force, assumes legal effects and must be complied
81 Schwarze 2000, p. 170.
82 Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 245; Waline 2012, p. 428-429.
83 Article 3 Act n° 79-587 of 11 July 1979.
84 Article 2 Act n° 79-587 of 11 July 1979.
85 Truchet 2013, p. 250.
86 Article 1 Act n° 79-587 of 11 July 1979.
87 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 356.
88 Article 4 Act n° 79-587 of 11 July 1979.
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with by all persons falling within its scope.89 In case of non-compliance, however, the
administrative authority is generally not empowered to enforce its decision without prior
judicial authorisation. Only in cases where the law explicitly allows it, in cases of urgency,
or in cases where no other legal remedy exists is the immediate forced execution by the
administrative authority permitted.90 Article R. 610-5 of the Criminal Code is of particular
relevance in this respect. According to this provision, infringements of police decrees and
orders are punishable by a fine. In addition, a number of other legal provisions, e.g. the
Consumer Protection Act and the Highway Code, criminalise infringements of certain
administrative decisions.91
In the context of this report, it is particularly important to keep in mind that France
has an extensive history of imposing administrative sanctions. Below, we discuss the most
essential aspects of these sanctions.
5.2.3.2 Administrative sanctions92
5.2.3.2.1 Concept and scope
Some twenty years ago, the Council of State conducted a study of the administration’s
power to impose sanctions. This resulted in a list of approximately 500 types of infringe-
ments punishable by administrative sanctions. Given this, it is no exaggeration to say that
the administration is to a large extent entrustedwith the enforcement of complex legislation
in such areas of law as employment, health, social security, tax, market regulation, and the
environment. This high degree of involvement of governmental agencies in the sanctioning
of unlawful forms of conduct is consistent with the French tradition of having a powerful,
centralised administration. Nevertheless, the key reason for the massive expansion of
administrative sanctions seems to be that the criminal justice system is unable to deal
adequately with extensive, complex and frequently changing administrative regulations.93
In the light of the case law of both the Constitutional Council and the Council of State,
administrative sanctions can be defined as non-criminal sanctions of a punitive nature
(sanction ayant le caractère d’une punition) which an administrative authority imposes
for a breach of a legal obligation. Thus, an administrative sanction is an ex post and
repressive response to unlawful conduct, whereas administrative police measures (see
Section 5.4.4) focus on the prevention of infringements.94
89 Chrétien & Chifflot 2012, p. 532-533; Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 247-248; Truchet 2013, p. 260-
262.
90 See Chrétien & Chifflot 2012, p. 539-540; Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 248-249; Frier & Petit 2013,
p. 377-379; Truchet 2013, p. 262-263.
91 Auby & Cluzel-Métayer 2012, p. 15.
92 For a detailed analysis, see Degoffe 2000; Dellis 1997; Moderne 1993.
93 Breen 2013, p. 195 and 204. See also Crucis & Breen, nrs. 3 and 16-18; Frier & Petit 2013, p. 376.
94 Breen 2013, p. 196-197; Frier & Petit 2013, p. 303-304.
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There are different types of administrative sanctions, the most common of which are:
a warning or injunction; a suspension or even revocation of an authorisation; and an
administrative fine.95 A crucial restriction put forward by the Constitutional Council,
however, is that deprivation of liberty cannot be imposed as an administration sanction.96
This is based on Article 66 of the Constitution, which states that judicial authorities are
the guardians of the freedom of the individual.97
5.2.3.2.2 Revocation of an authorisation as an administrative sanction
The aforementioned distinction between administrative sanctions and administrative
policemeasures is not always clear-cut andmust be assessed in the light of the circumstances
of the case.98 This can be illustrated by the revocation of an authorisation. As we will see,
the legal qualification of this administrative decision depends on the predominant motive
of the administrative authority.
First, an authorisation can be revoked if its holder ceases to meet a necessary condition
for obtaining it. These conditions may relate, for example, to nationality, physical ability,
or a financial guarantee. In such cases, the competent administrative authority is always
entitled to revoke an authorisation. However, revocation of an authorisation in this case
cannot be qualified as an administrative sanction. Second, under certain conditions, the
revocation of an authorisation can be used as an instrument tomaintain public order. This
is discussed in Section 5.4 of this report. Finally, administrative authorities can revoke an
authorisation as a means of punishing the authorisation holder for committing an
infringement. In such cases, the revocation is considered to be an administrative sanction.99
According to the Council of State case law, such a sanction may only be imposed when a
legal instrument empowers administrative authorities to impose sanctions. This legal
instrument does not have to be a formal law (une loi). Taking into acccount Articles 34
and 37 of the Constitution, regulations can indeed also empower administrative authorities
to impose administrative sanctions.100
5.2.3.2.3 Substantive and procedural guarantees101
In its landmark decision of 28 July 1989, the Constitutional Council ruled that neither the
principle of the separation of powers nor any other principle or rule of constitutional status
precludes an administrative authority, actingwithin the limits of its powers, from imposing
sanctions. However, two restrictions apply. First, as stated, any deprivation of liberty is
95 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 377.
96 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 377.
97 Teitgen-Colly 2013, p. 4.
98 See Crucis & Breen, nrs. 33-34 and 33-38; Degoffe 2013, p. 2-3; Petit 2013, p. 1-6.
99 Breen 2013, p. 205-206. See also Crucis & Breen, nrs. 45-46; Tchen, nr. 108.
100 Crucis & Breen, nr. 58; Waline 2012, p. 438. See also Breen 2013, p. 210; Frier & Petit 2013, 377.
101 For a thorough analysis, see Crucis & Breen, nrs. 55-123.
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excluded (supra, Section 5.2.3.2.1). Second, specific statutory measures are required to
ensure respect for constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms.102 Somemonths earlier,
theConstitutional Council had already determined that the principle of legality of offences103
and punishments, the principle of necessity of punishments, the principle of non-
retroactivity of more severe criminal laws, and the rights of the defence apply to all
penalties intended to serve as punishments, evenwhen Parliament has conferred the power
to inflict such penalties upon a body other than a court of law.104 Furthermore, in 2012,
the Constitutional Council ruled that the principles of independence and impartiality, as
reflected in Article 16 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789,
must also be respected.105
As a constitutional court, the Constitutional Council assesses the constitutionality of
legislation and performs both ex ante106 and ex post107 reviews. Although the Constitutional
Council is not a supreme court that is hierarchically superior to the Council of State or
the Court of Cassation, its decisions are binding on public authorities and all administrative
and judicial bodies. Nevertheless, the case law of the Council of State on procedural guar-
antees in relation to administrative sanctions is of particular importance. In practice, the
Constitutional Council often tends to follow, albeit implicitly, the viewpoint of the Council
of State in this area.108
Although the substantive and procedural requirements outlined by the Constitutional
Council are also imposed by the Council of State, it is remarkable that the Council of State
largely takes into account the diversity of contexts in which administrative sanctions can
be imposed. As a consequence, the level of substantive and procedural guarantees may, to
a certain extent, vary depending on the context.109 Nevertheless, the EuropeanConvention
on Human Rights (ECHR) has a harmonising effect. While the Council of State initially
ruled that administrative sanctions did not raise an issue under Article 6, § 1 ECHR, this
102 Conseil constitutionnel, Decision n° 89-260 DC of 28 July 1989, cons. nr. 6.
103 The Constitutional Council nevertheless accepts that administrative offences are defined by reference to the
legal obligations of the holder of an administrative authorisation (Conseil constitutionnel, Decision n° 88-
248 DC of 17 January 1989, cons. nr. 37).
104 Conseil constitutionnel, Decision n° 88-248 DC of 17 January 1989, cons. nr. 35-36. See also Conseil consti-
tutionnel, Decision n° 93-325 of 13 August 1993, cons. nr. 47-48; Conseil constitutionnel, Decision n° 2006-
535 DC of 30 March 2006, cons. nr. 36; Conseil constitutionnel, Decision n° 2009-580 DC of 10 June 2009,
cons. nr. 14; Teitgen-Colly 2013, p. 5-6.
105 Conseil constitutionnel, Decision n° 2012-280 QPC of 12 October 2012, cons. nr. 16. See also Teitgen-Colly
2013, p. 6.
106 According to Article 61 of the Constitution, organic laws (lois organiques) must be submitted to the Consti-
tutional Council before their promulgation. Acts of Parliamentmay, before their promulgation, be submitted
to the Constitutional Council.
107 If, during proceedings in progress before a court of law, a claim is made that a legislative provision infringes
the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the Council of State or the Court of Cassation may
refer the case to the Constitutional Council (Article 61-1 Constitution).
108 Breen 2013, p. 201.
109 Breen 2013, p. 208.
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opinion changed in the second half of the nineties. Taking into account the case law of the
European Court of Human rights, the Council of State currently holds the imposition of
various punitive administrative sanctions to be a criminal charge in the sense of Article 6
ECHR.110 This implies not only that the right to a fair trial in principle111 applies to
administrative sanction proceedings, but also that the person concerned can appeal a
decision imposing an administrative sanction to an administrative judge. Since it is a full
remedial action (un recours de plein contentieux objectif), the judge will assess the case
both on the facts and the merits.112
5.2.4 Repeal of administrative acts
5.2.4.1 Two types of repeal
Unless an administrative act is subject to a time limit, it will remain in force for an indefinite
period of time. In other words, an administrative act will continue to apply unless it is
annulled by the courts or repealed by the administrative authority that issued it.113 With
regard to the latter, French administrative law makes a distinction between the revocation
(abrogation) and the withdrawal (retrait) of an administrative act. Both types of repeal can
be useful for an administrative approach to combating (organised) crime.
Subject to certain conditions, an administrative authority can revoke an individual
administrative act. Such a revocation has only prospective effect and not retroactive effect
on the legal consequences that have already resulted from the administrative act. In contrast,
the withdrawal of an administrative act does have retroactive effect and is, in that sense,
similar to the annulment of an act by a court.114 The conditions under which revocation
and withdrawal are permitted are mainly laid down in Council of State case law. As we
will see, different rules apply depending on whether or not an individual administrative
decision creates rights.
5.2.4.2 Revocation of individual administrative acts
5.2.4.2.1 Individual administrative decisions creating rights
In light of the principle of legal certainty and the principle of protection of legitimate
expectations, lawful administrative decisions conferring rights on individuals are to be
110 Chrétien & Chifflot 2012, p. 376; Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 243. For a detailed analysis, see
Collet 2013, p. 1-6.
111 For some exceptions, see Breen 2013, p. 209-210.
112 See Frier & Petit 2013, p. 376-377; Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 438-439.
113 Waline 2012, p. 439.




respected and cannot be revoked. However, this rule is not without exceptions. In cases
explicitly provided for by law, administrative authorities indeed have the power to revoke
individual administrative acts conferring rights. They will do so by means of an actus
contrarius.115
In contrast, unlawful individual administrative decisions creating rightsmay be revoked
within fourmonths after the decision is signed. After the expiry of this period, the decision
is affirmed. Nevertheless, two derogations from this rule should be taken into account. On
the one hand, a considerable number of legal and regulatory provisions impose other time
limits for the revocation of this category of administrative decisions. On the other hand,
the time limit of four months does not apply if the beneficiary of the decision requests its
revocation. In that case the administration is always allowed to revoke its decision, provided
that the revocation does not affect the rights of third parties.116
5.2.4.2.2 Individual administrative decisions not creating rights
Lawful individual administrative decisions that do not create nor confirm the existence of
rights may be revoked at any time.117 Evidently, the same goes for unlawful decisions of
this kind. Thismeans that administrative authorities have the discretion to revoke individual
administrative decisions that do not create rights. Under this rule, police authorisations
may be revoked without restrictions.118
Asmentioned above, administrative decisions obtained by fraud or deliberate deception
can never create rights (supra, Section 5.2.1).119 Applying themaxim fraus omnia corrumpit,
such decisions are always revocable. Permits, permissions or licences obtained by providing
false information, threat, or bribery can thus be revoked at any time.
5.2.4.3 Withdrawal of individual administrative acts
5.2.4.3.1 Individual administrative decisions creating rights
In line with the principle of non-retroactivity of administrative acts and the principle of
protection of legitimate expectations, a lawful individual administrative decision creating
rights cannot be withdrawn.120 The lawfulness of the act implies that there is no valid
ground for withdrawal. Since administrative authorities do not have any discretionary
powers with regard to this category of administrative acts, considerations of expediency
can never justify a withdrawal of these acts.121 However, two important nuances must be
115 Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 255; Waline 2012, p. 443. See also Schwarze 2006, p. 883.
116 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 368; Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 255; Truchet 2013, p. 254-255.
117 Waline 2012, p.443. See also Schwarze 2006, p. 883.
118 Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 255.
119 Auby & Cluzel-Métayer 2012, p. 13.
120 Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 251. See also Schwarze 2006, p. 878.
121 Waline 2012, p. 441.
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pointed out. First, a lawful individual administrative decision conferring rights may be
withdrawn when the law explicitly permits it.122 Second, such an administrative decision
may bewithdrawn at the request of the decision’s beneficiary, provided that the withdrawal
does not affect the rights of third parties.123
An explicit124 administrative decisionwhich is unlawful, but nevertheless confers rights
on an individual, may be withdrawn under conditions similar to those that apply to the
revocation of such a decision. As a general rule, withdrawal is possible within four months
after the decision is signed. However, this time limit does not apply if the decision’s bene-
ficiary requests125 its withdrawal. In that case, the administration is always allowed to
withdraw its decision, provided that the withdrawal does not affect the rights of third
parties. Furthermore, specific legal or regulatory provisions126 can prescribe a different
time limit or can even stipulate that withdrawal is allowed at any time. In addition, it should
be noted that unlawful administrative decisions creating rights may be inconsistent with
EuropeanUnion law and thereforemust bewithdrawn even if the time limit of fourmonths
has expired.127
In some exceptional cases, an administrative decision will be so gravely flawed as to
be legally non-existent. Such décisions inexistantes may be withdrawn at any time. The
administration will even be obliged to withdraw such void decisions.128
5.2.4.3.2 Individual administrative decisions not creating rights
The principle of protection of legitimate expectations applies to administrative acts con-
ferring rights, but this principle seems irrelevant for lawful administrative acts that do not
create rights.129 Although the withdrawal of these lawful administrative acts is in any case
contrary to the principle of non-retroactivity and therefore – strictly speaking – prohib-
ited130, the administration can nevertheless withdraw them as long as they remain unexe-
cuted. In that case, withdrawal has the same effect as revocation.131
In accordance with the principle of legality, unlawful administrative decisions not
creating rights may be withdrawn at any time. This obviously requires that their unlawful-
122 Chrétien & Chifflot 2012, p. 526.
123 Chrétien & Chifflot 2012 526; Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 251; Waline 2012, p. 441.
124 For the withdrawal of implicit administrative decisions, see Chrétien & Chifflot 2012, p. 527; Frier & Petit
2013, p. 371-372; Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 252; Truchet 2013, p. 258.
125 The beneficiary of the decision may indeed have an interest in the withdrawal, e.g. if he hopes that the
administration will take a more favorable decision (Truchet 2013, p. 258).
126 For an example, see Waline 2012, p. 442.
127 Frier & Petit 2013, p.372; Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 251-252.
128 Chrétien & Chifflot 2012, p. 528; Schwarze 2006, p. 880.
129 Waline 2012, p. 441.
130 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 257.
131 Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 252-253.
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ness must have become apparent.132 Again, the maxim fraus omnia corrumpit is of partic-
ular significance. Permits, permissions or licences obtained by providing false information,
threat, or bribery can indeed be withdrawn at any time.
5.3 Instruments to screen and monitor persons and legal entities
5.3.1 Screening and monitoring in specific sectors
5.3.1.1 The principle of freedom of trade and industry and its restrictions
The principle of freedomof trade and industry goes back toArticle 7 of the Décret d’Allarde
of 1791133, which is still in force today and is confirmed by Article 1 of the Act of
27 December 1973134. Moreover, this principle is considered a general principle of law,
which, according to the Constitutional Council, even has constitutional status.135 Never-
theless, the freedom of trade and industry is not unlimited. Within the context of this
study, four types of restrictions are of particular importance. First, certain business activities
can only be pursued by persons without a criminal record. This is, for instance, the case
for bankers, insurers, and pub operators.136
Second, the criminal court may prohibit a convicted person from practicing a trade or
engaging in a commercial or industrial occupation. This prohibition will be of a temporary
– i.e. for a period of maximum fifteen years – or a permanent nature.137 The prohibition
to practice a trade is an optional penalty138, which can be imposed if the person concerned
is convicted of an offence for which the law explicitly allows this kind of additional pun-
ishment. This is the case for a large number of criminal offences defined in the Criminal
Code and in specific (criminal) laws139, as well as for tax-related offences140.
Third, the personal disqualification (faillite personnelle), imposed by a court pursuant
to Articles L. 653-3 and following of the Commercial Code, entails a prohibition from
running, managing, administering or controlling – directly or indirectly – any commercial
or craftsman’s business and any legal entity.141 This personal disqualification is a professional
132 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 373; Truchet 2013, p. 258.
133 Loi du 2-17 mars 1791 portant suppression de tous les droits d’aides, de toutes les maîtrises et jurandes et
établissement des droits de patentes.
134 Loi n° 73-1193 du 27 décembre 1973 d’orientation du commerce et de l’artisanat.
135 Dekeuwer-Défossez & Blary-Clément 2010, p. 126; Reinhard, Thomasset-Pierre & Nourissat 2012, p. 86.
136 Dekeuwer-Défossez & Blary-Clément 2010, p. 135.
137 Article 131-27, second paragraph Code pénal.
138 Vallansan & Vabres, nrs. 31 and 34.
139 For an overview, see Laborrier & Reygrobellet, nrs. 195-199; Vallansan & Vabres, nr. 31.
140 Article 1750 Code général des impôts. See Vallansan & Vabres, nrs. 44-45.
141 Article L. 653-2 Code de commerce. According to Article L. 653-8 of the Commercial Code, the court may
also pronounce, instead of personal disqualification, a prohibition to practice a trade or run a business.
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sanction, which can be imposed on traders and de jure or de facto managers of legal entities
who have committed serious faults in the running of their business.142 The duration of the
personal disqualification will be determined by the court, but may not exceed fifteen
years.143
Finally, the Décret d’Allarde had already provided that the freedom of trade and
industry was subject to restrictions specified in police regulations. Currently, these
restrictions are quite numerous.144 In this context, it should be noted that some commercial
activities are allowed only after prior notification of the competent authority (déclaration).145
Furthermore, quite a lot of commercial activities require prior administrative authorisation
(autorisation préalable).146
In the following sections, we discuss the licensing system for pubs and restaurants, the
granting of casino licences, and the regulation of prostitution.
5.3.1.2 Licences for pubs and restaurants
Anyone looking to open a pub, bar or public house must submit a written statement to
themayor of themunicipality involved or – in Paris – to the prefect of police at least fifteen
days before the opening.147 This statement must not only contain personal information
about the applicant and information about the establishment, but must also include the
permis d’exploitation148, which is obtained after completion of compulsory training on the
rights and obligations of a pub or restaurant operator. The permis d’exploitation is valid
for ten years. Extension for another ten years is only possible after attending a new training
course.149
The mayor150 immediately provides the applicant a statement, attesting that the latter
has obtained the required tax licence.151 This licence is a fiscal document, which has to be
distinguished from the prior notification to the mayor. The mayor is not entitled to control
the information provided by the person concerned, nor is he able to assess the competence
of the applicant.152 However, the mayor will transmit a copy of the written statement to
142 Reinhard, Thomasset-Pierre &Nourissat 2012, p. 308. For an in-depth analysis, see: Laborrier &Reygrobellet
nrs. 227-271.
143 Article L. 653-11, first paragraph Code de commerce.
144 Reinhard, Thomasset-Pierre & Nourissat 2012, p. 87-88.
145 See Dekeuwer-Défossez & Blary-Clément 2010, p. 139-140.
146 See Dekeuwer-Défossez & Blary-Clément 2010, p. 137-139; Kendérian, nrs. 36-38; Reinhard, Thomasset-
Pierre & Nourissat 2012, p. 310-311.
147 Article L. 3332-3 Code de la santé publique.
148 Article L. 3332-3 Code de la santé publique.
149 See Article L. 3332-1-1 Code de la santé publique.
150 In Paris, the prefect of police.
151 Article L. 3332-4-1 Code de la santé publique. For a listing of the various types of licence, see Article L. 3331-
1 and L. 3331-2 Code de la santé publique.
152 Ribière, nrs. 62, 71 and 77-84.
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the public prosecutor and the prefect of the department.153 Although the public prosecutor
is not entitled to refuse the opening of the bar, he will assess the applicant’s file and can,
where appropriate, start an investigation. Furthermore, the public prosecutor will contact
the tax authorities, charged with granting licences.154
The operation of a pub or restaurant is subject to legal requirements concerning such
issues as the protection of minors, consumer protection, and the suppression of public
drunkenness. These requirements are set out in the applicable legislation and further
detailed in regulatory orders from the prefects of the departments.155 The prefect of the
department – or in Paris the prefect of police156 – can order the closure of the pub or
restaurant due to non-compliance with the operating conditions.157 The closure of the
establishment is temporary and applies for the term set by the prefect, on the understanding
that the termwill be no longer than sixmonths. Except in cases involving gross negligence,
the operator of the bar or restaurant will receive prior notice158, giving him the opportunity
to rectify the situation and prevent closure of the premises. In any event, the decision to
close a pub or restaurant may only be taken after the person concerned has been afforded
the opportunity to present evidence in writing and, where appropriate and upon request,
orally. The person concerned has the right to be assisted by a lawyer or to be represented
by a proxy of his choice. Furthermore, the prefect must notify the person concerned in
writing of the legal and factual grounds underlying the closure decision (supra, Section
5.2.2).159
It should be noted that the Minister of the Interior is also empowered to order the
closure of a pub or restaurant. The only difference between that power and the power of
the prefect is the duration of the closure. According to Article L. 3332-16 of the Code de
la santé publique, the Minister of the Interior can order a closure for a period of between
three months and a year.
In principle, the closure of the bar or restaurant does not imply the revocation of the
permis d’exploitation. However, the operating licencewill be revoked if the bar or restaurant
is closed due to a criminal offence relating to its actual operation or its customers. In such
cases, the closure can be ordered immediately for a period of sixmonths.160 Although these
cases involve closing an establishment as a result of a criminal offence, the Council of State
153 Article L. 3332-3 Code de la santé publique.
154 Ribière, nrs. 74-76.
155 Ribière, nrs. 152-169 and 176-180.
156 Article L. 3332-15, 6° Code de la santé publique.
157 Article L. 3332-15, 1° Code de la santé publique. An establishment open to the public can also be closed if
it does not comply with applicable safety rules (Article L. 123-4 Code de la construction et de l’habitation;
see De Fay, nrs. 134-138).
158 Article L. 3332-15, 1° Code de la santé publique.
159 Article L. 3332-15, 5° Code de la santé publique.
160 Article L. 3332-15, 3° and 4° Code de la santé publique.
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has ruled that these closures too are administrative police measures rather than adminis-
trative sanctions. Indeed, the ultimate intention of the measure is to maintain or restore
public order and not to sanction the person concerned.161
Pursuant to Article L. 3352-6 of the Code de la santé publique, non-compliance with a
closure order is punishable by two months’ imprisonment and a fine of € 3.750.
5.3.1.3 Casino licences162
Since the 19th century, French gambling policy has been based on a general prohibition
of all forms of gambling, mitigated by a number of specific exemptions.163 According to
this approach, three types of gambling activities are allowed: lotteries, betting on horse
races, and casinos and gaming circles. Because the State has a monopoly in the former two
sectors, in which only State-controlled enterprises are permitted to operate, casinos and
gaming circles164 are the only gambling sector in which private companies are allowed to
supply services.165 However, as we will see, the regulatory framework for casinos is quite
restrictive – Senator F. Trucy even calls it ‘utterly draconian’166 – and closely monitored.
The stringent regime can be regarded as a result of the commitment of the French
authorities to prevent and counteract the potential and undesirable side effects of casino
gambling, such as money laundering and forms of tax and financial fraud.167
Casinos are establishments where on the one hand games of chance are operated and
on the other shows are organised and catering is offered.168 Currently, there are 198 casinos
in France169, the majority of which are owned by four large groups of companies.170 The
relatively low number of casinos is a consequence of Article L. 321-1 of the Code de la
sécurité intérieure, according to which casinos may only be established in municipalities
classified as seaside resorts, spas, climatic health resorts, or tourist resorts. This restriction
161 Crucis & Breen, nr. 25; Pontier 2013; Tchen, nr. 60.
162 In this part, we only discuss the regulatory framework for land-based casinos. It should be noted that Act
n° 2010-476 of 12 May 2010 (Loi n° 2010-476 du 12 mai 2010 relative à l’ouverture à la concurrence et à la
régulation du secteur des jeux d’argent et de hasard en ligne) contains provisions relating to Internet gambling.
See Jouette Melchior 2011 237-249; Péraldi Leneuf 2011, p. 219-236.
163 See Littler 2009, p. 65-66.
164 In contrast to casinos, gaming circles (cercles de jeux) are non-profit organisations (associations) composed
of members who pay an annual membership fee. Except for slot machines, gaming circles organise games
of a nature similar to those offered by casinos, it being understood that gambling in gaming circles – in view
of their legal form – is strictly limited to members (Littler 2009, p. 79. See also Truchy 2008, p. 131). Gaming
circles are regulated by the Decree of 5 May 1947 (Décret n°47-798 du 5 mai 1947 portant réglementation
de la police des jeux dans les cercles).
165 Littler 2009, p. 71 and 74; Truchy 2008, p. 129-130.
166 Truchy 2008, p. 131.
167 Littler 2009, p. 67.
168 Article 1 Arrêté du 14 mai 2007 relatif à la réglementation des jeux dans les casinos.
169 Casinos De France 2014, p. 3.
170 European Casino Association 2013, p. 44. See also Nikkinen 2014, p. 21.
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goes back to the Act of 15 June 1907171 and implies that casinos are basically limited to a
small percentage of municipalities, regarded as tourist destinations, with a relatively small
residential population. However, under certain conditions, a casino can also be set up in
the principal city of agglomerations with a total of more than 500.000 inhabitants.172 On
this basis, cities like Lyon,Nice andToulouse granted an authorisation for the exploitation
of a casino.173
A casino can only be operated based on a temporary licence174, which is granted by the
Ministry of Interior taking into consideration the specifications put forward by the
municipal council in the cahier des charges.175 This enables municipalities to conclude
agreements with candidates for the operation of a casino.176 In this context, municipalities
can not only levy taxes, but can also demand that casino operators invest in cultural and
sport-related activities.177 Furthermore, the agreements often stipulate that casino operators
must contribute to funding treatment centres and helplines to help players who are vulner-
able to gambling addiction.178
The applicant for a licence must submit an application (dossier) to the prefect of the
department where the casino will be located. The application must contain the relevant
information with regard to the company’s share capital and those controlling it. The cahier
des charges must also be included.179 The prefect of the department will transmit the
application, together with the results of his administrative investigation180, to the Ministry
of Interior, which will take a decision about the granting of the licence after consulting the
Commission consultative des jeux de cercles et de casinos.181 This consultative commission
examines not only the information provided by the applicant, but also the advice provided
by themunicipal council, the prefect of the department, and the Service Central des Courses
et Jeux, which is part of the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police. The Service Central
des Courses et Jeux performs an in-depth investigation of the applicant’s background, his
financial integrity, and the source of his fund. The opinion of the Commission consultative
des jeux de cercles et de casinos is purely advisory. The final decision regarding whether or
not to grant a licence, is taken by the Minister of the Interior, who has a discretionary
power. This decision and its justifications are made public.182
171 Truchy 2008, p. 129.
172 See Article L. 321-1, 2° Code de la sécurité intérieure.
173 Littler 2009, p. 76.
174 Article L. 321-1 Code de la sécurité intérieure.
175 Article L. 321-2 Code de la sécurité intérieure.
176 Rouault & Ribeyre, nr. 226.
177 Littler 2009, p. 78 and 85.
178 European Casino Association 2013, p. 45.
179 Article R. 321-2 Code de la sécurité intérieure. See Rouault & Ribeyre, nrs. 231-232.
180 See Rouault & Ribeyre, nr. 233.
181 See Article R. 321-4 and Article R. 321-7 to R. 321-12 Code de la sécurité intérieure.
182 European Casino Association 2013, p. 17.
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The licence to operate a casino is granted by means of an order of the Minister of the
Interior that stipulates, inter alia, the duration of the authorisation and the operating
hours.183 Once a licence is granted, the Ministry of the Interior will continue to monitor
the casino’s operations184, which means that the Service Central des Courses et Jeux185 will
conduct inspections on a regular basis. Furthermore, officials from the Ministry of Finance
examine and analyse the accounting and financial records of casino operators.186 In that
respect, the Minister of the Interior is empowered, after considering the advice of the
Commission consultative des jeux de cercles et de casinos187, to suspend and even revoke a
licence. A suspension for a maximum of four months or a partial or total revocation is
allowed in cases of non-compliance with the cahier des charges, the requirements of the
licence, or the applicable regulations.188
5.3.1.4 The regulation of prostitution
5.3.1.4.1 The abolitionist regime
Since 1960189, French prostitution policy has been based on an abolitionist approach,
according towhich commercial sex is seen as a private occupation and amatter of individual
choice and responsibility, outside the realm of state intervention.190 This policy is based
on two fundamental principles. To begin with, prostitutes are regarded as victims of social
maladjustment and/or of pimps who force them to practice prostitution.191 This explains
the importance attached to the social support of prostitutes, to measures that help them
leave the prostitution sector, and to the prevention of social conditions that impose risks
leading to persons ending up in the sector.192 The second principle is the criminalisation
of the exploitation of prostitution. Procuring and associated offences, punishable under
Article 225-5 et seq. of the Penal Code, are regarded as offences against the dignity of per-
sons. Procuring includes not only helping, assisting or concealing the prostitution of others,
183 See Article L. 321-2 and Article R. 321-5 Code de la sécurité intérieure.
184 See Article R. 321-38; European Casino Association 2013, p. 45.
185 More precisely its Division de la surveillance générale des casinos et des cercles.
186 Casinos De France 2014, p. 13.
187 In urgent cases, the Minister of the Interior can suspend the licence for a maximum of two months without
advice from the consultative commission.
188 Article L. 321-2, Article R. 321-10 and Article R. 321-30 Code de la sécurité intérieure.
189 In that year, France ratified the United Nations Convenion of 2 December 1949 “for the suppression of the
traffic in persons and of the exploitation of the prostitution of others”. As a consequence, prostitution shifted
from being treated as a public health issue to a social problem (Mathieu 2012, p. 205).
190 Mathieu 2004, p. 153-154.
191 Mathieu 2012, p. 203.
192 Mazur 2004, p. 123.
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but also profiting from the prostitution of others and hiring, training, corrupting or pres-
suring a person with a view to prostitution.193
In its initial form, the abolitionist regime implied the abolition of the regulation of
prostitution which was in force until 1960, but not necessarily the abolition of prostitution
itself. However, French prostitution policy is, to a certain extent, characterised by a lack
of consensus over the ultimate meaning – and consequently the aims – of abolitionism.194
In this respect, the National Assembly passed a non-binding resolution on the 6th of
December 2001, reaffirming France’s abolitionist position, specifying, however, that the
long-term objective is a ‘society without prostitution’.195 Nevertheless, individual prostitu-
tion is not illegal196 and although prostitution may be an undesirable phenomenon and is
not considered a real profession, prostitutes must still pay income taxes and social security
contributions.197 Despite this, the freedom of prostitutes to pursue their activity has been
substantially restricted.
First, the Marthe Richard Act of 13 April 1946 ordered the closure of the maisons de
tolérance. Before this Act entered into force, licensing brothels was regarded as an appro-
priatemeans for the authorities to keep prostitution under strict supervision and to impose
moral and medical control on the prostitutes.198 However, the regulation of prostitution
as a form of labour was criticised because it would amount to a form of state support
towards a system of exploitation of women.199 As a consequence, the Act of 13 April 1946
introduced a complete ban on brothels and other prostitution establishments, which cur-
rently still applies. Thismeans that prostitutes are required towork in a totally independent
and autonomous way.200 Although they have the right to work in private201 in their own
home202, in practice street prostitution is the most common form of prostitution.
At the end of the 1990s the prostitution sector in general and street prostitution in
particular underwent a transformation, prompted by the fact that French cities were being
confronted with a large number of migrant prostitutes from Eastern Europe. These pros-
193 Article 225-5 Code pénal.
194 St. Denny 2014, p. 6.
195 Résolution réaffirmant la position abolitionniste de la France enmatière de prostitution, Assemblée Nationale
2012-2012, n° 782. For a critical assessment, see St. Denny 2014, p. 10-13.
196 Mazur 2004, p. 123.
197 Rassat 2011, p. 689. See also Mazur 2004, p. 124; Mathieu 2012, p. 204.
198 Mathieu 2012, p. 204.
199 St. Denny 2013, p. 6.
200 Mathieu 2012, p. 204.
201 Mazur 2004, p. 137.
202 Conte 2013, p. 317. Pursuant to Article 225-10, 3° of the Penal Code, anyone who sells or makes available
to one or more persons any premises or places not open to the public, in the knowledge that those persons
will engage in prostitution there, is liable to a penalty of ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of € 750.000.
This means that, for instance, the landlord who rents out a house or a flat to a prostitute, knowing that it
will be used for prostitution, can be prosecuted. The same goes for a real estate agency, selling a house or a
flat to a prostitute (see Rassat 2011, p. 705 and 711-712).
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titutes started to operate in areas that had never been affected by prostitution, or at any
rate had not been affected by it for several years. Moreover, these prostitutes seemed to
operate under the strict control of organised procuring networks.203 As a consequence of
this evolution, the traditional abolitionist approach came under pressure, which resulted
in a partial policy shift. Since then, French prostitution policy has increasingly framed
prostitution as a safety and public order issue which should be tackled by police action.204
This has resulted in several initiatives at the local and national level.
On the one hand, in 2002, numerous cities developed a strict anti-prostitution policy.
Within the framework of their power to impose the administrative police measures neces-
sary to maintain public order (infra, Section 5.4.4), cities like Strasbourg, Metz, Lyon and
Aix-en-Provence prohibited prostitution in parts of their territory.205
At national level, the Domestic Security Act of 18 March 2003206 created a legal basis
for the expulsion of migrant prostitutes. In addition, this Act reintroduced the offence of
passive soliciting. According to Article 225-10-1 of the Penal Code207, publicly soliciting
another person by any means, including passive conduct, with a view to inciting them to
engage in sexual relations in exchange for remuneration208 is punishable by two months’
imprisonment and by a fine of € 3.750. This statutory provision has far-reaching conse-
quences, since it essentially means that the mere presence of prostitutes in the urban space
is punishable. Furthermore, the criminalisation of passive soliciting can easily lead to an
arbitrary repression of prostitutes on the streets209, which may in turn lead to an increase
of prostitution in indoor premises, such as bars, nightclubs, hotels or private flats.210 Taking
into account these criticisms and concerns, the National Assembly and the Senate recently
approved a bill providing for the repeal of Article 225-10-1 of the Penal Code.211
The decriminalisation of passive soliciting does notmean that prostitution is no longer
regarded a problematic issue. This is clearly evidenced by the various attempts over the
last decade to implement a policy of criminalisation of the purchase of sexual services.212
InDecember 2013, theNational Assembly approved a legislative proposal that wouldmake
203 Mathieu 2004, p. 206-207; Mathieu 2012, p. 160.
204 Mathieu 2012, p. 207; St. Denny 2013, p. 8.
205 Mathieu 2004, p. 161.
206 Loi n° 2003-239 du 18 mars 2003 pour la sécurité intérieure.
207 As introduced by Article 50 of the Domestic Security Law.
208 Or a promise of remuneration.
209 Mathieu 2012, p. 204-205 and 207-208.
210 Mathieu 2004, p. 162.
211 See Article 13 Proposition de loi adoptée par l’Assemblée Nationale, renforçant la lutte contre le système
prostitutionnel, transmise par M. le Président de l’Assemblée Nationale à M. le Président du Sénat, Sénat
2013-2014, n° 207; Article 13 Proposition de loi adoptée par l’Assemblée Nationale, renforçant la lutte contre
le système prostitutionnel. Texte de la Commission Spéciale, Sénat 2013-2014, n° 698.
212 See St. Denny 2012.
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it possible to punish clients of prostitutes213, which would be tantamount to the de facto
prohibition of prostitution.214 However, the Senate rejected this proposal in July 2014.215
5.3.1.4.2 The closure of premises
Anyonewho, acting directly or through an intermediary, holds,manages, exploits, directs,
operates, finances or contributes to financing a place of prostitution is liable to a penalty
of ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of € 750.000.216 In addition, it is forbidden to accept
or habitually tolerate prostitution or soliciting clients with a view to prostitution in any
given place open to or used by the public. The holder, manager, operator or financier of
such places is liable to the same penalties.217
When a prosecution is initiated based on the above offences, the investigating judge
may order the temporary closure of the premises whose occupier, manager, or employee
is prosecuted. Furthermore, the investigating judge may order the closure of the places
listed in Article 706-36, 2° of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This concerns any hotel,
furnished house, pension, bar, restaurant, club, dance hall, place of entertainment, or its
outbuildings open to or used by the public. These places can be closed if it appears that a
person prosecuted for a prostitution offence has been found to have been knowingly offered
assistance by the management or personnel to destroy evidence, exercise pressure on wit-
nesses, or encourage the continuation of his unlawful activities.218
In both cases, the complete or partial closure of premises is only temporary and applies
for the term set by the investigating judge, on the understanding that the maximum term
is three months. Whatever its initial duration, the closure may be repeatedly extended
under the same procedure by terms of no longer than three months. This implies that the
investigating judge can decide to continue the closure of an establishment for the duration
of the preliminary inquiry.219 Furthermore, the court hearing the case can decide to renew
the closure measure for a maximum term of three months on each occasion.220 This must
be viewed in the context of Article 225-22 of the Criminal Code, according towhich natural
and legal persons convicted of the offences set out under Article 225-10 of the Criminal
Code incur the additional penalty of the mandatory closure, either permanently or for a
213 See Article 16 Proposition de loi adoptée par l’Assemblée Nationale, renforçant la lutte contre le système
prostitutionnel, transmise par M. le Président de l’Assemblée Nationale à M. le Président du Sénat, Sénat
2013-2014, n° 207.
214 St. Denny 2013, p. 3. See also St. Denny 2014, p. 4, 8 and 13-16.
215 See Proposition de loi adoptée par l’AssembléeNationale, renforçant la lutte contre le système prostitutionnel.
Texte de la Commission Spéciale, Sénat 2013-2014, n° 698, 12.
216 Article 225-10, 1° Code pénal.
217 Article 225-10, 2° Code pénal. The decision to prosecute will be recorded in the trade register and in the
securities registers (see Article 706-37 Code de procédure pénale).
218 Article 706-36 Code de procédure pénale.
219 Rassat 2011, p. 729-730.
220 Article 706-36 Code de procédure pénale.
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maximum period of five years, of the entire establishment or the parts of it that were used
for the purpose of prostitution.221 In addition, their business assets will be confiscated.222
These additional penalties can be imposed even if the person concerned is not prose-
cuted. However, he has the right to present his opinion during the hearing. To this end,
the public prosecution service must summon the person concerned and inform him about
the actual prosecution and the possibility of additional penalties.223
5.3.1.4.3 Withdrawal of bar or restaurant licences
Natural and legal persons convicted of the offences set out under Article 225-10 of the
Criminal Code are subjected to the additional penalty of permanent withdrawal of their
bar or restaurant licence.224 In this case too, the licence can be withdrawn if the holder is
not prosecuted, provided that he was summoned and afforded the opportunity to be
heard.225
Furthermore, a conviction for one of the offences listed in Article 225-10 of the Crim-
inal Code automatically implies that the person concerned is no longer allowed to run a
public house.226
5.3.2 Public procurement law
France has incorporated Article 45 of Directive 2004/18/EC227 and Article 39 of Directive
2009/81/EC228 into its domestic public procurement legislation.229 Therefore, candidates
221 Article 225-22, 2° Code pénal. This additional penalty ipso facto leads to the suspension of the licence for
the same period (Rassat 2011, p. 722).
222 Article 225-22, 3° Code pénal. See Rassat 2011, p. 722-723.
223 See Article 706-38 Code de procédure pénale.
224 Article 225-22, 1° Code pénal.
225 See Article 706-38 Code de procédure pénale.
226 Article L. 3336-2, 1° Code de la santé publique. See Rassat 2011, p. 721.
227 Directive 2004/18/EC of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works
contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, O.J. 2004, L 134/114. It should be noted that
public procurement rules adopted pursuant to Directive 2004/18/EC were revised and modernised by
Directive 2014/24/EUof the EuropeanParliament and theCouncil of 26 February 2014 onpublic procurement
and repealing Directive 2044/18/EC (O.J. 2014, L 94/65), which contains significant additions to both the
mandatory and discretionary grounds for the exclusion of economic operators from participation in a pro-
curement procedure.Member States are required to enact the laws, regulations and administrative provisions
necessary to comply with Directive 2014/24/EU by 18 April 2016. Directive 2004/18/EC was repealed with
effect from that date.
228 Directive 2009/81/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply
contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security,
and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, O.J. 2009, L 216/76.
229 See Article 43 Code des marchés publics 2006; Article 8 and Article 38 Ordonnance n° 2005-649 du 6 juin
2005 relative aux marchés passés par certaines personnes publiques ou privées non soumises au code des
marchés publics. For a critical analysis, see Dal Farra 2011, nr. 74, 2-11.
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or tenderers are excluded fromparticipation in a procurement procedure if they have been
finally convicted in the last five years of one of the offences listed in Article 8, 1° and 2° of
Ordinance n° 2005-649 of 6 June 2005. These include the participation in a criminal
association, money laundering, fraud, corruption, trafficking in influence, and acts of ter-
rorism. Furthermore, companies in the process of liquidation are excluded from participa-
tion in a procurement procedure.230 The same goes for applicants who did not comply
with their legal obligation to pay taxes or social security contributions in the year preceding
the tender.231
Candidates or tenderers will need to certify that they are not in one of these situations.
To do this, they have to submit a declaration of honour.232 With regard to non-compliance
with tax and social security obligations, the competent agency can issue a certification of
compliance if the person concerned has rectified the situation and has paid the taxes and
social security contributions.233
5.4 Instruments directed at preventing the disturbance of public
order
5.4.1 The police powers of the prefect of the department
The prefect of the department is a key player in the field of administrative policing. He is
not only responsible for public order (ordre public) and safety in his department, but also
– in the context of national security – for preparing and executing the measures of internal,
civil and economic security.234 The concept ordre public encompasses the three classical
components of public safety, public health, and public peace235, along with, according to
the case law of the Council of State, the respect for human dignity.236 Since the purpose of
the administrative police is to prevent breaches of public order237, the prefect can, in his
capacity as autorité de police administrative238, take all appropriate measures with a view
to safeguarding public order. Additionally, the prefect is also entrusted with administrative
policing powers in a number of specific fields. These police spéciales relate, inter alia, to
230 Article 8, 3° Ordinance n° 2005-649 of 6 June 2005.
231 Article 8, 4° Ordinance n° 2005-649 of 6 June 2005.
232 Article 44, I, 2° Code des marchés publics 2006.
233 X s.l.n.d., p. 5.
234 Article 11 Decree n° 2004-374 of 29 April 2004. In a limited number of departments, the prefect is assisted
by a préfet adjoint pour la sécurité, who deals exclusively with security matters (Waline 2012, p. 94-95).
235 See Article L. 2212-2 CGCT.
236 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 293-294; Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 348; Serrand 2012, p. 81-82; Truchet
2013, p. 307-308.
237 Waline 2012, p. 352-353.
238 Chrétien & Chifflot 2012, p. 145.
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inspections in railway stations and airports and the closure of dangerous or unhealthy
establishments.239
Pursuant to Article 34, first paragraph of Act n° 82-213 of 2 March 1982240, the prefect
of the department heads the department’s state services. It follows that the police assists
the prefect and that the latter is empowered to give instructions to both the national police
and the gendarmerie.241 Whereas the prefect of the department carries out most of his tasks
under the authority of the prefect of the region (supra, Section 5.1.1), this is not the case
formaintaining public order, which is an exclusive power of the prefect of the department.
The regional prefects are not responsible for themaintaining public order and consequently
have no police powers.242
The prefect’s decisions usually take the form of orders (arrêtés), which can be of a
regulatory nature, e.g. police regulations, or an individual nature, e.g. authorisations or
permits.243 The responsibility of the prefect to maintain public order must be distinguished
from the mayor’s responsibility in this field. The division of powers between both
authorities is set out in Article L. 2215-1 of the Code général des collectivités territoriales.
The basic principle is that the mayor ensures the so-called police municipale and is thus
responsible for maintaining public order in his municipality. However, the following
restrictions apply.
First, the powers of themayor are obviously limited to the territory of themunicipality.244
Measures relating to public order, public safety, public security and public health, whose
scope of application is not restricted to one municipality, can thus only be taken by the
prefect of the department.245 Given the small scale of many municipalities, this situation
frequently occurs. Second, in the event of disturbance of public order in two or more
adjacent municipalities, the prefect can take a well-reasoned decision to use his power of
substitution. This permits him to exercise certain of the mayor’s police powers246, which
contributes to the cohesiveness of administrative policing.247 Third, the prefect of the
department can intervene in cases where the mayor fails to act. If the mayor does not
comply with a notice given by the prefect, the latter can take all measures necessary to
239 Chrétien & Chifflot 2012, p. 241.
240 Loi n° 82-213 du 2 mars 1982 relative aux droits et libertés des communes, des départements et des régions.
241 Chrétien & Chifflot 2012, p. 241; Maillard Desgrées Du Loû 2011, p. 377.
242 Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 145.
243 Chrétien & Chifflot 2012, p. 241; Waline 2012, p. 96.
244 Truchet 2013, p. 310.
245 Article L. 2215-1, 3° CGCT.
246 It concerns the powers mentioned in Article L. 2212-2, 2° and 3° and Article L. 2213-23 of the Code général
des collectivités territoriales. See Article L. 2215-1, 2° CGCT.
247 Waline 2012, p. 360.
178
D. Van Daele
maintain public safety, health, and peace.248 Here again, the prefect uses his power of sub-
stitution.249
5.4.2 The police powers of the mayor
The far-reaching powers of the prefect of the department aside, the mayor still plays an
important role in the area of administrative policing.250 Acting as an autorité de police
administrative, the mayor is entrusted with the police municipale.251 This concept of
municipal police should first of all be understood in a functional sense, meaning that the
mayor, within the limits indicated above and under the administrative control of the prefect
of the department, is responsible for maintaining public order in his municipality.252 This
implies that themayor ensures order, safety, security and public health in hismunicipality.253
In light of this, he has the power to issue police regulations. Furthermore, the mayor pro-
motes and coordinates the crime prevention policy in his municipality.254 In that context,
a local security and crime prevention council – presided over by the mayor – is established
in municipalities with more than 10.000 inhabitants and in municipalities that include a
sensitive urban area (zone urbaine sensible)255.256
It should be noted that the mayor is also officer of the judicial police.257 In that respect,
Article 40, second paragraph of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CPP) sets out themayor’s
obligation to notify the district prosecutor immediately of any felony or misdemeanour
of which he has knowledge, and to transmit any relevant information, official reports, or
documents.
The mayor’s responsibility for the police municipale does not imply that each munici-
pality has its own local police force. On the contrary, the French police system is largely
centralised, comprising the Police Nationale and the Gendarmerie Nationale. Currently
only a small number of municipalities – approximately 3,500 – have their own municipal
police force, acting under the direct authority of the mayor.258
248 Article L. 2215-1, 1° CGCT.
249 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 300; Waline 2012, p. 360.
250 Waline 2012, p. 145.
251 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 296.
252 Article L. 2212-1 CGCT.
253 See Article L. 2212-2 CGCT.
254 Article L. 132-4 Code de la sécurité intérieure (CSI).
255 As defined by Article 42, nr. 3 of the Act of 4 February 1995 (Loi n° 95-115 du 4 février 1995 d’orientation
pour l’aménagement et le développement du territoire).
256 Article L. 132-4 Code de la sécurité intérieure (CSI).
257 Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 142.
258 Donnelly 2013, p. 37. For a detailed analysis of the municipal police forces, see De Fay, nrs. 310-393.
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Furthermore, the state police regime (régime de la police d’État)259 must be taken into
account. On the one hand, this regime applies to the department capitals.260 On the other
hand, the Ministers of Home Affairs and Finance, following a request from the municipal
council or with its agreement, can decide to implement the state police regime in munici-
palities with more than 20.000 inhabitants that are confronted with the nature and extent
of delinquency typical of urban areas.261 The régime de la police d’État not only implies
that the police services are financed exclusively by the State and that all police officers are
State personnel, but also that the prefect of the department is responsible for maintaining
public order in the strict sense.262 In these municipalities, the prefect can take all the nec-
essarymeasures to prevent and suppress violations of the public peace.263 As a consequence,
the police powers of the mayor are significantly reduced.264
5.4.3 The Prefecture of Police of Paris
The Paris metropolitan area enjoys special status in the French administrative system,
which has its historical roots in the Napoleonic era265 and is, with regard to security man-
agement, reflected in the fact that the powers of the municipal police are executed by the
prefect of police (préfet de police)266, who heads the Prefecture of Police of Paris (Préfecture
de police de Paris). The territorial competence of the prefect of police is not restricted to
the Paris department, but also covers the petite couronne, i.e. the three surrounding
departments: Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis and Val-de-Marne.267 All police forces
within the city of Paris and the petite couronne are obliged to report directly to the prefect
of police.268
The powerful position of the prefect of police does not imply that the mayor of Paris
is uninvolved in themaintenance of public order, but his powers are limited to the domains
of public health, fairs and markets, and traffic and parking.269 To this end, the mayor is
259 See Tchen, nrs. 160-166.
260 Article R. 2214-1 CGCT.
261 If the municipal council does not agree, such a regime can be imposed by decree of the Council of State. See
Article L. 2214-1 and Article R. 2214-2 CGCT.
262 Chrétien & Chifflot 2012, p. 559; Serrand 2012, p. 88-89; Waline 2012, p. 360.
263 Article L. 2214-4 andArticle L. 2212-2, 2° CGCT. Themayorwill takemeasures responding to neighbourhood
disturbances.
264 See Frier & Petit 2013, p. 297.
265 Order of 1 July 1800 (12 messidor an VIII) determining the functions of the prefect of police.
266 Article L. 2512-13, first paragraph CGCT; Article L. 131-2 Code de la sécurité intérieure (CSI).
267 Article L. 122-2 CSI.
268 Mouhanna 2010, p. 31.
269 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 198; Serrand 2012, p. 89.
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assisted by the Direction de la Prévention et de la Protection, which consists of surveillance
and protection agents, mainly entrusted with the protection of municipal facilities.270
5.4.4 Administrative police measures
5.4.4.1 Concept, scope, and limitations
Administrative police measures are by their very nature unilateral acts that impose obliga-
tions upon citizens. As discussed in Section 5.2.1, a distinction must be made between
regulatory and individual acts. Whereas the former have general scope and apply –
depending on the case – across the territory of the department or the municipality, the
latter are addressed to a specific person and contain a prohibition, an injunction, a suspen-
sion or a requisition.271
The competent administrative authorities are obliged to take all measures necessary
to maintain public order.272 However, this obligation does not imply that the powers of
the prefect of the department, the mayor, and other administrative police authorities are
unlimited. According to the Council of State case law, freedom is indeed the rule and its
restriction by the authorities must remain the exception.273 This means that an administra-
tive police measure will only be legal to the extent it is necessary to maintain public order,
which implies that the competent autorité de police administrative must balance the
interests of individual freedom against the maintenance of public order. This balancing
act is done by means of three criteria. First, public order must actually have been disturbed
or be in danger of being disturbed. In this context, the seriousness of the disturbance needs
to be assessed. Second, the importance of the fundamental freedom at stake and of its
infringement must be evaluated.274 Infringement of an individual liberty must be avoided
as much as possible and is justified only to the extent that no other possibility exists.275
Furthermore, unless the law explicitly allows it, police authorities cannot subject the
exercise of legally guaranteed freedoms to either prior authorisation or advance notifica-
tion.276 Third, the proportionality principle must be taken into account. This not only
implies that the restriction imposed on the person concerned must be proportionate to
the disturbance of public order, but also that – from the broader perspective of all admin-
270 Mouhanna 2010, p. 32.
271 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 303.
272 See Frier & Petit 2013, p. 301-302; Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 356-357.
273 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 304; Waline 2012, p. 362.
274 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 305.
275 Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 355.
276 Waline 2012, p. 363.
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istrative police measures available – only the necessary or indispensable, i.e. the least
drastic measure must be applied.277
Although it follows from the above that general prohibitive measures are generally
forbidden, an outright prohibition of certain activities is nevertheless permissible in
exceptional cases, such as those involving practices that are contrary to human dignity.278
More generally, it can be observed that an increasing feeling of insecurity seems to lead to
a greater acceptance of the legitimacy of prohibitive measures taken by municipal
authorities.279
5.4.4.2 The revocation of an authorisation
As discussed in Section 5.2.3, the revocation of an authorisation can be an administrative
sanction and a policemeasure, depending on the predominantmotive of the administrative
authority. In the context of maintaining public order, administrative authorities may,
under certain conditions, revoke an authorisation if the continuation of the authorised
activity would provoke disorder and illegal conduct. Although the revocation will in these
cases often be the consequence of irregularities detected, it is not used as a means of
sanctioning such irregularities. The rationales underlying the administrative decision are
to prevent further infringements and to protect public order or third-party interests. As
a consequence, the revocation of the authorisation is in this case not a sanction, butmerely
an administrative police measure.280
In applying this preventive approach, the authorisation to work in a casino can, for
instance, be revoked when irregularities are detected. Another typical example is the
revocation of the authorisation to sell alcohol in a bar after it becomes apparent that the
bar is a meeting place for criminals, and taking into account that a fake passport and a gun
have been found on the premises.281
If an authorisation is revoked due to a disturbance of public order, the procedural
guarantees will be less strict than those applicable in cases in which an authorisation is
revoked as an administrative sanction, since the principle of legality of offences and pun-
ishments as well as the rights provided for in Article 6, § 1 ECHR do not apply to admin-
istrative police measures.282 However, the person concerned must be informed of the
grounds for the revocation of the authorisation. Moreover, in principle such a police
measure cannot be taken before affording the person concerned the opportunity to be
277 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 305; Lombard, Dumont & Sirinelli 2013, p. 354-355.
278 Frier & Petit 2013, p. 305-306.
279 Waline 2012, p. 364.
280 Breen 2013, p. 205.
281 Breen 2013, p. 205.
282 Breen 2013, p. 198; Frier & Petit 2013, p. 304; Petit 2013, p. 2-3.
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heard, which implies that he must be notified of the intended revocation and must be
afforded the opportunity to examine the file (supra, Section 5.2.2).283
5.4.4.3 The closure of pubs, restaurants and discotheques
Pursuant to his powers as autorité de police administrative, the mayor can order the tem-
porary closure of a pub or restaurant if it is operated in such a way that it endagers public
order. Grounds must be provided for the provisional closure of an establishment. Given
that thismeasure is intended tomaintain public order and is therefore not an administrative
sanction, the closure will be limited to the period necessary to restore public order.284
Furthermore, the police powers of the prefect must be taken into account. On the one
hand, the prefect of the department – or in Paris the prefect of police285 – can order the
closure of a pub or restaurant in the case of a violation of public order, health, peace, or
morality, provided that this violation relates to the actual operation or customers of the
bar or restaurant. The closure has amaximumduration of twomonths, although the prefect
can set a shorter period if the operator agrees to attend a course to obtain a business
licence.286 On the other hand, the prefect of the department – or in Paris the prefect of
police – can close a discotheque for a maximum period of three months if the public order,
security, or peace is disturbed by activities taking place in the establishment.287
In both cases, the closure is an administrative police measure288, which may only be
imposed after the person concerned has been afforded the opportunity to present evidence
in writing, or when appropriate and upon request, orally. He has the right to be assisted
by a lawyer or to be represented by a proxy of his choice. In addition, the prefect must
notify the person concerned in writing of the legal and factual grounds underlying the
closure decision (supra, Section 5.2.2).289
283 See Article 1 Act n° 79-587 of 11 July 1979 and Article 24 Act n° 2000-321 of 12 April 2000.
284 Ribière, nrs. 183-185.
285 Article L. 3332-15, 6° Code de la santé publique.
286 Article L. 3332-15, 2° and 4° Code de la santé publique. For a list of examples of the application of this article,
see Ribière, nrs. 192-193.
287 Article L. 333-1 Code de la sécurité intérieure.
288 Ribière, nrs. 186-187.
289 For the closure of a bar or restaurant, see Article L. 3332-15, 5° Code de la santé publique.
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6.1.1 German administrative organisation
The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state1, consisting of
thirteen territorial states and three city states (Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg). As con-
stituents of the Federation (Bund), these sixteen Länder are states with sovereign rights
and responsibilities. Unless otherwise provided or permitted by the Grundgesetz (GG),
the exercise of state powers and the discharge of state functions is a matter for the Länder.2
This implies that the Federation has legislative and administrative powers only in those
areas enumerated in the Basic Law.
With regard to the legislative power, article 70 (1) of the Basic Law stipulates that the
Länder shall have the right to legislate as far as the Basic Law does not confer legislative
power on the Federation. A distinction has to be made between two types of legislative
power of the Federation. On the one hand, the Federation has exclusive legislative power
with respect to the matters listed in article 73 of the Basic Law, e.g. foreign affairs; defence;
financial matters; and cooperation between the Federation and the Länder concerning
criminal police work and concerning the protection of the free democratic basic order and
the constitution. In these matters, the Länder shall have power to legislate only when and
to the extent that they are expressly authorised to do so by federal law.3 On the other hand,
article 74 of the Basic Law contains a long and extensive list of matters under concurrent
legislative powers (e.g. civil law; criminal law; court organisation and procedure; labour
law; and most aspects of the law relating to economic matters). In this respect, the Länder
may only legislate as long as and to the extent that the Federation has not exercised its
legislative power by enacting a law.4 Given the fact that the Federation has regulated virtually
all the matters listed in article 74 of the Basic Law, the system of concurrent legislative
powers means in practice that the Federation has exclusive power. As a consequence, the
1 Art. 20 (1) GG.
2 Art. 30 GG. Amendements to the Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their par-
ticipation in principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in articles 1 and 20 of the Basic
Law shall be inadmissible (art. 79 (3) GG).
3 Art. 71 GG.
4 Art. 72 (1) GG.
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legislation of the Länder mainly concerns cultural matters, public order and municipal
matters.5
This limited role of the Länder in the field of legislation contrasts with their extensive
position in the field of administration.6 Here, the fundamental rule of article 30 of the Basic
Law – according to which the exercise of state functions is, in principle, a matter for the
Länder – is of real significance.7 Firstly, the Länder obviously execute their own legislation.
Secondly, they shall in principle8 also execute the federal laws as part of their own affairs.9
In this perspective, the Federation merely disposes of restricted oversight competences
(Bundesaufsichtverwaltung).10 This implies that federal control is limited to subsequent
supervision of the legality of administrative action.11 Thirdly, the Basic Law contains a
limited number of cases in which the Länder execute federal laws on federal commission
and thus under close oversight of the Federation (Bundesauftragsverwaltung).12
Given this important role of the Länder in the execution of federal laws, the federal
administration in Germany is rather limited. The Federation only executes its own laws
through its own administrative authorities (bundeseigene Verwaltung) in matters listed in
the articles 86 to 90 of the Basic Law. This includes for instance the federal tax department,
the aviation administration or the federal border police. In comparison, the Länder have
an extensive administrative apparatus. Although there are some differences between the
various Länder, generally speaking the administrative organisation has a multilevel struc-
ture.13
The highest level, characterised by a smooth transition between governmental and
administrative duties, consists of the supreme authorities (oberste Landesbehörden), such
as the StateGovernment (Landesregierung) and theministerial departments. These principal
authorities coordinate and guide the Landesoberhörden, which are directly subordinated
to a ministry and carry out special tasks for the whole territory of the State. An example
of such a Landesoberhörde is the State Criminal Police Office.14 As a central agency, this
Landeskriminalamt is responsible both for the criminal investigation of serious forms of
crime and for the supervision and the support of the criminal investigation activities of
the State’s police stations.15
5 Burkens & Van Schagen 2004, p. 342.
6 Heun 2011, p. 62.
7 Burkens & Van Schagen 2004, p. 342.
8 When the Basic Law does not otherwise provide or permit.
9 Art. 83 GG.
10 See art. 84 GG.
11 Heun 2011, p. 144.
12 See art. 85 GG.
13 Burkens & Van Schagen 2004, p. 342; Heun 2011, p. 63.
14 Schröder 2012, p. 49-50.
15 For an overview of the Landeskriminalämter in the sixteen Länder, see Mokros 2007, p. 50-65.
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In some of the states, the intermediate authorities (Landesmittelbehörden) form the
second level in the administrative organisation. They are subordinate to a supreme state
authority and are only competent for a part of the state. At this intermediate level, the
district or regional governments (Bezirksregierungen), headed by the Regierungspräsident,
are the central actors.16
Finally, the lower state authorities (untere Landesbehörden) have jurisdiction only for
a small part of the country. These are for example the chief executive of a county (Landrat)
and the cities not belonging to a district (kreisfreie Städte). They are subordinated to an
intermediate authority.17 In this perspective, it needs to be considered that the municipal-
ities are a part of the Länder and as a consequence are entrusted with supra-local tasks,
which they exercise under the supervision and in accordance with the instructions of the
state.18 Hence, the municipal authorities are the most important administrative enforcers
of federal and state laws.19 However, they also have their own responsibilities. Article 28
(2) of the Basic Law stipulates that municipalities must be guaranteed the right to regulate
all local affairs, within the limits prescribed by law.20 This autonomy includes regulations
in the form of by-laws. These are decided upon by democratically elected communal
councils, andmainly concern cultural affairs, public infrastructure and the promotion and
support of the local economy.21
6.1.2 The administrative approach to combating organised crime in the
context of organised crime policy in Germany
The German criminal political debate about organised crime and the ways to respond to
this phenomenon originates from the second half of the 1980s and reached its peak in the
last decade of the twentieth century. Partly due to the influence of European and interna-
tional policies, organised crime and its containment became the predominant issue in
German criminal policy during the 1990s. This resulted in important legislation that was
enacted after intense and sometimes even controversial discussions in the political and
academic sphere. The legislation relates first of all to issues of substantive criminal law,
such as the introduction of the offence of money laundering into the German Criminal
Code; the creation of new instruments for the confiscation of criminal assets; the widening
of the scope of the statutory offence of participation in a criminal association; and the
16 Schröder 2012, p. 50.
17 Schröder 2012, p. 50.
18 Stein & Frank 2010, p. 133.
19 Heun 2011, p. 78.
20 Within the limits of their functions designated by law, associations of municipalities shall also have the right
to self-government.
21 Heun 2011, p. 78-79.
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extension of the definition of corruption. Secondly, a number of important legislative ini-
tiatives were taken to facilitate criminal investigations on organised crime. Reference can
be made not only to the broadening of the scope of already existing instruments, such as
the legislation on telephone tapping, but also to the introduction of statutory provisions
on new investigatory powers, such as the electronic surveillance of private premises.22
Although the policy pursued so far almost exclusively focused on reforms of the sub-
stantive and procedural criminal law, attention was also paid to approaching organised
crime via tax measures. This has led to a so-called multi-agency alliance of intervention
in which public prosecutors, customs and the financial administration cooperate. The
third section of the Money Laundering Control Act23 provides that the tax authorities are
informed about any relevant information gathered in the context of criminal investigations
based on suspicion of money laundering. This information can be used for further fiscal
investigations, even if the criminal suspicion was unsubstantiated. Conversely, the tax
authorities pass information to the public prosecution service. Under certain conditions,
such financial information can be used in criminal investigations. This approach, which
can be interpreted as a move from confiscation through asset penalty towards forfeiture
through taxation, shows that criminal law inGermany is to some extent no longer the only
instrument in the fight against organised crime. Nevertheless, as Kilchling points out, it
is partly unclear whether this development is limited to a kind of utilitarian use of taxation
law for the tackling of organised crime or whether it can be seen as a broader tendency to
‘escape’ from criminal law and criminal prosecution.24 The former seems to be the case.
Indeed, to date, Germany’s organised crime policy does not focus on the role of the (local)
administrative authorities in preventing and combating this type of crime.As a consequence,
Germany does not have a specific set of tools nor an institutional framework for an
administrative approach to combating organised crime. As we will discuss in this report,
this does not, however, imply that the administrative authorities cannot play a role in
combating crime in general and organised crime in particular. In this respect, three issues
are of particular relevance.
First of all, it should be pointed out that Germany has a long-standing tradition of
administrative sanctions.25 The Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (AdministrativeOffences Act)
contains general regulations for all administrative offences according to federal and state
laws.26 It is very similar to the law governing criminal offences and was enacted in 1952.
An Ordnungswidrigkeit is defined as an unlawful and reprehensible act, constituting the
22 See Kilchling 2004, p. 717-762.
23 Gesetz über das Aufspüren von Gewinnen aus schweren Straftaten (Geldwäschegesetz – GwG) of 13 August
2008.
24 Kilchling 2004, p. 735-736 and 754-755.
25 For a general analysis, see Dannecker 2013, p. 213-254.
26 The Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz defines only some administrative offences.Most of these offences are scattered
over a multitude of various laws and regulations.
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factual elements set forth in a statute that enables the act to be sanctioned by an adminis-
trative fine.27 While the Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz only allows for fining natural persons
and legal entities, there are several other laws allowing administrative authorities to impose
other administrative sanctions. In this perspective the revocation and withdrawal of bene-
ficial administrative acts (infra, Section 6.2) are particularly important.
Secondly,German legislation provides a number ofmechanisms allowing administrative
authorities to screen and monitor persons and legal entities (infra, Section 6.3). Although
thesemechanismswere not created to tackle organised crime, utilising them in this context
can in a certain sense be seen as a form of what in the Netherlands is referred to by the
broad concept of the administrative approach to combating organised crime. However,
as we will discuss in Section 6.5 of this report, such an approach is only possible if
administrative authorities obtain information, which allows them to make targeted and
efficient use of their administrative means and powers.
Finally, both the police services and the Ordnungsbehörden are entrusted with the task
of preventing and averting dangers for the public order and security (Gefahrenabwehr).
In Section 6.4 of this report, we shall examine whether and to what extent instruments
directed at preventing the disturbance of public order can be used against criminal groups.
6.2 Essential characteristics of German administrative procedure
6.2.1 Verwaltungsverfahren and Verwaltungsakt
From a general viewpoint the concept administrative procedure or administrative proceed-
ing can be defined as a decision-making process carried out under the responsibility of a
public law authority, which results in a decisionwith legally binding effect.28 This definition
must be seen in the perspective of the federal structure of Germany. Consequently,
administrative competence is divided between the Federal Government and the Govern-
ments of the Länder.29
General administrative law at the federal level is codified in the Verwaltungsverfahrens-
gesetz (VwVfG)30, which defines the administrative procedure (Verwaltungsverfahren) as
the activity of authorities having an external effect and directed to the examination of basic
requirements, the preparation and the adoption of an administrative act.31 Pursuant to
§ 35 VwVfG, an administrative act (Verwaltungsakt) shall be any order, decision or other
27 § 1 (1) Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (OwiG).
28 Röhl & Wollenschläger 2007, p. 199.
29 Singh 2001, p. 33.
30 Schröder 2012, p. 43.
31 § 9 VwVfG.
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sovereign measure taken by an authority to regulate an individual case in the sphere of
public law and intended to have a direct, external legal effect. This definition implies that
an administrative act cannot contain a general abstract rule applicable to all citizens. In
principle, an administrative act relates to an individual specific case.32 There is an important
exception to this fundamental rule: an administrative authority can indeed issue a so-called
Allgemeinverfügung. Such a general order is an administrative act either directed at a group
of people defined or definable on the basis of general characteristics or relating to the
public law aspect of a topic or its use by the public at large.33
An administrative act can only be performed by an authority (Behörde) performing
functions of public administration.34 In this perspective, the Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz
applies to the administrative activities under public law of the official bodies of the Federal
Government and public law entities, institutions and foundations operated directly by the
Federal Government.35 With regard to the administrative activities under public law of
the official bodies of the Länder36, the situation is more complex. In principle, the Verwal-
tungsverfahrensgesetz is applicable to these administrative activities in those cases where
the Länder execute federal legislation on behalf of the federal authorities. Moreover, the
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz applies when the Länder execute federal legislation within
the exclusive or concurrent powers of the Federal Governement. However, the Verwal-
tungsverfahrensgesetz shall only apply to the extent that no federal law or regulation contains
similar or conflicting rules.37 Furthermore, the Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz shall not apply
to the execution of federal law by the Länder when the administrative activity is regulated
by legislation on administrative procedure of the Länder.38 According to this so-called
Landessubsidiaritätsklausel the Länder have their own legislation on administrative proce-
dure (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetze der Länder). Nonetheless this legislation resembles
the federal Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz or even simply refers to it.39
Some proceedings are explicitly excluded from the scope of the Verwaltungsverfahrens-
gesetz. In the framework of this study it is important to bear in mind that this Act shall
not apply to procedures of the federal or local tax authorities under the Fiscal Code
(Abgabenordnung), nor to criminal and other prosecutions and the punishment of
administrative offences (Ordnungswidrigkeiten).40
32 Kramer 2013, p. 35-36.
33 § 35 VwVfG. See Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 299-310; Detterbeck 2013, p. 148-153; Knack & Henneke
2010, p. 746-750.
34 Schröder 2012, p. 56. See also § 1 (4) VwVfG.
35 § 1 (1) 1 VwVfG.
36 And local authorities and other public law entities subject to the supervision of the Länder.
37 § 1 (1) and (2) VwVfG.
38 § 1 (3) VwVfG.
39 Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 14-16; Schröder 2012, p. 48.
40 See § 2 (2) VwVfG.
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Finally, the Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz covers only general administrative law, i.e.
the rules, general principles and legal concepts applicable to all spheres of administrative
activity. Apart from this Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, there is particular or specific legis-
lation (Besonderes Verwalungsrecht), dealing with the activities of the municipalities and
other public authorities in domains as police, public security, public health and environ-
mental protection.41
6.2.2 The course of the administrative procedure
6.2.2.1 The commencement of proceedings
Pursuant to § 10 VwVfG the administrative procedure shall not be tied to specific forms
when no legal provisions exist which specifically govern this.42 It shall be carried out in an
uncomplicated, appropriate and timely manner. In that perspective, the administrative
authority has to make its decision as soon as possible.43
The authority shall decide after due consideration whether and when it is appropriate
to instigate administrative proceedings. However, this discretionary power does not apply
in all cases. First of all, in some cases the authority is obliged by law to act ex officio or
upon application. Secondly, legislation can stipulate that the authority may only act upon
application.44 Moreover, the discretionary power is not unlimited. When an authority is
empowered to act at its discretion, it shall indeed do so in accordance with the purpose of
the discretionary powers and has to respect the legal limits to those powers.45
6.2.2.2 The administrative investigation
By virtue of the Untersuchungsgrundsatz the administrative authority shall determine ex
officio the facts of the case and the type and scope of investigation. The authority is not
bound by the participants’ submissions and motions to admit evidence.46
During the administrative procedure the authority must take all circumstances of the
case into account, including those favourable to the participants.47 Furthermore, § 24 (3)
VwVfG explicitly stresses that the authority shall not refuse to accept statements or appli-
cations fallingwithin its sphere of competence on the ground that it considers the statement
or application inadmissible or unjustified.
41 Schröder 2012, p. 43.
42 The formal procedure, which is characterized by special procedural rules, is regulated in § 63 – § 71 VwVfG.
It is applicable only in certain cases prescribed by the law.
43 Röhl & Wollenschläger 2007, p. 220.
44 § 22 VwVfG.
45 § 40 VwVfG.
46 § 24 (1) VwVfG.
47 § 24 (2) VwVfG.
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As a general rule, the administrative authority shall utilise the evidence that, after due
consideration, is deemed necessary to ascertain the facts of the case.48 Given the principle
of freedom of evidence and taking the proportionality principle into account, the authority
can use all means of evidence it considers to be necessary to investigate the case.49 The
Administrative Procedure Act only contains a non-exhaustive list of the admissible means
of evidence. In the first place the authority can gather information of all kinds. Secondly,
the authority can hear participants, witnesses and experts or gather statements in writing
or electronically from these persons. Furthermore the authority may obtain documents
and records and is allowed to visit and inspect the locality involved.50
Notwithstanding the fact that the administrative authority determines the facts of the
case ex officio, a duty exists for the participants in the administrative procedure to cooper-
ate.51 Paragraph 26 (2) VwVfG contains the obligation for the persons concerned to assist
to ascertain the facts of the case and in particular to state facts and evidence known to
them. A more extensive duty to assist in ascertaining the facts – and in particular the duty
to appear in person or make a statement – does, however, only exist where the law specif-
ically imposes such an obligation.52
Although the obligation to cooperate cannot be enforced, the participant in the
administrative proceedings should be aware that non-compliance with this obligation can
be taken into consideration by the administrative authority in the decision-making process.53
It is indeed possible that the refusal to provide the necessary (personal) information leads
to an unsatisfactory establishment of the facts of the case.54 This can result in negative
decision, for instance the denial of a license or a permit.
6.2.2.3 Due process in administrative proceedings
6.2.2.3.1 Hearing of participants
According to § 25 (1) VwVfG the authority shall, when necessary, inform the participants
in the administrative proceedings on their rights and duties. The right to be informed only
relates to general aspects of the procedure and does not include a right to information
about the facts of the on-going administrative investigation. This aspect should, however,
be considered in conjunction with the right of the person to be heard, as provided for in
48 § 26 (1) VwVfG.
49 Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 189; Fehling, Kastner & Störmer 2013, p. 341-342.
50 See § 26 (1) VwVfG.
51 Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 185; Detterbeck 2013, p. 365.
52 For a number of examples, see Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 194-195. Furthermore also witnesses and
experts can have a duty to cooperate. They are obliged to make a statement or furnish opinions when the
law specifically requires this (see § 26 (3) VwVfG).
53 Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 194.
54 Fehling, Kastner & Störmer 2013, p. 347; Knack & Henneke 2010, p. 502.
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§ 28 (1) VwVfG. Before an administrative act which affects the rights of the person con-
cerned may be issued, he must be given the opportunity to make a statement about the
facts relevant to the decision. As such a statement requires knowledge of the facts of the
case, the right to be heard includes a principal obligation of the autority to communicate
these facts to the concerned person. Furthermore, the right to be heard also obliges the
authority to thoroughly consider the statement of the person concerned and to deal with
his arguments at the latest in the motivation of the decision.55
The right to be heard is not an absolute right. Pursuant to § 28 (3) VwVfG a hearing
shall not take place where it conflicts with a compelling public interest. In addition § 28
(2) VwVfG stipulates that the hearing of a person may be omitted when this hearing is not
required by the circumstances of the case. This is the case in the following situations in
particular. First, a hearing is not compulsorywhen an immediate decision appears necessary
in the public interest or when a delay would involve a risk.56 Similarly, a hearing is not
necessary when this would jeopardise a deadline vital to the decision.57 Furthermore the
person concerned does not need to be heard if the authority has not the intent to diverge,
to his disadvantage, from the statements he has made.58 Fourthly, the hearing may be
omitted when the authority wishes to issue a general order (Allgemeinverfügung), similar
administrative acts in considerable numbers or administrative acts using automatic
equipment.59 Finally, the hearing of a person is not necessary when measures of adminis-
trative enforcement (Verwaltungsvollstreckung) are to be taken.60
6.2.2.3.2 Access to the file
Participants in administrative procedures have the right to examine the documents that
are relevant for the procedure61, as far as knowledge of the contents is required to assert
or defend their legal interests.62 The decision of the administrative authority whether
examination of the documents is required has to be reasonable. In that perspective, access
to the file has to be granted if the person concerned argues that this is necessary for pursuing
legally established purposes.63 However, until administrative proceedings have been con-
cluded, the right to access documents shall not apply to draft decisions and work directly
connected with the preparation of decisions.64
55 Röhl & Wollenschläger 2007, p. 222 and 232.
56 § 28 (2) 1° VwVfG.
57 § 28 (2) 2° VwVfG.
58 § 28 (2) 3° VwVfG.
59 § 28 (2) 4° VwVfG.
60 § 28 (2) 5° VwVfG.
61 Where participants are represented as provided under § 17 and § 18 VwVfG, only the representatives shall
be entitled to inspect documents.
62 § 29 (1) VwVfG.
63 Fehling, Kastner & Störmer 2013, p. 378-379; Röhl & Wollenschläger 2007, p. 230.
64 § 29 (1) VwVfG.
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Although the right to examine documents is part of the fair trial principle in adminis-
trative proceedings65, this right adheres to limitations. The authority is not obliged to allow
examination of documents when this would interfere with the orderly performance of its
task. Moreover, access to the file can be refused in case disclosure of the contents would
be disadvantageous to Germany as a whole or to one of its Länder. The refusal to access
information is also possible if the proceedings are secret by law or by their very nature,
based on the rightful interests of participants or third parties.66
6.2.2.3.3 Administrative secrecy
Participants in the administrative procedure have the right to require that matters of a
confidential nature – especially those relating to their private lives and business – shall not
be revealed by the authority without their permission.67 This should be seen in light of the
right to informational self-determination and serves as a guarantee for the person that his
private life or professional and company secrecies will not be disclosed unauthorised. The
non-disclosure obligation is not restricted to the authority that carries out the administrative
procedure, but is extended to any other authority with knowledge of the concerned infor-
mation.68
Although confidential matters in the sense of § 30 VwVfG refer to facts, situations and
actions concerning the participant in the administrative procedure, the principle of
administrative secrecy also applies to third parties69, such as the proxy or representative
of the applicant, a family member of the applicant, a witness, an expert or an informant.70
6.2.2.4 The termination of proceedings
The administrative procedure concludes when an administrative act is adopted. According
to § 37 (1) and (2) VwVfG an administrative act may be issued in writing, electronically,
verbally or another form71 and must be sufficiently clearly defined in content. A written
or electronic administrative act72 needs to be accompanied by a statement of grounds,
which must contain all relevant factual and legal grounds leading to the decision. With
regard to discretionary decisions, the authority shall also indicate all aspects and points of
65 Röhl & Wollenschläger 2007, p. 229.
66 § 29 (2) VwVfG. For a detailed analysis of the restrictions of the right to access the administrative file, see
Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 216-219; Knack & Henneke 2010, p. 549-554.
67 § 30 VwVfG.
68 Röhl & Wollenschläger 2007, p. 215-216.
69 Röhl & Wollenschläger 2007, p. 215.
70 Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 226; Knack & Henneke 2010, p. 587.
71 A verbal administrative act must be confirmed in writing or electronically when there is justified interest
that this should be done and the person affected requests this immediately. An electronic administrative act
shall be confirmed in writing under the same conditions (§ 37 (2) VwVfG).
72 As well as an administrative act confirmed in writing or electronically.
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view considered while exercising the powers of discretion.73 A standard-form including a
statement of grounds fitting all cases is not sufficient. However, the administration may
refer to sources of information to which the person concerned has had access and which
clarify the reasons for the decision. In particular, referencemay bemade to correspondence
and to the oral hearings which preceded the decision.74
The duty to state grounds has exceptions.75 First, no statement of grounds is required
when the administration is granting an application or is acting upon a declaration and the
administrative act does not infringe upon the rights of others. Second, there is no need for
a motivation when the person for whom the administrative act is intended or who is
affected by the act is acquainted with the opinion of the authority on the factual and legal
positions and is able to comprehend it without motivation. In the third place no specific
reasonsmust be givenwhen the authority issues identical administrative acts in considerable
numbers or with the help of automatic equipment, provided that the individual case does
not merit a motivation. Finally, there is no duty to state grounds when this derives from
a legal provision or when a general order is publicly promulgated.76
An administrative act shall be made known to the person for whom it is intended or
who is affected by it.77 This notification is a necessary condition for the validity of the
administrative act.78 As far as the Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz does not provide otherwise,
formal remedies for administrative acts are governed by the Code of Administrative Court
Procedure (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung) and its implementing legislation.79 A written or
electronic administrative act susceptible to an appeal, must be accompanied by a statement
in which the person concerned is informed about the possibility and terms of an appeal
against this act.80
6.2.3 Repeal of administrative acts
6.2.3.1 Legal basis
Pursuant to § 43 (2) VwVfG, an administrative act remains effective as long as it is not
withdrawn, annulled, otherwise cancelled or expires. Basically, two methods of repeal of
administrative acts exist: (a) the revocation (Widerruf), which is the repeal of a legally valid
73 § 39 (1) VwVfG.
74 Schwarze 2006, p. 1387-1388.
75 For a thorough analysis, see Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 367-373; Fehling, Kastner & Störmer 2013, p.
550-553; Knack & Henneke 2010, p. 828-835.
76 See § 39 (2) VwVfG.
77 § 41 (1) VwVfG.
78 § 43 (1) VwVfG.
79 § 79 VwVfG.
80 See § 37 (6) VwVfG.
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administrative act81 and (b) the withdrawal (Rücknahme), i.e. the repeal of an unlawful
administrative act82. The lawful or unlawful nature of an administrative actmust be judged
in light of the factual circumstances and the legal position applicable at the time of adoption
of the act.83 Consequently, a lawfully adopted administrative act will remain lawful even
if the authority, resulting from changed legal or factual circumstances, would be no longer
competent to issue it.84
In a number of cases, the withdrawal and the revocation of an administrative act on
the basis of § 48 and § 49 VwVfG are to be considered administrative sanctions.85 As we
will see, a further distinction needs to be made between non-beneficial and beneficial
administrative acts. Where the first category acts imposes burdens, the second category
acts confers benefits. An administrative decision imposes burdenswhen it lays down duties
or orders; when it prohibits certain actions; when it removes rights or changes them to
the disadvantage of the beneficiary; orwhen it results either in other forms of legally relevant
disavantage or in the denial of legally relevant advantages.86 The distinction between these
two categories of administrative acts is not clear-cut. An administrative act can confer
benefits on the addressee, but can also impose burdens on a third party at the same time.
Apart from administrative acts with third-party effect, there are also administrative acts
with dual effect. These include advantages as well as burdens for the addressee.87
Due to the subsidiarity principle88, paragraphs 48 and 49 of the Verwaltungsverfahrens-
gesetz are only applicable insofar as no federal law or regulation contains similar or con-
flicting provisions. As a consequence, these paragraphs are frequently replaced by special
legal provisions, like for example § 15 of the Gaststättengesetz (infra, Section 6.3.1.2).89
6.2.3.2 Revocation of a lawful administrative act
The revocation of a lawful administrative act is usually applied when the factual and legal
position on which the administrative act was based, has changed in such a way causing
the content of the administrative act to be inconsistent with the applicable law.90 With
regard to the grounds of revocation, a distinction must be made between non-beneficial
and beneficial administrative acts.
81 See § 49 VwVfG.
82 See § 48 VwVfG.
83 Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 531-532 and 562-563; Knack & Henneke 2010, p. 1079; Schwarze 2006, p.
888.
84 Detterbeck 2013, p. 222.
85 Dannecker 2013, p. 234.
86 Schwarze 2006, p. 891-892. See also Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 568; Schmieszek 2009, p. 331.
87 Schwarze 2006, p. 888.
88 § 1 VwVfG.
89 Dannecker 2013, p. 234; Kramer 2013, p. 142. For an overview of these special legal provisions, see Bader &
Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 526-529 and 564-566.
90 Dannecker 2013, p. 235.
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6.2.3.2.1 Grounds for revocation of non-beneficial administrative acts
Acting within his discretionary power, the competent authority may revoke a lawful, non-
beneficial administrative act without restrictions.91 According to § 49 (1) VwVfG there
are two exceptions to this general rule. Firstly, revocation is not possible if the relevant
authority would be obliged to issue an administrative act with the same content. Secondly,
revocation can be not allowed for other reasons, for instance when the authority has
promised to a third party not to revoke the administrative act.92
6.2.3.2.2 Grounds for revocation of beneficial administrative acts
In the light of the principle of compliance with statutory law and the principle of protection
of legitimate expectations, lawfully adopted beneficial administrative decisions cannot be
revoked. As a general rule priority will be given to protecting the interest of the addressee.93
However, in a limited number of cases the possibility to revoke such administrative acts
is accepted in the general interest. In that perspective § 49 (2) VwVfG is a remedial sanction
provision94, containing an exhaustive list of grounds for revocation of beneficial adminis-
trative acts.
First, a lawful, beneficial administrative act may be revoked when law permits this.95
Therefore, any legal rule having general effect – such as legislation, but also statutory reg-
ulations and by-laws – can open the possibility for revocation.96 Although administrative
provisions cannot constitute a legal basis for the revocation of an administrative act97,
revocation is nevertheless permissible when the right to do so is reserved in the adminis-
trative act itself.98 An administrative act can, after due consideration, be issued with such
a revocation clause.99 In that case, the principle of protection of legitimate expectations
poses no problem, since the citizen is ruled to be aware of the clause and must take the
possibility of revocation of the administrative act into account.100 Nevertheless, the mere
existence of a revocation clause is not sufficient alone to revoke an act. This is only permis-
sible if objective reasons exist.101
91 See Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 566-567; Knack & Henneke 2010, p. 1082-1084; Schwarze 2006, p. 888-
889.
92 Schwarze 2006, p. 889.
93 Schwarze 2006, p. 889.
94 Dannecker 2013, p. 235.
95 § 49 (2) 1° VwVfG.
96 Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 571; Detterbeck 2013, p. 239; Schwarze 2006, p. 889.
97 Schwarze 2006, p. 889.
98 § 49 (2) 1 VwVfG. See Knack & Henneke 2010, p. 1086-1087.
99 § 36 (2) 3° VwVfG.
100 Schwarze 2006, p. 889-890.
101 Detterbeck 2013, p. 239.
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Secondly, an administrative act may be combined with an obligation, i.e. a stipulation
requiring the beneficiary to perform, suffer or cease a certain action.102 If the beneficiary
of a lawfully adopted administrative decision does not comply with this obligation, the
administrative decision may be revoked.103 In that case a legally obtained advantage – such
as a subsidy – is annulled as a result of the failure of the beneficiary to comply with the
attached obligation(s).104 Although it is irrelevant whether the beneficiary was at fault105,
the proportionality principle may in certain circumstances prevent revocation of the
administrative act. This can occur if the obligation was only a minor factor in relation to
the benefits conferred.106 In such cases the proportionality principle implies that the com-
petent authority must first warn the person concerned to comply with his obligation. If
he does not take the necessary measures, the administrative act can be revoked. Thus, the
revocation of the act is to be considered as the ultima ratio.107
Furthermore the authority has the right to revoke a lawful beneficial administrative
act when it would be entitled, as a result of a subsequent change in circumstances, not to
issue this act.108 This third ground for revocation is the most commonly used one.109 New
circumstances may relate to considerations that are internal or external to the act.110 Such
a circumstance can be a change in behaviour of the addressee of the administrative act.111
However, it should be stressed that revocation is only allowed if failure to revoke the act
would be contrary to the public interest.112 Hence, the act can only be revoked if this is
necessary in order to remove or prevent a direct threat to the state, the public interest or
important community interests.113
In the fourth place revocation is also permissible when the authority would be entitled
not to issue the administrative act, as a result of amendments to a legal provision, including
legislation, but also statutory regulations and by-laws.114 Two additional conditions have
to be fulfilled. Firstly, it is required that the beneficiary did not use the benefit or has not
yet received any benefits. Secondly, a revocation of the administrative act is only allowed
when failure to revoke would be contrary to the public interest.115
102 § 36 (2) 4° VwVfG.
103 § 49 (2) 2° VwVfG.
104 Dannecker 2013, p. 235.
105 Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 573.
106 Knack & Henneke 2010, p. 1088; Schwarze 2006, p. 890.
107 Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 573-574; Detterbeck 2013, p. 240.
108 § 49 (2) 3° VwVfG.
109 Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 574.
110 Schwarze 2006, p. 890.
111 Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 574; Knack & Henneke 2010, p. 1088.
112 § 49 (2) 3° VwVfG.
113 Schwarze 2006, p. 890.
114 Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 577; Knack & Henneke 2010, p. 1090.
115 § 49 (2) 4° VwVfG.
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Finally a lawful beneficial administrative act can be revoked to prevent or eliminate
serious harm to the common good.116 In assessing this condition the case law of the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht relating to the concept of major public interests in cases involving a
possible restriction of the freedom to exercise one’s professionmight serve as a guideline.117
It should be noted that this ground for revocation is to be considered a so-called Notstand-
sklausel, i.e. emergency clause, which has to be interpreted restrictively and may only be
used in exceptional cases.118
6.2.3.3 Withdrawal of an unlawful administrative act
6.2.3.3.1 Grounds for withdrawal of non-beneficial administrative acts
It follows from § 48 (1) VwVfG that the withdrawal of an unlawful non-beneficial
administrative act is subject to the principle of the freedom to withdraw. This means that
such an administrative act may be withdrawn at all times.119 Since the sole effect of such
an act is to impose burdens, the withdrawal is deemed to not disadvantage the person
concerned.
6.2.3.3.2 Grounds for withdrawal of beneficial administrative acts
The withdrawal of an unlawful beneficial administrative act is a measure that is remedial
in nature and serves to restore the legal order.120 An administrative act which gives rise to
a right or an advantage relevant in legal proceedings or which confirms such a right or
advantage may only be withdrawn when subject to the restrictions determined in § 48 (2),
(3) and (4) VwVfG.121 In this context a distinction has to be made between administrative
acts involving a payment and other beneficial administrative acts.
6.2.3.3.2.1 Administrative acts involving a payment
An unlawful administrative act providing for a single or continuing financial payment or
a divisible material benefit may not be withdrawn when the beneficiary relied upon this
act and his reliance, weighed against the public interest, deserves protection. Legitimate
expectations of the beneficiary are in general worthy of protection if he has utilised the
contributions made or has made financial arrangements which he can no longer cancel,
or can only cancel by suffering a disadvantage which reasonably cannot be asked of him.122
116 § 49 (2) 5° VwVfG.
117 Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 578; Schwarze 2006, p. 890-891.
118 Detterbeck 2013, p. 242.
119 Ipsen 2005, p. 209; Knack & Henneke 2010, p. 1038 and 1040-1041; Schwarze 2006, p. 891.
120 Dannecker 2013, p. 235.
121 § 48 (1) VwVfG.
122 § 48 (2) VwVfG.
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However, the legitimate expectation of the beneficiary cannot always justify upholding
an unlawful beneficial administrative act. Three exceptions are defined in § 48 (2)VwVfG.123
Firstly, the beneficiary cannot claim to have legitimate expectations when he obtained the
administrative act by false pretences, threat or bribery. Secondly, the administrative act
can be withdrawn if the beneficiary obtained it by giving information which was substan-
tially incorrect or incomplete. Thirdly, the beneficiary cannot claim legitimate expectations
if he either was aware of the illegality of the administrative act or was unaware of it due to
gross negligence. In these three cases the unlawful administrative act involving a payment
may be withdrawn. In general this withdrawal will have retrospective effect.124 As a conse-
quence, already made payments need to be returned.125
A person who makes incorrect or incomplete statements about facts relevant for
granting a subsidy, to a public authority competent to approve a subsidy or to another
agency or personwhich is involved in the subsidy procedure, commits the criminal offence
of subsidy fraud under § 264 of the Strafgesetzbuch (StGB). Similarly, withholding infor-
mation on facts relevant to the subsidy from the subsidy giver is a criminal offence. Fur-
thermore, the use of a certificate of subsidy entitlement, which was acquired through
incorrect or incomplete statements in subsidy proceedings, is qualified as subsidy fraud.
Paragraph 264 StGB should be read in conjunctionwith the Subsidies Act126, which obliges
the subsidy provider to indicate the facts relevant for granting the subsidy to the applicant.127
Conversely, the applicant has the obligation to inform the subsidy giver without delay
about all the facts forming an obstacle for granting a subsidy.128
6.2.3.3.2.2 Other beneficial administrative acts
Unlawful administrative acts not involving financial payments may be withdrawn under
§ 48 (3) VwVfG. This means that the legitimate expectations of the beneficiary are not
protected by the continuation of the administrative act.129 However, in these cases the
authority can be obliged to pay compensations for material losses incurred (infra, Section
6.2.3.6).
123 See Bader&Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 540-543; Fehling, Kastner& Störmer 2013, p. 662-664; Knack&Henneke
2010, p. 1062-1065.
124 § 48 (2) in fine VwVfG.
125 Schwarze 2006, p. 893.
126 Gesetz gegen missbräuchliche Inanspruchnahme von Subventionen (Subventionsgesetz – SubvG) of 29 July
1976.
127 § 2 (1) SubvG.
128 § 3 (1) SubvG.




A lawful administrative actmay be revoked even after the timeframe for appeal has lapsed.130
Since the revocation of a lawful, non-beneficial administrative act is not subject to any
restrictions in time131, revocation is possible at any time. On the contrary, a lawful beneficial
administrative decision can only be revoked within one year from the date the authority
in question discovers the facts justifying the revocation.132 This period puts a time-limit
on the decision, not on processing.133
Similarly, unlawful administrative acts can be withdrawn even after they have become
non-appealable.134 Whereas unlawful administrative decisions imposing burdens may at
all times be set aside135, the withdrawal of unlawful beneficial administrative acts is subject
to the aforementioned time limit of one year. However, this restriction does not apply if
an administrative act which provides for a financial payment was obtained by false pre-
tences, threat or bribery. Such an unlawful beneficial administrative actmay bewithdrawn
at all times.136
6.2.3.5 Effects of revocation and withdrawal
A lawful administrative act can be revoked wholly or partly.137 The same goes for the
withdrawal of an unlawful administrative act.138 Whereas an unlawful administrative act
may be withdrawn either retrospectively or with future effect139, a revocation has in prin-
ciple only effect for the future.140 The revoked act shall become null and void when the
revocation comes into force, except when another date is dictated by the authority.141
Although in principle a retrospective revocation of an administrative act is excluded,
one important exception exists to this fundamental rule. A lawful administrative act which
provides for a single or continuing financial payment may indeed not only be revoked for
the future but also with retrospective effect. However, such a retroactivity of the revocation
is only allowed in two cases. In the first place a retrospective revocation is possible when
130 § 49 (1) and (2) VwVfG. Once the administrative act has become non-appealable, the decision to revoke it
shall be taken by the authority competent under § 3 of the Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz. This also applies
when the administrative act has been issued by another authority (§49 (5) VwVfG).
131 Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 569; Knack & Henneke 2010, p. 1080.
132 § 49 (2) jo. § 48 (4) VwVfG.
133 Dannecker 2013, p. 237.
134 § 48 (1) VwVfG. Once the administrative act has become non-appealable, the decision to withdraw it shall
be taken by the authority competent under § 3 of the Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz. This also applies when
the administrative act has been issued by another authority (§48 (5) VwVfG).
135 Schwarze 2006, p. 891-892.
136 § 48 (2) and (4) VwVfG.
137 § 49 (1) and (2) VwVfG.
138 § 48 (1) VwVfG.
139 § 48 (1) VwVfG.
140 § 49 (1) and (2) VwVfG.
141 § 49 (4) VwVfG.
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the payment is not used for the purpose for which it was intended in the administrative
act.142 Secondly, a retrospective revocation of the administrative act is permissible if the
act prescribed an obligation to which the beneficiary either failed to comply with or did
not comply with during the stipulated period.143 This ground for revocation is of particular
importance in cases concerning subsidies.144
Where an administrative act is withdrawn or revoked with retrospective effect, the
person concerned – e.g. the applicant for subsidies – shall have to return any payments or
contributions which have already been made. The amount of such a reimbursement shall
be stipulated in a written administrative act.145
6.2.3.6 Compensation
If a beneficial administrative act was revoked on one of the grounds provided for in § 49
(2) 3°, 4° and 5° VwVfG (supra, Section 6.2.3.2.2), the person affected can claim compen-
sation for damages. Upon application the authority shall reimburse the person concerned
based on his reliance on the continued existence of the administrative act. This applies,
however, only to the extent that this reliance merits protection.146
Moreover a compensation for suffered material losses is granted in case of withdrawal
of an unlawful administrative act not involving financial payments. The obligation to pay
damages follows only where the legitimate expectation gives rise to protection. This
question is subject to the same principles as thosewhich apply to administrative acts covered
by § 48 (2) VwVfG (supra, Section 6.2.3.3.2.1).147
In both cases the financial disadvantage shall be reimbursed to an amount that not
exceeds the interest of the affected person. The authority determines the financial damages.
A claim for compensation may only be made within a year. This period shall commence
as soon as the authority has informed the affected person.148
142 § 49 (3) 1° VwVfG.
143 § 49 (3) 2° VwVfG.
144 Detterbeck 2013, p. 242; Kramer 2013, p. 142.
145 § 49a (1) VwVfG. For a detailed analysis, see Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 589-595; Detterbeck 2013, p.
243-245; Knack & Henneke 2010, p. 1100-1110; Schmieszek 2009, p. 346-348.
146 § 49 (6) VwVfG. For a detailed analysis, see Bader & Ronellenfitsch 2010, p. 584-586; Knack & Henneke
2010, p. 1097-1099.
147 § 48 (3) VwVfG. See also Schwarze 2006, p. 894.
148 § 49 (6) jo. § 48 (3) VwVfG.
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6.3 Instruments to screen and monitor persons and legal entities
6.3.1 Screening and monitoring on the basis of sector-specific laws
6.3.1.1 Trade regulation act
6.3.1.1.1 Freedom of trade
According to article 12 (1) of the Basic Law all Germans have the right to freely choose
their occupation or profession. However, this fundamental principle of occupational
freedomdoes not preclude that the practice of an occupation or profession can be regulated
by or pursuant to a law. In that perspective every natural person or legal entity149 may
practice a trade or set up a business, as far as the Trade Regulation Act (Gewerbeordnung)
does not prescribe or allow exceptions or limitations to the freedom of trade.150
By virtue of § 14 (1) GewO the commencement of a fixed location business (stehenden
Gewerbes) has to be notified to the competent administrative authority, who registers the
business activity. Similarly, a change to a business and the setting up of a branch office or
a dependent local office are registered. A trade or Gewerbe is defined as every activity that
a person performs in self-employment, on his own account, in his own name and on a
permanent basis. Although this activity has to be profit oriented, it is not relevant whether
or not a profit is actually made. Furthermore only activities not harmful to society can be
qualified as a trade.151
The data supplied will be stored in the Gewerberegister, which is managed by the
municipal administration and enables the competent local trade office to carry out
inspections and surveys. Given the fact that the respective local trade registers are not
connected with each other152, the monitoring of trades and businesses is mainly a local
issue.153 Nevertheless, the competent trade office automatically sends a copy of the business
registration to the responsible tax office.154 In addition, data from the Gewerberegister can
under certain conditions be transmitted to other relevant institutions, such as the Federal
Employment Agency, the Employer’s Liability Insurance Association and the Chamber
of Industry and Commerce.155
149 Pewestorf, Söllner & Tölle 2013, p. 596.
150 § 1 (1) GewO.
151 See Frotscher & Kramer 2013, p. 146-151; Ruthig & Storr 2011, p. 117-125; Stober & Eisenmenger 2011, p.
15-21.
152 Stober & Eisenmenger 2011, p. 34-35.
153 Frotscher & Kramer 2013, p. 152-153; Stober & Eisenmenger 2011, p. 12.
154 See § 138 Abgabenordnung.
155 See § 14 (8) GewO.
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6.3.1.1.2 License requirements and inspection
The Gewerbeordnung contains two important exceptions to the general rule of freedom
of trade. Firstly, there are trades requiring a license, which means that some business
activities are only allowed on the condition that the competent administrative authority
has issued an authorisation (Genehmigung) or a permit (Erlaubnis). This is, for instance,
the case for variety shows (display of persons on stage, including peepshows156)157, gaming
houses158 and gaming machines for use by the public159, auctions160, and real estate agents,
builders and building supervisors161. A licence for these trades will only be granted if the
applicant provides evidence of his personal reliability, his professional skills and – where
necessary – his financial capacity.
Secondly, there are trades that can be practiced without a licence, but are subjected to
special inspections on the basis of § 38 GewO. These besonders überwachungsbedürftige
Gewerbe include, amongst others, the purchase and sale of a whole list of goods162 by
companies specialised in trading with second hand goods, the provision of information
on financial circumstances and personal matters (credit agencies and detective agencies)
and the sale and installation of building security measures including lock and key services.
Only persons that can prove they are particularly reliable can perform these types of
activities. The competent administrative authority will check the reliability of the person
concerned immediately after the notification of the commencement of the business. For
this purpose, the trader has to present without delay a Certificate of Good Conduct
(Führungszeugnis) and an excerpt from theCentral TradeRegister (Gewerbezentralregister).
If he does not fulfill this obligation, the administrative authority will obtain this information
ex officio.163 Alongside these documents, the administrative authority can ask the trader
to provide additional documents which are appropriate to prove his personal reliability.
Given the duty for the participant in the administrative procedure to cooperate (supra,
Section 6.2.2.2), the trader will be obliged to present these documents.
Traders requiring a license or practicing a trade subjected to inspection must, upon
request, provide the competent administrative authority with oral andwritten information
necessary for the monitoring of their business operations.164 During the normal business
hours officials of the administrative authority are furthermore empowered to enter and
inspect the business premises and check the business documents. Outside the normal
156 Sailer 2007b, p. 209.
157 § 33a GewO.
158 § 33i GewO.
159 § 33c GewO.
160 § 34b GewO.
161 § 34c GewO.
162 Such as motor vehicles, precious metals, precious stones, pearls and jewelry and scrap metal.
163 § 38 (1) GewO. See Stober & Eisenmenger 2011, p. 83-85.
164 § 29 (1) GewO. See Stober & Eisenmenger 2011, p. 51.
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business hours, business premises can only be entered during the day and on the condition
that this is necessary to prevent urgent threats to public safety or order.165
If a trade is practiced without the required license, the competent administrative
authority is entitled to prevent the continuation of the enterprise.166 In this respect, the
authority can order the closure of the business premises.167
6.3.1.1.3 Prohibition to practice a trade due to unreliability
Based on § 35 (1) GewO the competent168 administrative authority may prohibit the
practice of a trade in whole or in part. This provision is mainly of importance for those
trades that can be exercised without an authorisation or a permit. With regard to trades
requiring an authorisation or a permit, the specific legislation usually provides the possi-
bility to withdraw or revoke the authorisation or permit based on the unreliability of the
trader.169 In that case § § 35 (1) GewO does not apply.170
Given the far-reaching nature of the prohibition to practice a trade due to unreliability,
strict conditions must be fulfilled. First of all, a prohibition is only possible in cases where
there are facts demonstrating the unreliability of either the trader or a person entrusted
with the management of the business.171 Important examples are the conviction for a
criminal offence which is connected to the running of the business; the non-fulfilment of
tax and social insurance obligations, for instance in the case of illegal employment; and
the fact that the person concerned has not paid invoices repeatedly due to economic
inability.172 Secondly, the prohibition to practice a trade must be a necessary measure to
protect the general public or the employees in the company.173 This condition implies that
the trademust be practiced in such away that important rights or legally protected interests
are potentially endangered.174 In the third place it follows from the proportionality principle
that milder measures – e.g. a warning or the imposition of requirements – should be taken
into account before prohibiting the practice of a trade.175 In that perspective the adminis-
165 § 29 (2) GewO.
166 § 15 (2) GewO.
167 Sailer 2007b, p. 210.
168 See § 35 (7) GewO.
169 Frotscher & Kramer 2013, p. 156; Ruthig & Storr 2011, p. 149-150.
170 § 35 (8) GewO. See Stober & Eisenmenger 2011, p. 44.
171 § 35 (1) GewO.
172 Pewestorf, Söllner & Tölle 2013, p. 603-605. See also Frotscher & Kramer 2013, p. 159-160; Ruthig & Storr
2011, p. 132-139.
173 § 35 (1) GewO.
174 Pewestorf, Söllner & Tölle 2013, p. 605.
175 Pewestorf, Söllner & Tölle 2013, p. 605; Ruthig & Storr 2011, p. 153-154; Stober & Eisenmenger 2011, p. 48.
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trative authority can allow, on request of the trader, the continuation of the business by a
proxy176 who guarantees the proper management of the business.177
The prohibition order (Untersagungsverfügung) can be limited to the practiced business,
but can also be extended to other or even all businesses of the person.178 This order shall
be entered in the Gewerbezentralregister and applies to the whole territory of Germany.
In order to prevent the continued exercise of the prohibited trade, the competent admin-
istrative authority can take the necessarymeasures of administrative enforcement (Verwal-
tungsvollstreckung). Taking account of the principle of proportionality, these measures
can also include the closure of the business premises.179
The prohibition to trade due to unreliability may be revoked in case the trader
demonstrates in a written request to the administrative authority that there are new facts
justifying the assumption that he is reliable again. In principle, revocation is possible at
any time. However, during the first year, the revocation of the Untersagungsverfügung can
only be allowed for special reasons.180
6.3.1.1.4 Prohibition to practice a trade due to disadvantages and dangers
The prohibition to practice a trade can not only be based on grounds relating to the
unreliability of the person concerned, but is under certain conditions also possible in cases
where this person is reliable. The competent administrative authority may indeed at all
times prohibit the further use of any commercial plant if this is necessary given the pre-
dominant disadvantages and dangers for the public interest.181 However, in case of such a
so-called Sachbezogene Untersagung182, the person concerned has the right to receive a
reimbursement for the losses incurred.183
6.3.1.2 Law on public houses and restaurants (Licensing Act)
The law on public houses and restaurants was initially part of the Gewerbeordnung, but
became a separate branch of trade law – the so-called Gaststättenrecht – in 1930184, with
its own Licensing Act (Gaststättengesetz) containing specific regulations for bar services
and restaurants.185 As a consequence of the Föderalismusreform 2006, the legislative power
with respect to the Gaststätten was transferred to the Länder, which means that the Feder-
176 See § 45 GewO.
177 § 35 (2) GewO.
178 § 35 (1) GewO.
179 Frotscher & Kramer 2013, p. 157; Sailer 2007b, p. 210; Stober & Eisenmenger 2011, p. 50.
180 § 35 (6) GewO.
181 § 51 GewO.
182 Pewestorf, Söllner & Tölle 2013, p. 605.
183 § 51 GewO.
184 Knemeyer 2007, p. 302; Sailer 2007b, p. 205.
185 § 1 GastG.
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ation can no longer regulate this matter.186 Nevertheless, it is appropriate to briefly discuss
the federal Gaststättengesetz of 5 May 1970. After all, this act is still into force in nine states
that have not enacted legislation concerning public houses and restaurants yet.187 Further-
more, the Licensing Acts of the other seven states are broadly in line with the federal
Gaststättengesetz.188
As a general rule, the running of a pub or a restaurant requires a special license189,
which can be limited to a certain period of time190 and can be subject to conditions191. The
licence has to be denied in the circumstances set out in § 4 of the Gaststättengesetz. In the
framework of this study it is of particular importance that the competent administrative
authority is obliged to refuse a license if facts justify the assumption that the applicant does
not have the required reliability to run the business192 or that he will exploit persons that
are inexperienced or weak-minded. The license has also to be denied if facts justify the
assumption that the applicant will encourage alcohol abuse, illegal gambling, handling of
stolen goods or immorality. Furthermore, a licence will be refused when a person does not
comply with the health or food laws or the laws concerning employment protection or
protection of minors.193
Paragraph 15 of the Gaststättengesetz contains specific provisions relating to the with-
drawal and the revocation of the license to run a pub or restaurant. The licence will be
withdrawn if a ground for refusal was present when the licence was granted, but the
administrative authority was unaware of this.194 If one of the circumstances mentioned in
§ 4 of the Gaststättengesetz occur during the practice of the catering trade, the licence will
be revoked.195 In addition, revocation of the licence is possible – but not obliged – in the
circumstances envisaged in § 15 (3) of the Gaststättengesetz. They include for instance the
non-compliance with imposed conditions.
Running a pub or a restaurantwithout the required licence constitutes an administrative
offence.196 This rule applies both to cases were the licence was not obtained and to cases
where an obtained licence was withdrawn or revoked.197 In these circumstances, the com-
186 Art. 74 (1) 11° GG.
187 Art. 125a (1) GG.
188 Frotscher & Kramer 2013, p. 215-216.
189 § 2 GastG. In Brandenburg and Thüringen, for example, the running of a pub or restaurant in principle no
longer requires a license and only needs to be notified to the competent administrative authority (Pewestorf,
Söllner & Tölle 2013, p. 607; Stober & Eisenmenger 2011, p. 99).
190 § 3 (1) Gaststättengesetz.
191 See § 5 Gaststättengesetz.
192 In particular if the applicant is an alcoholic.
193 § 4 (1) 1° Gaststättengesetz.
194 § 15 (1) Gaststättengesetz.
195 § 15 (2) Gaststättengesetz.
196 § 28 (1), 1° Gaststättengesetz.
197 Pewestorf, Söllner & Tölle 2013, p. 617; Ruthig & Storr 2011, p. 225.
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petent administrative authority can take the necessarymeasures to prevent the continuation
of the business enterprise.198 The closure of the pub or the restaurant can thus be ordered.199
6.3.1.3 The regulation of prostitution
6.3.1.3.1 The situation before the Prostitution Act of 20 December 2001
Although prostitution as such is since the 1973 reform of the “Sexualstrafrecht” no longer
a criminal offence, it was regarded as an act contrary to public decency and morality.200
As a consequence, prostitutes did not enjoy a specific legal status and conducted their
activities in a legal grey area. Moreover, brothels, brothel-like establishments and other
establishments which make a profit from providing sexual services did not fall within the
scope of application of the Gewerbeordnung, which not only meant that such an establish-
ment could not be registered as a trade or business, but also implied that trade inspections
were not possible. In practice, the authorities qualified brothels and similar establishments
as “the letting of rooms on a commercial basis” and hence often tolerated the activities of
the brothel keepers.201
The situation was somewhat different for restaurants, pubs and bars falling under the
scope of the Gaststättengesetz. A proprietor who provided conditions facilitating sexual
intercourse between prostitutes and clients in his restaurant, pub or barwas indeed qualified
as unreliable because he was encouraging immoral conduct. Thus, pursuant to § 4 of the
Gaststättengesetz a licence could be denied. According to the administrative praxis and
the case law of the administrative courts, proprietors could however prevent the refusal
of a licence if they kept the rooms of their restaurant, pub or bar strictly separate from that
part of the building in which sexual services were initiated and performed.202
6.3.1.3.2 The current regime
The Act of 20 December 2001 regulating the legal situation of prostitution203 has, to a large
extent, made an end to the former ambivalent approach. The legislator decided against
the immorality of prostitution. Henceforth, prostitution is an occupation or profession
which is protected under the principle of occupational freedom, set out in article 12 of the
Basic Law. Although prostitution is not a profession like any other, the principle of free
self-determination implies that a person’s voluntary and autonomous decision to engage
198 § 31 Gaststättengesetz juncto § 15 (2) GewO.
199 Ruthig & Storr 2011, p. 225-226; Stober & Eisenmenger 2011, p. 52-53 and 103.
200 Stühler 1997, p. 861.
201 Federal Ministry For Family Affairs Senior Citizens Women And Youth 2007, p. 65-66.
202 Caspar 2002, p. 1322-1324; Stühler 1997, p. 862-863. See also Federal Ministry For Family Affairs Senior
Citizens Women And Youth 2007, p. 66.
203 Gesetz zur Regelung der Rechtsverhältnisse der Prostituierten (Prostitutionsgesetz) of 20 December 2001.
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in prostitution must be respected, as long as it does not violate any rights of others.204 In
that perspective, the legal relationship between the prostitute and the client is regulated
as a contract with unilateral obligations. Prostitutes thus have the right to claim payment
of the agreed remuneration. Furthermore, they will also have an enforceable claim if they
make themselves available for a certain period of time to render their services.205 This claim
is based on the fact that an agreement between a prostitute and a brothel keeper – in par-
ticular in the context of an employment relationship – constitutes a contract with unilateral
obligations. Given the unilateral character, clients or brother operators do not have an
enforceable claim to the performance of (specific) sexual services based on any agreement
with the prostitute.206
The legislator paid no attention to regulations applying to prostitution establishments.
This explains why the Prostitution Act did not change the Gewerbeordnung or the Gast-
stättengesetz. Nonetheless, it seems to be broadly accepted that the legislator intended that
the change in attitude towards prostitution should impact the legal system.207 This means
that the Prostitution Act has an indirect effect – Ausstrahlungswirkung208 – on trade and
licensing law. As a result, brothel keepersmust be recognised as persons engaged in a trade
or business and need to register their trade under the Gewerbeordnung.209 Moreover, the
restrictions for restaurants, pubs or bars no longer apply. The mere finding that such an
establishment initiates contacts between prostitutes and clients is no longer a sufficient
ground for the denial, revocation or withdrawal of a trade licence in accordance with § 4
(1) and § 15 of the Gaststättengesetz.210 In the so-called “Swinger club judgement” of
6 November 2002, the Bundesverwaltungsgericht ruled that the goal of § 4 (1) of the Gast-
stättengesetz is not to promote morality as such. The scope of application of this provision
is limited to those matters which go against generally accepted attitudes, which are prohib-
ited by the criminal law orwhich are due to their public nature seen as ethically degrading.211
204 Federal Ministry For Family Affairs Senior Citizens Women And Youth 2007, p. 9 and 11.
205 § 1 Prostitutionsgesetz.
206 See Federal Ministry For Family Affairs Senior Citizens Women And Youth 2007, p. 13-16.
207 Federal Ministry For Family Affairs Senior Citizens Women And Youth 2007, p. 15 and 65.
208 Stober & Eisenmenger 2011, p. 17.
209 Federal Ministry For Family Affairs Senior Citizens Women And Youth 2007, p. 67.
210 Caspar 2002, p. 1324-1326; Frotscher & Kramer 2013, p. 172; Stober & Eisenmenger 2011, p. 104-105. See
also Federal Ministry For Family Affairs Senior Citizens Women And Youth 2007, p. 67.
211 BVerwG, Judgement of 6 November 2002, NVwZ 2003, p. 603.
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Nonetheless, if the brothel poses the risk that prostitutes have to carry out their work
against their will212 or in other unacceptable circumstances213, a prohibition pursuant to
§ 35 of the Gewerbeordnung can be imposed (supra, Section 6.3.1.1.3). Similarly, a licence
for a restaurant, pub or bar is to be denied, revoked or withdrawn if the operation of this
establishment poses such a risk. Furthermore, causing a nuisance to guests and residents
can in specific cases justify the imposing of conditions or even the revocation of the licence.
The same goes if the protection of young people214 is placed at risk.215 It should be noted,
however, that the parliamentary debate on the regulation of prostitution did not focus on
the questionwhether the administrative authorities should dispose of additional and specific
mechanisms formonitoring prostitution establishments. In this respect, a distinctionmust
be made between the responsibilities of the Länder, which have the exclusive competence
for licensing law, and the possibility at the federal level to take legislative measures in order
to enhance the control and the monitoring of brothels and other commercial businesses
whose purpose is to generate income from the offering of sexual services.216
Finally, article 297 of the Act Introducing the Criminal Code217 authorises state govern-
ments to prohibit prostitution – in all its forms218 – across either an entire municipality or
parts of a municipality for the protection of young persons or public decency. In addition,
prostitution can entirely or at certain times of the day be prohibited along public roads,
paths, in squares, parks and other visible locations. Although most of the Länder have
made use of this possibility to zone off areas in which prostitution is not permitted, in
practice it has proven difficult to prevent prostitution in this so-called Sperrbezirke.
Admittedly, any personwho violates a ban imposed by such an ordinance against pursuing
212 In this regard, the Bundesgerichtshof ruled that § 181a (1), 2° of the Criminal Code has to be interpreted
restrictively. If a prostitute is working voluntarily in a brothel or brothel-like establishment, the mere fact
that she is integrated into an organisational structure by rules governing fixed working hours, place of work
and prices does not constitute “determining” her work within the meaning of this provision. However, the
brothel operator may not determine the nature and the extent of the prostitute’s work. The prostitute must
have the right to terminate her employment relationship at any time, she must be permitted to refuse to
perform sexual acts and may also not be subject to the employer’s right to issue directives to the effect that
she must accept certain clients (see Federal Ministry For Family Affairs Senior Citizens Women And Youth
2007, p. 42-43).
213 Persons in charge of a prostitution establishment commit a criminal offence if they keep prostitutes personally
and financially dependent on the operation (see § 180a (1) StGB). Furthermore, the promotion of prostitution
on a commercial basis is punishable if the personal or financial independence of the prostitute is restricted
(see § 181a (2) StGB).
214 With regard to prostitution likely to corrupt juveniles, see also § 184f of the Criminal Code.
215 Federal Ministry For Family Affairs Senior Citizens Women And Youth 2007, p. 67. See also Caspar 2002,
p. 1326-1328; Ruthig & Storr 2011, p. 120-121 and 137.
216 Federal Ministry For Family Affairs Senior Citizens Women And Youth 2007, p. 48, 53, 59 and 68-70.
217 Einführungsgesetz zum Strafgesetzbuch (EGStGB) of 2 March 1974.




prostitution is considered to be committing an administrative offence.219 In addition,
persistently contravening such a prohibition constitutes a criminal offence.220 However,
the ordinances are often only selectively enforced, which probably explains why many
prostitutes ignore the prohibitions.221
6.3.1.4 The regulation of gambling
6.3.1.4.1 The division of powers between Federation and Länder
Taking into account the division of powers between the Federation and the states, German
gambling law distinguishes two categories of gambling activities. The first category com-
prises sports betting, lotteries and traditional casino games. Since these activities are a
potential threat to public order and security, the police laws of the Länder regulate them.
The operation of gambling machines in amusement arcades (game halls), restaurants and
pubs, in contrast, is considered as a commercial activity. Until the Föderalismusreform
2006, this second type of gambling activities was regulated in the Gewerbeordnung and –
for the technical specifications – theGamblingOrdinance (Spielverordnung222).223 Whereas
the placement of gamblingmachines in pubs and restaurants is still subject to authorisation
under § 33c of the federal Gewerbeordnung, the legislative powerwith regard to amusement
arcades currently belongs to the Länder.224 Yet, only Berlin enacted its own Spielhallenge-
setz225, therefore the amusement arcades in the other fifteen states are still regulated by the
Gewerbeordnung.226
6.3.1.4.2 The regulation of casino gambling
It follows from the above that the Länder are entitled to regulate casino gambling on their
territory. In that perspective, the state laws on casinos (Spielbankgesetze der Länder) contain
provisions regarding, among others, the licence required for the running of a casino, the
types of games permitted, the player protection measures, the taxation of casino revenues
and measures to prevent money laundering. In this way, the Länder can develop their own
policies with regard to casino gambling. However, it should be noted that the Länder
concluded the German Interstate Treaty on Gambling of 2008, with a view to a more
comprehensive and to a certain extent unified framework for lotteries, casino games and
219 See § 120 Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz.
220 § 184e StGB.
221 See Federal Ministry For Family Affairs Senior Citizens Women And Youth 2007, p. 72-74.
222 Verordnung über Spielgeräte und andere Spiele mit Gewinnmöglichkeit (Spielverordnung – SpielV) of
6 February 1962. See Peters 2011, p. 134-137.
223 Becker 2011, p. 195-196; Frotscher & Kramer 2013, p. 175-177.
224 Art. 74 (1) 11° GG. See Krappel 2013, p. 673-679.
225 Frotscher & Kramer 2013, p. 175, footnote 112.
226 Art. 125a (1) GG.
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sports betting.227 This Treaty is now replaced by the Glücksspielstaatsvertrag of
15 December 2011228, which entered into force on 1 July 2012.
The fundamental objectives of the Glücksspielstaatsvertrag are, inter alia, prevent and
combat gambling addiction, restrict the offering of gambling services in the public interest,
protect players against fraudulent practices and prevent and control gambling-associated
crimes.229 In order to achieve these objectives, the Länder must limit the number of casi-
nos.230 As a consequence, there are approximately seventy casinos in Germany, around
half of which are owned by the state government and run by state-operated enterprises
and the other half owned by a combination of state-licensed private and public companies.231
Pursuant to § 2 (2) and § 4 of the Glücksspielstaatsvertrag, a licence from the competent
state authority is necessary to run a land-based casino.232 Depending on the state, either
the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Finance acts as supervisory body.233 The
application for a licence will be rejected if the casino is considered as contrary to one of
the indicated objectives of the Glücksspielstaatsvertrag. In this respect, the applicant has
no legal right to obtain a licence. Moreover, applicants for a licence are obliged to submit
a social-concept, in which they outline the intended measures to prevent the socially
harmful effects of gambling.234 Furthermore, casino licence holders have to comply with
comprehensive anti-money launderingmeasures and are required to take player protection
measures, which include strict registration and identification procedures. They can be held
liable for losses if they fail to prevent vulnerable players fromplaying.235 In order to protect
players, a central database containing the personal data of barred players is set up.236
Casinos are obliged to carry out controls to ensure that barred players are not permitted
to play.237
6.3.1.4.3 The regulation of gambling in amusement arcades
Whereas land-based casinos are subject to strict rules and casino-games may be offered
only by the state or state-licensed companies, a less restrictive regime applies to gambling
227 Becker 2011, p. 199-202.
228 Staatsvertrag zum Glücksspielwesen in Deutschland (Glücksspielstaatsvertrag – GlüStV) of 15 December
2011. For a detailed analysis, see Pagenkopf 2012, p. 2918-2924.
229 § 1 GlüStV.
230 § 2 (2) and § 20 (1) GlüStV.
231 European Casino Association 2013, p. 48; Gamblingdata 2011, p. 7. See also Becker 2011, p. 195.
232 Since offering gambling services over the internet is illegal, online casino games are not allowed at all (§ 4
(4) GlüStV).
233 European Casino Association 2013, p. 48.
234 § 2 (2) and § 6 GlüStV.
235 European Casino Association 2013, p. 49.
236 See § 23 GlüStV. Barring can take place on the request of the player, at the initiative of casino operators or
on request by a directly involved third party (European Casino Association 2013, p. 49).
237 § 20 (2) GlüStV.
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in amusement arcades, restaurants and bars. Though the latter form of gambling is in
practice themost problematic, the operation of gamblingmachines in amusement arcades,
restaurants and bars is seen as a commercial activity. As a result, private companies may
offer slot machines in these places.238 However, both the Glücksspielstaatsvertrag of 2011
and the Gewerbeordnung contain conditions and limitations for gambling in amusement
arcades.
As a general rule, the operation of an amusement arcade or game hall (Spielhalle)
requires a written and time restricted licence from the competent state authority. A licence
can be subject to conditions and will in any event only be granted if the game hall is com-
patible with the aforementioned fundamental objectives of the Glücksspielstaatsvertrag.239
In this case too, the applicant has to submit a social-concept, containing the intended
measures to prevent the socially harmful effects of gambling.240 In addition, the Länder
can not only impose minimum distance requirements between game halls, but can also
decide that a municipality may only grant a limited number of licences for such establish-
ments.241
6.3.2 Public procurement law
Germany has incorporated article 45 of Directive 2004/18/EC242 and article 39 of Directive
2009/81/EC243 into its domestic public procurement legislation. Therefore, a person or a
firm shall be excluded fromparticipation in procurement procedures when the contracting
authority has knowledge that this person – or, in the case of a firm, a person whose conduct
has to be attributed to the firm – has been finally convicted in Germany or in another State
for the forming of a criminal or terrorist organisation; money laundering or hiding
unlawfully obtained financial benefits; fraud; subsidy fraud; bribery; or tax evasion. How-
ever, a derogation from this ground for mandatory exclusion is possible for overriding
requirements in the general interest and provided that other companies can not adequately
provide the necessary services. Furthermore, derogation is allowed if particular circum-
238 See Becker 2008, p. 161-164; Becker 2011, p. 202-206.
239 § 2 (3), § 4(1) and § 24 GlüStV. See also § 33i GewO.
240 § 2 (3) and § 6 GlüStV.
241 See § 25 GlüStV.
242 Directive 2004/18/EC of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works
contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, O.J. 2004, L 134/114.
243 Directive 2009/81/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply
contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security,
and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, O.J. 2009, L 216/76.
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stances of the individual case indicate that the offence committed does not question the
reliability of the company.244
Besides these mandatory grounds for exclusion, German public procurement law
contains a number of discretionary grounds allowing public authorities to prevent a person
or a firm from taking part in a public procurement process. Important examples are
applicants not complying with their legal obligation to pay taxes or social security contri-
butions or who are guilty of serious misconduct. Furthermore companies in the process
of liquidation can be excluded.245
It should be noted that public procurement rules adopted pursuant to Directive
2004/18/EC are revised and modernised by Directive 2014/24/EU246, which contains sig-
nificant additions both to the mandatory and discretionary grounds for exclusion of eco-
nomic operators fromparticipation in a procurement procedure.Newoffences, for instance
terrorist offences, offences linked to terrorist activities and child labour or other forms of
human trafficking offences, have been added to the existing list of offences resulting in a
mandatory exclusion. In addition, an economic operator shall be excluded fromparticipa-
tion in a procurement procedure if he does not fulfil his obligations relating to the payment
of taxes or social security contributions, provided that this infringement has been established
by a judicial or administrative decision having final and binding effect. In the absence of
such a decision, the economic operator nevertheless can be excluded if the contracting
authority can demonstrate by any appropriate means that the economic operator is in
breach of its obligations relating to the payment of taxes or social security contributions.
Also Directive 2014/24/EU contains other new discretionary grounds for exclusion, like
bankruptcy or insolvency of the economic operator.247
6.3.3 The prohibition of an association
6.3.3.1 The freedom of association and its restrictions
According to article 9 of the Basic Law all Germans have the right to form corporations
and other associations. This fundamental right of freedom of association is, however,
244 § 6 EG Vergabe- und Vertragsordnung für Leistungen, Teil A (VOL/A); § 6 EG and § 6 VS Vergabe- und
Vertragsordnung für Bauleistungen, Teil A (VOB/A); and § 4Vergabeordnung für freiberuflicheDienstleis-
tungen (VOF).
245 § 6 EG Vergabe- und Vertragsordnung für Leistungen, Teil A (VOL/A); § 6 EG and § 6 VS Vergabe- und
Vertragsordnung für Bauleistungen, Teil A (VOB/A); and § 4Vergabeordnung für freiberuflicheDienstleis-
tungen (VOF).
246 Directive 2014/24/EUof the EuropeanParliament and theCouncil of 26 February 2014 onpublic procurement
and repealing Directive 2044/18/EC, O.J. 2014, L 94/65. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regu-
lations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2014/24/EU by 18 April 2016.
Directive 2004/18/EC is repealed with effect from that date.
247 See article 57 Directive 2014/24/EU.
220
D. Van Daele
subject to limitations. Associations whose aims or activities contravene the criminal laws
or that are directed against the constitutional order or the concept of international
understanding are indeed prohibited.248 Although the second paragraph of article 9 of the
Basic Law prohibits these types of associations, the protection of the freedomof association
as well as the principle of legal certainty require that the criminal or unconstitutional
character of the association shall be determined in a specific procedure, which can lead to
the issuing of a prohibition order (Verbotsverfügung).249 This procedure is regulated in the
Gesetz zur Regelung des öffentlichen Vereinsrecht (Vereinsgesetz) of 5 August 1964250, which
is applicable to any association – regardless its legal form – consisting of several natural
or legal persons who voluntarily act with a common purpose for a long period of time and
subjected themselves to organised decision-making.251
The prohibition of an association can not only be based on the aim or activities of the
association itself, but under certain conditions also on acts committed by its members.
This is possible if these acts are connected with the activities or the aim of the association.
Moreover, it is required that the acts are the result of an organised decision-making and
that it can be assumed that the association condones the acts.252
In the following sections we will discuss firstly the aforementioned types of prohibited
associations. Subsequently, the prohibition order will be dealt with.
6.3.3.2 Associations contravening the criminal law
Associations whose aims contravene the criminal laws shall be prohibited pursuant to
article 9 (2) of the Basic Law and § 3 (1) of the Vereinsgesetz. In this context, the aim of an
association can be demonstrated by means of its program, statements or speeches made
by the members, propaganda material, documents published on behalf of the association,
and so on.253 In line with this, it is fairly obvious that a criminal or a terrorist organisation
– whose formation is a criminal offence pursuant to §§ 129, 129a and 129b of the Strafge-
setzbuch – will be prohibited.254
248 Foreigners are not protected by article 9 of the Basic Law. They can, however, form an association on the
basis of § 1 of the Vereinsgesetz. Such an association can not only be prohibited in the three mentioned cases,
but also when it prejudices or endangers essential interests of Germany (§ 14 Vereinsgesetz. See Stein &
Frank 2010, p. 335-336; Sailer 2007a, p. 278-279).
249 Maurer 2010, p. 760.
250 See also the Verordnung zur Durchführung des Gesetzes zur Regelung des öffentlichen Vereinsrechts (Vereins-
gesetz) of 28 July 1966.
251 § 2 (1) Vereinsgesetz. Political parties and parliamentary fractions are no assocation within the meaning of
the Vereinsgesetz (§ 2 (2)Vereinsgesetz). Political parties that seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic
basic order or to endanger the existence of Germany shall however be unconstitutional according to article
21 (2) of the Basic Law. The Bundesverfassungsgericht rules on this question of unconstitutionality.
252 § 3 (5) Vereinsgesetz.
253 Baudewin 2013, p. 1050.
254 Ipsen 2009, p. 164.
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In addition, associations with a legitimate aim, but who carry out activities contrary
to the criminal law, shall be prohibited.255 Although under German law only the natural
persons belonging to the association can be held criminally responsible for the offences
they commit and the association itself can only be sanctioned within the framework of the
administrative Ordnungswidrigkeitenverfahren, this does not alter the fact that the commit-
ting of offences by association members can – under certain conditions – lead to the
compulsory dissolution of the association. This will be the case if the criminal activities of
the functionaries or members or the association can be attributed to the association itself.
In this respect, a prohibition on the basis of article 9 (2) of the Basic Law and § 3 (1) of the
Vereinsgesetz does not require that the committing of offences is the main purpose or the
main activity of the association. It suffices that criminal offences committed by themembers
of the association are considered to be of such a nature that they shape the character of
the association. This will be the case if the association supports the delinquent behaviour
of the members in a spirit of solidarity and/or is covering up the offences. In applying this
rule, for instance various violent motorcycle clubs and gaming clubs were qualified as
associations contravening the criminal law.256
6.3.3.3 Unconstitutional associations
Associations that are directed against the constitutional order shall be prohibited. This
refers to the Kernsubstanz der Verfassung and corresponds to the concept of the free
democratic basic order.257 The prohibition reflects the idea of the so-called ‘militant’ or
‘combative’ democracy, which should be understood against the background of the expe-
riences with the Nazi regime. In principle, it means that a democracy should be combative
in order to be able to assure its own continued existence.258 In other words, genuine threats
to the political system must be met and the enemies of democracy should not be in the
position to be able to exploit the freedoms inherent in democracy.259 This does not interfere
with the fundamental right of freedom of expression, since an association may critically
question the principles of the free democratic basic order and may formulate and discuss
constitutional alternatives. However, associations who seek to continuously undermine
this order and who are characterised by an actively belligerent, aggressive attitude are not
tolerated.260 In application of this principle, a number of right-wing and left-wing
extremist associations were prohibited.261
255 Art. 9 (2) GG; § 3 (1) Vereinsgesetz.
256 See Planker 1998, p. 113-115. For a comprehensive list, see Baudewin 2013, p. 1052-1054.
257 Ipsen 2009, p. 164; Maurer 2010, p. 756 and 760.
258 Burkens & Van Schagen 2004, p. 318.
259 Kommers & Miller 2012, p. 285.
260 Baudewin 2013, p. 1050-1051; Planker 1998, p. 116.
261 For an overview, see Baudewin 2013, p. 1052-1054.
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The militant democracy is also a rationale for the prohibition of associations directed
against the concept of international understanding.262 This concept relates to the funda-
mental and indispensable rules of international law guaranteeing a peaceful co-existence
of nations.263
6.3.3.4 The prohibition order
Pursuant to § 3 (1) of the Vereinsgesetz, an association may only be treated as prohibited
after an administrative investigation264 by the competent authority (Verbotsbehörde), which
results in the issuing of a so-called Verbotsverfügung. In this administrative order the
Verbotsbehörde declares (a) that the aims or activities of the association contravene the
criminal laws or (b) that the association is directed against the constitutional order or the
concept of international understanding. The Verbotsverfügung implies not only the com-
pulsory dissolution of the association, but will in principle also lead to the seizure and
confiscation of the association’s assets.265 As a consequence, the members of the forbidden
association will not be able to use the financial means of this association to create a new
association with the same aim or with a view to similar activities.266 Furthermore,
infringements of the prohibition order constitute a criminal offence under § 20 of the
Vereinsgesetz.
Insofar as the organisation and activities of the association remain limited to the territory
of one state, the oberste Landesbehörde267 – i.e. the Ministry of Interior268 – will act as Ver-
botsbehörde.269 Associations operating in more than one state, can be prohibited by the
Federal minister of Internal Affairs.270 Since the Verbotsverfügung has to be regarded as
an administrative act which affects the rights of the association concerned, the latter must
be given the opportunity of commenting on the facts relevant to the decision to prohibit
its existence.271 This right to be heard is not an absolute right (supra, Section 6.2.2.3.1).
The Vereinsverbot can be enforced once the prohibition order is served to the association
or at the latest when this order is published in the Bundesanzeiger.272 The association
concerned can bring an action against the prohibition order before the competent
administrative court.273 Whereas the Oberverwaltungsgericht shall adjudicate in first instance
262 Art. 9 (2) GG. See also § 3 (1) Vereinsgesetz.
263 Ipsen 2009, p. 164.
264 The investigative powers are regulated in § 4 of the Vereinsgesetz.
265 § 3 (1) Vereinsgesetz. The seizure and confiscation are regulated in §§ 10-13 of the Vereinsgesetz.
266 Baudewin 2013, p. 1051.
267 The Länder can however designate another competent authority.
268 Sailer 2007a, p. 275.
269 § 3 (2), 1° Vereinsgesetz.
270 § 3 (2), 2° Vereinsgesetz.
271 Baudewin 2013, p. 1049; Planker 1998, p. 114.
272 § 3 (4) Vereinsgesetz.
273 Maurer 2010, p. 761; Sailer 2007a, p. 276 and 281-282.
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on actions against prohibition orders issued by the oberste Landesbehörde274, the Bundesver-
waltungsgericht shall rule in first and last instance on actions brought against prohibition
orders issued by the Federal minister of Internal Affairs.275 Although an action in principle
shall have suspensive effect, this will not be the case if immediate execution was ordered
by the competent Verbotsbehörde.276
6.4 Instruments directed at preventing the disturbance of public
order
6.4.1 Police services and Ordnungsbehörden
In Germany, the maintenance of public order and security is a shared responsibility of the
police services and the Ordnungsbehörden, which both are entrusted with the task of
Gefahrenabwehr, i.e. preventing and averting dangers for the public order and security.277
The federal police (Bundespolizei) carries out its duties according to the Federal Police
Act, whereas the police services of the states (Länderpolizei) operate on the basis of the
police laws of the Länder. The Gefahrenabwehr by police services is characterised by actions
on the spot which aim at protecting or, when necessary, restoring public order, security
and health in an individual case.278 By contrast, the Ordnungsbehörden are administrative
authorities which operate pursuant to the Ordnungsrecht in amore formal and bureaucratic
way and are not only competent for the Gefahrenabwehr in individual cases, but can also
enact general abstract rules to prevent and avert dangers.279
The maintenance of public order and security on the basis of the Ordnungsrecht is of
particular importance with regard to the administrative approach to combating organised
crime. The Ordnungsrecht can generally be defined as the area of the law dealing with the
organisation, the tasks and the competences of the Ordnungsbehörden. It is based on dif-
ferent sources of law: (a) specific laws of both the Federation – e.g. the Trade Regulation
Act and the Licensing Act – and the Länder; (2) general statutes from the Länder, for
example the Ordnungsbehördengesetz280 in Nordrhein-Westfalen281; and (3) general
274 § 48 (2) Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (VwGO).
275 § 50 (1) 2° VwGO.
276 § 80 (1) and (2) VwGO.
277 Götz 2013, p. 173; Kugelmann 2012, p. 4.
278 Pieroth, Schlink & Kniesel 2012, p. 28-30.
279 Knemeyer 2007, p. 252; Pieroth, Schlink & Kniesel 2012, p. 29.
280 Gesetz über Aufbau und Befugnisse der Ordnungsbehörden – Ordnungsbehördengesetz (OBG).
281 For an overview of the sixteen Länder, see Pieroth, Schlink & Kniesel 2012, p. 42-56.
224
D. Van Daele
administrative law at the level of both the Federation – e.g. the Verwaltungsverfahrensge-
setz – and the Länder.282
There is no uniformity between the Länder with regard to the organisation of the
Gefahrenabwehrbehörden. Basically, two types can be distinguished. The first type of
organisation is the Einheitssystem – also called Mischsystem283 –, which is based on the
traditional Prussian model and is characterised by the fact that no formal distinction is
made between police authorities and Ordnungsbehörden. This implies that one single
authority – “der Polizei” – is responsible for the Gefahrenabwehr. It should be noted,
however, that this authority is divided into the police service – the Polizeivollzugsdienst284 –
on the one hand and general and specific Polizei(verwaltungs)behörden –which are, among
others, entrusted with the task of the Gefahrenabwehr on the basis of the Ordnungsrecht
– on the other hand. The Einheitssystem is in force in Baden-Württemberg, Bremen, the
Saarland and Sachsen.285
The other twelve Länder opted for a second type of organisation, namely the Tren-
nungssystem or Ordnungsbehördensystem. As the name makes clear, this system is based
on a clear separation at the institutional level between Polizeibehörden, performing police
tasks, and Ordnungsbehörden286, which are in principle responsible for the Gefahrenabwehr.
In these Länder the competence of the police services in relation to the Gefahrenabwehr
is limited to urgent cases. It is noteworthy that the Trennungssystem does not necessarily
imply that there should be separate laws for the police and the Ordnungsbehörden. Such
separate laws indeed only exist in Bayern, Brandenburg, Nordrhein-Westfalen and
Thüringen. In the other Länder the organisation and competences of the police and the
Ordnungsbehörden are laid down in one and the same law.287
6.4.2 Public order maintenance by the Ordnungsbehörden
With regard to the public ordermaintenance by the Ordnungsbehörden, a distinctionmust
be made between two situations. In the first place, an Ordnungsbehörde can issue an order
to prevent or avert a danger for the public order and security in an individual case. Such
a Verfügung has to be qualified as an administrative act (Verwaltungsakt)288, which, in the
absence of specific rules to the contrary, will be issued according to the procedure laid
282 Gusy 2011, p. 237-238.
283 Thiel 2013, p. 35.
284 In Saarland the term Vollzugspolizei is used (Kugelmann 2012, p. 59).
285 Kugelmann 2012, p. 29 and 59-60; Schenke 2011, p. 277-278.
286 Some of the Länder use a different term, namely Verwaltungsbehörden der Gefahrenabwehr (Hamburg,
Niedersachsen and Sachsen-Anhlt), Sicherheitsbehörde (Bayern) and Gefahrenabwehrbehörde (Hessen). See
Kugelmann 2012, p. 29 and 60.
287 Kugelmann 2012, p. 29 and 59-60; Schenke 2011, p. 278-279.
288 Kugelmann 2012, p. 247.
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down in the federal Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz and the Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetze of
the Länder.289 Although a Verfügung is in principle intended to regulate an individual case,
the Ordnungsbehörden can also issue an Allgemeinverfügung or general order, which is
directed at a group of people defined or definable on the basis of general characteristics
(supra, Section 6.2.1).290
Secondly, the Ordnungsbehörden are competent to issue general rules to protect public
order and security. Such regulations or byelaws are enacted in the form of Ordnungsbe-
hördliche Verordnungen291 – or Polizeiverordnungen in the Länder with the Einheitssystem –
and contain orders and prohibitions directed against an indefinite number of cases and
of persons.292 An Ordnungsbehördliche Verordnung is based on the concept of ‘abstract
danger’, which means that this instrument can be used if there is a sufficient degree of
probability on the basis of objective facts that damages will occur in the (near) future.293
In this perspective an Ordnungsbehördliche Verordnung can stipulate that a permit or a
licence is required for certain activities.294
Although this Gefahrenabwehr durch Rechtsverordnung has a long historical tradition,
its practical importance has diminished in the last decades. This is mainly due to the
growing number of specific laws regulatingmatters that used to be regulated by Ordnungs-
behördliche Verordnungen. Important examples of this evolution are the building inspec-
torate regulations that aremainly incorporated in the Landesbauordnungen and the provi-
sions of the Gewerbeordnung concerning the practice of a trade.295 If such a specific law is
applicable, an Ordnungsbehördliche Verordnung can only be issued on the condition that
this law expressly allows the Ordnungsbehörden to do so.296 Notwithstanding this evolution,
Ordnungsbehördliche Verordnungen still are an important instrument to regulate certain
aspects of social life, such as human behaviour in public spaces.297
6.4.3 The closure of premises
As appears from the above, business premisses, pubs, restaurants and brothels can under
certain conditions be closed on the basis of the Gewerbeordnung or the Gaststättengesetz.
Apart from these sector-specific laws, the state police laws grant the police the power to
289 Knemeyer 2007, p. 254 and 257.
290 Götz 2013, p. 242-243; Kugelmann 2012, p. 247.
291 Also known under other terms, such as Verordnungen zur Gefahrenabwehr and Verordnungen über die
öffentliche Sicherheit (oder Ordnung) (see Pieroth, Schlink & Kniesel 2012, p. 185-186).
292 Götz 2013, p. 240; Kugelmann 2012, p. 250.
293 Gusy 2011, p. 239-241; Thiel 2013, p. 235.
294 Götz 2013, p. 241-242.
295 Schenke 2011, p. 347; Wolffgang, Hendricks & Merz 2011, p. 141.
296 Gusy 2011, p. 239.
297 Gusy 2011, p. 239. For a general overview, see Götz 2013, p. 244-248.
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seize goods. This Sicherstellung298 can be applied not only to movable goods, but also to
immovable property299, such as parcels of land, buildings and other premises.300 Within
the scope of this study it is particularly important that immovable property can be seized
if this is required to avert an actual threat to public order.301 This danger can originate
from the characteristics of the property. However, it is also possible that the danger is a
result of the way the owner or possessor uses the property.302
Whereas some authors consider the seizure in the context of the Sicherstellung as a
merely factual act (Realakt)303, the most convincing viewpoint seems to be that the
administrative seizure of immovable goods has to be qualified as an administrative act
(Verwaltungsakt). Consequently, the police can take the necessary measures – e.g. the
sealing of the property or the replacement of the lock of a house – to enforce the seizure304,
which can last as long as necessary to neutralise the danger.305 As soon as the conditions
for the Sicherstellung are no longer fulfilled, the property has to be returned to the owner
or possessor.306 It should be noted that the qualification of the administrative seizure as a
Verwaltungsakt implies that the person concerned can request by means of an action
(Anfechtungsklage) the rescission of the Sicherstellung.307
6.5 The information position of the administrative authorities
6.5.1 Exchange of information between administrative authorities
6.5.1.1 Exchange of information at national level
As a general rule administrative authorities have a duty to assist one another. The so-called
Amtshilfe implies that each authority shall render assistance to other authorities, when it
is requested to do so.308 Such official assistance may be requested particularly when an
298 Most of the Länder use Sicherstellung as an overarching concept. Only Baden-Württemberg and Sachsen
make a distinction between the safekeeping of an object in the interest of the owner (Sicherstellung) and the
seizure of an object in the general interest (Beschlagnahme). See Pieroth, Schlink & Kniesel 2012, p. 340;
Schmidt 2014, p. 194.
299 Götz 2013, p. 71; Schmidt 2014, p. 194.
300 Rachor 2007, p. 637.
301 See, for instance, § 43, 1° Polizeigesetz des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (PolG NRW).
302 Pieper 2013, p. 150-151; Pieroth, Schlink & Kniesel 2012, p. 343; Schmidt 2014, p. 198.
303 See, for example, Rachor 2007, p. 637. Some authors differentiate between different hypotheses (see, for
instance, Thiel 2013, p. 202-203).
304 Schmidt 2014, p. 194-196. See also Rachor 2007, p. 637.
305 Rachor 2007, p. 649-650.
306 Götz 2013, p. 74; Gusy 2011, p. 168-169; Thiel 2013, p. 207.
307 § 42 (1) VwGO. For a detailed analysis, see Schmidt 2014, p. 205-207.
308 § 4 (1) VwVfG.
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authority cannot perform the official act itself due to legal or material309 reasons. Further-
more an authority can request Amtshilfe when in carrying out its tasks, it requires knowledge
of facts unknown to and unobtainable by it or it needs documents or other evidence in
the possession of the authority approached. Additionally, official assistance is also possible
if an authority could only carry out the task at substantially greater expense than the
authority approached.310
In relation to the applicable law, a distinction must be made. Whereas the law applying
to the authority requesting assistance determines the admissibility of the measure to be
put into effect by official assistance, the Amtshilfe shall be carried out in accordance with
the law applying to the authority of which the request is made.311 In that perspective the
requested authority shall be responsible for the execution of the official assistance.However,
the authority requesting assistance is responsible vis-à-vis the requested authority for the
legality of the measure to be taken.312
Although there is in principle an obligation to render assistance, the Administrative
Procedure Act imposes a number of restrictions on this general rule. First of all, the
authority approached can be unable to provide assistance for legal reasons. Amtshilfe needs
to be refused as well when the requested assistance would be detrimental to the Federal
Republic or to one of the Landër. Furthermore § 5 (2) VwVfG stipulates explicitly that the
authority approached shall not be obliged to submit documents or files nor to impart
information when proceedings must be kept secret either by their nature or by law.313
Apart from these mandatory grounds for the refusal of official assistance there are
some circumstances in which the approached authority has the possibility to render
assistance without being obliged to do so. There is no obligation to provide Amtshilfe when
the authority concerned could only provide such assistance at disproportionately great
expense or when another authority can provide the same assistance with much greater
ease or at much lower cost. Amtshilfe can also be refused when the requested authority
could only provide assistance by seriously jeopardising its ownwork.314 These three grounds
for refusal are exhaustive. This implies that the authority approached may not refuse
Amtshilfe on the grounds that it considers the request inappropriate for other reasons or
that it considers the purpose for which Amtshilfe was requested inappropriate.315
309 Such as the lack of personnel or equipment.
310 § 5 (1) VwVfG.
311 § 7 (1) VwVfG.
312 § 7 (2) VwVfG.
313 § 5 (2) VwVfG.
314 § 5 (3) VwVfG.
315 § 5 (4) VwVfG.
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6.5.1.2 Exchange of information at European level
On the basis of § 8a VwVfG German administrative authorities can – and in some cases
are obliged to316 – request assistance from administrative authorities of the other Member
States of the European Union.317 In the opposite direction, every German administrative
authority shall comply with a request for assistance from an administrative authority of a
Member State of the European Union insofar as this is required according to legal instru-
ments of the EuropeanUnion.318 However, if such requests are not translated intoGerman
language, they will only be executed if their content appears from the annexed documents
in German language.319 Furthermore the German authorities can refuse the execution of
a request if the competent foreign administrative authority does not sufficiently indicate
the reasons for the assistance needed.320
Apart from the execution of requests for official assistance the Verwaltungsverfahrens-
gesetz allows the spontaneous cross-border exchange of information through information
networks that are established for this purpose. Insofar as this is required according to legal
instruments of the European Union, the competent German authorities may, without
being so requested, send information about facts and persons to both the administrative
authorities of the other Member States of the European Union and the Commission.321 If
this is provided for in the legal instruments of the EuropeanUnion, theGerman authorities
are obliged to inform the person concerned of the fact of the transmission of the informa-
tion.322
6.5.2 Data from criminal case files
Subject to certain conditions, § 474 II of theCode of Criminal Procedure allows information
from a criminal case file to be provided to public agencies, for example administrative
authorities. More specifically personal data from criminal proceedings may be ex officio
transmitted to administrative authorities if this is allowed on the basis of a special provision.
Following such an ex officio transmission, further personal data may be transmitted if this
is necessary for the performance of duties by the administrative authority.323 The data from
a criminal case file can then be used by the administrative authority to implement an
already issued administrative measure. In addition, it can also be useful to have such data
316 Such an obligation exists only if the legal instruments of the EuropeanUnion contain an obligation to request
administrative assistance.
317 § 8a (2) VwVfG.
318 § 8a (1) VwVfG.
319 § 8b (2) VwVfG.
320 § 8b (3) VwVfG.
321 § 8d (1) VwVfG.
322 See § 8d (2) VwVfG.
323 § 474 II 2° StPO.
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available previous to the issuing of an administrative act. In that perspective the public
prosecution service may provide information from a criminal case file to an administrative
authority if this information is required in order to prepare measures. This second form
of provision of information shall only be admissible with regard to measures upon whose
implementation personal data from criminal proceedings may, ex officio, be transmitted
to administrative authorities pursuant to a special provision.324
In both cases the public prosecution service or, where appropriate, the judge325 will
transmit the data to the administrative authority, which in principle shall not be able to
inspect the criminal case file itself. However, inspection of the files may be granted if the
provision of information requires disproportionate effort or if the administrative authority
declares, indicating the reasons, that the provision of partial information would not be
sufficient for the performance of its duties.326 Under these conditions the criminal case file
may be sent to the administrative authority327, whichmay also inspect officially impounded
pieces of evidence328.
The transmission of data from criminal case files to administrative authorities requires
a specific statutory provision. One of the most important provisions in this context is the
Einführungsgesetz zum Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (EGGVG), which contains an extensive
set of legal rules concerning the so-called Verfahrensübergreifende Mitteilungen von Amts
wegen.329 In the framework of this study two aspects are of particular importance. First,
personal data of the accused concerning the subject of the criminal procedure may be
transmitted to an administrative authority when knowledge of this data is required for the
revocation, the withdrawal or the restriction of an administrative licence, permit or
authorization to practice a trade. Exchange of personal data from criminal case files to an
administrative authority is admissible either when the data indicate that the person con-
cerned violates his professional obligations or when they raise doubts about his suitability
or reliability.330 Secondly, personal data may be transmitted to administrative authorities
when knowledge of these data is required to avert substantial danger to the public welfare
or public safety.331
324 § 474 II 3° StPO.
325 In preparatory proceedings and after final conclusion of proceedings, the public prosecutor shall decide
whether to provide information and allow inspection of the criminal case file; otherwise the presiding judge
of the competent court shall decide (see § 478 StPO).
326 § 474 III StPO.
327 § 474 V StPO.
328 § 474 IV StPO.
329 See § 12 to § 22 EGGVG.
330 § 14 (1) 5 EGGVG.
331 See § 17 EGGVG.
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6.5.3 Data regarding criminal convictions
In the perspective of an administrative approach to combating organised crime, it is
appropriate for an administrative authority to be aware of the criminal past of applicants
for permits or subsidies and applicants submitting tenders. The necessary information is
available in the Bundeszentralregister, which is subject to the authority of the federal
Minister of Justice332 and contains among others data about criminal convictions and other
judicial decisions in criminal matters. In addition, administrative decisions which are rel-
evant from a criminal law perspective333 – for example the withdrawal or revocation of
certain permits and the prohibition to practice a trade334 – are recorded in the Bundeszen-
tralregister.335 In contrast to the courts and the public prosecution service, who have upon
request an unrestricted right of access to the information in the Bundeszentralregister336,
administrative authorities can only receive a so-called Certificate of Good Conduct
(Führungszeugnis) insofar as they need it for the exercise of their functions.337 This Certifi-
cate of Good Conduct, which in principle can also be asked from the person concerned338,
contains only the data mentioned in § 32 BZRG.
6.5.4 Tax information
Public officials339 shall be obliged to observe tax secrecy340, which comprises not only all
findings gathered in administrative proceedings, auditing procedures or in judicial pro-
ceedings in taxmatters, but also all findings gathered in criminal proceedings for tax crimes
or in administrative fine proceedings for tax offences.341 As a consequence, the Tax
Administration cannot provide tax information to other administrative authorities. This
general rule is, however, subject to a number of exceptions. For example, tax information
may be disclosed insofar as it serves the implementation of either another administrative,
auditing or judicial procedure in tax matters or a criminal procedure for tax crimes. Dis-
closure of tax information shall also be permissible insofar as law expressly permits it or
the persons concerned give their consent. Furthermore, tax information may be disclosed
332 § 1 Gesetz über das Zentralregister und das Erziehungsregister (Bundeszentralregistergesetz – BZRG).
333 Roxin & Schünemann 2012, p. 497.
334 § 10 (2) BZRG.
335 § 3 BZRG.
336 § 41 BZRG.
337 § 31 (1) BZRG. See Kindhäuser 2013, p. 341-342; Roxin & Schünemann 2012, p. 498.
338 § 31 (1) BZRG.
339 See § 7 Abgabenordnung (AO).
340 § 30 (1) AO.
341 See § 30 (2) AO.
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when there is a compelling public interest in the disclosure.342 Although the concept of
‘compelling public interest’ is not defined in § 30 of the Abgabenordnung343, it is clear that
it should be interpreted restrictively and that disclosure of tax information on this ground
is only permissible in cases where there is danger of serious detriment to the public good.344
Furthermore, reference must be made to § 31a of the Abgabenordnung, which allows
disclosure of tax information for the purpose of countering unlawful employment and the
misappropriation of benefits. Disclosure of the circumstances of the person concerned
shall be permissible under this provision as far as this is necessary to implement criminal
proceedings, administrative fine proceedings or any other court or administrative proceed-
ings with the aim of (1) countering unlawful employment or illegal work; (2) deciding
whether a licence under the Temporary Employment Act should be issued, withdrawn or
revoked; or (3) deciding whether benefits paid from public funds should be approved,
granted, recovered, refunded, continued to be granted or allowed to be retained. In addition
the circumstances of the person concerned may be disclosed insofar as this is necessary to
assert a claim for repayment of benefits paid frompublic funds. In all these cases the revenue
authorities are in principle obliged to disclose to the competent body the facts required in
each case. However, this obligation shall not apply insofar as this would involve a dispro-
portionate amount of time and effort.345
342 See § 30 (4) AO.
343 § 30 (4) 5° AO contains only three examples in which a compelling public interest shall be deemed to exist
in particular.
344 Pahlke & Koenig 2004, p. 270.
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7 The administrative approach in Italy
F. Calderoni & F. Di Stefano
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Background
Italy has developed a complex antimafia legal framework in its struggle against mafia-type
associations.1 Antimafia legislation entered into force in the 1950s as an instrument for
tackling the dangerous infiltration of the public system – corruption, for example.2 The
first explicitly antimafia law was adopted in 1965. Its main feature was to ban persons
either suspected or convicted of being members of organized crime groups from entering
into contracts with public administrations.3
The ‘mafia-type association’ is the key concept when determining the scope of
administrative measures. This is because Italy has been dealing with different types of
mafia-type associations, including the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, the Neapolitan Camorra and
the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta, since the 19th century.4 The concept of mafia-type association
was eventually defined in 1982, with the introduction of the offence of mafia-type associa-
tion into theCriminal Code. Article 416bis paragraph 3 of the ItalianCriminal Code defines
a ‘mafia-type association’ as follows:
The association is of a mafia-type when the participants use the power of
intimidation of the association, and the condition of subjection and omertà
(code of silence) that arises from it, to commit crimes, or to obtain – directly
or indirectly – control over economic activities, public contracts or concessions,
1 Frigerio 2009.
2 This kind of normative strategy started with Law no. 1423 of 27 December 1956.
3 According to Law no. 431 of 13 May 1965 followed by Law no. 152 of 22 May 1975. The first law aimed to
address persons linked to organized crime groups that have been shown to pose a risk to society by widening
the use of personal prevention measures (Law no.1423 of 27 December 1956). Scholars criticized the law
because it did not sufficiently explain the term ‘mafia’. In order to address the loophole, Law no. 152 of
22 May 1975 was enacted.
4 In addition to the definition of a mafia-type association, this report uses the UN definition of ‘organised
criminal group’, namely: ‘a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and
acting in concert with the aimof committing one ormore serious crimes or offences established in accordance
with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, financial or other material benefits.’ United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, Palermo, Italy, December 2000, Article 3.
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or to obtain unfair profits for themselves or others, or to impede or jeopardise
the free exercise of the right to vote or to gain votes for themselves or others
upon elections.5
This country report aims to describe the main administrative measures used in the Italian
legal system. Section 7.1.2 discusses the historical background of the administrative
measures in Italy, highlighting the main events. Section 7.2 discusses the existing screening
and/ormonitoring of persons regarding their past criminal activities. Section 7.3 discusses
instruments to prevent the disruption of public order. Section 7.4 deals with confiscation
and seizure, specifically related to criminal organizations. Section 7.5 concerns the disso-
lution of city councils that have been infiltrated by the mafia.
7.1.2 The history of antimafia measures in Italy
In Italy, the most relevant antimafia measures were adopted as a result of specific events,
such as homicides and mafia attacks on the State.6 This led scholars to consider antimafia
5 According to Article 416bis of the Criminal Code:
1. Whoever is part of a mafia-type association consisting of three or more people is punishable with 7 to
12 years of imprisonment.
2. Whoever promotes or manages or directs such an association is punishable with 9 to 14 years of
imprisonment
3. The association is of a mafia-type when the participants use the power of intimidation of the association,
and the condition of subjection and omertà (code of silence) that arises from it, to commit crimes, or
to obtain – directly or indirectly – control over economic activities, public contracts or concessions, or
to obtain unfair profits for themselves or others, or to impede or jeopardise the free exercise of the right
to vote or to gain votes for themselves or others upon elections.
4. If the association uses weapons the penalty is from 9 to 15 years for the cases provided by the first
paragraph and from 12 to 24 years for the cases provided by the second paragraph.
5. The association is armed whenever the participants have at their disposal, for the achievement of the
aims of the association, weapons or explosives, even if hidden of kept in a deposit.
6. If the economic activities whose control the participants aim to achieve or maintain are financed wholly
or in part with the price, the product or the profit of crimes, the penalties provided by the previous
paragraphs are increased from one third to the half.
7. Upon conviction, the confiscation of the assets which served or were allocated to the commission of the
crime and the assets which are its price, product, profit or investment is mandatory. 9. These provisions
also apply to the camorra and to other associations, whatever their local names, including foreign ones,
which, taking advantage of the intimidation power of the association, pursue aims corresponding to
those of mafia-type associations.
8. The previous provisions also apply to the camorra and to other associations, whatever their local names,
including foreign ones, which, taking advantage of the intimidation power of the association, pursue
aims corresponding to those of mafia-type associations.
6 For example, after 1982, the introduction of several antimafia provisions was accelerated by the murders of
Member of Parliament Pio La Torre and of General Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, both in Palermo. Moreover,
further homicides of judges and policemen – the Capaci and the via D’Amelio assassinations of Giovanni
Falcone and Paolo Borsellino – led to othermeasures such as LegislativeDecree no. 306 of 1992 (the ‘Falcone
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legislation as the product of an ‘ongoing emergency’ which ultimately created its own
problems of coordination and consistency in the antimafia legal system.7
Law 575/1965, adopted in the early 1960s, expanded the application of personal pre-
ventive measures foreseen in the previous Law 1423/1956. Preventive measures are
measures adopted by administrative authorities (e.g. the local police chief) imposing a
number of obligations or prohibitions to people falling under specific categories prescribed
by law (e.g. dangerous subjects). A number of loopholes became clear in the system in the
70s and 80s, and particularly that the term ‘mafia’ had not been sufficiently explained.
Several innovations were introduced in the 1980s and 1990s as a reaction to the mafia
attacks against politicians, members of the judiciary and of the law enforcement agencies.
These innovations concerning new criminal offences, investigatory powers and preventive
measures ordered by administrative authorities, e.g. the prohibition against residing in a
certain area of a city, and the seizure and the confiscation of property independent of a
final criminal conviction.8 Law 646/1982 was a cornerstone in this process, with two
innovations that changed the strategy against mafia-type associations:
– A new provision criminalizing participation in mafia-type association (Article 416-bis
of the Italian Criminal Code);
– Introduction of patrimonial prevention measures in addition to personal ones.9
In addition, Legislative Decree no. 163 of 12 April 2006 – containing the Code of public
contracts for works, services and supplies – reshaped the regulation of public procurement
to improve control over this field.10 More recently, in 2008 and 2009, two lawswere enacted
to further implement the antimafia legal framework. Firstly, LegislativeDecree no. 92/2008,
which:
Act’, dealing with trials and police action in the fight against the mafia) (Fijnaut & Paoli 2004, see also Van
de Bunt & Van der Schoot 2003).
7 Moccia 1995.
8 Fulvetti 2008.
9 Law no. 646 of 13 September 1982 added patrimonial preventive measures to personal preventive ones, in
particular seizure and confiscation. Seizure, a temporarymeasure, is usedwhen there is a discrepancy between
the suspect’s income and his/her lifestyle. Confiscation, a final measure, is applied when a suspect fails to
prove that an asset has been derived from a legal source. Moreover, this normative disposition permits
financial investigations at every lending institution and in every public administrative office in order to
collect useful information. See the definition (p. 3) explaining when an association is considered a mafia-
type organization, according to Article 416bis, paragraph 3, of the Criminal Code (See also Fijnaut & Paoli
2004; Savona et al. 1998; UNICRI & BASCAP 2013 and Van de Bunt & Van der Schoot 2003).
10 According to Legislative Decree no. 163 of 12 April 2006, Codice dei contratti pubblici relativi a lavori, servizi
and forniture, also known as the Code of public contracts for works, services and supplies. As underDirective
2004/17/EC and Directive 2004/18/EC.
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– extended patrimonial prevention measures to crimes listed in Article 51, paragraph
3bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure;11
– made it possible to apply preventive measures for persons suspected of kidnapping for
ransom, drug trafficking and human trafficking;
– made it possible to adopt personal and patrimonial prevention measures separately
and independently. This ensures that the confiscation system can be applied even
against heirs in the event of the relevant person’s death;
– introduced equivalent confiscation for persons convicted of being amember of amafia-
type association.
Second, Law no. 94 of 15 July 2009:
– made it possible to apply preventive measures for persons suspected of the unjustified
possession of assets;
– made it possible to apply personal and patrimonial prevention measures separately,
regardless of the risk the person concerned poses to society;
– updated provisions concerning the dissolution of city councils that have been infiltrated
by themafia. This implemented a rule barring local administrators of a council dissolved
owing to mafia infiltration from re-election (Article 143, paragraph 11 of Legislative
Decree 267/2000).
Last, in 2011 Legislative Decree no. 159/2011 introduced the ‘Code of antimafia laws, rel-
evant preventivemeasures and new antimafia provisions’ (hereafterAntimafia Code). The
Antimafia Code combined all the previous legislation into a unique normative corpus12
and is currently the main reference point for antimafia measures.13
11 The offences listed inArticle 51, paragraph 3bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure are: Article 416, paragraph
6 and 7, Article 416 for offences indicated in Articles 473, 474, 600, 601, 602, 416bis and 630 of the Criminal
Code, Article 74 of the Consolidated Law adopted with Decree of the President of the Republic 309/1990,
Article 291quater of the Consolidated Law adopted with Decree of the President of the Republic no. 43 of
23 January 1973, Article 260 of Legislative Decree no. 152 of 3 April 2006.
12 The promulgation of the Antimafia Code made it possible to apply personal and patrimonial measures
separately, i.e. independent of the risk to society posed by the subject (Article 2bis, paragraph 6bis of Law
no. 575 of 1965, introduced by Law no.125 of 2008 and Law no. 94 of 2009). Furthermore, Law no.190 of
6 November 2012 dealt with ‘Measures to prevent and suppress corruption and illegality inside public
administration.’ The Prime Minister’s Decree of 18 April 2013 envisaged the setting up and continuous
updating of the ‘white lists’. Finally, the Stability Law of 2013 (Law no. 228 of 24 December 2012) has updated
the confiscation system included in the Antimafia Code.
13 Legislative Decree no. 218 of 15 November 2012 updated the Antimafia Code. It introduced new targets for
the antimafia documentation system (Article 85 of the Antimafia Code, further discussed in detail in section
7.2.1). In particular this included European economic interest groupings (EEIGs), members of company
audit committees (even companies without legal personality), persons who manage and represent foreign
companies (those without a second Italian home office), and gambling operators (organized into capital-
based companies).
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7.2 Screening and monitoring
This section focuses on existing Italianmeasures governing the screening and/ormonitoring
of businesses for the criminal past of natural persons involved in them. Section 7.2.1 deals
with the measures on the documentazione antimafia (antimafia documentation) Section
7.2.2 discusses other screening and/or monitoring procedures. Section 7.2.3 focuses on
the protection extended to the natural and legal personswho are screened and/ormonitored.
7.2.1 Documentazione antimafia
7.2.1.1 History of the legislation
Italywas the first country in the EuropeanUnion to conduct ‘criminal audits’, i.e. to regulate
by law and conduct systematic investigations of the antecedents of companies.14 In 1994,
Legislative Decree 490/1994 introduced the antimafia documentation system. Enterprises
or individuals applying for public aid or bidding on public procurement contracts were
requested to exhibit an ‘antimafia certificate’, attesting that they had not been involved in
mafia-type associations. This not only meant that relevant subjects in the enterprise (e.g.
owners, shareholders, administrators) were not convicted of mafia-related offences, but
also that no preventive measures had been imposed on them. In 1998, Decree of the Pres-
ident of the Republic no. 252/1998 repealed part of LegislativeDecree 490/1994 and updated
the system. It distinguished between the antimafia communication and antimafia informa-
tion and introduced a simplified certification system through the Chambers of Commerce.
In 2010-2011, after more than fifteen years from the introduction of the antimafia
documentation, the debate on the effectiveness of the system generated a further reform.
The Parliament delegated the Government to reform the antimafia legislation.15 The
guiding principles were to revise and simplify it, in particular regarding antimafia docu-
mentation. The Government regulated the system in the second book of the Antimafia
Code. Since 2012, this legislation is the new reference point for the antimafia documentation
system.16 TheCode has compiledmost of the antimafia provisions into a unique legislative
corpus that abrogates most of the previous regulations.17
14 Van de Bunt & Van der Schoot 2003; White 2000.
15 Article 2, paragraph 1 of Law 136/2010; according to Law 575/1965 and Article 4 of Legislative Decree no.
490 of 1994.
16 Legislative Decree no. 218 of 15 November 2012 introduced corrective dispositions to the antimafia docu-
mentation system, foreseen into Antimafia Code, entering into force on 12 February 2013.
17 TheAntimafiaCode abrogated Lawno. 1423 of 27December 1956 andLawno. 575 of 31May 1965. Legislative
Decree no. 218 of 15 November 2012 introduced corrective dispositions to the antimafia documentation
system, foreseen into the Antimafia Code, entering into force of 12 February 2013.
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7.2.1.2 The Antimafia Code in force
The antimafia documentation system focuses on screening tenderers and licence applicants
for mafia infiltration. The aim is to verify whether any of the conditions initially provided
for in the 1965 law are present. In specific cases, screening also verifies whether other
specific conditions suggest mafia infiltration.
Article 67 of the Antimafia Code provides that an individual who has a preventive
measures imposed on him18 or is convicted of offences listed under Article 51 paragraph
3bis of the Italian Criminal Procedure Code cannot be issued any kind of licence or
authorization.19 This includes licences or police authorizations, public concessions, con-
cessions for public works, registration in public registers (i.e. the Chamber of Commerce),
attestations to carry out public works, public funding and firearms licences.
According to Article 83 paragraph 1 and 2 of the Antimafia Code, before contracting
or issuing concessions or grants, contracting authorities must obtain the required type of
antimafia documentation from the Prefecture.20
The prefect is a high-level administrative civil servant who has general competence to
act on behalf of government at the provincial level.21 The prefect operates under the
authority of the ItalianMinistry of the Interior and is in charge of the Prefecture-Territorial
Government Office (UTG).22 It has competence on public order and security at the
provincial level; guarantees the security and safety of citizens, the protection of properties,
and compliance with national and regional laws and local ordinances. The prefect has
access to police forces to enforce thee tasks.23 If the public interest so requires, he may
18 These are special preventive personal or patrimonial measures of a quasi-criminal nature. The proceedings
must be final.
19 The offences listed inArticle 51, paragraph 3bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure are: Article 416, paragraph
6 and 7, Article 416 for offences indicated in Articles 473, 474, 600, 601, 602, 416bis and 630 of the Criminal
Code, Article 74 of the Consolidated Law adopted with Decree of the President of the Republic 309/1990,
Article 291quater of the Consolidated Law adopted with Decree of the President of the Republic no. 43 of
23 January 1973, Article 260 of Legislative Decree no. 152 of 3 April 2006.
20 Article 84 of the Antimafia Code.
21 According to Article 11 of Legislative Decree number 300 of 1999. Functions of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Justice, Treasury, Finances, Public Instruction, Cultural Activities and Assets are not part of the
prefect’s general competence (Legislative Decree no. 300 of 1999). As in most civil-law countries, the Italian
legal system is inspired by the French system, established in 1800 by Napoleon. As in other such countries,
Italy considers administrative law a distinct branch of the law, aimed at regulating the relationship between
citizens and public administration.
22 According to Article 1 of Legislative Decree no. 29 of 2004. Legislative Decrees no. 300 of 1999 and no. 29
of 2004 have changed the Prefecture into the Prefecture-Territorial Government Office (UTG). Currently
there are 106 Prefectures in Italy.
23 The prefect is in charge of a provincial committee set up to defend public order and security. See also Section
7.3.1 for a more detailed explanation. Another government body is the Permanent Conference, established
by Legislative Decree no. 300/1999 Article 11, updated by Legislative Decree no. 29/2004. Its function is to
cooperate with the prefect to coordinate the activities of the local public offices and to guarantee collaboration
with local government’s representatives. The Permanent Conference is composed of four sections: adminis-
tration, economic development, environment, and community services. The purpose of this body is to
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adopt essentialmeasures, called ‘ordinances’ or ‘decrees’.24 Furthermore, in the relationship
between State and local administrators, he assumes the role of guarantor of administrative
activities. This includesmonitoring correct procedure during local elections and supervising
the suspension of city council administrators.
The competent prefect issues the antimafia documentation, i.e. the comunicazioni or
the informazioni, after consulting the national antimafia database.25 The prefect’s compe-
tence depends on the place of residence of the relevant natural person or the head office
of the relevant legal person.26 The prefect, in cooperation with other law enforcement
agencies,must conduct a background check on all the individuals identified in theAntimafia
Code prior to awarding licences, permits, concessions, financial allowances and authoriza-
tions, before admitting tenders, and before concluding, approving or allowing various
contracts.27 In particular, enterprises or individuals who conclude contracts with adminis-
trative authorities must include the antimafia documentation in their bid/application
dossier.28
According toArticle 85, the antimafia checks apply to the following individuals: owners
and technical managers of individual enterprises, legal representatives of associations,
cooperatives and consortiums, themajority partners in capital companies, all themembers
of general partnerships, all the general partners in limited partnerships and all local repre-
sentatives of companies. Moreover, according to Article 2508 of the Italian Civil Code, the
legal representative of a foreign company (without a second home office in Italy) must
also be screened.29 Article 85 of the Antimafia Code was updated in 2012 to include new
categories, more specifically European economic interest groupings (EEIGs), members of
company audit committees (even if the company lacks legal personality), persons who
manage and represent foreign companies (without a second Italian home office) and
mediate in social conflicts. The prefect is the president of the Permanent Conference, whose members are
other local authorities.
24 Article 1 and 2 of Royal Decree no. 773 of 1931.
25 Article 83, paragraph 1 and 2; Article 84ss; Article 87 and Article 90 of the Antimafia Code. The Italian
Ministry of the Interior manages a national database of antimafia documentation in order to check for
‘impediments’ to the issuing of antimafia documentation (Article 96 of the Antimafia Code; Article 5,
paragraph 4, of the Ministry of the Interior Decree of 14 March 2003). The database, which is connected to
the computer system of the Antimafia Investigative Directorate (hereafter: DIA), allows users to consult
data acquired from the prefect during checks, even information gathered when accessing the construction
sites of the companies concerned (Article 102 of the Antimafia Code). In order to verify impediments or
mafia infiltration, the data is linked to the Data Elaboration Centre (CED) (Law no. 121 of 1 April 1981
Article 8; Article 99, paragraph 2bis of theAntimafia Code, inserted byArticle 6, paragraph 1, of the Legislative
Decree no. 218 of 15 November 2012).
26 Article 87, paragraph 1 and Article 90, paragraph 1 of the Antimafia Code.
27 Mastrodomenico 2013.The prefect and the Guardia di Finanza (Financial Police) have the power to undertake
patrimonial, financial and fiscal investigations in order to check the economic lifestyle, assets and financial
means of people subject to the antimafia screening (Article 19 of the Antimafia Code).
28 Article 87, paragraph 1 of the Antimafia Code.
29 Royal Decree no. 262 of 16 March 1942.
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gambling dealers (organized into capital-based companies).30 Also, before issuing the
informazioni, the Prefecture also checks the applicant’s cohabiting family members.
Antimafia documentation consists of two types of checks: comunicazione antimafia
(antimafia communication), and informazione antimafia (antimafia information). Both
are defined in Article 84 of the Antimafia Code.
1. Comunicazione antimafia certifies the absence of any impediment, i.e. grounds for
disqualification, banishment or suspension based on a final preventive judgment, a
preventivemeasure or a criminal conviction for offences listed inArticle 51, paragraph
3bis of the Italian Criminal. Comunicazione antimafia concerns all aforementioned
natural or legal persons covered under Article 85 of the Antimafia Code. Procedure
Code.31
2. Informazione antimafia has a wider scope, allowing investigation of any attempt at
mafia infiltration into a company.32 Informazione antimafia gives the prefect and law
enforcement agencies greater flexibility. Apart froma check on a natural or legal person’s
criminal records and pending proceedings, the competent authorities can undertake
investigations (similar to criminal investigations) to prove the presence of mafia infil-
tration. In addition, the prefect has the option of further monitoring and the right to
make on-site checks at the construction sites of any company awarded public works
contracts.33
The type of documentation required depends on the size of the contract or funding. Article
83 of the Antimafia Code regulates the financial threshold for issuing antimafia documen-
tation.34 Whether antimafia documentation must be requested depends on the value of
the contract in question in accordance with a three-tier system:
– when the contract value is below €150,000, no antimafia documentation is required;35
– when the contract value is above €150,000 but below the EU threshold for public pro-
curement, the comunicazione antimafia is required;36
30 Legislative Decree no. 218 of 15 November 2012.
31 Article 84, paragraph 2 of the Antimafia Code.
32 Article 84, paragraph 3 of the Antimafia Code.
33 Article 93 of the Antimafia Code.
34 Malagnino 2011.
35 According to Article 83 paragraph 3 under e of the Antimafia Code.
36 Article 87 of the Antimafia Code. EU regulation no. 1336/2013 entered into force on 1 January 2014,
updating previous EU thresholds for public contracts (Directive 2004/17/EC, Directive 2004/18/EC and
Directive 2009/81/EC). For services and supply contracts, the EU thresholds are: for ordinary sectors, €134,000
and €207,000 depending on the type of contract and awarding body. For certain special sectors, the threshold
is €414,000. These leave little room to apply antimafia communication in the case of services and supply
contracts. For public work contracts, the EU threshold, both for the ordinary and special sectors, is €5,186,000.
Consequently, antimafia communication is required for any contract between €150,000 and €5,186,000.
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– when the contract value exceeds the EU threshold, or in specifically defined cases,37
informazione antimafia is required.
The antimafia communication and antimafia information are both considered binding
acts. They do not leave discretionary power to the contracting authorities,38 implying that
the natural or legal personmay not negotiate with public administrators about the outcome
of the check.
The antimafia communication
Natural or legal persons are required to obtain the antimafia communication document
when applying or bidding for:39
– licences, police or commercial authorizations;
– public concessions;
– concessions for publicworks (with a value below the EU threshold, and above €150,000);
– entry into public registers (e.g. the Chamber of Commerce);
– certification of qualification to conduct public works;
– entry into public registers or authorization proceedings to conduct entrepreneurial
activities;
– public funding awarded by the State, public bodies and the European Communities in
order to conduct entrepreneurial activities;
– licences to possess firearms;
– public works contracts valued below €5,186,000 (i.e. the EU threshold);
– services and supply contracts above €150,000 but below €207,000 (ordinary sectors)
or €414,000 (special sectors).
The check involving the communication also applies for the relatives of persons subject
to preventive measures. Consequently, a preliminary family check must be carried out
before the antimafia documentation can be issued. In addition, an antimafia check must
be carried out on corporate decision-makers, such as managing directors.40
The antimafia communication is not required in some cases, specifically:41
37 See Article 91 of the Antimafia Code. antimafia information is mandatory for public concessions for public
waters or state property, or for the assignment of public financial contributions aimed at conducting
entrepreneurial activities valued at more than €150,000 (Article 91, paragraph 1 under b). The authorization
of subcontracts with a value in excess of €150,000 is evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
38 The contracting authorities are the State, local governments, public authorities, associations consisting of
local governments or public authorities which serve the public interest (Article 3 paragraphs 25, 32 and 33
of the Code on Public Contracts and Article 1 paragraph 9 of Directive 2004/18/EC).
39 Article 67 paragraph 1 and 2 of the Antimafia Code.
40 Article 67 paragraph 4 of the Antimafia Code.
41 Article 83 paragraph 3 of the Antimafia Code.
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– contracts between public subjects: public administrators, public authorities, even when
constituted in single contracting authorities, companies controlled by the State (or by
another public authority), public works authorities and general contractors;42
– contracts between public and other private entities;
– issuing or renewing public security authorizations or licences;
– contracts and grants for self-employed people;
– contracts with a value below €150,000.43
The antimafia communication verifies the absence of any ‘impediment’.44 An impediment
exists when a person is subject to a preventive measure and/or a conviction for offences
indicated inArticle 51, paragraph 3bis of the ItalianCriminal ProcedureCode. The presence
of an impediment prevents the person from concluding a contract with the administrative
authorities.45
The competent prefecture issues the antimafia communication after consulting the
national antimafia database. The prefect is competent to perform the checks if he has ter-
ritorial competence over the place of residence of a natural person or the home office of
a legal person. When the subjects of the check reside abroad, the competent prefect has
territorial competence over the place where the contract is being executed.46 If no impedi-
ments are detected in the database, the prefect can issue the antimafia communication at
once.47 This communication enables the subject of the check to access grants, subsidies or
contracts awarded by administrative authorities. The antimafia communication expires
six months after it is issued. If an impediment emerges from the database, the prefect
conducts further checks.48 If the impediments are confirmed, the prefect issues a prohibitive
antimafia communication.49 This prohibitive communication prevents access to grants,
subsidies and contracts awarded by administrative authorities.
The prefect must issue the communication within 45 days, with an option to extend
the deadline a further thirty days in the case of complex checks.
If the prefect does not issue the antimafia documentation before the deadline, the
subjects can participate in the procurement or be granted licenses and authorizations.
However, if impediments are detected after the deadline passes, the grant, funding, conces-
sion etc. is revoked, even if the contract has been concluded. Revocation excludes any
42 Article 176 of Code of Public Contracts.
43 Article 83 paragraph 3 of the Antimafia Code.
44 Article 84, paragraph 2 of the Antimafia Code.
45 Article 84 paragraph 2 of the Antimafia Code.
46 Article 83 paragraph 1 and 2; Articles 87 and 90 of the Antimafia Code and Article 88 paragraph 4 of the
Antimafia Code.
47 Article 88 of the Antimafia Code.
48 Article 88 paragraph 2 of the Antimafia Code.
49 Article 88 paragraph 3 of the Antimafia Code.
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activities already carried out, with the contractor being reimbursed for costs already
incurred in preparing the remaining activities, in line with the contract.
Antimafia-information
The antimafia information supplements the antimafia communication because it enables
verification not only of impediments but also of any attempt at mafia infiltration into an
enterprise.50 According to Article 91 of the Antimafia Code, before contracting or issuing
administrative acts, contracting authorities51 must request the antimafia information from
the Prefecture.52 The contracting authority must indicate the name of the company, the
object and the value of the contract, and the personal details of people concerned.53 The
antimafia information is required for:54
– concessions for public works with a value above the EU threshold;55
– public concessions (or subsidies) for entrepreneurial activities valued at more than
€150.000;56
– authorizations of subcontracts or assignations to build public works or to supply public
services valued at more than €150.000;
– public procurement contracts above the EU threshold;
– specific sectors, regardless of the contract value (for example concrete supply and
garbage disposal);57
– any contract stipulated by a city council within five years of its dissolution for mafia
infiltration, regardless of the contract value.58
In some specific cases, antimafia information is not required for:59
– contracts between public subjects: public administrators, public authorities, even con-
stituted in single contracting authorities, companies controlled by the State (or by
50 Article 84 paragraph 3 and 4 and Article 91 paragraph 6 of the Antimafia Code.
51 I.e. public administrators, public authorities, even constituted in single contracting authorities, companies
controlled by the State (or another public authority), public works authorities and general contractors in
accordance with Article 176 of the Code of Public Contracts.
52 Article 84, paragraph 3 of the Antimafia Code.
53 According to Article 83 paragraph 1 and 2 and Article 91 paragraph 4 of the Antimafia Code.
54 Article 91 of the Antimafia Code.
55 According to Legislative Decree no. 163/2006, Directive 2004/17/EC and Directive 2004/18/EC, updated by
Commission Regulation (EC) 1177/2009.
56 According to Article 91 of the Antimafia Code.
57 According to the last paragraph of Article 91 of Legislative Decree no. 159 of 2011 and the Circular of the
Ministry of the Interior no. 4610/2010, these sectors are at risk. Such contractors must therefore adhere to
the antimafia information system, regardless of the contract value.
58 Article 143 of Legislative Decree 267/2000 and Article 100 of the Antimafia code. See Section 7.5 for further
information.
59 Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Antimafia Code.
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another public authority), public works authorities, general contractors (Article 176
of the Code of public contracts);
– contracts between public and other private subjects that have specific requirements of
good conduct;
– the issuance or renewal of public security authorizations or licences;
– contracts and grants awarded to self-employed people;
– contracts with a value below €150,000.60
The antimafia information verifies the absence of elements showing the infiltration of the
mafias in an enterprise. In addition to the impediments concerning the antimafia commu-
nication, the following elements are considered evidence of mafia infiltration:61
– convictions for offences related to organized crime activities (a final conviction is not
required);
– the imposition of pre-trial precautionary measures or convictions for the offences
indicated in Articles 353, 353bis, 629, 640bis, 644, 648bis, 648ter of the Italian Criminal
Code, Article 51 paragraph 3bis of the Italian Criminal Procedure Code, and Article
12quinquies of Law no. 356 of 1992;
– proposal or imposition of personal or patrimonial preventive measures;
– failure to report specific serious offences (e.g. bribery and extortion in favour of a mafia
association), by subjects indicated inArticle 38 under b of the Code of Public Contracts;
evidence emerging from on-site checks conducted by the prefect at work sites;62
– findings from the investigations conducted by the prefects also including the controls
on construction sites.
– replacement of the relevant subjects in an enterprise with family members of persons
subject to preventive measures or prior convictions;
– repeated violations (within a five-year period) of the obligation to conduct traceable
financial transactions.
The competent prefect issues the antimafia information immediately after consulting the
national antimafia database, provided the aforementioned issues are not present. The
competent prefect is the one with jurisdiction over the natural person’s place of residence
or legal person’s homeoffice.63 If circumstances to the contrary arise, the prefect can conduct
further checks. The introduction of antimafia information has reinforced the prefect’s
checks by moving from a more formal procedure, in which the absence of impediments
60 According to Article 91 paragraph 1 under a and c of the Antimafia Code.
61 Article 84 paragraph 4 of the Antimafia Code. See also article 91 paragraph 6 of the Antimafia Code.
62 Article 84 paragraph 4 of the Antimafia Code.
63 According to Article 83 paragraph 1 and 2, Article 86 paragraph 2, Article 91 paragraph 1 and Article 97 of
the Antimafia Code.
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was evaluated using the Chamber of Commerce database, to a factual and more effective
procedure. In cooperation with law enforcement agencies, the prefect can undertake
investigations similar to criminal investigations. Furthermore, he can also conduct further
activities, e.g. controls at the construction sites.64 If any of the above issues is identified,
the prefect issues ‘negative antimafia information’ (informazione antimafia interdittiva),
which prohibits any further license, authorization andpublic procurement. This information
is shared with the national anfimafia prosecutor’s office (Direzione Nazionale Antimafia),
with the contracting authority, the Chamber of Commerce, to the interforce antimafia law
enforcement agency (Direzione Investigativa Antimafia), to the supervisory authority for
public contracts, to the Antitrust Authority, to the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry
of Economic Development, and to the Income Revenue Authority.65
The prefect must issue antimafia information within 45 days but has the option of
extending this deadline for a further thirty days if complex checks are necessary.66 The
antimafia information expires after twelve months. Any changes in a company must be
communicated within thirty days, however.67 If the prefect does not issue antimafia
information before the deadline, the subjects can participate in the procurement or be
granted licenses and authorizations. However, if impediments are detected after the
deadline passes, the grant, funding, concession etc. is revoked, even if the contract has
already been concluded. Revocation excludes any activities already conducted, with the
contractor being reimbursed for any costs already incurred in preparing the remaining
activities, in line with the contract.68
In some cases, the contracting authority has the option of contracting the company
anyway, even if mafia infiltration is suspected.69 According to the case law of the Italian
Council of State, the highest administrative court, this is not up to the contracting
authority.70 The contract can only remain in place if specific conditions apply, namely:71
– if the work is still under way;
– if the supply of goods and services is considered essential (in the public interest);
– if the supplier cannot be replaced immediately
64 Article 93, paragraph 1 of the Antimafia Code.
65 Article 91, paragraph 7bis of the Antimafia Code
66 Article 92, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Antimafia Code.
67 Article 86, paragraph 3 of the Antimafia Code.
68 According to Article 92, paragraph 3, Article 83 paragraph 1 and 2 of the Antimafia Code.
69 Article 83 paragraph 1 and 2 of the Antimafia Code.
70 See Section 7.2.1 of this chapter.
71 Article 94 paragraph 3 of the Antimafia Code.
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This option is therefore subject to particularly strict requirements, including detailed reasons
as to why the contracting authority has decided to continue working with the contractor
in question.72
There used to be a third category of antimafia information: ‘atypical antimafia infor-
mation’.73 Again, the prefect issued this type of antimafia documentation. The aim was to
identify attempts at mafia infiltration into companies. The contracting authority had the
discretionary power to decide whether the contract with the subject involved mafia infil-
tration.74 Atypical information was therefore not an administrative act with prescribed
consequences. Its aim was to give public administrators information about tenderers.
However, this system was criticized because it allowed the contracting authority to make
decisions regarding mafia infiltration into companies without having the legal authority
to do so.75 The Antimafia Code does not include atypical antimafia information.76
7.2.1.3 Self-certification
For contracts requiring an antimafia communication, there is a self-certification system
with the purpose of simplifying and streamlining the procedure for the enterprises. For
contracts requiring antimafia information, self-certification is not allowed.77 The self-cer-
tification system allows a subject to attest to the absence of impediments as provided for
in Article 67 of the Antimafia Code. Article 89 lists the situations in which self-certification
is allowed:
– for the conclusion of urgent contracts and their renewal (for service provider contracts);
– for private activities subject to the administrative instrument of self-declaration at the
start of the work (by the private subject for the administrative authority);
– for private activities subject to the administrative instrument of tacit approval.78
In these cases, the contracting authorities and public authorities can acquire antimafia
self-certification from natural and legal persons. At a later stage, this documentation can
72 Malagnino 2011. See also Cons. di Stato, Section. V, no. 4467 of 9 September 2013.
73 Article 10 paragraph 9 ofDecree of the President of the Republic no. 252 of 1998, Article 1septies of Legislative
Decree no. 629 of 1982 and Law no. 726/1982.
74 Zamberletti 2008.
75 Malagnino 2011. See also: Cons. di Stato, Section III, no. 5177/2012; Cons. di Stato, Section III, no. 3247/2012;
T.A.R. Abruzzo, Section. I, no. 870/2010; Cons. di Stato, Section. V, no. 5247/2005; Cons. di Stato, Section
IV,1 March 2001, no.1148; Cons. di Stato, Section VI, 17 April 2009, no. 233; Cons. di Stato, Section V,
31 December 2007, no. 6902; T.A.R. Campania Napoli, Section I, 23 January 2007, no. 596; T.A.R. Catania,
Section. IV, no. 941/2009; Cons. di Stato, Section.VI, no. 1948/2007; Cons. di Stato, Section. IV, no. 1148/2001;
T.A.R. Sicilia Palermo, no. 1479/2009; T.A.R. Calabria, Reggio Calabria, no. 197/2007; Cons. di Stato, Section
V, no. 4135/2006; Cons. di Stato, Section. IV, no. 3491/2009; Cons. di Stato, III, 14 September 2011, no. 5130
and Section VI, 28 April 2010, no. 2441.
76 Article 91 of the Antimafia Code.
77 Article 89 of the Antimafia Code.
78 According to Decree of the President of the Republic no. 300 of 26 April 1992.
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be sent to the competent Prefecture. The self-certification document has to be signed
according to Article 38 of the Decree of the President of the Republic no. 445/2000, as the
subject is responsible for what he has declared. The public administrators can check the
trustworthiness of the declarations. In case of false information, they can inform the
competent authority (such as the Prosecutor’s Office).79
The introduction of the new Antimafia Code has extended the possibilities for self-
certification. In the past, service contracts were excluded from this system. Due to its effi-
ciency, self-certification is widespread in Italy. It is presently required to open new public
commercial activities, such as bars, pizzerias and hotels.
7.2.2 Other screening and/or monitoring procedures
Legislation aimed at ensuring the transparency of public contracting prohibits negotiation
with subjects targeted by preventive measures. Specifically, this includes:
– The code of public contracts. Article 38 paragraph 1 under b of the Public Contracts
Code sets out general requirements for contracting with the administrative authorities.
Under b and c, theCode states that persons subject to a preventivemeasure or convicted
of participating in an organized crime group are banned from contracting with
administrative authorities; this prohibition is also set out inArticle 247 of theAntimafia
Code.80
– The Antimafia Code states that public authorities81 cannot award licences, permits,
concessions, subsidies, benefits for mafia victims or authorizations, or accept or award
tenders, or approve or allow various contracts, including tender contracts, if there are
impediments or mafia attempts to infiltrate companies (Article 67 and Article 94,
paragraph 1, of the Antimafia Code).82
In particular, subjects who have a preventive measure imposed on them or who are con-
victed of offences listed in Article 51, paragraph 3bis of the Italian Criminal Procedure
Code, cannot obtain:83
79 Article 75 and 76 of Decree of the President of the Republic 445/2000.
80 According to Article 38 paragraph 1 of Legislative Decree no. 163 of 12 April 2006 and Article 45 paragraph
1 of Directive 2004/18/EC. See also: T.A.R. Campania Napoli, no. 5058/2009; Cons. di Stato, Section. VI,
number 4574/2006; Cons. di Stato, no. 5780/2008; Constitutional Court, number 25/2002; Cons. di Stato,
Section. V, 27 June 2006, no. 4135; Cons. di Stato, Section V, 29 August 2005, no. 4408; T.A.R. Calabria
Catanzaro, Section II, 12 February 2007, no. 38; Cons. di Stato, Section VI, 11 December 2009, no. 7777;
T.A.R. Lazio, no. 8434 of 24 September 2013; T.A.R. Calabria Catanzaro, Section I, 2011, no, 1334; Cons. di
Stato, Section I, number. 477/2012.
81 According to Article 83 Antimafia Code.
82 See Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2; according to Article 94 of the Antimafia Code, and Article 11, paragraph 3, of
Decree of the President of the Republic no. 252 of 1998.
83 Article 67 of the Antimafia Code.
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– licences or police authorizations;
– public concessions;
– concessions for public works;
– entry into a public register (i.e. the Chamber of Commerce);
– certification of their qualification to conduct public works;
– other entries into public registers or authorization proceedings to conduct
entrepreneurial activities;
– public funding awarded by the State, public bodies or the European Communities for
entrepreneurial activities;
– firearms licences
The final decision applying a preventive measure implies the refusal of applications for
licences, authorizations, concessions, attestations, certification of qualifications, and a
prohibition against contracting with the administrative authorities.84
7.2.3 Legal protection of natural and legal persons subject to screening and/or
monitoring
The documents relating to the antimafia documentation system are administrative deeds.
They can be challenged before an administrative judge. An administrative deed is a legal
unilateral act implemented by an administrative authority. The discrepancy between a
deed and its normative basis allows the subject of the deed, e.g. a licence applicant, to
contest it. The deed may be of ‘faulty legitimacy’ (vizio di legittimità) or merit (vizio di
merito). The legitimacy of the deed is flawed if it is not consistent with the applicable leg-
islation (e.g. the problem of detournement de pouvoir or exceeding the power bestowed
by legislation). The deed is of faulty merit if it conflicts with the principles and values of
the Italian legal system, specifically principles provided for in the Italian Constitution,
such as transparency and efficiency.
Antimafia information, which automatically prevents a natural or legal person from
contracting with the administrative authorities, can cause that person direct damage. For
this reason, it can be contested directly before the administrative court. If the court annuls
the deed, both the measure eliminating the person’s contract from the tender and the
provisions assigning the tender to another company are invalid. In otherwords, the decision
to award the contract to another company becomes invalid and the tender proceduremust
be repeated.
84 Article 67 paragraph 2 of the Antimafia Code.
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7.3 Instruments directed at preventing the disturbance of public
order
This section analyses the administrative measures intended to prevent the disturbance of
public order. Section 7.3.1 discusses the revocation, refusal, and withdrawal of permits,
licences, subsidies or government or other tenders regulated by various normative sources
at the national and regional level. Section 7.3.2 examines the possibility of closing down
and/or expropriating premiseswhen public disturbance occurs in or around those premises.
7.3.1 Revoking or refusing licences, subsidies, or government or other tenders
The authorities screen enterprises and individuals based on information provided by the
applicants themselves, or gathered from financial institutions, Chambers of Commerce
and government databases, including law enforcement agencies.85 If it turns out that a
Criminal Court has barred a person suspected or convicted of being linked to organized
crime from contractingwith the administrative authorities, or that enterprises or corpora-
tions bidding on a contract are suspected of having been infiltrated by organized crime
groups, the authorities cannot conclude a public contract or grant any kind of licence, or
financial contribution to such enterprises or corporations. According to Article 11 of the
Consolidated Law of Public Security (also known as TULPS), licences must also be denied
to people sentenced tomore than three years of imprisonment.86 This is a general provision
which preceded the antimafia legislation and to some extent overlaps with it, although the
TULPS is broader.
The provincial head of the State Police (Questore) may also suspend a licence for
commercial activity if the property concerned is a usual hangout for criminals or people
known to pose a risk to society. This measure can also be applied if the location poses a
risk to public safety or public order.87
As a government official, themayor of amunicipality (comuni) supervises public order
and security and passes information to the prefect.88 By issuing motivated deeds and acting
in accordancewith general principles of the legal system, themayormay implement urgent
measures to prevent serious risks to public safety. He can also order the prefect to intervene
85 See Section 7.2.1 of this chapter.
86 According to Articles 11 to 14 of Royal Decree no. 773 of 18 June 1931, Testo unico delle Leggi di Pubblica
Sicurezza (Consolidated Public Security Laws, also known as TULPS). This decree focuses on the protection
of the public order, while the antimafia documentation system (Section 7.2.1) focuses on prevention in the
public administration contracting system.
87 Article 100, paragraph 1 of Royal Decree no. 773/1931. An example is a place that has been the scene of
rioting or serious public disorder. See also: T.A.R. Lombardia, sentence no. 69 of 13 February 2008.
88 According to Article 54 of Legislative Decree no. 267 of 18 August 2000.
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with the help of law enforcement agencies.89 As mentioned in Section 7.2.1, the prefect
ensures the coordination of administrative activities. In order to enforce the mayor’s
actions, the prefect has the power to adopt appropriate measures (on the mayor’s behalf).
He can perform inspections to check the regular functioning of services placed under
major’s competence and guarantee law enforcement’s activities.90
7.3.2 Closure and/or expropriation of premises
If a commercial activity’s licence has been suspended multiple times, the Questore can
decide to close down the premises indefinitely.91 The owner of the premises is not entitled
to any kind of compensation or financial contribution from the administrative authorities.92
7.4 Seizure and confiscation of assets
Italy has developed a complex system of seizure and confiscation. The legislation aims to
tackle the financial resources of organized crime.93 The Italian system recognizes four types
of confiscation:
1. criminal confiscation (Article 240 andArticle 416bis paragraph 7 of the ItalianCriminal
Code);
2. extended confiscation (Article 12sexies of Legislative Decree 306/92);
3. preventive seizure and confiscation (Article 24 of the Antimafia Code);
4. equivalent confiscation (Article 25 of the Antimafia Code).
89 Article 54, paragraph 4 of Legislative Decree no. 267/2000.
90 According to Article 54, paragraph 9 of Legislative Decree no. 267 of 18 August 2000, Testo unico delle leggi
sull’ordinamento degli enti locali, also known as theConsolidated Law on Local Public Bodies, TUEL; updated
by Legislative Decree no. 187 of 12 November 2010.
91 Article 100, paragraph 2 of Royal Decree no. 773/1931. See also: T.A.R. Toscana, sentence no. 258 of
31 January 2006.
92 See Section 7.2.2 of this chapter. The rationale behind this procedure is to isolate people under investigation
from their economic and territorial contexts.
93 Transcrime 2013. Law no. 55 of 19 March 1990 provides for the confiscation of all the assets deriving from
drug trafficking, extortion, usury, money laundering, and smuggling. Moreover, for the first time in Italian
law this provision allows these measures (confiscation and seizure) to be applied even against straw men
and counsellors.
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7.4.1 Criminal confiscation
Criminal confiscation is regulated by Article 240 of the Criminal Code. Criminal confisca-
tion is established beyond a reasonable doubt at the end of a criminal trial on the basis of
the rule of evidence required in criminal procedures.94 Specifically:
– following conviction, the court may order the confiscation of means used or intended
to be used to commit a crime or make use of the product or profits of that crime;95
– profits obtained by the offender by committing the crime are mandatorily confiscated
upon conviction.96 This includes technical equipment used (wholly or in part) to
commit cyber-crimes;97
– objects whose use, manufacture, possession or transfer is an offence in itself are
mandatorily confiscated, even if a conviction has not been pronounced.98
The burden of proof for connecting the goods and the crime rests with the prosecution.99
New confiscation measures specifically related to criminal organizations have been
added to traditional confiscation since the 1980s. In 1982, Law no. 646 addedArticle 416bis
to the ItalianCriminal Code, which criminalizes participation in amafia-type organization.
Paragraph 7 contains more specific rules on the confiscation of goods owned by members
of organized crime groups.100 In this case, the means used or intended to be used to commit
the crime and the price (e.g. the payment for a murder), products and proceeds of the
crime are confiscated mandatorily.101 The procedure requires evidence of a link between
the confiscated assets and the offence. All the confiscation measures enacted within crim-
inal proceedings can give rise to seizure. According to Article 321 paragraph 2 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, ‘the court may also order the seizure of items subject to confisca-
tion’.102
94 Italian Criminal Code, Article 240.
95 Article 240, paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code.
96 Article 240, paragraph 2 no. 1 of the Criminal Code.
97 Article 240, paragraph 2, no. 1bis of the Criminal Code. Listed in Articles 615ter, 615quater, 615quinquies,
617bis, 617ter, 617quater, 617quinquies, 617sexies, 635bis, 635ter, 635quater, 635quinquies, 640ter and
640quinquies of the Italian Criminal Code Law no. 12 of 15 February 2012, Article 240 paragraph 2 (updated)
of the Criminal Code.
98 Article 240 paragraph 2 under 2 of the Criminal Code.
99 Maugeri 2008; Menditto 2011.
100 Law no. 646/1982 significantly amended Law no. 575/1965. Article 2 of Law no. 575 extended the precau-
tionary measures of special surveillance for public security and obligatory residence to persons suspected
of participating in a criminal organization. These measures already applied to persons who pose a risk to
society under Law no. 1423/1956.
101 UNICRI & BASCAP 2013.
102 Article 35 paragraph 5 of the Antimafia Code states that, when ordering the seizure of assets, the court must
appoint a judge and an administrator who is chosen from a special registry. The administrator is tasked with
the custody, conservation and administration of seized assets, and with increasing their value if possible.
Within thirty days of the appointment, the administrator must submit a detailed report to the judge about
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7.4.2 Extended confiscation
The extended confiscation system was introduced in 1994 by Legislative Decree 399/1994
and Law 501/1994, which added article 12sexies to Law 356/1992.103 The extended confis-
cation of illegally obtained assets is imposed on persons convicted for offences typically
related to the activity of criminal groups. Thanks to the reversal of the prosecutor’s burden
of proof, assets at the disposal of the convicted person and disproportionate to his income
may be confiscated. The extended system makes it possible to confiscate assets whether
or not they have criminal origins. The procedure does not require any proof of a connection
between criminal behaviour and the assets in question.
In practice, extended confiscation is applied if the person is unable to prove the lawful
origin of his assets or property and the court is authorized to confiscate them. The prose-
cutor is not required to prove that the person has committed a specific offence or to
demonstrate a link between the assets and a specific crime.104
7.4.3 Preventive seizure and confiscation
The Italian legal system provides for a special preventive form of seizure and confiscation
that permits seizure and confiscation as administrative and preventive measures. Such
measures are non-conviction based, administrative in nature and enforced outside criminal
proceedings by law enforcement authorities under judicial supervision and less strict rules
of evidence.105
According to Article 20 of the Antimafia Code, goods in direct or indirect control of
the accused person are seized when there is a disparity between the goods’ value and the
income of the person concerned, or sufficient evidence that the assets are the proceeds of
crime. The accused person loses control of the goods seized, and a judicial administrator,
appointed by the court, administrates the assets. Preventive seizure may be applied before
the hearing pertaining to the confiscation.106 This happens when goods are in danger of
disappearing, being misappropriated or transferred.107 Urgent seizure may be used when
the seized assets, including their listing, conditions, estimated value, any third-party rights and preferred
management options.
103 Article 12sexies of Legislative Decree no. 306/1992, amended to Law no. 356/1992, has been introduced by
LegislativeDecree no. 399/1994 (amended to Lawno. 501/1994). TheConstitutional Court abrogated former
article 12quinquies paragraph 2 of Law no. 356 of 1992, declaring it unconstitutional in light of Article 27
of the Italian Constitution (principle of non-guilt).
104 Maugeri 2008; Menditto 2011.
105 Menditto 2011.
106 Article 24 of the Antimafia Code.
107 Article 22, paragraph 1 of the Antimafia Code.
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assets are in serious danger of disappearing, beingmisappropriated or transferred.108 Seizure
can be applied after imposing a preventative personal measure.109 According to Article 24
of the Antimafia Code, preventive confiscation can be ordered:
– if the owner of the goods subject to the preventive proceedings is unable to prove their
lawful origin;
– if the subject’s declared income is disproportionate to his real economic activities;
– if there is evidence suggesting that the goods are of illegal origin.
The applicable legislation allows for personal and patrimonial measures to be applied
separately. Patrimonial measures can be adopted independently of the risk that the subject
poses to society.110 The current regulation concerning evidence of guilt and proof of dis-
proportionate value of the assets are sufficient to justify preventive confiscation when the
persons concerned are suspected of being in contact with organized crime groups.111
7.4.4 Equivalent confiscation
Last, Article 25 of the Antimafia Code allows for the seizure and confiscation of assets of
equivalent value if a person is the subject of a preventive measure and he:
– misappropriates, hides or devalues goods in order to elude seizure or confiscation
measures;
– has transferred the assets in good faith to third parties
The rationale behind this provision is to guarantee the confiscation of illicit revenues in
any possible way.112
108 Article 22, paragraph 2, of the Antimafia Code.
109 Article 24, paragraph 3, of the Antimafia Code.
110 Article 18 of the Antimafia Code.
111 Originally, confiscation was used to obtain assets at the disposal of subjects deemed a risk to society. The
confiscation system was applied if the income a person declared on his tax statement was disproportionate
to his legitimate activities. In time, with the introduction of Legislative Decree 92/2008, Law 125/2008 and
Law 94/2009, the confiscation systemwas used even for persons not considered a risk to society. Investigators
look not only at the financial assets of suspected criminals themselves, but also at the assets of their spouses,
children anddomestic partners for a period of five years. Furthermore, any natural or legal persons, companies,
or associations at the direct or indirect disposal of the criminal are subject to investigation.
112 According to Legislative Decree no. 92 of 2008, Article 2ter paragraph 10. See also: Cass., Section UU, 3 July
1996; Cass., 11 June 2008 no. 25676; Cass., Section UU, 8 January 2007, no 57; Cass., 4 July 2007, number
33479 and Cass., 15 June 2005, number 27433.
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7.5 The dissolution of local administrations owing to mafia
infiltration
This section addresses another administrative measure meant to combat the mafia. It
allows for the dissolution of municipal or provincial councils and its replacement by a
panel of three commissioners.113 Themeasure aims to eradicate relationships between local
politics and the mafias and to ensure the impartiality, efficiency, efficacy, and transparency
of the public administration.114
Article 143 of Legislative Decree 267/2000 allows for the dissolution of municipal and
provincial councils and the suspension or dismissal of themayor and provincial presidents.
Article 146 extends this measure to consortia of municipalities or provinces, local units of
the National Health Service, and other publicly owned companies.
The competent prefect initiates the procedure. It appoints a three-member committee
to conduct an enquiry if actual, unequivocal, and relevant indicators reveal a relationship
between members of the city council and the mafias or when there are influences that
compromise the independence of public administration.115 The committeemust assess the
coexistence of various elements in order to establish whether a city council should be dis-
solved. Specifically, it must review all the main aspects of the local administration. The
committee delivers a written report to the prefect within the deadline of three months
(extendable by a maximum of three further months)116 The prefect submits a report to the
Minister of the Interior regarding the existence of actual, unequivocal, and relevant indi-
cators of mafia infiltration within 45 days and after consultation of local police and prose-
cution authorities.117 TheMinister of Interior can propose to the Government (the Council
of Ministers) the dissolution of the concerned local authority. The dissolution decree is
then issued by the President of the Republic within three months of the Council of Minis-
ters’ decision.118
The dissolution of the city council implies the dismissal of the mayor or the provincial
president, of the city’s or province’s council and government and of any other person
connected to the mentioned positions.119 The local administrators responsible for the
conducts leading to the dissolution are barred from re-election at local elections once a
113 Ramacci & Spangher 2010. The city council represents the local assembly (Article 37 of Legislative Decree
no. 267 of the 18 August 2000).
114 Mete 2009. According to Article 97 of the Italian Constitution. Article 114 defines municipalities (comuni)
as local governments with statutes, financial autonomy, and legislative power with regard to their adminis-
trative functions. City councils are elected and serve a five-year term (Article 51 paragraph 1 of Legislative
Decree no. 267 of 18 August 2000).
115 Article 143, paragraph 2 of Legislative Decree 267/2000.
116 Commissione parlamentare d’inchiesta sul fenomeno della criminalità organizzata mafiosa o similare 2005.
117 Article 143, paragraph 3 of Legislative Decree 267/2000.
118 Article 143, paragraph 4 of Legislative Decree 267/2000.
119 Article 143, paragraph 4 and 6 of Legislative Decree 267/2000.
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definitive provision has been issued against them.120 The prosecution may be informed of
any relevant conduct emerged during the enquiry and this may trigger the application of
preventive measures.121
A decree of the Minister of Interior, upon the prefect’s proposal, may adopt any useful
measure to avoid any dangerous situation in relation to the managers, directors and any
other employee of the local administration (e.g. suspension, transfer, etc.). This decree can
be issued also if the local administration is not dissolved after the prefect’s enquiry.122
An extraordinary commission of three members (public officials or members of the
judiciary) is appointed in the dissolution decree. The dissolution lasts between 12 and 18
months (extendable to amaximumof 24months). The extraordinary commissionmanages
the local administration during this time until the next elections.123 To tackle the main
risks and carry out public contracts, the extraordinary panel must adopt a priority plan
setting out the necessary measures within sixty days of commencing its assignment.124 For
the five years following the dissolution, the local authority must acquire the informazione
Antimafia for any public procurement contract, subcontract or concession, independently
from the size of the contract.
There are a number of indicators of mafia infiltration into a city council, including
negativemanagement of its administration,malfunctioning of public services; in particular
tenders awarded for waste management, building projects, or concessions, permits and
licences representing very sensitive areas125 The Constitutional Court has ruled that the
dissolution of city councils is in line with the Constitution.126 As an obiter dictum, the
Court reasoned that this measure has a preventive effect and does not require the same
standard of proof as criminal proceedings.127
There are currently nine regions in Italy in which this kind of administrative measure
has been applied.128 Although this procedure is only used in extreme cases, it is an indicator
for measuring the presence of organized crime groups.129
120 Article 143, paragraph 11 of Legislative Decree 267/2000.
121 Article 143, paragraph 8 of Legislative Decree 267/2000.
122 Article 143, paragraph 5 of Legislative Decree 267/2000.
123 Article 144, paragraph 1 of Legislative Decree 267/2000.
124 Article 145, paragraph 2 of Legislative Decree 267/2000.
125 (For a database of the dissolved administrations, see: Comuni sciolti s.l.n.d.
126 The Italian Constitutional Court, judgment no. 103/1993.
127 See also: T.A.R. Lazio Roma, Section I, 1 July 2013, no. 6492; Cons. di Stato, IV, 6 April 2005, no. 1573; Cons.
di Stato, Section V, 22 March 1998, no. 319; Cons. di Stato, Section VI, 24 April 2009, no. 2615; Cons. di
Stato, 6 April 2005, no. 1573; Cons. di Stato, Section IV, 10 March 2011, no. 1547. Constitutional Court
19 March 1993, no. 103; Cons. di Stato, Section IV, 10 March 2011, no. 1547.
128 Sicilia, Campania, Calabria, Puglia, Basilicata, Lazio, Liguria, Piemonte and Lombardia.
129 La Spina 2008.
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8 The administrative approach in the
Netherlands
M. Peters & A.C.M Spapens
8.1 Introduction
8.1.1 Background
The authorities in the Netherlands often utilize administrative laws to curb different types
of crime, often in combinationwith penal and fiscal instruments. Administrativemeasures
are frequently used to deny criminals access to public services that are essential for specific
criminal enterprises.1 Criminals can for instance misuse a licence for a bar or a gambling
arcade to launder the illegal assets obtained through other criminal activities. A permit
for a discotheque may be misused to sell illicit drugs, and a licence for a prostitution
business to exploit women for sexual purposes. The danger is that criminals will infiltrate
and corrupt public authorities and public bodies in order to acquire licences and other
services that they require for their criminal activities.2 To prevent this, the Dutch govern-
ment believes that public authorities must apply administrative instruments in tandem
with traditional criminal law enforcement measures.3 This country report focuses on the
following main question:
Which administrative instruments are used in the Netherlands to prevent serious
and organized criminals from using (and misusing) the public services that they
require to undertake specific illegal activities (‘administrative approach’)?4
This report served as a example for the authors of the other legal country reports, both
substantially and procedurally. Hence, the report was finalised during the timeframe of
research project, in July 2013. Thereafter, the authors have strived to include new develop-
ments in the Netherlands in the report.
1 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 20.
2 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 20.
3 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 20-21.
4 The reader should bear in mind that the primary purpose of the instruments described below is usually not
the prevention of crime.
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The report is structured as followed. Section 8.2 discusses the instruments that give
the administrative authorities the tools they need to screen and monitor applicants for
licences. Section 8.3 addresses the instruments directed at preventing the disturbance of
public order. Finally, Section 8.4 briefly discusses the seizure of assets by the administrative
authorities. For each instrument, we devote a separate subsection to the question of how
other public bodies can share information with the administrative authorities and to the
legal protection offered to the parties concerned. Before discussing the instruments
themselves, we begin with a brief summary of the history of the administrative approach
to serious and organized crime in the Netherlands.
8.1.2 Historical background in the Netherlands
In the early 1980s, registered crime in theNetherlands quadrupled.5 TheDutch government
responded in 1985 by issuing the Society andCrime (Samenleving en criminaliteit) policy,6
which also pointed out the threat of organized crime to society and the risks of it infiltrating
into the legal economy.7 The government proposed two tracks. The first focused on
increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement and the repression of illegal activities. The
second track aimed to develop preventive measures.8
In the second half of the 1980s, the emergence of ‘Dutch style’ organized crime
increasingly worried the authorities, particularly in Amsterdam. Criminal groups had
grown wealthy importing and exporting narcotic drugs and had started to invest their
money in legitimate businesses and property, for instance in the Amsterdam Red Light
District. The Dutch were very interested in the methods used in the United States to fight
the Italian-American mafia, and this interest led to the Dutch-American Conference on
Organized Crime in 1990.9 This conference was critical to policymaking against organized
crime in the Netherlands,10 in part because the US experiences had made clear that,
alongside law enforcement agencies, local government played a vital role.11
A second important influence on the development of the administrative approach in
the Netherlands was the ‘IRT affair’,12 which came to a climax in 1993 when a special
investigation squad mounted to combat the ‘Dutch networks’ was disbanded. The direct
5 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 15; Huisman et al. 2005, p. 2-8.
6 Kamerstukken II 1984-1985, 18995, nrs. 1-2.
7 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 15.
8 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 15.
9 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 16-17.
10 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 16-17.
11 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 16.
12 The Interregionale rechercheteams (IRT) were special investigation squads mounted especially to investigate
organized crime. There were seven teams, which were integrated into the National Criminal Investigation
Squad (Nationale Recherche) in 2004.
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reason was a covert operation in which the police had allowed a criminal to bring large
amounts of narcotic drugs into the country. The aim was to allow this criminal to establish
connections with persons whom the police suspected of being the top organized crime
bosses in the Netherlands. The operation ran for several years without success. The IRT
affair – particularly the fact that the informer had been allowed to smuggle large amounts
of narcotic drugs into the country with the aid of the police and sell them afterwards – led
to a public outcry and suspicions of police corruption. It resulted in a parliamentary enquiry
by the Van Traa Commission, which reported in 1996.
The affair clearly pointed out two problems. The first was that the police had assumed
that Dutch-style organized crime consisted of large, well-organized and hierarchically
structured syndicates. In practice, it was a network of relatively small groups who engaged
in criminal projects in ever-shifting coalitions. The infiltration operation had been doomed
from the start, simply because there was no ‘end-boss’.
Second, the IRT affair made clear that the police and the public prosecution service
lacked a transparent legal framework for applying special investigative methods. This was
one of the main conclusions of the parliamentary enquiry in 1996. It led to the Special
Powers of Investigation Act (Wet op de Bijzondere Opsporingsbevoegdheden), which was
adopted in 2000.
The IRT affair not only had a major effect on criminal procedural law and policy, but
also on complementary approaches to serious and organized crime. In its final report,13
the Van Traa Commission concluded that criminals make use of legal means in order to
enhance and broaden their criminal activities.14 According to the Commission, several
sectors are particularly vulnerable.15 These sectors include bars and restaurants, hotels,
gambling, real estate and road transport.16
In 1997, the City of Amsterdam was the first to establish a ‘Van Traa Team’, a team of
civil servants charged with preventing criminals from obtaining licences to operate a
legitimate business in the city.17 The team had to base its interventions mainly on the
generalmunicipal by-law (Algemene Plaatselijke Verordening, APV), whichwewill discuss
further in Section 8.3.3. In 2003, the Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act (Wet
bevordering integriteitsbeoordelingen door het openbaar bestuur, BIBOB Act) substantially
extended the legal framework. The BIBOB Act made it easier for local authorities to check
applicants’ criminal and tax records. Even criminal connections and a lack of transparency
in financial matters are now sufficient grounds to refuse a licence or to withdraw it. The
13 Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 24072, nr. 10 and 11.
14 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
15 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
16 Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 24072, nr. 10 and 11, p. 60.
17 It was named the Van Traa Team in honour of the president of the parliamentary commission, who had
perished in a car accident in 1997.
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BIBOB Act covers several types of high-risk business, such as gambling arcades, coffee
shops, bars and restaurants (including fast food), and the sex business.18
In 2007,Amsterdam launched the Emergo project as amulti-agency approach to serious
and organized crime (e.g. exploitation, narcotic drugs, money laundering) in the Red Light
District.19 Emergo involves cooperation between the police, the public prosecution service,
the municipal authorities (including the Van Traa Team) and the Tax and Customs
Administration. The government adopted the Administrative Approach to Organized
Crime (Bestuurlijke Aanpak Georganiseerde Misdaad) programme in 2008.20 One outcome
of this programme was the establishment of Regional information and Expertise Centres
(Regionale Informatie- en Expertise Centra, RIECs) all over the country. The ten RIECs
are to a large extent modelled on the Emergo project: the centres analyse particular crime
problems based on information shared by the partners and then coordinate responses by
the different public authorities. The current government policy programme, Safety begins
with Prevention (Veiligheid begint bij Voorkomen),21 has the administrative approach to
organized crime as one of its three pillars, including the effective application of the BIBOB
Act and other administrative instruments.22 This approach aims to hamper serious and
organized crime by means of interventions at the local, regional and national levels.23
Although much has been achieved in the past two decades when it comes to using
administrative instruments against serious and organized criminal activities, it must be
noted that the government still finds it necessary to popularize the concept further. In
particular, the mayors of small and rural communities often find it hard to believe that
organized criminals might find their towns and villages an attractive place to start up a
business. They may also think that tackling serious and organized crime is solely a law
enforcement activity. Amsterdam and some other regions, such as the Meuse-Rhine
Euroregion and more recently the five largest towns in the Province of Noord-Brabant,
are to some extent still in the vanguard in applying the BIBOBAct and other administrative
instruments.
18 Prostitution was legalized in the Netherlands in 2000. The sale of hashish and marihuana in coffee shops is
illegal but not prosecuted based on the expediency principle, and can therefore not be licensed. Coffee shop
operators do however require a licence under theAlcohol Licensing andCateringAct (Drank- en Horecawet).
19 Project Emergo, 2011.
20 Kamerstukken II 2007-2008 29911, nr. 11, p. 5ff.
21 Kamerstukken II 2006/2007, 28684, nr. 119.
22 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties & Ministerie van Justitie 2008.
23 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties & Ministerie van Justitie 2008, p. 5;
Meerdinkveldboom & Terpstra 2010, p. 8.
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8.2 Screening and monitoring
As mentioned above, the Dutch government has provided administrative authorities with
several tools to screen and monitor natural persons and legal entities. This section focuses
on the instruments entailing:
the preventive screening and monitoring of applicants (persons and legal entities)
for permits, tenders and subsidies.
Section 8.2.1 addresses the Verklaring omtrent het Gedrag (VOG). Section 8.2.2 presents
an in-depth analysis of the BIBOB legislation. Finally, Section 8.2.3 discusses the Wet
controle op rechtspersonen (Wcp). With regard to each instrument, we also provide a sep-
arate overview of the sources of information the administrative authoritiesmay access and
how information is exchanged.
Before we turn to discussing the available administrative instruments, we must briefly
address the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht, Awb). This Act
was adopted in 1992 and regulates general administrative procedure for all other adminis-
trative laws, as well as legal protection against administrative decisions.24 This implies that
the Awb procedure is applicable to all of the instruments discussed hereafter. However,
more specialized administrative laws may deviate from the Awb regime.25 Furthermore,
the Awb comprises several specific administrative enforcement instruments, which we
will address in Section 8.3.
We must also briefly discuss the legal protection procedure under the Awb. Whenever
an administrative authority takes a decision, any person mentioned in the refusal or
revocation ordinance becomes a belanghebbende, or interested party (Article 4:8 Awb).
Such a party can object to an ordinance that he considers harmful to his interests. This
objection must be in writing and addressed to the administrative authority who took the
decision.26 If the administrative authority is unwilling to revise its decision, the interested
party can lodge an appeal with the court of first instance.27 The court of first instance only
reviews the decision of the administrative authority with respect to procedure, i.e. whether
the procedureswere followed correctly.28 The interested partymay appeal against a decision
of the court of first instance with the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State
(Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak Raad van State, ABRvS).
24 PG-Awb I, p. 64ff.
25 PG-Awb I, p. 64ff.
26 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 136.
27 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 136.
28 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 136.
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8.2.1 Verklaring Omtrent het Gedrag (VOG)
The first screening instrument available to the administrative authorities that wewill discuss
here is the Verklaring Omtrent het Gedrag (VOG). Translated, this means ‘certificate of
good conduct’ and it may be required from a person or a legal entity.29 The relevant legis-
lation concerns Articles 28 to 39 of the Judicial Data and Criminal Records Act (Wet
justitiële en strafvorderlijke gegevens, Wjsg). Submission of aVOG is a common requirement
for persons applying for a job with a public authority, but also for a range of other positions
in which persons with certain criminal backgrounds would present a risk. An example is
a convicted paedophile who applies for a job at a day care centre for children. The VOG
is also requested from people that want to join a rifle club.30
An application for a VOG is filed with the municipality where the applicant resides or
on thewebpage of Dienst Justis.31 Dienst Justis, more specifically its COVOGunit (Centraal
Orgaan Verklaringen Omtrent het Gedrag), is part of the Ministry of Security and Justice
(Veiligheid en Justitie). It performs the actual screening32 and issues the certificate. It is a
simple statement of non-objection to a person or legal entity.33
If there are objections against a person or legal entity, the Ministry will refuse the VOG
based on the risk the person poses to society should he or she repeat the offence, encom-
passed in Article 35 Wjsg.34 The objections must be relevant to the position for which the
VOG was requested.35 For instance, an applicant for a position as a taxi driver who has
been repeatedly sentenced for drink driving, or someone who wants to be an accountant
and was recently convicted in a major fraud case will be refused a VOG. However, if the
person who wants to start an accountancy firm has a drink driving record, he will – in
principle – be granted a VOG.36 If the authorities refuse the VOG, the applicant can lodge
an objection in line with the Awb, and he can also subsequently appeal a negative decision
concerning that objection.37
Screening: information sources and procedure
The COVOG determines whether a request for a VOG is admissible based on Article 30
Wjsg. A request is admissible if the applicant filed it according to the right procedure under
29 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
30 Certificate of Good Conduct Brochure, via www.justis.nl. For some job applications, a positive VOG is even
required by law.
31 Certificate of Good Conduct Brochure, via www.justis.nl. Dienst Justis is the central organ in the Ministry
of Security and Justice responsible for VOGs and other certificates.
32 Staatscourant 2013, 5409, p. 1; http://www.justis.nl/Producten/verklaringomtrentgedrag/.
33 Staatscourant 2013, 5409, p. 1; http://www.justis.nl/Producten/verklaringomtrentgedrag/.
34 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
35 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
36 Certificate of Good Conduct Brochure, via www.justis.nl.
37 Certificate of Good Conduct Brochure, via www.justis.nl.
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the Awb38 and if the request is necessary in order to reduce the risk to society.39 The request
is regarded necessary when (1) legislation makes the VOG mandatory40; (2) the VOG
concerns the prolongation of or entry into a (paid or honorary) position, a visa or emigra-
tion and; (3) a legal entity asks a one-man concern to provide a VOG before entering into
a business relationship.41 This list is not exhaustive.42 Continuous screening is possible for
taxi cardholders and persons working in childcare, based on Article 22a and b of the
Judicial Data and Criminal Records Decree (Besluit justitiële en strafvorderlijke gegevens).43
The information accessed by the COVOG is the ‘judicial information’ held in the
Criminal Records System (Justitieel Documentatie Systeem, JDS), as defined in Articles 2
to 7 Wjsg. This system contains data on criminal offences involving persons and legal
entities and their outcomes, i.e. decisions taken by the courts or the public prosecutor.44
When screening, the COVOG will look at the specific job profile submitted by the organi-
zation that is requiring a VOG from their (prospective) employee or business relation.45
A VOG will be issued if the person is not registered in the JDS. If the job applicant is reg-
istered, the risk he or she poses will be assessed, as described in Article 35 Wjsg, according
to an objective criterion and a subjective criterion.46 The objective criterion consists of
four elements: (1) judicial information (the offence committed)47; (2) whether the offence
has been repeated; (3) the risk posed to society and; (4) whether the above would constitute
limitations on the applicant’s proper execution of the job.48 If the objective criterion throws
up a red flag, the applicant may still receive a VOG if the subjective criterion has been
fulfilled, i.e. that, based on the circumstances of the case, the interest of the individual
weighs more heavily than the risk he poses to society.49
In addition, the COVOG may also obtain information from police criminal records
(HKS) and it can ask for information from the prosecution and probation services.50 The
HKS also lists criminal cases in which the applicant was a suspect, whereas the JDS only
38 Title 4.1. Awb.
39 Staatscourant 2013, 5409, p. 1-2.
40 Including Article 4.2.1. of the Wet educatie en beroepsonderwijs; Article 2 of the Advocatenwet and Article
50 of the Wet kinderopvang, but local legislation can also make it mandatory, for instance before granting
a licence to operate a business. Staatscourant 2013, 5409, p. 9.
41 Staatscourant 2013, 5409, p. 2.
42 Staatscourant 2013, 5409, p. 10.
43 Staatscourant 2013, 5409, p. 2 and 10-11.
44 Staatscourant 2013, 5409, p. 14, with the exception of acquittals, non-admissibility of the public prosecutor
or the decision not to prosecute when a person was falsely marked as a suspect.
45 Staatscourant 2013, 5409, p. 27
46 Staatscourant 2013, 5409, p. 2.
47 The period of time that theCOVOG reviews is determined by the particular crime committed. Staatscourant
2013, 5409, p. 2-4.
48 Staatscourant 2013, 5409, p. 2-4.
49 Staatscourant 2013, 5409, p. 5.
50 Certificate of Good Conduct Brochure, via www.justis.nl.
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registers actual convictions. The COVOG may request such information if it needs more
background on the judicial information it is considering within the framework of the
subjective criterion.51
Arequest for aVOGcanbe combinedwith other screening andmonitoring instruments
that will be discussed below.
8.2.2 The BIBOB legislation
This section describes the Dutch Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act, which
we refer to hereafter as the ‘BIBOB Act.’ The BIBOB Act enables the administrative
authorities to refuse or revoke permits as well as tenders and subsidies funded by the
government if screening required by the Act has a negative outcome.52 The aim of the
BIBOB Act is to prevent public authorities from unintentionally facilitating criminal
offences by granting permits, licences, tenders or subsidies. The BIBOB Act therefore gives
public authorities an instrument with which to protect their integrity. BIBOB screening
has both a repressive and preventive aspect.53 The screening is repressive if ‘a suspicion
arises that criminal offences are being committed’ and the authorities consequentially
revoke a permit, tender or subsidy. It is preventive if the authorities refuse to grant a permit,
tender or subsidy because of the ‘serious risk that it will be used to commit or facilitate
criminal offences.’ We will elaborate on the substantive elements of the BIBOB Act below.
When compared to VOG vetting, BIBOB screening is both more comprehensive and
limited in its application. It is more comprehensive because the competent authorities may
request all types of relevant information from the judicial authorities, the police, the Tax
and Customs Administration, and private parties such as the Chamber of Commerce.
Even criminal intelligence obtained from trustworthy sources is eligible in a BIBOB
screening. It ismore limited because it is only applicable in a restricted number of economic
sectors that are deemed susceptible to criminal infiltration (see Section 8.2.2.1).
In principle, the municipalities and other administrative authorities are competent to
conduct screenings before granting licences, for example. The competent authority under
the BIBOB Act is Bureau BIBOB (Landelijk Bureau BIBOB),54 a national agency that is
part of Dienst Justis and resides under the Ministry of Security and Justice.55 The Bureau
is responsible for systematically analysing the criminal background and affiliations of
applicants and, based on this analysis, for advising the administrative authorities about
the risks of issuing a licence, subsidy or tender to the persons or legal entities under
51 Staatscourant 2013, 5409, p. 15.
52 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 129-130.
53 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 129-130.
54 Hereafter: Bureau BIBOB.
55 http://www.justis.nl/Producten/bibobIntegriteitsbeoordelingdoorhetopenbaarbestuur/.
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scrutiny.56 Wewill elaborate on the relationship between the local administrative authorities
and Bureau BIBOB below.
The following sections address the application of the BIBOB screening to the granting
of licences, subsidies and tenders respectively (Sections 8.2.2.1-8.2.2.3). Section 8.2.2.4
then discusses legal protection in cases where the authorities refuse or revoke a permit, a
subsidy or a tender. Finally, Section 8.2.2.5 focuses on the screening procedure and how
various public authorities can exchange information in the context of the BIBOB Act.
8.2.2.1 Screening of applicants for licences
In 2008, the mayor of Alkmaar refused to renew the business permits for a number of pros-
titution ‘windows’ in the ‘Achterdam’ area. This refusal was based on a Bureau BIBOB advice
after it had examined the available information compiled from several sources. The advice
itself remains undisclosed to this day. After the applicant objected and appealed to the lower
court, the latter ruled that the initial advice provided insufficient information on the ‘serious
risk that the permit would be misused for illegal purposes’.57 After this ruling, Bureau BIBOB
prepared a supplementary advice based on more information than its first one. In appeal,
the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State (ABrVS) ruled that in light of the
supplementary advice, the mayor had been justified in refusing the initial permit applica-
tion.58,59
First of all, the BIBOB Act allows for the screening of persons and legal entities for prior
criminal activities.60 It covers the following licences:
– a mandatory permit for an institution or company following from a municipal ordi-
nance;61
– a permit based on the Alcohol Licensing and Catering Act;62
– an exemption based on the Opium Act;63
– a permit based on the Road Haulage Act;64
56 Joosten, Rovers & Urff 2008, p. 33-35. See also, p. 173-194 and 267-294; Kamerstukken II 1999-2000 26883,
nr. 3, p. 6.
57 Rechtbank Alkmaar 12 November 2009, LJN: BK2970.
58 Dienst Justis April 2012, p. 8; ABRvS 20 July, LJN: BR2279.
59 Numerous examples can be given of how the BIBOB Act is applied. According to Bureau BIBOB, the
example above is one of the most complex they have ever had to deal with, taking into account the amount
of information available. See Dienst Justis April 2012, p. 8.
60 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
61 Article 1 paragraph 1 sub c under 1 in conjunction with Article 7 paragraph 1 BIBOB Act.
62 Article 1 paragraph 1 sub c under 2 in conjunction with Article 3 Licensing and Catering Act.
63 Article 1 paragraph 1 sub c under 3 in conjunction with Article 6 Opium Act.
64 Article 1 paragraph 1 sub c under 4 in conjunction with Article 4 paragraph 1 and 3 Road Haulage Act.
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– a permit based on the Passenger Transport Act 2000;65
– a permit based on the Environmental Management Act;66
– a permit based on the Housing Act;67
– an attribution based on the Telecommunications Act.68
Moreover, on 1 July 2013, the new and consecutive Evaluatie – en uitbreidingswet BIBOB69
came into force.70 It broadened the scope of the BIBOB screening to the real-estate sector,
to gambling operations and to fireworks importers.71 ‘Headshops’72 and public events have
also been brought under the scope of the BIBOB procedure via the BIBOB Decree (Besluit
BIBOB).73 These economic activities have been included under the scope of BIBOB
screening because they are thought to be vulnerable to criminal infiltration.74
Article 3 paragraph 1 BIBOB Act, allows the administrative authorities to refuse to
make a requested decision or to cancel a decision that has been taken if there is a serious
danger that the decision could in part be used:
a. to make use of proceeds obtained or yet to be obtained from criminal offences that
have been committed or;
b. to commit criminal offences.
Examples of crimes that present a ‘serious danger’ are: drug trafficking, human trafficking
and property crimes such as fraudulent bankruptcy, theft, fencing stolen goods, money
laundering and embezzlement.75 For the authorities to refuse or revoke a licence, criminal
offences must have been committed (Article 3 paragraph 1 sub a) and there must be a clear
connection between the licence to be granted or already granted and the criminal offences
(Article 3 paragraph 1 sub b).76 Additionally, based on paragraph 6 of Article 3 Act, the
authorities may refuse or revoke a permit when they suspect that a criminal offence was
committed to acquire the permit.77
65 Article 1 paragraph 1 sub c under 5 in conjunction with. Article 4 paragraph Passenger Transport Act 2000.
66 Article 1 paragraph 1 sub c under 6 in conjunction with Article 8.1 Environmental Management Act.
67 Article 1 paragraph 1 sub c under 7 in conjunction with Article 40 paragraph 1 and article 61a Housing Act.
68 Article 1 paragraph 1 sub c under 8 in conjunction with Article 4.3 paragraph 3 sub b Telecommunications
Act.
69 Kamerstukken II 2010-2011 32676, nr. 2 and 3.
70 The latest developments as of 30 January 2013 are documented in Kamerstukken I 2012-2013 32676, nr. G.
71 Kamerstukken II 2010-2011 32676, 3, p. 1.
72 A headshop sells supplies for using drugs, such as cigarette papers, water pipes etc.
73 Besluit tot wijziging van het Besluit BIBOB, Staatsblad 2011, 418.
74 Kamerstukken II 2010-2011 32676, 3, p. 3.
75 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 131.
76 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 131.
77 See also: Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 131-132.
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Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 3 BIBOB Act define the scope of what is to be considered
a ‘serious danger’:78
a. facts and circumstances leading to the reasonable suspicion that the applicant is con-
nected to criminal offences. This suspicion can be based on police and judicial infor-
mation;
b. if the criterion described under a has beenmet, the administrative authoritymust assess
the seriousness of those criminal offences;
c. the nature of the connection; the connection to the criminal offence needs to be assessed,
i.e. the connection needs to be interpreted in conjunction with sub d;
d. the extent of the criminal profits gained or to be gained. Higher profits imply a greater
level of risk.79
Paragraph 4 of Article 3 BIBOB Act determines the scope of ‘the nature of the connection’
to a criminal offence. To begin with, this refers to an offence the applicant has committed
himself. It also encompasses offences under Article 51 of the Dutch Criminal Code com-
mitted by a legal entity at a time when the applicant was a manager or a board member or
with which he had business relations. It further covers a situation in which someone else
has committed a criminal offence but the applicant has a relationship with this person, for
instance when this person has invested money in his business.80 The new BIBOB Act has
adjusted the concept of a ‘criminal offence’ under Article 3 BIBOB Act. Administrative
offences for which a person or legal entity received an administrative fine (bestuurlijke
boete)81 are now included in screening, even if the business no longer exists.82 Finally,
paragraphs 5 and 6 state that when an administrative authority undertakes screening as
explained above, the principle of proportionality needs to be respected. This means that
revoking or refusing to grant a permit is only permitted if such actions are in proportion
to the risk established under Article 3 paragraph 1 BIBOB Act.
8.2.2.2 Screening of applicants for subsidies
The BIBOB provisions described above also apply to public subsidies. According to Article
6 paragraph 1, in conjunction with Article 3 BIBOB Act, an administrative authority can
refuse to issue or can revoke a subsidy already issued to a person or legal entity if there is
a serious danger of misuse. Article 4:21 paragraph 1 Awb defines a subsidy as:
78 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 131-132.
79 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 131-132; Struiksma & Kleene 2006.
80 See also: Scholten 2013.
81 Kamerstukken II 2010-2011 32676, 3, p. 21. A bestuurlijke boete is a punitive administrative sanction, as
regulated under Title 5.4 of the Awb.
82 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
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a claim to financial means, provided by an administrative authority for certain
activities of the applicant, other than payment for goods or services.
For a subsidy to be subject to BIBOB screening, the option of BIBOB screening must be
included in the conditions set for the subsidy.83 The legislator, however, assumes that all
public subsidies following from legislation or a governmental decree84 should come under
these conditions.85 According to Article 6 paragraph 3 BIBOB Act, such a decision must
comply with the law and must be proportional. A small subsidy amount, for example,
would not justify the violation of the applicant’s privacy that follows from the screening
procedure. BIBOB screening can be applied to any subsidy because the content is too
diverse to determine in advance which subsidy sectors should be included or exempted.86
8.2.2.3 Screening of tenderers under the BIBOB legislation
The BIBOB legislation also applies to public tenders at both the national and local levels.87
After all, the reason behind the legislation is to prevent public bodies from unwillingly
facilitating serious and organized criminal activities and thus to protect their integrity.88
As we shall see, however, since the Public Procurement Act 2012 (Aanbestedingswet 2012)
became effective on 1 April 2013, the BIBOB Act has played only a limited role in public
tenders.89
Tender regulations are quite complex. First of all, EU legislation applies to tenders for
works, deliveries and services above a certain threshold sum.90 Second, national rules apply
to public tenders and they may set conditions above and beyond the EU rules, for example
for tenders that fall below the EU threshold sum. Finally, local authorities may also set
specific rules regarding tenders.91 The Public Procurement Act 2012 however sought to
bring an end to the patchwork of rules by introducing a uniform screening instrument
and by newly implementing the EU rules on exclusion grounds and legal protection.92 In
assessing tenders, we must distinguish between a qualitative assessment of the company
or person applying under the tender procedure, the selection of providers, and the allocation
criteria.93 In the context of this report, the qualitative assessment is of primary importance.
Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004
83 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 144.
84 In Dutch, a governmental decree is a ‘Algemene maatregel van bestuur’ (AMvB).
85 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 144.
86 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 144.
87 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 137ff.
88 Kamerstukken 1999-2000, 26883, nr. 3, p. 2; Kamerstukken II 2010-2011, nr. 3, p. 4.
89 Kamerstukken I 2012-2013, 32440, P.
90 Directive 2004/18/EC and Directive 2004/17/EC; De Moor-van Vught 2012 p. 65-76.
91 For an overview of the Dutch tender rules, see Pijnacker Hordijk, van der Bend & van Nouhuys 2005.
92 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
93 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 137ff.
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on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply
contracts and public service contracts is relevant within the scope of the qualitative
assessment, particularly Article 45, which lists both compulsory (paragraph 1) and facul-
tative exclusion grounds (paragraph 2).94
The compulsory grounds for exclusion include previous convictions for participation
in a criminal organization, corruption, fraud and money laundering. The facultative
exclusion grounds comprise bankruptcy or similar situations, offences concerning profes-
sional conduct, failure to fulfil obligations to pay social security and other taxes or the
misrepresentation or failure to provide information as required under Section 2 of the
Directive, according to Article 45 paragraph 2g. Whenever an authority seeks to tender
and to assess whether an applicant should be excluded and for which period, it needs to
take into account the proportionality principle and the principle of non-discrimination.95
As a rule, all public authorities need to consider the compulsory and facultative exclusion
grounds for each tender.96
As we mentioned, the Act envisaged the renewed implementation of the EU Procure-
ment Directives97 and the directives regarding legal protection.98 Previous legislation99
lapsed after the Public Procurement Act 2012 entered into force, bringing to an end the
complex body of rules that existed before the uniform screening instrument envisaged in
the Act.100
Two components are of importancewhen looking at the uniform screening instrument:
the ‘self-declaration’ and the ‘declaration of conduct in tenders’. The ‘self-declaration’ is
a statement by the business that both the compulsory and facultative exclusion grounds
do not apply.101 The ‘declaration of conduct in tenders’, based on Article 2.89 of the Act,
allows the authority who is granting the tender to demand evidence that there are no
exclusion grounds.102 Antecedents that will be taken into account according to the Public
Procurement Act 2012 are irrevocable convictions for criminal offences summed up in
Articles 2.86 and 2.87, which describe the compulsory and facultative exclusion grounds
respectively.103 Other convictions considered are those in the economic sphere, taxes,
weapons andmunitions, illicit drugs or crimes bywhich persons or goodswere endangered.
94 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 137-140.
95 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 140. See also ’t Hart 2006, p. 616ff.
96 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 140. See also ’t Hart 2006, p. 616ff.
97 Directive 2004/17/EC and Directive 2004/18/EC.
98 Directive 2007/66/EC, Directive 89/665/EC and Directive 92/13/EEC.
99 Besluit aanbestedingsregels voor overheidsdrachten (BAO) and Besluit aanbestedingen speciale sectoren (BASS).
100 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
101 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
102 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
103 Kamerstukken II 2009-2010, 32440, nr. 3, p. 78-80.
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Finally, relevant antecedents include convictions for breaching EU and/or national tender
regulations.104
The Public Procurement Act 2012 has minimized the role of the BIBOB legislation
with regard to tenders. Only when there are questions regarding the origins of finances,
the BIBOB Act and Bureau BIBOB still have a role to play.105
8.2.2.4 The screening procedure and information sources
This section outlines the screening procedure under BIBOB legislation and the sources of
information that may be used to decide whether to refuse or revoke a licence, a subsidy or
a tender. Asking Bureau BIBOB for advise is the final step in the procedure. First, the
competent administrative authority itself must gather information, for example to assess
whether the application is in compliance with the laws on which the licence, subsidy or
tender was based (such as the Alcohol Licensing and Catering Act 2013).106 Below, we first
focus on the procedure with regard to licences and subsidies and then proceed with the
procedure for tenders.
The procedure for permits and subsidies107
To begin with, administrative authorities will ask the applicant to provide relevant infor-
mation.108 For example, if he wants to buy a pub and acquire a licence based on theAlcohol
Licensing and Catering Act, the authorities will ask him to provide information on his
qualifications and experience in the sector, as well as an extract from the Chamber of
Commerce register showing his business is listed and information on his income and
financial backers. Who is lending him the money, for example? If he is paying for the pub
from his own pocket, where and how did he acquire the necessary capital?
In addition, the administrative authorities may search for further information. They
can access open sources, such as data registered with the Chamber of Commerce or the
Land Registry, and information publicly available in newspapers and on the internet.
Furthermore, the authoritiesmay use semi-open sources, such as personal particulars from
the Municipal Personal Records database (GBA).109 Finally, the administrative authorities
may ask for information from closed sources, such as police and judicial information.110
This type of information gathering is seen as a ‘minor test’ in which the administrative
authority does its own ‘homework’. The information gathered from closed sources, for
example, is limited to the applicant’s criminal record and HKS information, comparable
104 Kamerstukken II 2009-2010, 32440, nr. 3, p. 78-80.
105 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
106 Joosten, Rovers & Urff 2008, p. 51ff.
107 In this section, the term ‘permit’ should also be understood to mean ‘subsidy’ unless indicated otherwise.
108 Klap & De Moor-van Vught 2009, p. 34-35; Joosten, Rovers & Urff 2008, p. 69ff.
109 Gemeentelijke Basis Administratie (GBA).
110 Joosten, Rovers & Urff 2008, p. 72-78; Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 132.
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to the screening applied in relation to a VOG. In practice, administrative authorities often
find it easier to request the applicant to hand in a VOG instead.111 If the applicant is unable
to present a VOG, this may be sufficient reason to refuse him a licence. Another important
aspect of the BIBOB legislation laid down in Article 26 BIBOB Act is that a public prose-
cutormay ‘tip’ the administrative authority that seeking advice fromBureau BIBOB would
be appropriate.112 Of course, such a tip implies that the public prosecutor holds information
on the applicant that is relevant to the licensing procedure, such as information that the
applicant has committed criminal offences, or that there is a serious risk of the applicant
committing criminal offences.113 The tip itself does not need to be motivated; Bureau
BIBOB and not the prosecutor will assess the applicant’s position.114
The ‘homework’ by the administrative authority can generate two results. First, the
outcome may be that there is no evidence of a ‘serious danger’ that the licence or subsidy
is being or will be misused for criminal activities. In that case, the applicant will be granted
the licence or subsidy or an existing licence or subsidy will not be revoked.
Second, the ‘homework’ may cause the authorities to suspect a serious danger. In that
case, the authorities may invite the applicant to a meeting in which he can dispute the
suspicions. If he is able to do this successfully, the municipal authorities may decide to
grant the licence or subsidy or to not revoke it. If the suspicions about the applicant or
permit holder remain, the administrative authority can respond in three ways:
1. It can revoke or refuse the permit, based on the applicable law mentioned in Article 1
BIBOB Act.
2. It can refuse or revoke the permit based on Article 3 BIBOB Act, i.e. the serious danger
criterion.
3. It can ask for in-depth (intensive) screening of the applicant by Bureau BIBOB.
This intensive screening focuses on a person’s (prior) involvement in criminal activities
and on detailed information regarding his company structure, financing, his personal sit-
uation, general indicators and policy indicators.115 This second screening differs from the
first in that not only the applicant but also his business relations, for example his financial
backers, are screened.
Bureau BIBOB’s advice centres on five topics: opacity with regard to the company’s
structure, its financing, the circumstances surrounding the permit applicant, the background
of the company’s financial backer and the owner of the premises in which the company
111 De Voogd, Doornbos & Huntjens 2007, p. 95; De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
112 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 134; Joosten, Rovers & Urff 2008, p. 173.
113 NJB 2007, 1673 ‘Tipfunctie OM bij Wet BIBOB moet actiever’.
114 Kamerstukken II 1999/2000, 26 883, nr. 3, p. 3 6 en 73-74, en Vzr. Rb. Roermond, 16 January 2009, LJN
BH0169.
115 Joosten, Rovers & Urff 2008, p. 405-407.
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is situated, and other circumstances which suggest that Article 3 BIBOB Act may apply,
such as a possible involvement in criminal activities. Bureau BIBOB may use a wide range
of information sources to screen applicants for licences and subsidies. These include
public sources, personal particulars gathered under Article 8 (opening words and sub e)
of the Personal Data Protection Act (Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens, Wbp) and semi-
closed sources provided to Bureau BIBOB under Articles 13 and 27 BIBOB Act.116 Article
27 allows for exchanges of information with the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration,
more specifically its department of investigation FIOD-ECD, the Dutch Immigration and
Naturalization Service and the Unusual Transactions Reporting Centre. It also allows the
Bureau BIBOB to request information from police sources, for example information
gathered in criminal investigations. It is not necessary for the applicant to have been a
suspect himself. He may for instance appear in the file because he regularly calls one or
more suspects whose telephones arewiretapped. In a BIBOBprocedure, this would indicate
that he maintains personal or business relations with known criminals who might present
a risk. In specific cases, even information provided by criminal informersmay be admissible
in a BIBOB procedure.
There are, however, two potential problems. To begin with, Bureau BIBOB cannot
interview the applicant or actively gather new information, and itmust therefore rely solely
on information already available.117 Second, the Bureau itself cannot search closed sources.
Instead it can only ask, for instance the police, to provide all available information on the
applicant and other subjects of relevance. It cannot checkwhether the information provided
is indeed complete. Of course, lawyers working on behalf of the applicant will often try to
prove that the advice was based on incomplete information and therefore biased.
The advice is formulated in such away that the administrative authority can independ-
ently decide to grant, refuse or revoke the permit. The advice can have three possible out-
comes, namely that there is no risk of the permit being used for criminal purposes, that
there is a lesser risk,118 and that there is a serious risk that this will be the case.119 The Bureau
only offers advice; it is the administrative authority that decides whether to grant, refuse
or revoke the permit. Thus, legal protection for the applicant is ensured.120 If the adminis-
trative authority decides to deviate from a ‘serious danger’ advice issued by Bureau BIBOB,
it needs to explain its reasons under the provisions of Article 3:50 Awb. Based on the in-
depth analysis, the administrative authority can then take one of three different decisions:
116 Kamerstukken II 26883, nr. 3, p. 7; Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 134; Joosten, Rovers & Urff 2008, p. 179.
117 Klap & De Moor-van Vught 2009, p. 34-35.
118 In which case extra provisions may be added to the permit under Article 3 paragraph 7 BIBOB Act before
granting it.
119 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 135; Joosten, Rovers & Urff 2008, p. 188.
120 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 135.
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1. There is no indication that Article 3 BIBOB Act applies; the licence or subsidy can be
granted;
2. There are indications of a limited risk; extra conditions can be added to the permit or
its period of validity can be curtailed, for example;
3. A ‘serious danger’ is indicated; the administrative authority can refuse to issue the
permit under applicable law as mentioned in Article 1 BIBOB Act or under Article 3
BIBOB Act.121
Figure 8.1 provides a summary of the procedure and information that can be accessed by
the authorities.
121 Joosten, Rovers & Urff 2008, p. 171.
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Information access under the BIBOB Act for permits and subsidiesFigure 8.1
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The procedure for tenders
With regard to tenders, specific procedures apply. On 1April 2013 the Public Procurement
Act 2012 entered into force. This legislation contains a uniform screening instrument
applicable to public tenders and their applicants.122 The screening procedure for tenders
comprises two parts: (1) the personal declaration and (2) the statement regarding good
conduct. The tenderer provides a personal declaration regarding the compulsory and fac-
ultative exclusion grounds, in accordance with the EU Procurement Directives.123 The
statement of good conduct, in the form of a Certificate of Conduct for Tenders
(gedragsverklaring aanbesteden, GVA),124 requires the applicant to provewhat he has stated
in the personal declaration,125 namely that the exclusion grounds do not exist.126 In the
Netherlands, the Ministry of Security and Justice issues the statement of conduct.127 Now
that the Public Procurement Act 2012 has entered into force, other screening instruments
are no longer allowed.128 This ensures a uniform screening procedure for all public tenders.
However, when there is still doubt about the bona fide status of an applicant after he
has provided the personal declaration and the statement of conduct, it remains possible
to ask for advice under the BIBOB legislation.129 It is expected that fromnowon, the BIBOB
legislation will see limited use in the case of tenders.130 Furthermore, since the introduction
of the Public Procurement Act 2012, an administrative authority can only ask Bureau
BIBOB for advice when the tender falls within the BIBOB sectors summed up under
Article 5 paragraph 3 sub a.131 Advice can also be requested when a contract is annulled,
or – under certain conditions – when a subcontractor is hired.132 Information regarding
sources of financing and special financial transactions as well as information based on
closed sources, such as criminal intelligence, can only be consulted when asking advice of
Bureau BIBOB.133
8.2.2.5 Legal protection when permits, subsidies and tenders are refused or revoked
The following section describes the procedures incorporated into the BIBOB legislation
to protect the legal interests of a person or legal entity that is refused a permit, subsidy or
tender, or that has a permit, subsidy or tender revoked. Below, we distinguish between
122 Kamerstukken I 2012-2013, 32440, nr. P.
123 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
124 Kamerstukken II 2009-2010 32440,nr. 3, p. 29; De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
125 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76; Kamerstukken II 2009-2010 32440, nr. 3, p. 19.
126 Kamerstukken 2009-2010, 32440, nr. 3, p. 19 en 29.
127 Kamerstukken 2009-2010, 32440, nr. 3, p. 19 en 29; De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
128 Kamerstukken 2009-2010, 32440, nr. 3, p. 19 en 29; De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
129 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
130 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
131 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 142.
132 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 142.
133 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 142.
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legal protection related to the refusal or revocation of permits and subsidies on the one
hand, and tenders on the other.
Legal protection of applicants for permits and subsidies
To begin with, Article 33 BIBOB Act offers the applicant to put forward his views on the
matter when the administrative authority makes its intentions clear, prior to the actual
decision.134 Next, after the authorities take a decision, the parties concerned may revert to
the legal protection procedure of the Awb, as described above.
Originally, the parties concerned and their lawyers were only notified of the intention
and the decision taken by the competent authorities in writing. This summarized the
findings of Bureau BIBOB, which carried out the actual screening. The defence was only
allowed to read the underlying report by the Bureau and make notes, but was not allowed
a copy. This procedure gave rise to all sorts of protests, for example that there was insuffi-
cient time to study the BIBOB advice and criticism as towhether the Bureau had presented
a balanced account and had used information from all possible sources, includingmaterial
favourable to the applicant’s case.135 To tackle these critiques, the procedure was changed
in the newBIBOBAct. Now the applicant receives a copy of the BIBOB advice on request.136
Another important legal question is whether a negative decision concerning a permit,
subsidy or tender is a ‘criminal charge’ according to Article 6 ECHR. If it is, all the safe-
guards of Article 6 ECHR would come into effect, such as the presumption of innocence,
the nemo tenetur principle and the nulla poena principle. According to the ABRvS, a
decision under BIBOB legislation to refuse or revoke a permit is not a ‘criminal charge’,
because the intention of the decision is not to determine guilt of a criminal offence. Instead,
Article 3 BIBOB Act aims to prevent public bodies from unwillingly facilitating criminal
activities. Refusal or revocation of a permit is therefore not a retributive action and not a
‘criminal charge’.137
The ECtHR followed the above view in Bingöl v. The Netherlands.138 The applicant
argued that theDutch government, by applying the BIBOBAct, assumed he had committed
offences for which he had not been convicted on the one hand, as well as illegal activities
he might commit in the future on the other. According to the applicant, the above consti-
tuted a criminal charge and he concluded that the Dutch authorities had violated the
safeguards of Article 6 paragraph 2. The ECtHR considered as follows:
134 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 135ff (permits) and p. 145 (subsidies).
135 Kamerstukken II 2010-2011, 32 676, nr. 3, p. 14; Staatsblad 28 March 2013, nr. 125.
136 Kamerstukken II 2010-2011, 32 676, nr. 3, p. 14; Staatsblad 28 March 2013, nr. 125.
137 ABRvS 16 July 2008, LJN: BD7378; ABRvS 8 July 2009, Jurisprudentie Bestuursrecht 2009, 183; De Moor-
van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
138 Bingöl v. The Netherlands, 20 March 2012, no. 18450/07.
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34. The Court notes that unlike in a number of other cases concerning Article
6 § 2 brought against the same respondent Party, the applicant in the present
case does not complain of the wording of a judicial or other decision reflecting
a finding of guilt on his part after a prosecution that did not result in a convic-
tion. […] Rather, the applicant complains that the refusal of the operating
license in and of itself violates Article 6 § 2 in that it takes his criminal
antecedents into account. 35. The Court and Commission have taken the view
that, for purposes of conviction and sentencing Article 6 does not prevent
domestic courts from having regard to an existing criminal record. […] It
cannot see any reason of principle why Article 6 § 2 should prevent competent
authority from doing so in considering whether a person meets standard of
probity required for a particular purpose.
The Court goes on in paragraph 36 to cite McParland v. the United Kingdom139 and reit-
erates:
The Court observed that the impugned proceedings had taken the form of a
licensing procedure. At no stage had they involved the determination of a
criminal charge within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. This
conclusion was not affected by the fact that the applicant’s request for license
there in issue had foundered on the basis of his previous criminal convictions.
37. In the present case also, the applicant was refused an operating license on
the ground that, in view of his criminal antecedents, he was deemed unfit to
carry on his intended business. Identical reasons therefore apply.
Here, the ECtHR followed the line of reasoning of the ABRvS, considered Bingöl’s appli-
cation inadmissible, and therefore rejected it. However, it can be argued that if the applicant
had complained that the refusal or revocation of the licence punished him for (future)
crimes, the ECtHR should at least have declared him admissible. In addition, possible
complaints could also have been directed at a violation of the ne bis in idem principle.
After all, the administrative authorities use previous criminal convictions to refuse or
revoke a permit, which could be argued is a second determination of guilt for the same
crime.140
139 McParland v. the United Kingdom, 30 November 1999, no. 47898/99.
140 For a critical view of the Dutch ‘administrative approach’ and the BIBOB Act as well as the Wet controle
rechtspersonen in relation to ‘criminal charge’, see Klap&DeMoor-vanVught 2009 andDeMoor-vanVught
201, De Moor-van Vught 2012.
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Legal protection of applicants for tenders
Since the exclusion of an applicant to a tender is a civil – and not a governmental – decision
by an administrative authority, complaints against such decisions can in principle be
submitted to aDutch civil court.141 Summary proceedings are also a possibility.142 However,
when the tender involves a public legal act by the administrative authority, the administra-
tive court is competent.143 Article 3 paragraph 3 in conjunction with paragraph 1 BIBOB
Act ensures that the relevant party is allowed to submit its views if an administrative
authority takes a decision (under Article 5 paragraph 3 sub c) on the allocation of a public
tender or the annulment of a contract for a public tender.144 Once that party has expressed
its views and the administrative authority upholds its decision, the parties concerned may
file an objection with that administrative authority under the legal protection procedure
of the Awb.145 If the administrative authority upholds its decision after reviewing the
objection, the parties can appeal to the administrative court and the ABRvS.146
The aforementioned Public Procurement Act 2012 also introduces the amended
Implementation of Judicial Protection Public ProcurementDirectives Act (Wet implemen-
tatie rechtsbeschermingsrichtlijnen aanbesteden, Wira), which is incorporated into Articles
2.126 through 2.130.147 The Wira governs legal protection with regard to tenders, but only
those requiring an announcement in the Official Journal of the European Union under
the BAO and Bass decrees, which implement the EU Procurement Directives for public
tenders in traditional and ‘special’ sectors.148
8.2.3 Wet controle op rechtspersonen (Wcp)
The Legal Entities (Supervision) Act (Wet controle op rechtspersonen, Wcp) entered into
force on 1 July 2011.149 The purpose of the Wcp is to supervise legal entities throughout
their lifespan in order to prevent and combat their misuse and to simplify the criminal
investigation of actual or intended offences committed through their misuse.150 The legis-
141 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 142; Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26 883, nr. 3, p. 7.
142 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 143.
143 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 142.
144 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 142.
145 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 142.
146 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 143.
147 Staatsblad 2012, 682; Kamerstukken II 2009-2010, 32440, nr. 3, p. 49. The Wira will be retracted as a separate
act and wholly integrated into the 2012 Public Procurement Act.
148 Van der Velden & Radder 2013, p. 46.
149 Staatsblad 2011, 194, amending the Wet documentatie vennootschappen.
150 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 2.
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lation particularly targets financial and economic crime.151 Screening takes place whenever
a change occurs in a legal entity, such as a takeover or a change in board.152
Implementation of the Wcp brought about several changes. Earlier on, only private
limited (BV) and public limited (NV) companies came under supervision.153 Now, this
also applies to foundations, associations, cooperatives and foreign companies.154 Moreover,
screening not only involves the persons directly associated with the legal entity, but also
their spouses, parents, grandparents and children.155 Family members are only screened
when this is deemed necessary to analyse the management network of the legal entity.156
Finally, companies used to be screened only when they were founded and when their
articles of association were amended.157 Under the Wcp, screening takes place whenever
changes occur in key data regarding the entity.158
Procedure and access to information
The screening of legal entities consists of four steps:
Dienst Justis automatically commences screening when there are changes in key
information concerning the legal entity.159 These include both public and closed databases,
such as the municipal personal records database (GBA), the Commercial Register, the
Land Registry Database, the registry of the Employee Insurance Agency (UWV), the
Central Insolvency Register, and the Criminal Records System. Dienst Justis gathers
information on, for instance, the founding of the legal entity, its board members and
stockholders, any move to other premises by the legal entity etc., as well as criminal and
financial antecedents of the legal entities and persons involved.160
Dienst Justis performs a risk analysis at the request of an enforcement authority.161
Based on this risk analysis, the Tax and Customs Administration and the Land Registry
Office also provide information.162 The National Police can check the available data against
ongoing criminal investigations in the police registry.163 If the information gathered leads
to the conclusion that an increased risk is present, a risk report is sent to several enforcement
151 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 1-2 & 17; Hartmann & van der Wulp 2011, p. 288ff.
152 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 2.
153 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
154 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76; Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 3-4; Hartmann & van der
Wulp 2011, p. 288ff.
155 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 13. Their involvement is mentioned as increasing the risk of
circumvention.
156 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 14.
157 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 1-2.
158 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 4.
159 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 4.
160 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 4
161 Hartmann & van der Wulp 2011, p. 290.
162 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 5.
163 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 5.
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authorities, i.e. the public prosecution service, the Tax and Customs Administration, the
Dutch Central Bank (DNB), the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM),
the police, and special investigation services such as the FIOD-ECD.164 The risk report can
lead to two types of interventions by the enforcement authorities referred to in Section
8.3, i.e.:
– a criminal investigation when there is concrete information on a criminal offence;165
– a preventive intervention, whichmust be undertakenwithin two years of the risk report
date, such as the start of a BIBOB investigation or refusal to grant a tender.166 Please
note that Chapter 5 of the Awb is not applicable to activities deployed by Dienst Justis,
as will be discussed below.167
The interventions remain the responsibility of the enforcement authorities that receive
the risk reports.168 Other authorities that need the information to execute their public tasks,
such as the Financial Intelligence Unit Netherlands (FIU-NL), are allowed to request
information from Dienst Justis.169
Legal protection
In the explanatory memorandum for the Wcp, specific attention was given to the – at that
time new – instrument of the risk report and its relationship to Article 8 ECHR, Article
10 paragraph 1 of the Dutch Constitution, and the Personal Data Protection Act (Wet
bescherming persoonsgegevens, Wbp).170 Concrete measures are: (1) persons, and their
family members,171 who are involved in a legal entity will be informed about the screening
when the legal entity is registered with the Dutch Chamber of Commerce;172 (2) existing
legal entities to which the Wcp applies will be informed via other means, such as a public
information campaign;173 (3) the risk report will be removed from the databases of the
enforcement authorities if the report has not been used for a period of two years;174 (4)
according to Articles 35 and 3 of the Wbp, any parties involved can request access to the
data stored by Dienst Justis and ask for it to be corrected.175 When an authority takes a
164 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 5; http://www.justis.nl/.
165 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 7.
166 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 7; De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76.
167 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 17; Hartmann & van der Wulp 2011, p. 289.
168 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 7.
169 De Moor-van Vught 2012, p. 65-76. Hartmann & van der Wulp 2011, p. 290.
170 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 9-14.
171 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 14.
172 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 12.
173 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 12.
174 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 13.
175 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31948, nr. 3, p. 13.
288
M. Peters & A.C.M Spapens
decision based on the information received fromDienst Justis under theWcp, the applicable
laws are those regarding the specific enforcement regime onwhich the decisionwas based.
8.3 Instruments directed at preventing the disturbance of public
order
In this section, we will discuss the administrative instruments directed at preventing the
disturbance of public order and their relevance for curbing serious and organized criminal
activities. First, Section 8.3.1 describes the possibilities for monitoring and sanctioning
under theAwb.Next, Section 8.3.2 discusses the opportunities to refuse and revoke licences
under the regime of local spatial plans. Section 8.3.3 describes local regulations issued
under the municipal by-law (Algemeen Plaatselijke Verordeningen, APV). Section 8.3.4
concludes this section by examining the powers of administrative authorities to close and
expropriate premises.
8.3.1 Instruments included in the Awb
Asmentioned above, the Awb is the overarching instrument for administrative procedural
law, and regulates the decision making process, the formalities regarding decisions and
legal protection in relation to these decisions. The Awb offers administrative authorities
several enforcement tools. Naturally, these instruments are not solely relevant in the context
of an administrative approach to serious and organized crime, but for ensuring compliance
with administrative laws in general.
This section briefly discusses the supervising and sanctioning instruments of the Awb.
This will also help clarify the instruments discussed in subsequent sections, which rely to
some extent on the Awb instruments. For municipalities, the competent authority is the
Mayor and Municipal Executives (College van Burgemeester en Wethouders), based on
Article 125 of the Municipalities Act (Gemeentewet). For provinces, it is the Provincial
Executive (Gedeputeerde Staten), based onArticle 122 of the Provinces Act (Provinciewet).
For the District Water Boards (Waterschappen),176 it is the chairperson (Dijkgraaf), based
on Article 61 of the Water Board Act (Waterschapswet).
Supervising instruments under the Awb
TheAwb comprises a number of inspection tools, which are listed inChapter 5Awb. These
include:
176 Administrative units in the Netherlands that are empowered to manage Dutch water supplies.
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– entering premises, with the exception of private homes, without permission (Article
5:15 Awb);
– requesting information (Article 5:16 Awb);
– requesting identification documents from persons (Article 5:16a Awb);
– requesting data and documents concerning businesses (Article 5:17 Awb);
– investigation of objects, such as measurement, sampling and opening of packages
(Article 5:18 Awb);
– stopping and investigating means of transport and their cargo as well as requesting
relevant documents as prescribed by law from the driver and/or shipmaster (Article
5:19 Awb)
Article 5:20 Awb obliges persons to cooperate with the execution of the aforementioned
competences.
Sanctioning instruments under the Awb
The administrative authorities can impose sanctionswhen a natural person or legal entity177
does not comply with the local regulations set by the competent administrative authority
within their jurisdiction or with legislation for which the municipality (or province) is
administratively responsible. According to Article 5:1 paragraph 1 of the Awb, an admin-
istrative offence is ‘conduct in breach of regulation determined by or through legislation.’
Conduct constituting an administrative offence is usually a criminal offence as well.178 This
implies that in those cases, the public prosecution service may start a parallel criminal
investigation. Generally, however, offences will first be dealt with administratively and if
that does not result in compliance, the authorities will start criminal proceedings.
The Awb includes three types of administrative sanctions: orders for administrative
coercion (last onder bestuursdwang); orders for administrative penalties ((preventieve) last
onder dwangsom) and administrative fines (bestuurlijke boete).
The order for administrative coercion is imposed on a non-compliant actor to force
him to (wholly or partially) repair a breach of an administrative regulation to the original
factual situation.179 The order for administrative coercion is addressed to the person or
legal entity in breach. It states which actions must be taken and sets a deadline.180 The
order can be executed either by the personwho has breached the administrative regulation
or, if he fails to do so in good time, by the administrative authority itself. In that case, the
costs of the repair are borne by the non-compliant actor.181 For example, if someone built
177 Article 5:1 paragraph 3 Awb.
178 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 104.
179 Article 5:21 Awb.
180 Article 5:24.
181 Article 5:25 Awb.
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an extension to his house without a permit, the municipality may require it to be torn
down to restore the original situation.182 The administrative authorities cannot impose an
order for administrative coercion in cases requiring immediate enforcement, for example
because the situation is dangerous.183
The second instrument, the order for administrative penalties, is comparable to the
order for administrative coercion. The main difference is that the non-compliant actor is
also required to pay a fine if he fails to restore the illegal situation or exceeds the time limit
set.184 Administrative authorities that are competent to apply an order for administrative
coercion are also competent to apply an order for administrative penalties. However, they
may not impose both simultaneously.185 The administrative authorities can also impose
an order for administrative penalties preventively,186 for example for a notorious offender
who repeatedly commits the same violations.187
Finally, administrative fines are an important instrument. The aim of the fine is not
restoration, but is solely an obligation on the offender to pay.188 Article 5:44 Awb prevents
concurrence of an administrative procedure for an administrative fine and a criminal
procedure for the same offence. Consequently, there has been some discussion in the
Netherlands as to whether such a sanction falls within the scope of ‘criminal charge’ as
meant under Article 6 ECHR.
Apart from these sanctioning instruments, the administrative authoritiesmay of course
also revoke decisions and licences whenever the person or legal entity fails to comply with
the relevant conditions. This decision follows fromArticle 1:3 of the Awb and from specific
laws applying to the activity. For example, the competent authorities may shut down part
or all of a company for a certain period if it violates its environmental permit and causes
pollution. Thus, further damage to the environment is prevented and the company will
be obliged to take measures to prevent reoccurrence. In addition, the administrative
authorities may also require the legal entity to clean up the pollution it caused, and if this
is impossible, for example in the case of air pollution, they may impose an administrative
fine. If the offence is repeated, the authorities may decide to revoke the environmental
permit.
182 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 105.
183 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 109. For instance, an order for administrative coercion can be imposed when a café
where illicit drugs are being used and traded causes a nuisance. It cannot be imposed if a demonstration
takes place without a permit and needs to be broken up.
184 Article 5:31d Awb.
185 Article 5:32 Awb.
186 Article 5:32a Awb.
187 http://www.hetccv.nl/instrumenten/bestuurlijke-aanpak/menu-bestuurlijk-instrumentarium/menu1/
menu2.html.
188 Article 5:40 Awb.
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Legal protection
Article 8:1 of theAwb offers persons and legal entities subject to an order for administrative
coercion or an administrative penalty the opportunity to object. The objection must be in
writing and must state reasons. It is sent to the administrative authority that took the pri-
mary decision (the municipality, the province or the water board), which will then review
its decision. If the competent authority dismisses the objection, the applicant can appeal
to the court of first instance and if this appeal is also dismissed, to the Administrative Law
Division of the Council of State (ABRvS).
In a case of an administrative fine, the situation is different. There is greater legal pro-
tection for the offender. The following rights of the offender substantiate this higher pro-
tection. First, the offender has the right to inspect the documents (Article 5:49 paragraph
1); second, he has the right to obtain documents in a – for him – understandable language
(Article 5:49 paragraph 2), in accordance with Article 6 paragraph 3 ECHR. He also has
the right to call witnesses (Article 7:8 paragraph 1 in conjunctionwithArticle 7:22 paragraph
1 and Article 8:60 paragraph 4 Awb) and has the right of legal counsel for the ongoing
procedure (Articles 2:1 and 8:24 Awb). Moreover, the interested party can lodge an
objection and appeal against the administrative fine in the same way as for the orders.
However, in appeal against the fine, the interested party is not obliged to make a statement
concerning the offence in accordance with Article 8:28a Awb, refering to the safeguard of
the ‘criminal charge’ as defined under Article 6 paragraph 2 ECHR. That obligation does
exist for other administrative appeals under Articles 8:27 and 8:28 Awb.
To ensure further safeguards, the Awb offers two procedures for the administrative
fine: a ‘light’ and a ‘heavy’ procedure. The light procedure applies when the fine is 340
euros or lower and the heavy procedure when it exceeds this threshold, unless exceptions
included in other – more specific – legislation apply. There are three differences between
the light and heavy procedures. In the heavy procedure, the authority is obliged to draft
an official report (Article 5:53 paragraph 2 Awb), there must be a hearing (Article 5:53
paragraph 3Awb), and the official who detects the offence punishable by an administrative
fine cannot be the same official who inflicts the fine. Under the light procedure, these
obligations do not apply.
With regard to the revocation of positive decisions, for instance when a permit has
already been given and the administrative authority decides to revoke that permit based
on a violation of the terms of that permit, Article 1:3 in conjunction with 6:1 and 6:2 Awb
offer the opportunity to object to the revocation. The normal objection procedure, as
explained in Section 8.2 of this report, applies in such cases.
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8.3.2 Refusing and revoking permits under the local spatial plan regime
While conducting a supervising action in the context of the Emergo project in Amsterdam,
the administrative authorities discovered an illegal hotel in the city’s Red Light District. Since
this contravened the local spatial plan – the premises could only be used as a private home
and not for business purposes – the municipal authorities forced the owners of the premises
to restore it to its original and legal purpose.189 This required radical renovation work (the
premises had been divided into different rooms that had been rented out separately), which
ensured that it could no longer be used as a hotel.
Spatial plans as defined by Dutch administrative law are regulations governing a specific
part of a municipality or province. Spatial plans are regulated by the Environmental
Licensing (General Provisions) Act (Wet algemene bepalingen omgevingsrecht, Wabo) and
to a lesser extent by the Spatial Planning Act (Wet Ruimtelijke ordening, Wro). According
to Article 3.1 paragraph 1 Wro, at the local level spatial plans incorporate rules on how to
utilize the land – and the real estate on that land – within the municipality’s geographical
area. The local authorities may draw up specific spatial plans for different parts of the
municipality.190 A spatial plan is valid for a period of ten years.191 As the example above
shows, spatial plans give administrative authorities an important tool for regulating
activities, including those associated with crime. Below, we briefly discuss the main
instruments available in the Netherlands. The reader be aware that this is a very complex
area of administrative law and that this report will only discuss the basics.
The integrated physical environment permit
The integrated physical environment permit or omgevingsvergunning was introduced in
2010with the enactment of theWabo. It combines over 25 existing permits and exemptions
for activities such as building and demolition, and it also applies to environmental protec-
tion.192 The Wabo offers a unified and univocal administrative enforcement regime for
the integrated physical environment permit.193 The enforcement regime also extends to
affiliated areas of legislation.194
189 Projectgroep Emergo 2011, p. 168 and 218-219.
190 Article 3.1. Wro.
191 Projectgroep Emergo 2011, p. 168 and 218-219.
192 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31953, nr. 3, p. 3. This permit was implemented to unify and shorten the many
permit procedures, as well as to improve cooperation between and within tiers of government in the
Netherlands and to improve the overall quality of execution.
193 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31953, nr. 3, p. 13.
194 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31953, nr. 3, p. 14.
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Refusing and revoking permits under the Wabo
First of all, the granting, refusing or revoking of an integrated physical environment permit
is important in the context of this country report. Article 2.1 Wabo lays down that an
integrated physical environment permit is necessary for building, constructing, demolishing
and utilizing buildings or land in concordance with a spatial plan or order. Performing
one of the above activities without a permit constitutes a breach of the Wabo legislation.195
The Wabo offers different administrative competences to enforce the legislation.196
Article 2.2 Wabo determines that when a municipal or provincial regulation states that a
permit or exemption is required to perform the activities as described in sub a-k of Article
2.2, that regulation constitutes a prohibition on performing those activities without a
permit or exemption. Article 2.3Wabo prohibits any action that contravenes the conditions
set in the integrated physical environment permit. The integrated physical environment
permit covers an entire project and – if applicable – assesses the different aspects of that
project in one go.197 Article 2.3a Wabo states that it is prohibited to maintain any part of
a building that has been built without such a permit.
Articles 2.10 to 2.20 clarify the grounds for refusing an integrated physical environment
permit. These include, for instance, violation of the local spatial plan.198 Article 2.20 creates
a special ground for refusal. If an integrated physical environment permit is requested for
a building project (Article 2.1, paragraph 1 sub a), the competent authority can request a
screening of the application under BIBOB legislation. This article has been in force since
1 October 2010.199 A competent authority can refuse or withdraw the integrated physical
environment permit whenever the BIBOB screening detects a serious risk that the permit
will be used to exploit profits derived from actual or future criminal offences. BIBOB
screening includes criminal offences committed by cooperating partners (in legal entities).200
According to paragraph 2 of Article 2.20 Wabo, the competent authority can also request
a advice from Bureau BIBOB. There is thus a direct link to screening under the BIBOB
Act and a permit-issuing instrument.
Paragraph 2.6ff201 and Chapter 5 Wabo establish the guidelines for revoking an inte-
grated physical environment permit. Chapter 5 Wabo concerns revocation as a sanction.
It starts by identifying the laws to which the enforcement regime of the Wabo applies. The
enforcement regime applies to the integrated physical environment permit as well as to
195 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31953, nr. 3.
196 A criminal law response is also possible under the EconomicOffences Act (Wet Economische delicten, WED).
197 Kamerstukken II 2008-2009, 31953, nr. 3, p. 21.
198 Article 2.11 Wabo.
199 Staatsblad 2010, 231.
200 ABRvS 15 July 2009, nr. 200807654/1/H3.
201 It is possible to revoke part of a permit, according to Article 2.29. According to Article 2.30 to 2.32, a permit
can be amended by several different competent authorities. Article 2.33 allows for the possibility of completely
revoking a permit.
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an extensive list of activities involving the protection of the environment and historical
buildings and sites. A permit or exemption can only be revoked by the administrative
authority that had the competence to grant the permit or exemption in the first place.202
This is not necessarily the competent authority of the enforcement regime under Chapter
5 of the Wabo.203 Paragraph 3 of Article 5.19 dictates that an administrative authority
cannot withdraw a permit and/or exemption unless and before it offers the person in
breach the opportunity to comply, within a specific timeframe, with the general or specific
terms of the permit or exemption, in accordance with paragraph 4.204 In total, there are
seven grounds for withdrawing a permit or exemption. Article 5.19 paragraph 1 offers
four general grounds:
i. the permit or exemption has been granted due to incorrect or incomplete information;
ii. the permit or exemption holder is acting or has acted in breach of the permit or
exemption;
iii. current or past non-compliance with the requirements or limitations of the permit or
exemption;
iv. current or past non-compliance with the general rules that apply for the permit or
exemption holder.
Paragraph 2 adds one particular ground to the aforementioned grounds:
v. a permit concerning the management of hazardous substances can be withdrawn if
the holder acts in breach of Article 10 of the Environmental Management Act (Wet
Milieubeheer).
Finally, paragraph 4 formulates two grounds for withdrawing an integrated physical
environment permit:
vi. if a permit for activities as meant in Article 2.25 Wabo is granted to a specific person,
and someone else executes those activities;
vii. if a ground for refusal under the BIBOB Act is present, which means that there is a
serious risk that the permit or exemption is being used (in part) to commit criminal
offences or to exploit profits from criminal offences.205 Article 2.20 of the Wabo is
applicable as well.
202 Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 844, nr. 3, p. 140-141 (in this document, the article is referred to as article
5.21).
203 Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 844, nr. 3, p. 140-141.
204 This opportunity to complywith the permit and/or exemption is not a separate decision by the administrative
authority and is therefore not open to objection or appeal. ABRvS 19 May 2004, JN 2004, 258.
205 Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 844, nr. 3, p. 140-141.
295
8 The administrative approach in the Netherlands
The consent and enforcement regime of the Wabo
The enforcement regime of the Wabo is both administrative and criminal: acting without
or in violation of an integrated physical environment permit is a criminal offence under
the Economic Offences Act (Wet Economische Delicten, WED).206 The consent and
enforcement regime of the Wabo fully applies to the Wro and thus to spatial planning.207
This encompasses all of Article 2.1 paragraph 1, sub a to d Wabo, which includes building
(sub a), construction activities (sub b), utilization in breach of the zoning plan (sub c) and
demolition (sub d).208
According to Article 2.4 Wabo, the relevant authorities for the integrated physical
environment permit are the Mayor and Municipal Executives.209 Only when a project is
of national or provincial interest does the Minister or the Provincial Executive qualify as
the competent authority.210 Article 5.10 and 5.11Wabo regulate administrative enforcement.
Under these provisions, public servants are designated as supervisors regarding compliance
with the Wabo provisions and affiliated laws. In principle, the relevant Minister appoints
the public servants. However, Article 5.10 paragraph 3 determines thatmost public servants
will be appointed by local authorities, such as the municipalities. These public servants
are basically competent only within the jurisdiction of the relevant municipality.211
The public servants appointed in this manner have the following competences. First,
they can apply the competences regulated by the General Administrative Law Act (Awb)
discussed above. In addition, public servants appointed under the Wabo and affiliated
laws may, according to Article 5.13 Wabo, enter houses without the occupant’s consent if
one of the conditions listed in paragraph 1 sub a – e applies. These activities have in com-
mon that public servantsmust be able to enter houses without consent in order to properly
execute their supervisory tasks. The procedural requirements for entering houses are reg-
ulated by the General Act on Entry into Dwellings (Algemene wet op het binnentreden,
Awbi). The public servant needswritten and signed authorization underArticle 2 paragraph
3 of the Awbi. Furthermore, according to case law, they can only search by – literally –
looking around the house that they have entered.212 They may not open closets, search
under floors, etc.213 While in the house, they can make use of their other competences
under the Awb, as explained in Section 8.3.1 of this country report.214
206 Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30844, nr. 3, p. 51. The implications of the criminal responsewill not be discussed
in this country report.
207 Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30844, nr. 3, p. 17.
208 Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30844, nr. 3, p. 17.
209 Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30844, nr. 3, p. 18.
210 Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30844, nr. 3, p. 18.
211 Public servants however can be appointed by more than one local authority.
212 E.g. Hoge Raad 21 October 2003, LJN: AH9998, r.o. 4.7.
213 Hoge Raad 21 October 2003, LJN: AH9998, r.o. 4.7.
214 Blomberg, Tekst & Commentaar Wet algemene bepalingen omgevingsrecht, commentaar bij artikel 5.13.
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Sanctions other than revoking permits under the Wabo
Title 5.3 of the Wabo lists the sanctions applying to violations of the conditions set in the
integrated physical environment permit or affiliated legislation. The competent adminis-
trative authoritymay administer two types of sanctions, namely the order for administrative
coercion and the order for administrative penalty as defined by the Awb. However, the
Wabo has expanded the conditions related to these instruments as follows:
1. Everyone is obliged to cooperate with the public servants who are executing their
supervisory tasks, according to Article 5:20 Awb, as described in paragraph 8.3.1. If
someone is uncooperative, the administrative authority can apply administrative
coercion or an administrative penalty under Article 5.14Wabo. Before this competence
was extended to the authorities, cooperation could only be enforced by criminal law.215
2. According to Article 5.15 Wabo, the Minister of Infrastructure and Environment has
the authority to enforce an order for administrative coercion under the Wabo or affil-
iated laws if (a) he is responsible for administrative enforcement and (b) no other
administrative authority is authorized. In most cases however the local authority will
be competent.216
3. Article 5.17 broadens the use of the orders for administrative coercion and administra-
tive penalty. Under the regime of Article 5.17, these measures can be employed to
prevent a risk to public health and/or safety. Instead of employing administrative
coercion or a penalty to end the situation breaching the Wabo or affiliated laws, the
orders can be used to manage hazardous situations (temporarily).217 The aim is to
prevent the situation from leading to injury or damage. For instance, administrative
authorities can put a fence around a hazardous building.218
4. Article 5.18 allows for the orders to be imposed not only on the personwho is in breach
of the administrative regulation, but also on his legal successor. This is called ‘proprietary
effect’ (zakelijke werking). Whether someone is a legal successor is determined by the
regime of Article 2.28 Wabo.219 Proprietary effect is only possible when the decision
taken by the administrative authority has been registered in public registers220 and any
legal successor can be assumed to have cognizance of it.221 Competence is discre-
215 Kamerstukken II 1999-2000, 26929, nr. 3, p. 12. More specifically via Article 184 of the Dutch Criminal Code
(intentionally obstructing an official order).
216 Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30844, nr. 3, p. 56; p. 138.
217 Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 844, nr. 3, p. 139-140 (in this document, the article is referred to as Article
5.19).
218 Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 844, nr. 3, p. 139-140.
219 Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 844, nr. 3, p. 140 (in this document, the article is referred to as Article 5.20).
220 More specifically the Gemeentelijke beperkingenregister ex Article 7 paragraph 3 sub a Wet kenbaarheid
publiekrechtelijke beperkingen onroerende zaken.
221 Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 844, nr. 3, p. 140.
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tionary.222 Legal succession can take place through transfer of property,223 but other
possible options are transfer of rent or lease.224 Proprietary effect can be useful in pre-
venting illegal occupants of a building or to tackle cannabis cultivation.225
Legal protection
Chapter 6 of the Wabo clarifies the legal protection with regard to government decisions.
It mainly follows the regulations of the Awb, albeit with some exceptions. Title 8 Awb
provides for two instances of appeal. First, the lower court decides in appeal. If the person
who has lodged an appeal is dissatisfied with the ruling of the lower court, he can submit
an appeal to the ABRvS. One exception is when an appeal is lodged against a decision
concerning a spatial plan based on the Wro. In that case, it may be possible to lodge the
appeal directly with the ABRvS. Articles 6.4 to 6.5a Wabo list other exceptions to the Awb.
8.3.3 Municipal by-law (APV)
A well-known Dutch operator of several pubs and restaurants was suspected of bankruptcy
fraud. The immediate cause was the closure of a restaurant (the Oysterbar) in Amsterdam
due to bankruptcy. The owner, who also owns other restaurants and bars in Amsterdam and
Groningen, was suspected of a construction whereby he took on leases from legal entities,
paying the rent but not the taxes they were obliged to pay. The tax debts of the legal entities
grew, they were declared bankrupt, and then a new legal entity would take over the business,
oftenwith the same persons, including the final owner, on the board. TheCity of Amsterdam
decided to establish a team to investigate the circumstances of the closure of the Oysterbar
aswell as other associated pubs and restaurants. The team advised themunicipality – amongst
others226 – to revoke the business permits because actions by the operational management
disturbed public order and were in violation of the municipal by-law.227 After all, the owner
and operators were only able to profit from their construction (and to continue doing so)
because the City of Amsterdam had issued permits and licences for their business and the
sale of liquor.
222 As can be shown by the wording of the article, which says that the authority may impose such a sanction,
not that it must impose.
223 Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30 844, nr. 3, p. 140.
224 Blomberg, Tekst & Commentaar Wet algemene bepalingen omgevingsrecht, commentaar bij 5.18.
225 Olst & Volst 2012, p. 544-549.
226 The BIBOB legislation forms the main point of departure.
227 Spanjaard 2004; Gemeente Amsterdam June 2004.
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Goal of the instrument
The legislation offers the local authorities the opportunity to develop and implement a
tailor-made local policy. Its basis is Article 147, paragraph 1 of the Municipalities Act
(Gemeentewet), which provides for the adoption of a general municipal by-law (Algemene
plaatselijke verordening, APV). The main aim of the APV is to maintain public order and
safety.228 APVs are elaborations of higher laws, such as theDamocles Act discussed below,229
and include general binding regulations (algemeen verbindende voorschriften).230 Obviously,
APVs cannot conflict with the higher laws.
Scope of competence
The APV can include powers to enter a home without the inhabitant’s permission (Article
149a Municipalities Act), regulate prostitution (Article 151a Municipalities Act), or desig-
nate a security risk area (veiligheidsrisicogebied) when there is an apparent or suspected
disturbance of public order due to possession of illicit arms (Article 151b Municipalities
Act). The Municipalities Act also regulates the power to place CCTV cameras (Article
151c Municipalities Act). The local authorities may include criminal sanctions (Article
154 Municipalities Act) as well as administrative sanctions (Article 154b and further
Municipalities Act) in the APV. The Association of Dutch Municipalities (Vereniging van
Nederlandse Gemeenten, VNG) has drawn up a model APV, which most municipalities
have adopted.231
In addition to the provisions incorporated in theMunicipalities Act, the local authorities
can also include conditions regarding licences for pubs, restaurants, hotels, gambling
arcades, etc. in the APV. The APV may also be used to prevent disturbances of public
order in and around premises and in public areas, as well as hindrance caused by drug
dealing. Finally, the APV is used to regulate public events as well as environmental provi-
sions, such as a parking.
The local authorities may include reasons to close premises in the APV if narcotic
drugs, illicit weapons or illegal gambling are discovered. Such conditions are incorporated
in theAPVs ofMaastricht232 andAmsterdam for example.233 Recently, the local authorities
in Amsterdam also proposed to amend the APV pertaining to prostitution. Prostitution
has been legal in the Netherlands since 2000 and the City of Amsterdam regulated these
activities by granting permits to prostitution businesses at a certain location, i.e. ‘window
228 Van Alphen 2011, p. 294.
229 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 124-129.
230 General binding provisions. Thismeans that the decision in the ordinance applies not just for one individual
but for all the inhabitants of that specific municipality.
231 www.bestuurlijkhandhaven.nl; www.vng.nl.
232 VanDaele et al. 2010 124-127; http://decentrale.regelgeving.overheid.nl/cvdr/XHTMLoutput/Actueel/Maas-
tricht/40110.html.
233 VanDaele et al. 2010124-127; http://www.regelgeving.amsterdam.nl/algemene_plaatselijke_verordening_2008.
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prostitution’.234 Since 2008, licences have also been required for escort services. The
municipality now proposes to oblige operators to include measures to prevent and tackle
human trafficking in their business plans. These measures include a ban on having prosti-
tutes work two shifts a day at different windows. The manager of the company renting out
the windowsmust be present during opening hours, and the prostitutes are obliged to take
a language test to ensure that they are able to work independently. All of this is included
in the permit requirements and non-compliance can result in withdrawal of the licence.
Amsterdam, however, chose not to extend its regulatory oversight to cover individual
prostitutes working from home.235 The proposed adjustments to the APV are meant to
‘normalize’ the prostitution branch, as numerous studies have shown that sexual
exploitation of prostitutes is common there.236
Legal protection
When a municipality takes a decision based on a provision set in the APV, the Awb and
the legal protection associated with it applies.
8.3.4 Closure and expropriation of premises
In Maastricht, a city in the south of the Netherlands and close to the national borders with
Germany andBelgium, drug dealing caused frequent disturbances of public order. In response,
the municipal authorities established a ‘flex team’, which targeted drug tourists, dealers and
users.237 The team consists ofmunicipal specialists in administrative law, building and rental
law and the local APV. On 29 March 2010, the City reported that it had shut down five
buildings for three months and an internet café for one year as a result of the flex team’s
work. The case began when neighbours complained about drug use and dealing in and
around these premises. Based on these complaints, the flex team was able to enter the houses
and found hard drugs present, resulting in their administrative closure.238
The competence to close and/or expropriate buildings depends on several administrative
laws, of which the most important are the Municipalities Act (Gemeentewet), the Housing
Act (Woningwet), the ExpropriationAct (Onteigeningswet) and theOpiumAct (Opiumwet).
234 Algemene toelichting bij de APV, wijziging naar aanleiding van concept wijzigingen Prostitutiebepalingen.
Found at http://www.amsterdam.nl/zorg-welzijn/programma/algemene-artikelen/concept-apv/.
235 Spapens & Rijken 2014.
236 Spapens & Rijken 2014.
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The instrument can be applied when there is a violation of public order.239 Below, we will
first discuss the competences of closure and expropriation respectively.
Closing of premises
Article 174a paragraph 1 of the Municipalities Act gives the mayor the competence to close
buildings, non-publicly accessible rooms and land if public order is disturbed or, according
to paragraph 2, if there is a risk of future disturbance.240 The latter preventive measure can
only be taken if a building has already been closed owing to misuse by its inhabitant and
there are indications that that person will use the building next door in the same manner.241
Furthermore, the mayor has the competence to close buildings or rooms under Article
13b of the Opium Act (Damocles Act). This competence can be applied if narcotic drugs
are sold, delivered or distributed in or around buildings, rooms or land.242 This power also
applies when the drug dealing itself does not cause nuisance.243 This was the main reason
to expand the Opium Act, because the aforementioned Article 174a did not apply to drug
dealing in private homes.244 An important limitation remains when it comes to cannabis
nurseries, however, since Article 13b addresses only the selling, delivering or distribution
of drugs and not their production.245 Article 13b can be extended locally in an APV. Such
APVs have been issued inMaastricht andAmsterdam and are referred to as the ‘Damocles
policy’.246 In these local policy provisions, the local authorities can elaborate on definitions
such as ‘lokalen’247 or ‘softdrugs’, to determine what they mean in the local context and
which administrative sanction they prefer in particular situations.248
Article 17 paragraph 1 of the Housing Act (former Article 97, not substantially
amended)249 also gives the Mayor and Municipal Executives the competence to close
buildings whenever there is a threat to liveability or to health and if there is an obvious
risk of the violation being repeated. An example of such a situation is the closure of a
building in which a cannabis plantation has been established.250 Article 17 Housing Act
was added in the context of legislation regarding special measures to combat problems in
metropolitan areas (Wet bijzondere maatregelen grootstedelijke problematiek),251 which
239 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 120.
240 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 120-121.
241 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 120-121.
242 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 122.
243 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 122.
244 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 122.
245 Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 30515, nr. 6, p. 3.
246 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 124-127.
247 Premises.
248 Beleidsregels inzake de toepassing van artikel 13b Opiumwet, 16 April 2010, Gemeenteblad 2010, C. no. 46.
249 T&C Ruimtelijk Bestuursrecht, commentaar bij artikel 17 Woningwet via Kluwer Navigator.
250 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 121.
251 Staatsblad 2005, nr. 726.
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aimed to tackle fraudulent owners or tenants of buildings. This piece of legislation also
enlarged the scope of Article 14 of the Housing Act and Article 77 of the Expropriation
Act,252 which will be dealt with below.
Article 14 of the Housing Act regulates aftercare when Articles 174, 174a of the
Municipalities Act, 13b of the Opium Act or 17 of the Housing Act have been applied. The
municipal executive can decide that the owner of the building must choose between two
options. He can either give the use of the building to a person other than the one respon-
sible for its closure (paragraph 1 sub a) or he can assign supervision of the building to a
person or institution that works on the grounds where the building is located (paragraph
1 sub b).253
Expropriation of buildings
If the competences assigned under Article 17 of the Housing Act, Article 174/174a of the
Municipalities Act or Article 13b of the Opium Act have been used to close a building, the
municipal executive can decide to expropriate it under Article 77 of the Expropriation
Act, paragraph 1 sub 1 to 8. The decision to expropriate must be approved by the Crown
under Article 79 of the Act. If application of Article 14 of the Housing Act has not resulted
in lasting public order being restored around the building or the cessation of violations of
Articles 2 and 3 of the Opium Act, expropriation is permitted under sub 7. The same is
true for Article 17 of the Housing Act in conjunction with Article 77 paragraph 1 sub 8 of
the Expropriation Act. Expropriation can also take place as a consequence of spatial plans
and building plans, according to paragraph 1 sub 1 and 2 of the Act.254 In addition, under
sub 5 expropriation is possible when a building is vacated and inhabitable.
Legal protection against decisions to close or expropriate
Article 174a provides for a decision by an administrative authority to close a building.
Article 174a paragraph 4 states that before a final closure decision can be taken, the person
affected can take measures within a set period of time to end the disturbance of public
order. After that, the administrative authority can issue its closure decision. The person
affected by this decision, the interested party, can then lodge an objection to that decision
with the same administrative authority.255 After the objection, appeal is possible before a
court of first instance, and that decision may also be appealed before the ABRvS, under
the regime of the Awb.256
252 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 121.
253 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 121.
254 Article 77 paragraph 1 sub 1, 3 and 6 Expropriation Act.
255 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 127.
256 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 127.
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The mayor is also competent to close buildings grounded on Article 13b Opium Act
by means of an order for administrative coercion. The Awb is applicable,257 which means
that the decision needs to be motivated and announced, the interested party can be heard
and the provisions regarding objection and appeal are applicable.258 For the sanction as
imposed by Article 13b of the Opium Act, the safeguards of Article 6 ECHR are not appli-
cable.259
With regard to expropriation, according to Article 80 of the Expropriation Act,
Chapter 3.4 of the Awb is applicable. Thismeans that themost interested party will receive
the documents regarding the expropriation. Furthermore, they will be able to put forward
their views in accordancewithArticle 3:16 paragraph 1Awb. They can send their objections
to the Crown, which has to send the draft decision to the Council of State, after which it
will be published in theGovernmentGazette (Staatscourant). After publication, proceedings
before the court of first instance may commence, in which the court can examine whether
the expropriation procedure was unlawful. If this is the case, the owner is fully remuner-
ated.260 There is no appeal against the verdict of the court of first instance; however, appeal
in cassation remains a possibility.261
8.4 Seizing of assets
In the Netherlands, seizure of assets is arranged under criminal law262 and will therefore
not be discussed in this country report. Based on previous research,263 there are indications
that the seizing of assets is not regulated under criminal law in other European countries
but under administrative and/or civil law. The foregoing will be discussed in the other
country reports.
257 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 128.
258 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 128.
259 ABRvS 5 January 2005, nr. 200401581/1; ABRvS 29 March 2006, nr. 200508042/1; ABRvS 10 June 2009, nr.
200807739/1/H3.
260 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 129.
261 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 129.
262 More specifically under Article 36e of the Dutch Criminal Code.
263 12798/12 COSI 62 ENFOPOL 242 GENVAL 54; 10899/11 JAI 380 COSI 44 CRIMORG 77 ENFOPOL 179.
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9 The administrative approach in Poland
M. Wąsek-Wiaderek & A. Zbiciak
9.1 Introductory remarks
9.1.1 Background
Poland became a democratic state in 1989 when the communist regime was overthrown.
From that year, Poland started to build a legal system based on the rule of law and the free-
market economy. In 1997, the new Polish Constitution, in which economic freedom is a
cornerstone, entered into force. Article 20 of the Polish Constitution1 provides that: ‘A
social market economy, based on the freedom of economic activity, private ownership,
and solidarity, dialogue and cooperation between social partners, shall be the basis of the
economic system of the Republic of Poland.’ In 2004, Poland became a Member State of
the European Union.
All legislation concerning economic activities has been adopted in the past 25 years.
On 1 January 1999 the law introducing local self-government and a new administrative
division entered into force. This legislation replaced the two-stage administrative division
in Poland with a three-stage one, consisting of voivodships (województwa), counties
(powiaty), and communes (gminy). At present, Poland comprises 16 voivodships and 314
counties. The administrative power in a voivodship is exercised by:
1. local authorities: the voivodship council – a body elected for a period of four years –
and the Marshal Office (Urząd Marszałkowski), led by the Marshal (Marszałek);
2. the central government bodies: the Voivodship Office led by the Voivode (Wojewoda),
appointed by the Prime Minister.
The county council governs the counties. The council is elected in universal and direct
elections for a term of four years. The executive power is vested in the office of the county
(starostwo) and led by the governor (starosta), who is elected by the county council. In
Poland, 65 cities have counties’ rights.
Commune councils govern the communes The commune councils are also elected in
universal and direct elections and installed for a four-year term. The executive power in
communes is vested in mayors. They are called wójt in village communes, burmistrz in
1 Act of 2 April 1997, Official Journal of 1997, no. 78, item 483, as amended.
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communes consisting of villages and towns or towns only, and prezydent (president) in
communes consisting of large cities. Mayors are elected directly.
9.1.2 Administrative measures to combat organized crime – overview
Because the market-based economy was only introduced in 1989, there is no long-lasting
legal tradition to prevent and combat crimes through administrative measures in Poland.
Instead, a traditional approach based on criminal law prevails. Poland imposes penal
sanctions on both criminal offences (crimes) and fiscal offences (fiscal crimes). This is
based on the new Criminal Code of 1997, which entered into force on 1 September 1998,
and on the Fiscal Penal Code of 1999, which covers both fiscal criminal procedure and
fiscal offences. Petty offences (wykroczenia) are regulated separately in the Petty Offences
Code of 1971.
In recent years, however, legislation has been introduced to regulate specific economic
activities, includingwith the intention of preventing crime. For example, in 2009 the Polish
Parliament adopted a new gambling law that imposed stricter requirements on gambling
operators. At that time, this extension of the powers of control of administrative bodies
was justified by the fact that the gambling sector was being misused for money laundering
and fraud. Furthermore, amendments to the Act on Counteracting Drug Addiction
introduced administrative measures to combat new psychoactive substances. This was
deemed necessary because these substances were freely available in specialized shops, even
though they can be hazardous to a person’s health. In this case, the legislative process by
which this new law was adopted took little time.2
Administrative measures to regulate economic activities, which may also be applied
to prevent or repress criminal activity, break down into seven groups:
1. preventive screening and monitoring of persons applying for a posting or job in sectors
susceptible to criminal infiltration;
2. preventive screening and monitoring of applicants (persons and legal entities) for
licences, permits, tenders and subsidies;
3. measures to control business activities with reference to: a) the proper use of a permit
or licence and b) eligibility of persons to operate the business;
4. powers to withdraw licences and permits and to close the business if the requirements
are not met;
5. powers to impose administrative penalties on thosewho engage in a regulated economic
activity without an appropriate licence or permit;
2 Cichomski & Kumanek 2013, p. 153-154.
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6. special administrative powers assigned to financial administrative bodies allowing
them to gather information on suspicious transactions and to suspend the transaction
or block an account;
7. the administrative power of the police to grant permits for the possession of firearms.
The administrative bodies responsible for screening and monitoring procedures as well
as inspections have access to information concerning criminal activities stored in national
registers. We describe the National Crime Register and the National Centre of Criminal
Information below.
It should be stressed that in Poland it is not possible to seize assets of criminals based
on a decision by an administrative body. Article 46 of the Constitution states that ‘Property
may be forfeited only in cases specified by a statute, and only by virtue of a final judgment
of a court’. However, it is possible to seize illegal goods outside the framework of criminal
procedure. To begin with, for example, the court competent to adjudicate civil cases3
decides on the forfeiture of drugs, psychotropic substances and drug precursors at the
request of theVoivodship Pharmaceutical Inspector or the Chief Pharmaceutical Inspector
of the Polish Army. This competence is based on Article 34 (3) of the Act of 29 July 2005
on Counteracting Drug Addiction4 (hereafter referred to as the Act on CDA).
Second, with reference to new psychoactive substances, the same Act allows the com-
petent sanitary inspector to impose an administrative decision ordering the withdrawal
of the substance from the market and its destruction at the expense of its holder.5 As
mentioned above, this competence was introduced only recently in response to the pro-
duction and sale of new psychoactive substances.
Third, in certain situations, bank accountsmay be blocked temporarily by administrative
decision (see Section 9.4).
Finally, tax law includes administrative provisions that produce an outcome similar to
the seizure of illegal incomes. Pursuant to Article 30 (1) item 7 of the Act of 26 July 1991
on income tax from natural persons, incomes from undisclosed sources are subject to a
75% income tax rate. This tax may be imposed together with a criminal penalty for a fiscal
crime of non-disclosure of income following a ruling by the Polish Constitutional Court
that the principle of ne bis in idem is not violated by the cumulative application of both
measures. The tax authorities have considerable administrative powers to investigate
undisclosed sources of income. In particular, they have access to case-files of pending
3 See Łucarz & Muszyńska 2013, paragraph 4.
4 Consolidated text published in: Official Journal of 2012, item 124, with amendment.
5 Article 44c of the Act on CDA in conjunction with the Article 27c of the Act of 14 March 1985 on the State
Sanitary Inspectorate (consolidated text published in: Official Journal of 2011, no. 212, item 1263, with
amendments.
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criminal proceedings against the taxpayer or other persons.6 On 18 July 2013, however,
the PolishConstitutional Court ruled that the legal framework for determining undisclosed
sources of income is partly in violation of the Polish Constitution.7 As a result, the legislator
will have to re-regulate the tax procedure for establishing undisclosed incomes.
This country report is structured as follows. To beginwith, the remainder of this section
briefly introduces the two criminal registers mentioned above and identifies the topics
relevant for further analysis. Second, it describes the obligations to report bans on economic
activities imposed in a final decision by a court or other procedural body. Third, it presents
the provisions in theCode of Criminal Procedure that regulate the exchange of information
between procedural bodies and administrative authorities.
Section 9.2 addresses the screening of natural persons who apply for a post in sectors
susceptible to criminal activities. Section 9.3 is devoted to administrative measures con-
cerning specific business activities as listed in items 2-3 above. Section 9.4 covers the
measures indicated in items 4 and 5 above. Finally, Section 9.5 addresses other administra-
tive measures, as listed in items 6 and 7 above.
The report does not include the administrative competences of the tax and customs
authorities in the context of the evasion of taxes and customs duties. The powers of these
two public bodies aremeant to protect the fiscal interests of the state and to gather evidence
for subsequent criminal proceedings concerning fiscal offences or petty fiscal offences.
Instead, this report is limited to administrative measures that may serve to prevent or
combat crime.
9.1.3 The National Crime Register, the National Centre of Criminal
Information and other sources of information for screening and
monitoring of persons/entities
9.1.3.1 The National Crime Register
The procedure of screening andmonitoring of natural persons or collective entities running
a business, as well as natural persons applying for a post or job, requires access to informa-
tion about the applicant’s past criminal activities, confirmed in a final judgment by the
competent criminal court. The National Crime Register (hereafter referred to as the NCR)
holds data on final convictions, imposed sentences and penal measures (środki karne). In
addition, the NCR contains personal data on individuals who are detained on remand in
the course of criminal proceedings or persons wanted by the police and other prosecutorial
bodies.
6 See Ćwikowski 2012, p. 290-291.
7 Judgment SK 18/09, published in Official Collection of Judgments of the Constitutional Court, Series A –
OTK-A 2013, no. 6, item 80.
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TheNational CrimeRegister InformationOffice, which is part of theMinistry of Justice,
administrates the NCR.8 The NCR contains information on persons:
1. who have been convicted in a final judgment of criminal and fiscal offences;
2. against whom the proceedings concerning a criminal or fiscal offencewere conditionally
discontinued in a final judgment;
3. against whom the proceedings concerning a criminal or fiscal offence were finally dis-
continued under amnesty law;
4. Polish citizens convicted in a final judgment by courts in another EU Member State;9
5. against whom security measures (środki zabezpieczające) were adjudicated in a final
decision issued in proceedings concerning a criminal or fiscal offence;
6. minors on whom educational, correctional or educational-therapeutic measures were
imposed in a final decision issued in special proceedings conducted against minors
committing a criminal act;
7. who have been sentenced in a final judgment to an arrest penalty for a petty offence;
8. who are subject to a ‘wanted notice’;
9. who are detained on remand;
10. who are minors placed in shelters for minors.
The NCR also contains data on collective entities sentenced in a final judgment to a fine,
forfeiture, and a published ban.10
Access to the NCR
Pursuant to Article 6 of the Act on NCR, a significant number of persons and institutions
are entitled to obtain information from the NCR. In the context of a screening procedure,
information may be disclosed, inter alia, to the following bodies:
– public prosecutors, the police and other government bodies competent to conduct
preliminary proceedings concerning criminal and fiscal offences aswell as petty offences;
– the Agency of Internal Security, the Military Counterintelligence Service, the Customs
Service and the Central Anticorruption Office, to the extent necessary to carry out the
tasks entrusted to them by law;
8 Pursuant to Article 1 paragraph 2 of the Act of 24 May 2000 on the National Crime Register. Consolidated
text published in: Official Journal of 2012, item 654, with amendments.
9 In 2012 the Act on National Crime Register was amended in order to implement Council Decision
2009/316/JHA of 6 April 2009 on the establishment of the European Criminal Records Information System
(ECRIS); information about convictions of Polish citizens by courts of other Member States of the EU are
transmitted through ECRIS, a decentralized IT architecture; all EU countries convicting a non-national are
obliged to send information on this conviction immediately for registration in the NCR.
10 Collective entities may be held responsible for criminal acts on the basis of the Act of 28 October 2002 on
the liability of collective entities for acts prohibited under penalty. Official Journal of 2002, no. 197, item
1661, with amendments.
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– tax intelligence office (inspectors of theMinistry of Finance orOrgans of Fiscal Control),
to the extent necessary for the fulfilment of its statutory duties;
– the Chairman of the Financial Supervision Commission or the latter’s representative,
to the extent necessary for the exercise of their functions;
– government and local government administrative authorities or other public bodies,
to the extent necessary for the execution of their tasks as determined by statutory law;
– employers, to the extent necessary for the employment of staff, if the law requires that
an employee must be free of convictions for a criminal offence and must not have been
deprived of public rights in a criminal judgment if that employee is obliged to exercise
such rights; for determining whether the employee is entitled to occupy a particular
post, to exercise a profession or to conduct certain business activities;
– legal entities and entities not being legal persons but having legal capacity. These entities
may apply for information from the NCR if the law requires that their board members
or shareholders have not been convicted of a criminal offence.
As a rule, the information obtained from the NCR may be used only for the purpose for
which it was granted. However, in order to prevent an immediate and serious threat to
public safety, the institutionsmentioned above can use the information, with the exception
of employers, legal entities and other entities having legal capacity outside the procedure
for which it was granted.
Criminal information stored in the NCR is also available to the courts administrating
the National Court Register.11 Pursuant to Article 20a of the Act on NCR, information
relevant for the National Court Register is forwarded to the courts that register persons
and entities through the NCR ICT system either on request or automatically (ex officio),
immediately after theNCRhas received this data. Information sent automatically includes
an individual’s personal data, his/her identification number, the date of the judgment/deci-
sion and the date on which it became final, the court that issued it, the offence, all penalties
and penal measures imposed on the person, information on probation measures and their
execution.
Article 21a of the Act on the National Court Register determines the scope of the
information sent automatically from the NCR to the National Court Register.12 It concerns
information:
1. on convictions for offences against the protection of information and trading in cur-
rencies and securities indicated in the Criminal Code, as well as information on con-
victions for a number of offences regulated in the Code of Commercial Companies
11 The functions of the National Court Register are described in Section 9.4.1.
12 Consolidated text published in: Official Journal of 2013, item 1203.
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with regard to persons indicated inArticle 18 § 2 of the Commercial Companies Code.13
This concernsmembers of themanagement and supervisory boards, the audit commis-
sion or a receiver;
2. on penal measures referred to in Article 39 (2) of the Criminal Code (disqualification
from specific posts, prohibition to exercise a specific profession or to engage in specific
economic activities) concerning personswho are subject to entry or have been included
in the entrepreneurs’ register (Sections 2, 5 and 6), the register of associations, other
social and professional organizations, foundations, public healthcare institutions;
3. on convictions for an offence prosecuted ex officio or for a fiscal offence regarding
persons who are subject to entry or have been entered as members of the management
or a supervisory authority of a public benefit organization;
4. on convictions for an property offence, document fraud or a fiscal offence regarding
persons who are subject to entry or have been entered as members of the management
and supervisory boards of cooperative savings and loans companies.
Pursuant to Article 106a and 107 of the Criminal Code, information on a conviction can
be expunged from the register of offenders under the following conditions:
– For a sentence of imprisonment, the expunging of the sentence takes place ex officio
(by force of law) ten years after it is served or remitted, or from the time the statutes
of limitation bar its enforcement.
– At the request of the person sentenced, the courtmay order the sentence to be expunged
after five years if the person sentenced has respected the legal order during this period,
and if the prison sentence did not exceed three years.
– In the event of a sentence of life imprisonment, the sentence is expunged by force of
law ten years after it has been served or remitted, or from the time the statutes of limi-
tation bar its enforcement.
– Other sentences (fine, restriction of liberty) are expunged five years after having been
served or remitted.
– If a penalmeasurewas imposed, the convictionmaynot be expunged before the sentence
has been carried out or remitted or before its enforcement is barred by the statutes of
limitation.
– A sentence of imprisonment (if not suspended) for offences against sexual freedom
and decency is not expunged if the victim was a minor under the age of 15.14
Pursuant to Article 14 (2) of the NCR in conjunction with Article 68 § 4 of the Criminal
Code, information on conditional discontinuation of the proceedings will be removed
13 The Act of 15 September 2000; Official Journal of 2013, item 1030.
14 I have used the English translation of the content of the Criminal Code provided in: Faulkner 2012.
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from the NCR six months after termination of the probation period (which may last from
one to two years).
9.1.3.2 The National Centre of Criminal Information
The National Centre of Criminal Information (hereafter referred to as the NCCI) gathers
and stores information on pending criminal proceedings and on the application of special
investigative methods. It also contains other data relevant for assessing the risk a person
may pose to public order and safety. If a person is a subject of a pending criminal procedure,
thismay in specific cases also bar himor her fromobtaining a licence or a post/job, although
this may seem to conflict with the principle of presumed innocence following from Article
42 (3) of the Polish Constitution.
The National Centre of Criminal Information is part of the National Police Headquar-
ters. Its legal basis is the Act of 6 July 2001 on the gathering, analysis and transmission of
criminal information.15
The information gathered by the NCCI covers, inter alia, all proceedings in cases of
criminal and fiscal offences, information on all persons suspected of having committed
such offences and persons subject to special investigative methods such as covert surveil-
lance. It also contains information on objects used to commit a criminal offence or lost in
connection with the offence, information about entrepreneurs, civil partnerships, founda-
tions, or associations suspected of being used to commit a crime as well as information
about bank or securities accounts for which there is a reasonable suspicion that they have
been used to commit a crime or to collect proceeds of crime.16 TheNCCI keeps information
on persons suspected of a criminal or a fiscal offence for 15 years from the moment of
their registration.17
Access to the NCCI is much more limited than to the NCR. Inter alia, public prosecu-
tors, the police, customs authorities, tax authorities, the fiscal intelligence unit, the
authorities of financial information18 and public administrative authorities competent in
matters concerning citizenship, foreigners and repatriationhave access toNCCI information
and can use it for the following purposes:19
– to detect and prosecute offenders and prevent and combat crime;
– to establish whether the granting of a concession or permit to conduct a gambling
business poses a threat to national security or public order.
15 Consolidated text published in: Official Journal of 2010, no. 29, item 153, with amendments.
16 Article 13 (1) of the Act on NCCI.
17 Article 14 (1) of the Act on NCCI.
18 This concerns public bodies described in paragraph 9.5.1.
19 Article 19 of the Act on NCCI.
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9.1.3.3 Other sources of information for screening and monitoring of
persons/entities
Judicial authorities are also obliged to inform the appropriate public bodies of preventive
measures listed in Article 276 of the Code of Criminal Procedure20 that have been imposed
on suspects/accused persons in pending criminal proceedings. Under this provision, the
suspect or accusedmay be suspended fromhis professional duties or barred from exercising
his profession, and he or she may be ordered to refrain from certain professional activities
or from driving a particular type of vehicle.
Furthermore, criminal courts are obliged to inform the appropriate organs and institu-
tions about final judgments resulting in a penal measure listed in Article 39 (2) of the
Criminal Code.21 Pursuant to Article 180 of the Code on Execution of Criminal Sentences
(CECS),22 the court sends a copy of the judgment to the competent administrative
authority and to the employer or institution for which the convicted person performed
his profession if a final judgment results in that person being barred from specific posts
or banned from exercising a specific profession. If the convicted person holds a managerial
position, the court also sends a copy of the judgment to the competent supervisory body.
Article 181 of the CECS concerns similar duties by the criminal courts with reference
to final judgments imposing a penal measure prohibiting economic activity. The criminal
courts are obliged to send a copy of such a judgment to the administrative authority
competent in the place of residence of the convicted person or in the place of business
covered by the prohibition.
If, in the exercise of his profession or the conduct of certain economic activities, the
person convicted belongs to a professional association or other business organization, for
example the Polish Chamber of Commerce, the criminal court must notify these that
he/she has been barred from the specific profession or particular business.23
9.1.4 Legal basis for exchange of information between administrative
authorities and organs conducting criminal proceedings
The legality principle governs Polish criminal proceedings. Thus, in accordance with
Article 304 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, all citizens have the duty to notify the
public prosecutor or other investigative authorities if they have knowledge of an offence
committed ex officio. However, only moral sanctions apply when a person fails to comply
20 Act of 6 June 1997; Official Journal of 1997, no. 89, item 555, with amendments. Hereafter referred to as
‘the CCP’.
21 Act of 6 June 1997; Official Journal of 1997, no. 88, item 553, with amendments. Hereafter referred to as
‘the CC’.
22 Act of 6 June 1997; Official Journal of 1997, no. 90, item 557, with amendments.
23 Article 183 of the CECS.
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with this duty, except for themost serious offences indicated inArticle 240 of the Criminal
Code, such as murder and terrorist offences. Failing to report such offences is subject to
imprisonment for a maximum of three years.
The requirements for public and local government institutions, including all adminis-
trative bodies, are more stringent. Pursuant to Article 304 § 2 of the CCP, if a public body
and local government institution, in connection with their duties, discovers an offence
committed ex officio, they are legally obliged to report this immediately to the public
prosecutor or the police. In addition, they must take action to prevent the loss of traces
and evidence until the competent authority intervenes. The obligation to notify falls to the
head of the entity or a staff member who is obliged to do so in accordance with internal
rules. Failure to notify constitutes an offence punishable by a prison sentence of up to three
years.24
The Code of Criminal Procedure also regulates the notification procedure that allows
law enforcement agencies to respond to irregularities in the functioning of administrative
authorities. Pursuant to Article 19 of the CCP, if law enforcement agencies detect a serious
transgression in the activities of a state, local government or community institution and
particularly when this transgression encourages criminal offences, they are obliged to
inform the supervisory authority and if necessary also its controlling authority. The police
notify the public prosecutor of the identified transgression.
Furthermore, within a defined time limit, law enforcement agencies may request
explanations and information about measures applied in order to prevent similar trans-
gressions in the future. If they receive no explanation within the prescribed time limit, the
head of the relevant authority can be fined up to a maximum of PLN 10,000. That decision
can be subject to interlocutory appeal. If the public prosecutor has issued the fine, the
district court will examine the appeal.
Article 21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure includes a further obligation to provide
information. This provision states that supervisors must be notified immediately when
criminal proceedings have been initiated against persons employed in state, local govern-
ment and community institutions, against school pupils and students at schools and colleges,
as well as against soldiers. The public prosecutor is also required to notify persons other
than those referred to above about proceedings initiated against public officials if the
public interest so requires.
Article 156 § 5 in fine of the CCP allows administrative authorities to request access
to the case file of pending criminal proceedings. During the preparatory stage of the pro-
ceedings (i.e. in the course of investigation or enquiry), the public prosecutor can only
grant access to the case file ‘in exceptional cases.’ The Code of Criminal Procedure does
24 I have used the English translation of the content of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided in: Adamczyk
2014.
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not elaborate on the prerequisites for granting (or refusing) access to the case file to persons
or entities other than parties in the criminal proceedings. Thus, the decision on this issue
is entirely at the discretion of the public prosecutor.
In the course of the judicial proceedings, the president of the court competent to
examine the case may grant access to the case file.25
9.2 Screening and monitoring of persons applying for a post/job in
sectors vulnerable to criminal activities
9.2.1 Introduction
As mentioned above, administrative bodies and employers may obtain information from
criminal records when a person applies for a post/job if such a requirement follows from
the law.
In the Polish legal system, there is no unified and standardised requirement of ‘good
conduct’ for persons applying for a post/job in public or private sectors vulnerable to
misuse by criminals. Instead, many different laws govern specific spheres of professional
activity and include various requirements regarding the applicant’s background. We can
divide these requirements into three groups:
1. a general requirement that the candidate has no record for a criminal or fiscal offence;
2. the requirement that the candidate has no record for particular categories of criminal
or fiscal offences;
3. the requirement that the candidate has no record for a criminal or fiscal offence and
that no criminal proceedings against him/her are in progress at the time of the applica-
tion for the post/job.
The NCR does not register past criminal proceedings that were ultimately discontinued.
These are however kept in the NCCI for a period of 15 years from the time of their regis-
tration. As mentioned above, natural persons who work in a specific job or post may be
screened and barred from that job/post if they no longer meet the requirements.
In the past two years, Poland has seen a hot political debate on the large number of
regulated professions. It was argued that the excessive regulatory powers of various
administrative organs constitute a serious obstacle to the country’s economic development
and are causing growing unemployment. In 2013, a law was adopted that reduced or
25 Article 156 § 1 in fine of the CCP.
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abolished the requirements for access to regulated professions.26 In addition, some profes-
sions for which a declaration of good conduct was required before 1 January 2014 were
deregulated. For example, property agents now do not need a professional licence and
their criminal record is no longer screened.
Even after the recent changes, however, many legal acts still require proof of good
conduct. The next part of this report is limited to a few examples of laws concerning the
public and private sector that are particularly relevant in crime prevention.
9.2.2 Public servants and persons exercising public duties
A post or job in the public sector traditionally requires proof of good conduct. Screening
of criminal records applies to all candidates taking part in local elections as well as to
candidates for a parliamentary election. Persons convicted and sentenced to imprisonment
for an intentional (fiscal) crime, investigated ex officio, are not eligible for election.27 Equal
or similar requirements apply to prospective prosecutors, judges, lawyers, notaries, legal
advisers and other persons occupying high-level positions in public bodies.
The requirements for employees of public bodies are particularly stringent for those
who perform duties connected with public order and public safety. For example, officers
of the Border Guard Service are regularly screened and will have their duties suspended
if criminal proceedings have been initiated against them related to an intentional criminal
or fiscal offence, prosecuted ex officio. The same applies to officers detained on remand.
Suspension of professional duties lasts for the whole period of detention.28 Officers of the
Border Guard Services are dismissed from the service on final conviction for an intentional
criminal or fiscal offence prosecuted ex officio. They may be dismissed from office on final
conviction for other offences.29 Similar requirements apply to officers of the Customs
Service,30 the Prison Service and other services empowered with public security tasks.
Access to all the above-mentioned posts is closed to candidates convicted of a criminal or
fiscal offence. If the criminal record is expunged and obscured, the relevant persons may
once again apply for such posts.31
26 Act of 13 June 2013 amending acts regulating certain professions, Official Journal of 2013, item 829, in force
since 1 January 2014. As stated in the written justification for this Act, access to 380 professions was subject
to various administrative requirements. The Act concerns over 20 professions. Generally, the Act eased
access to regulated professions by, inter alia, reducing requirements to pass exams, and by exempting certain
groups of persons with professional experience from the requirement to undergo professional training.
27 Article 11 § 2 (1) of the Election Code, Official Journal of 2011, no. 21, item 112, with amendments.
28 Article 43 of the Act of 12 October 1990 on the Border Guard, Official Journal of 2011, no. 116, item 675.
29 Unintentional crimes – Article 45 of the Act.
30 Article 76 and 103 of the Act of 27 August 2009 on Custom Service, Official Journal of 2013, item, 1404.
31 See paragraph 9.1.3.
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Persons working with children, such as teachers in public schools and kindergartens,
must have a clean criminal record. They will also be suspended immediately from their
duties if they are suspected of having committed a criminal offence to the detriment of a
child. Suspension may follow on suspicion of another crime. If the suspect is a teacher,
the school’s director takes this decision.32 If the school director is suspected, this responsi-
bility falls to the local administration responsible for administrating the public schools.
9.2.3 Private sector: persons requiring a professional licence
A person who wants to work in professions sensitive to public order and public safety
must obtain a professional licence that proves he is qualified. This allows him to be
employed, but he requires a separate licence to start his own business.33 A professional
licence is required by detectives, taxi drivers and persons employed by entrepreneurs
providing physical or technical protection of persons or property.34
9.2.3.1 The professional licence for detectives35
Adetective licencemay be granted to a personwho: 1) is not suspected of having committed
an intentional criminal or fiscal offence; 2) has not been convicted for such offences in a
final judgment by a competent court; 3) has not been dismissed for disciplinary reasons
from the police or other public institutions competent to conduct criminal proceedings
or from a public administrative body in the past five years; 4) has obtained a positive
referral from the competent police department.36
The detective licence is issued by the competent Voivodship Police Commander.37
Legally, this is an administrative decision. The licence will be suspended if criminal pro-
ceedings are initiated against the detective for criminal offences against the interests of the
state, crimes against the life and health of persons, property crimes, economic crimes and
32 Articles 10 (5) and 83 of the Act on Teacher’s Charter (the Act of 26 January 1982, Official Journal of 2006,
no. 97, item 674.
33 The screening of natural persons upon their starting an economic activity is discussed in the third section
of the Report.
34 See: Sub-section 3.1.1.3. A professional licence is also required in other private sectors that are less susceptible
to criminal activities. For example, property appraisers are registered in the special register held by the
Ministry of Infrastructure and Development. Persons convicted of the following offences cannot be entered
into this register: offences against the activities of state and local government, offences against the adminis-
tration of justice, offences against the credibility of documents`(involving the falsification of documents
and using falsified documents), offences against property, offences against trade and offences against money
and securities, or for fiscal offences (Article 177 (1) of the Act on Real Estate Management, Official Journal
of 2010, no. 102, item 651, with amendments).
35 The Act of 6 June 2001 on detective services, Official Journal of 2002, no. 12, item 110.
36 Article 29(1) items 5-8 of the Act of 6 June 2001 on detective services.
37 Article 35 (1) of the Act of 6 June 2001 on detective services.
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crimes against freedom. The licencemay be suspended if criminal proceedings are initiated
against the detective for an intentional criminal or fiscal offence, other than those listed
above.38 The Minister of Interior Affairs administrates the register of licensed detectives.39
9.2.3.2 The professional licence for taxi drivers40
Pursuant to the Act on road transport, taxi drivers also need a licence. Prospective taxi
drivers are required to have a clean criminal record with regard to offences against life and
health and sexual freedom and decency as well as other offences if the sentence imposed
included a ban on exercising the profession of driver.41 The competent local mayor grants,
changes or withdraws the licence.42 The requirement of ‘good conduct’ remains after the
licence has been granted.43
Persons applying for a taxi driver’s licence must submit a document issued by the NCR
confirming their good conduct or a written declaration that they have no criminal record.
Submitting a false declaration is a criminal offence. Furthermore, administrative authorities
and employers can request information from the NCR, if the law requires a declaration of
good conduct in relation to a given post. The criminal courts are obliged to inform the
appropriate authorities about relevant final judgements or pending proceedings.
9.3 The legal framework for the screening and monitoring of natural
persons (with reference to economic activities)
9.3.1 Introduction
In order to discuss the screening and monitoring procedure in Poland and the specific
instruments of the administrative approach to combatting crime, we must first describe
the specifics of doing business in Poland. The majority of administrative instruments that
could be used to combat serious and organized crime fall within the realm of business
regulation. Local and central administrative authorities are equipped with specific instru-
ments to supervise and regulate the business activities of citizens in selected areas. As in
the two regulated professions presented in the previous section, certain branches of eco-
nomic activity must comply with specific requirements (limitations) because of their
38 Article 38 (1) and (2) of the Act of 6 June 2001 on detective services.
39 Article 40 (1) of the Act of 6 June 2001 on detective services.
40 The Act of 6 September 2001 on road transport, consolidated text published in: Official Journal of 2013,
item 1414, with amendments.
41 Article 6 (1) b of the Act of 6 September 2001 on road transport.
42 Article 7 (4) item 3 of the Act of 6 September 2001 on road transport.
43 See the judgment of the Highest Administrative Court of 28 September 2012, II GSK 1548/11, published in:
electronic database: Legalis, no. 538071.
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importance to the national economy and their vulnerability to exploitation for criminal
purposes.
Pursuant to Article 22 of the Constitution, all limitations on the freedom of economic
activity must be based on statutory law and can only be imposed if the public interest so
requires.44 The concept of ‘public interest’ is typically general in nature. It allows the legis-
lator the right and the duty to select specific economic activities and introduce appropriate
restrictions on the running of a business in these areas.45 Furthermore, Articles 22 and 5146
of the Constitution allow for the screening and monitoring of natural persons who
undertake or wish to undertaken specific economic activities.47 The Act of 2 July 2004 on
the Freedom of Economic Activity (hereafter referred to as the FEA Act) provides the
administrative authorities with the appropriate competences to control entrepreneurs.48
If a natural person or a collective entity wants to start a business, irrespective of regu-
latory requirements, he must first qualify as entrepreneur and as such be included in two
separate registers.49 After a natural person obtains the status of an entrepreneur, his crim-
inal record is checked only when specific regulations require a clean record.50
Different rules apply to legal entities that are commercial capital companies – a joint-
stock company or a limited liability company. Pursuant to Article 18 § 2 of the Code of
Commercial Partnerships and Companies, a person convicted in a final judgment for
offences such as document fraud, property crime and a number of offences indicated in
the Commercial Code cannot be a member of the management or supervisory board of
such companies. Information about convictions for these offences is sent automatically
from the NCR to the National Court Register. In the cases mentioned above, members of
the management and supervisory boards will be dismissed from their function ex lege,
based on Article 18 § 2 of the Code of Commercial Partnerships and Companies.
The ban on exercising these functions stands for a minimum of three years and is lifted
five years from the day after the conviction became final. Pursuant to Article 18 § 4 of the
Code of Commercial Partnerships and Companies, a convicted person may appeal to the
court that issued the judgment for a release from the ban on performing functions in a
commercial company, or to shorten the period of the ban, within three months of its
becoming final. However, this does not apply to offences committed intentionally. Some
businesses, such as a bank or a casino, can only be operated as a joint-stock company.
Here, the convicted person is barred from the management or supervisory board of such
44 Banaszak 2009, p. 137.
45 Bąkowski 2007, p. 122-123.
46 Article 51 of the Constitution reads as follows: No one may be obliged, except on the basis of statute, to
disclose information concerning his person data.
47 Skrzydło 2013.
48 Official Journal of 2004, no. 173, item 1807, with amendments.
49 For details see Section 9.4.1 below.
50 See for instance the Act on Waste. See Section 3.1.3.4.
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a company if the offence is indicated in Article 18 § 2 of the Code of Commercial Partner-
ships and Companies. If a convicted entrepreneur chooses to set up a capital company,
for example a limited liability company, to engage in another economic activity, Article
18 of the Code of Commercial Partnerships and Companies applies even if the activity
does not require a declaration of good conduct as such.
The remainder of this section is structured as follows. To begin with, Section 9.3.1
presents basic information on the FEA Act and the general rules of conducting business
in Poland. Sections 9.3.2.1 to 9.3.2.3 discuss the regulation and control of natural and legal
persons in specific economic sectors. These topics are presented only to the extent necessary
to analyse the screening and monitoring instruments (which are described in Section 9.4).
Finally, Section 9.3.3 addresses government tenders.
9.3.2 The Act on the Freedom of Economic Activity (FEA). General remarks
The FEA Act sets forth basic rules for undertaking, conducting and terminating economic
activities within the territory of Poland and the responsibilities of public administrative
authorities in this area.
One of the basic rules defined in the FEA Act is the principle of equality. According
to Article 6 (1), everyone is free to undertake, conduct and terminate an economic activity
under equal rights and pursuant to the terms and conditions mentioned in the law. Public
administrative authorities cannot impose requirements or conditions on natural persons
or legal entities that wish to engage in an economic activity other than those provided for
by law, particularly concerning the submission of documents or the disclosure of informa-
tion.51 Article 18 of the FEA Act lists the obligations for entrepreneurs and inter alia limits
the principle of equality. Entrepreneurs must meet with all requirements set for a given
economic activity, in particular those related to the protection of life, human health, public
morals, and the environment.
In the context of this report, we should emphasize here that an entrepreneur must
make or receive all payments related to economic activity in excess of the equivalent of
€ 15,000 via a bank account if another entrepreneur is party to the transaction.52 The
obligation of cashless transactions enables law enforcement authorities to acquire informa-
tion on ‘suspicious transactions’ from a bank.53
51 Zdyb 2013.
52 The conversion to PLN is based on the average foreign currency exchange rate set by the National Bank of
Poland as of the last day of the month preceding the month during which the transaction is concluded
(Article 22 of the FEA Act).
53 Article 105 Act of 29 August 1999 – The Banking Law (Official Journal of 2012, item 1376 – consolidated
version; Judgment of the Katowice Court of Appeal of 21 May 2009, I ACa 259/09. The issue of suspicious
transactions will be discussed in the last section of this report.
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The FEAAct distinguishes between three types of economic activities: licensed activities,
regulated activities and activities requiring a permit.54 Next, we describe the procedure,
the general requirements of the FEA Act and special requirements stemming from various
legal acts that regulate selected economic activities.
9.3.2.1 Activities requiring a concession (licensed activities)
In the past, state monopolies covered branches of economic activity that required a special
concession, as these were vital to generating revenues for the state budget and covering
areas of fundamental importance to the national economy. Although themonopolies have
been abolished, a strict regulatory regime applies to these economic sectors, for example
because of the risk of criminal infiltration. Complicated regulations govern the granting
of concessions and the activities of licensed operators.Moreover, in some areas the number
of available concessions is limited.55 The following economic activities require a concession:
1. Prospecting for or detecting deposits of mineral resources, extraction of minerals from
deposits, non-tank storage of substances and waste storage in a rock mass, including
underground mining excavations.
2. Manufacturing and trading in explosives, weapons, ammunition and products and
technology for military or police usage.
3. Manufacturing, processing, storing, transmitting, distributing and trading in fuels and
energy.
4. Protecting persons and property.
5. Broadcasting radio and television programmes (except if the programmes are distributed
only on the Internet).
6. Air transport services.
7. Operating a casino.
Other business activities than those listed above do not require a concession.56 Unless
otherwise provided for in specific legislation, the competentminister or another competent
central authority takes all administrative decisions concerning the concession. This includes
granting, refusing, altering and revoking the concession and limiting its scope.57
Before issuing a decision on a concession, the competent authority verifies the infor-
mation provided by the applicant in order to determinewhether the entrepreneur complies
with the conditions for conducting the economic activity and can guarantee that the
54 It should be noted that the FEA Act uses different names for economic activity requiring the permit. Some
activities belonging to this group are also called ‘licensed activities’ (or ‘activities requiring a licence’). In
this report, the notion of ‘licensed economic activity’ is used only for activities requiring a special permit,
called ‘the concession’.
55 Zdyb 2013, commentary to Article 46, item 1 and 26.
56 Article 46 of the FEA Act.
57 Article 47 of the FEA Act.
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activity covered by the concession will be performed properly.58 In addition, if granting
the concession poses a threat to the defence and security of the state or its citizens, the
competent authoritymay refuse to grant it.59 The concessionmay bewithdrawn or reduced
in scope for the same reasons. The competent authority is obliged to monitor such threats
regularly by checking the databases described in Section 9.1. The competent authority is
not obliged but entitled to withdraw the concession if irregularities occur.60 The prerequi-
sites for withdrawing a concession are described in more detail in the following section.
Separate statutes regulate the aforementioned seven branches of economic activity.
We describe four of these in the following section: the manufacture of and trafficking in
weapons and ammunition, the production and distribution of fuels and energy, the pro-
tection of persons and property, and the operating of a casino.
9.3.2.1.1 Manufacture of and trafficking in explosives, weapons and ammunition
The Act of 22 June 2001 on economic activity in the production of and trafficking in
explosive materials, weapons, ammunition and technology for military or police (further
referred to as the EWA Act) regulates this particular activity.61 The Minister of Internal
Affairs is the competent authority.
Obviously, strict regulation and monitoring of this economic activity is necessary to
prevent the illegal manufacture of and trafficking in weapons and ammunition. In this
case, the competent authority must consult the Minister of Economic Affairs, the Head of
the Internal Security Agency, the Chief of the Military Counterintelligence Service and
the appropriate Voivodship Commander of the Police in order to obtain a positive opinion
on the entity applying for the concession and about the proposed conditions for conducting
the licensed activity.62 These authorities, as well the Main Labour Inspector, must also be
informed of every concession granted.63 In accordance with Article 8 of the EWA Act, an
entrepreneur applying for a concessionmust, inter alia, prove his good conduct as follows:
1. he/she has a clean record with respect to final judgments for an intentional criminal
or fiscal offence;
2. he/she is not suspected of having committed an intentional criminal or fiscal offence
in pending criminal proceedings;
3. he/she is not registered as an insolvent debtor (the Registry of insolvent debtors is part
of the National Court Register, described in Section 9.4.1).
58 Article 50 of the FEA Act,
59 Article 56 (1) point 2 of the FEA Act.
60 This is criticized in the literature: Nałęcz 2010, p. 149-154.
61 Official Journal of 2012, item 1017 – consolidated version.
62 Article 7 (2) of the EWA Act.
63 Article 7 (3) of the EWA Act.
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Persons who have been granted the concession and all employees who work directly in
themanufacture of or trafficking in arms, ammunition or explosives are required to submit
a current medical and psychological certificate to the granting authority every five years
indicating the absence of contraindications to exercise or manage the economic activities
foreseen in the concession.64 The applicationmust be underpinned by documents certifying
that the applicant meets with the above-mentioned conditions. The competent authority
has the right to demand additional information from the applicant to verify the application,
and can also check the circumstances indicated in the application.65
9.3.2.1.2 Manufacturing, processing, storing, transmitting, distributing and trading in
fuels and energy
The Act of 10 April 1997 – The Energy Law regulates the manufacturing, processing,
storing, transmitting, distributing and trading in fuels and energy.66 The competent
authority is the president of the Energy Regulatory Office, who is appointed by the Prime
Minister.
The decision to subject these areas of business to strict regulation was motivated by
problems with the ‘fuel mafia’, which traded in fuels from illegal sources, both imported
from countries behind the eastern Polish border and domestically produced. This caused
the state as well as the European Union huge financial losses and threatened the safety of
citizens.67
The biggest fuel affair came to light in 2002. Members of organized criminal groups
used ‘straw men’, such as poor people, drug addicts and alcoholics, who would register a
business or a company under their name for a small fee. These straw men transferred
money and issued invoices designed to confirm alleged purchases and sales of fuel. The
documents passed through a chain of such companies, resulting in the ‘laundering’ of
illegal fuel on paper. In reality, excises were not paid and the products went straight from
the illegal importer to petrol stations. Second, a number of companies cooperating with
Polish refineries undertook another modus operandi. They delivered substances that had
been mixed with other components to petrol stations as sterling diesel fuel. These products
were laundered similarly as ‘imported’ fuel. Corrupt police officers and tax officials were
involved in these criminal activities. Third, illegal petrol was also produced from heating
oil and distributed at petrol stations as diesel fuel, since the excise imposed on oil used in
heating systems is much lower. This fuel was of poor quality and could have caused dan-
64 Article 11 (1) of the EWA Act.
65 Article 12 (4) of the EWA Act.
66 Official Journal of 2012, item 1059 – consolidated version.
67 Muras & Swora 2013, item 18.
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gerous vehicle breakdowns.68 The fuel affair was successfully investigated: 19 bills of
indictment were submitted to various courts, 330 persons were accused and 50 persons
were detained on remand. In total, 1263 companies were involved in this affair. A single
investigation conducted by the prosecutor’s office in Krakow established that the State
Treasury had lost in excess of PLN 1 billion. In total, the whole affair caused losses in excess
of PLN 10 billion.69
Article 32 of the Act regulates the scope of activities subject to licensing. A concession
is required (with some detailed exceptions) for the production of fuel and energy, the
storage of fuel, the transmission or distribution of energy or fuels, and the trade in fuels
or energy. Without a concession, for example, it is not possible to operate a legal petrol
station. In accordance with Article 33 of the Energy Law, the concession may be granted
to an entrepreneur who has sufficient financial resources and can prove that he has access
to them, who has the technical abilities to run the activities correctly, and who undertakes
to employ only people with relevant professional qualifications.
The concession cannot be granted to a person who has been convicted in a final judg-
ment of a criminal offence concerning an economic activity in the area covered by the
requested concession.70 The applicationmust include information on the applicant’s current
activities as well as financial statements regarding the last three years.71 Article 56 of the
Energy Law allows the President of the Energy Regulatory Office to impose fines (by way
of an administrative sanction) on entrepreneurs who inter alia failed to submit the required
certificates of origin of fuel or components or other required information or documents,
who did not respect the duties stemming from the concession, who did not submit the
financial statements within the prescribed time limits, who reported false data in the
financial statements, or who hindered the carrying out of inspections.
9.3.2.1.3 Protection of persons and property
The Act of 22 August 1997 on protection of persons and property regulates the business
of protecting persons and property.72 This is an example of the privatization of public
tasks.73 In principle, a company operating in this field may offer services provided by
employees involved in physical and technical protection. The services may cover, inter
68 See information provided by the police at http://www.policja.pl/pol/aktualnosci/80657,quotFabrykaquot-
nielegalnego-paliwa-zlikwidowana.html.
69 See information available at http://archiwum.rp.pl/artykul/395216-Miliardy-utopione-w-benzynie.html.
70 Article 33 (3) point 3 of the Energy Law.
71 Article 35 (1) point 3 of the Energy Law.
72 Official Journal of 2005, no. 145, item 1221, with amendments.
73 Zdyb 2013, commentary to Article 46, item 63.
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alia, protection of objects, areas,74 buildings and persons. The Minister of Internal Affairs
is the competent authority for granting concessions.
The screening procedure for applicants is complex and dual in nature. First, the natural
person must have a professional licence and be included in the special lists of persons
qualified to offer either physical or technical protection as administrated by the Head of
the National Police. Second, if the applicant is a collective entity, the natural person indi-
cated abovemust be amember of this entity.75 Furthermore, all other persons representing
this entity must be of good conduct. This means that the candidate must have a clean
criminal record and that no criminal proceedings concerning an intentional criminal
offence are being conducted against him/her. In addition, he or she must have an impec-
cable reputation, accounted for in writing by the competent Commander of the Police.76
The competent police department will remove the person from the above lists if he/she
no longermeets these requirements.Moreover, even a conviction for certain petty offences
such as driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or being intoxicated in theworkplace
suffices to remove a licence holder from the lists of persons qualified to offer physical or
technical protection.77 The concession is granted after consultation with the competent
Voivodship Police Commander.78
If a collective entity applies for a concession, all persons entitled to represent the
applicant must be free of convictions in a final judgment concerning an intentional crim-
inal or fiscal offence.
The entrepreneur holding the concession is obliged to verify, at regular intervals, that
his or her employees have not been convicted for the offences mentioned above. This
requirement also concerns the managerial staff. As mentioned in Section 9.1.3, employers
may request information from the NCR if the law so provides. They may also ask
employees to submit such information on a regular basis. The concession authority must
be notified immediately of convictions.79 Obviously, the policemay also access information
from the NCR and NCCI for monitoring purposes.
74 Article 5 (2) of the Act provides for an open catalogue of areas, buildings or other structures that must be
protected. These are, for example: 1) areas related to the defence of the state, such as plants producing
weapons and military equipment; 2) areas related to the economic interests of the state, for example: a)
plants having a direct connection with the extraction of minerals of strategic importance to the state, b)
ports and airports, c) banks and companies producing, storing or transporting cash in significant amounts;
3) areas related to public safety, in particular: a) facilities and installations which are essential for the func-
tioning of urban areas, whose destruction or damage may pose a threat to human life and health and to the
environment.
75 In other words, he or she must be a partner in a general partnership or limited partnership, or a member of
the management body or proxy established by the entrepreneur to direct the activities specified in the con-
cession, or must be a person authorized to represent the entrepreneur.
76 Article 26 (3) point 5 and 6 and Article 27 (2) point 2 of the Act.
77 Article 29 (6) and (7) of the Act.
78 Article 16 of the Act.
79 Article 19 of the Act.
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9.3.2.1.4 Operating a casino
The Act of 30 November 2009 on Gambling Law regulates casino operations.80 The
Minister of Public Finances is the competent authority for concessions, and the Director
of the Customs Chamber for permits. Gambling is subject to exceptionally detailed regu-
lations owing to the risk of criminal activities, particularly money laundering. Article 5 of
theGambling Law allowsmonopolies only for numbers games, cash lotteries and ‘telebingo’.
The FEA Act does not apply to the procedure to grant, refuse, alter or cancel an operating
concession for a casino.81
The Act sets forth the terms and conditions for the operators as well as the principles
for running games of chance, betting and electronic gambling machines.82 The casino
operating concessions only allow for roulette card games, dice games and electronic gam-
blingmachines.Only a joint-stock company or a limited liability companywith its registered
office within the territory of Poland is eligible for a concession. Other gambling activities
require specific permits.
80 Official Journal of 2009, no. 201, item 1540.
81 Article 32 (6) of the Gambling Law. Article 4 of the Gambling Law states that references in the Act to ‘casino’
should be taken tomean a separate placewhere cylindrical games, card games, dice games or gamingmachines
are organized in accordancewith the approved game regulations. In the casino the total number of cylindrical
games and card games must not be less than four and the number of gaming machines installed must not
be less than five or more than 70.
82 In accordance to Article 2 (1) of the Gambling Law:
1. games of chance are defined as games where the prize is either cash or a material prize and where the
outcome is notably random, while the terms and conditions are stipulated by the game regulations; this
refers to a) numbers games, b) cash lotteries, c) telebingo, d) roulette e) card games: black jack, poker
and baccarat, f) dice games, g) cash bingo, h) raffle bingo, i) raffle lotteries, j) promotion lotteries, k)
audiotele lotteries.
2. betting is defined as betting for cash or material prizes determined by luck a) the results of a sports
competition in which competitors are people or animals and where the participants pay stakes, while
the prize depends on the total stakes paid – ‘totalisator systems’; or b) the occurrence of different events
where the participants pay stakes and where the actual prize depends on the stake-to-winnings ratio
agreed between the bookmaker and the stake payer – ‘bookmaking services’;
3. games on electronic gamblingmachines are defined as games of chance that are played usingmechanical,
electromechanical or electronic devices, computer hardware included, where the prizes are either cash
or material prizes. A material prize is also a prize whereby the player can continue the game without
needing to pay the stake or start a new game using the prize won in the previous one. Games onmachines
are also games of chance that are played using mechanical, electromechanical or electronic devices,
computer hardware included, organized for commercial purposes, in which players cannot win cash or
material prizes.
It should be noted that in accordance with Article 16 of the Gambling Law, the entire profit from the
raffle lottery and raffle bingo is used for community services purposes, and notably for charity, as set
forth in the permit and the game regulations. The entity organizing a raffle lottery or raffle bingo must
present the authority granting the permit with a detailed report showing that such obligationwas fulfilled
within 30 days of the last day that the game was organized.
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General requirements for operating a casino and gambling venues
The Gambling Law lists general requirements for entities that wish to operate an economic
activity in scope of the Act (Article 11 and 12) and general rules for the operation of
gambling venues (see below). Furthermore, the Gambling Law lists detailed requirements
for obtaining a concession or a permit and the supervisory instruments.
Article 11 of the Gambling Law requires the absence of justified reservations with
regard to natural persons, legal entities or non-legal entities relating to the security of the
state, public order, or the state’s economic interests. This requirement also applies for
shareholders whose share exceeds 1% of the company’s initial capital, and members of the
management and supervisory boards as well as the audit committee. Furthermore, the
aforementioned natural persons are excluded if they are a suspect in pending proceedings
concerning a money-laundering offence as defined in Article 299 of the Criminal Code.
Natural persons who are shareholders and possess at least 1% of the initial capital, as
well as members of the management and supervisory boards and the audit committee of
the company, are required to have an impeccable reputation and no record of intentional
criminal or fiscal offences. At the request of the authority granting the concession or permit,
these persons must present a valid certificate stating that they have not been convicted of
any intentional criminal or fiscal offences.83
The gambling venues are obliged to establish the identity of their customers, register
this information, and hand it over on request to customs officers, inspectors and police
officers conducting inspections, as well as to the court and the prosecutor in pending
criminal proceedings. Information in the guest registry is kept for a period of three years
from the end of the calendar year in which it was entered.84
In addition to the above requirements, persons supervising or operating gambling
activities must have a special professional licence.85 The Minister of Public Finance issues
these licences to persons who meet all of the following requirements:
1. an impeccable reputation;
2. sufficient command of the Polish language to hold the function or position that they
are applying for;
3. absence of convictions for an intentional criminal or fiscal offence.
83 Article 12 of the Gambling Law.
84 Article 15a of the Gambling Law. Registration of guests is important for law enforcement authorities who
are supervising the execution of a penalmeasure imposing a ban on entering gaming centres or participating
in games of chance (Article 39 2d of the Criminal Code). Such penal measures may be imposed in a final
judgment by the criminal court.
85 Article 24 of the Gambling Law.
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Based on Article 26 of the Gambling Law, the Minister of Public Finance may cancel – by
way of a decision – the professional licence or recognition of the licence if the person no
longer meets these requirements.
Another general rule is that the entity that runs the gambling activity is not allowed to
entrust another entity with the activities related to the organization of such games, with
some exceptions.86 However, a company that offers numbers games, cash lotteries or betting
can entrust another entity with certain tasks under the agency contract. The entrusted
entity then:
1. must have an impeccable reputation (including absence of convictions for an intentional
criminal or fiscal offence);
2. must not be in arrears for the payment of income tax or customs duties, social security
contributions or health insurance contributions;
3. must not pose a threat to the security of the state, public order or the safety of the state’s
economic interests;
4. must be able to prove that its initial capital, funding or other assets earmarked for
performing the entrusted activities do not originate from illegal or undisclosed sources.
Concession/permit – ‘lawful capital’
The concession or permit can be granted only to entities that provide a document showing
that their capital originates from legal sources, and that are not in arrears for the payment
of income taxes, customs duties, social security contributions, or health insurance contri-
butions. The competent head of the tax office issues the certificate of lawful capital.87 This
certificate, as well as the declaration stating the absence of a criminal record, is attached
to the application. Article 35ff list detailed requirements for the application as well as the
documents the applicantmust provide. Furthermore, pursuant toArticle 78 of theGambling
Law, operators must comply with other requirements, such as:
1. administration of the a) sale of chips/tokens and cash at the casino, b) sale of cards for
the game at the cash bingo hall, c) operation of gambling machines;
2. keeping records for the game tax base and computation, in a predefined form, with
the exception of promotion lotteries;
3. keeping a register of tips at the casino, in a predefined form;
4. archiving all documents that enable the settlement of the financial result – for raffle
lotteries or raffle bingo.
At the request of theMinister of Public Finance or theDirectors of the CustomsChambers
competent to grant the permit, the entities organizing or running a gambling activity are
86 Article 28 of the Gambling Law.
87 Article 34 of the Gambling Law.
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obliged to provide information on their operations. This includes economic and financial
data on their current operations and, in particular, on turnover, financial results, economic
ratios, the headcount ratio, and their statistical ratios. Pursuant to Articles 89-91 of the
Gambling Law, the head of the customs office within whose jurisdiction the gambling
activities are organized may impose administrative penalties (fines) for the following acts:
1. organizing games without a concession or permit;
2. organizing games on electronic gambling machines outside the casino;
3. participating in a game organized without a concession or permit.
Pursuant toArticle 89 paragraph 2 of theGambling Law, the following fines can be imposed:
a. 100% of the gambling revenues if the games are offered without a concession or permit;
b. PLN 12,000 for every electronic gambling machine – if organizing games on such
machines outside the casino;
c. 100% of the prize won – if participating in a game organized without a concession or
permit.
The Head of the Customs Office within whose jurisdiction gaming is organized imposes
the fines in a decision. The fine is payable within seven days following the day of the
decision becoming final.88 The authority granting a concession may cease the activities of
a gambling operator by withdrawing the concession (see Section 9.4.3.2 below).
Article 20 of the Gambling Law provides another instrument of control. It obliges the
gambling operator to issue a personal certificate for a prize at the customer’s request. The
certificate is to be issued on a special form either on the day after the prize has been won
or at the latest on the day after the prize is paid out. The entity organizing the games must
keep records and copies of the certificates for five years following the calendar year in
which the prize was won or paid out. The gambling operator must make the records of
these certificates available to the Head of the Customs Office for validation. The entity
must purchase the certificate forms, by filing a relevant motion in writing, from the com-
petent Head of the Customs Office. The gambling operator must also keep records of
prizes above PLN 20,000 that have been paid out or distributed.
9.3.2.2 Regulated activity
If a provision of a separate act determines that an activity is a regulated within the context
of the FEAAct, the entrepreneurmay only conduct this activity if hemeets with the specific
conditions laid down in the said provisions of this separate act, and registers in the Regu-
lated Activity Register – hereafter referred to as RAR.89 The FEA Act itself does not list
88 Article 90 of the Gambling Law.
89 Article 64 the FEA Act.
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regulated activities. At present, Polish legislation has 20 types of regulated activities and
each has its own, specific conditions for entrepreneurs.90
The RAR is an open register kept by the competent authority. If this authority submits
a statement that an entrepreneur satisfies the conditions set for a specific activity in the
relevant regulatory legislation, the authority enters this information in the RAR. The aim
of the RAR is to simplify the procedure for starting a business in areas of economic activity
which in the opinion of the legislator require additional albeit not special regulations
because of their nature and importance to the national economy and public safety.91 Nev-
ertheless, embarking on a regulated activity under these conditions and registering in the
RAR only require the candidate to file a statement on an official form. The registration
authority may request a certificate concerning the applicant from the National Crime
Register, but other information provided by the applicant is not automatically verified.
However, the competent authority may check ex post whether the statement submitted by
the entrepreneur is accurate.92
The next sections offer some examples of regulated businesses that may be at risk of
beingmisused for criminal purposes. Section 9.4 then addresses the procedures for refusing
entry into and for removal from the RAR.
Operating a driver training centre
With regard to operating a driver training centre, the county governor (or, for a city with
county rights, the city president) is the competent authority for registration. The legal
basis for this is the Act of 5 January 2011 on vehicle drivers.93 Screening and monitoring
of this branch of economic activity are important in order to ensure road safety (by
appropriate training of future drivers) and because of the risk of corruption associated
with the examination of drivers before a driving licence is granted. The latter has been a
substantial problem in the past few years. In November 2013 alone, the web pages of the
police and the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau reported that corruption had been
uncovered at two driver training centres in Tarnów and Lublin. These cases led to the
arrest of several dozens of persons.
In accordance with Article 28 (2) of the Act, entrepreneurs who apply for registration
must be able to prove their professional skills and good conduct. They must:
1. have an infrastructure adequate for the scope of the prospective education and training;
2. employ at least one instructor who has an appropriate education and three years of
documented experience teaching driving skills. Natural persons must satisfy this
requirement;
90 Sieradzka 2013, commentary to Article 64, item 11.
91 Sieradzka 2013, commentary to Article 64, item 2.
92 Sieradzka 2013, commentary to Article 71, item 1.
93 Official Journal of 2011, no. 30, item 151, with amendments.
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3. not have a final conviction for an offence related to financial profits or document fraud.
This applies to natural persons and to members of the legal person’s management. The
application for registration must include, inter alia, a statement that the information
provided is complete and true.
Not only entrepreneurs applying for registration but also the instructors must be of good
conduct. This means the absence of any conviction in a final judgement for the following
criminal offences:94
1. a crime in the context of road safety,
2. a crime involving financial gain or personal profits (for example: corruption),
3. document fraud,
4. driving under the influence,
5. an intentional crime against life and health,
6. a crime against sexual freedom and decency.
The county governor cooperates with the police (to monitor the practical driving lessons
conducted outside the driver training centre) and the Regional Traffic Centres95 on
supervising the activity.96 Article 44 (1) of the Act states that the registration authority
shall inspect the driver training centre at least once a year or if there are indications of
fraud. Such indications may follow from statistical analysis of the number of persons who
passed the exam for a driving licence and traffic violations committed by these persons
over a two-year period after they obtained their driving licence. Inspections can also be
initiated if complaints are submitted to the supervisory authorities. The person empowered
by the registration authority performs the inspections of the driver training centre. Such
a person has the right:
– to demandwritten or oral explanations, access to documents and access to all informa-
tion related to the subject of control;
– enter the driver training centre and the premises where theory lessons are given (but
only onworking days and duringworking hours), as well the vehicles used for practical
training;
– observe the lessons.97
94 Article 33 (1) of the Act.
95 Centres that conduct state driving examinations. These centres provide technical assistance and register
information on the exam results of those who completed training in the centre.
96 Article 43 of the Act.
97 Article 44 (5) of the Act.
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Production, storage or marketing of bio-components and liquid bio-fuels
The President of theAgriculturalMarket Agency (appointed by the PrimeMinister), acting
under theAct of 25August 2006 on bio-components and liquid bio-fuels, is the competent
authority for registering activities in this area.98 The main reason for regulating this eco-
nomic activity is the need to protect the interests of the Treasury and the environment. In
accordance with Article 5 (1) and (2) of the Act, such activities require a declaration of
good conduct. This encompasses the absence of convictions for fiscal offences and property
crimes, document fraud, and offences against business transactions,money and securities.
Article 13 of the Act states that farmers can produce bio-fuels for their own use after
being entered into a separate register administrated by the President of the Agricultural
Market Agency. However, they are not allowed to sell or dispose of the bio-fuels or to
exceed the limits of production for their own use. They are also obliged to submit annual
reports.99 The registration authority is entitled to perform inspections. Persons empowered
to carry out these inspections are entitled to enter the operators’ facilities and premises
and demand oral or written explanations, documentation or other information related to
the inspection.
The registered entrepreneur is obliged to report to the registration authority and to
the President of the Energy Regulatory Office every three months on his or her activities,
such as the amount and type of manufactured and marketed liquid fuels, income earned
and costs incurred.100
The registration authority may impose an administrative penalty (a fine) on
entrepreneurs who, inter alia, undertake the activity without registration, hamper inspec-
tions, fail to submit the above-mentioned reports or provide untrue information in these
reports.101
Production of spirituous beverages/production of ethyl alcohol/manufacture of tobacco
products/production and bottling of wine
The Minister of Agriculture is the competent authority for registering the production of
spirituous beverages, ethyl alcohol, tobacco products and the bottling of wine. This com-
petence is based on the Act of 2 March 2001102 on the production of ethyl alcohol and the
manufacture of tobacco products (hereafter Act on ethyl alcohol and tobacco), the Act of
18 October 2006 on the production of spirituous beverages and on the registration and
protection of geographical indications of spirituous beverages103 (hereafterAct on spirituous
98 Official Journal of 2013, item 1134 – consolidated version.
99 Article 14(4) point 3 of the Act.
100 Article 30ff of the Act.
101 Article 33 of the Act.
102 Official Journal of 2001, no. 31, item 353 with amendments.
103 Official Journal of 2013, item 144 – consolidated version.
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beverages) and the Act of 12 May 2011 on the production and bottling of wine and trading
in these products and the organization of the wine market (hereafter Act on wine).104
Themain purpose of these regulations is to protect the health of citizens and to prevent
the marketing of products originating from illegal sources.
In accordance with Article 3 (3) of the Act on ethyl alcohol and tobacco, entrepreneurs
who produce, purify, denature or dehydrate ethyl alcohol ormanufacture tobacco products
are obliged to implement a system of internal control. This system must specify the fre-
quency and method of sampling for qualitative tests, the testing methods, and how to deal
with products that do not meet the quality requirements. He or she must also designate a
person responsible for quality control. The buildings and technical equipment used must
meet requirements specified in separate regulations on fire protection, sanitation and
environmental protection in particular.105
Article 5 (2) under 6, (3) and (4) of the Act on ethyl alcohol and tobacco lists the
technical specifications for operators as well as the requirement of good conduct. The
entrepreneur applying for registration must make clear in his statement that:
– he or she has no debts to the State Treasury, the Social Insurance Institution or the
Agricultural Social Insurance Fund;
– he or she has not been convicted of property crimes and document fraud (if the
entrepreneur is a legal person, this requirement concerns the members of its manage-
ment);
– he or she has obtained a certificate from the district commander of the State Fire
Department, the district sanitary inspector and the provincial environmental protection
inspector stating that the buildings and technical equipment for the intended economic
activities meet the requirements specified in fire protection, sanitation and environ-
mental protection regulations;
– the information provided in the registration application is complete and true.
The Acts on spirituous beverages (Article 6) and wine (Article 20) have similar require-
ments. However, the provisions in these Acts do not apply to home-made spirituous bev-
erages and wines intended only for personal use.
Operating a currency exchange office
Based on the Act of 27 July 2002 on Foreign Currency Exchanges, the President of the
PolishNational Bank (appointed by Parliament) is the competent authority for registering
104 Official Journal of 2011, no. 120, item 690 with amendments.
105 Article 3 (4) of the Act on ethyl alcohol and tobacco.
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currency exchange offices.106 Themain aim of this regulation is to preventmoney launder-
ing.
A currency exchange office can be operated by a natural person who has not been
finally sentenced for a fiscal offence or for an offence committed for gaining financial or
personal profits, as well as by a legal personwhosemembers ofmanagement or shareholders
have not been convicted for the same offences (Article 12 of the Act).107 Furthermore,
persons must be adequately trained to work in a foreign currency exchange office.108 In
accordance with Article 14 (1) and (2) of the Act, the operator is obliged to keep records
of all transactions. Furthermore, the operator must annually obtain an updated document
from the National Crime Register confirming the absence of a criminal record regarding
the above-mentioned crimes.
Employees of the Polish National Bank are responsible for checking the operator’s
activities. The entrepreneur is obliged to ensure that they can perform the checks without
difficulty by allowing access to all relevant documents, providing explanations, andmaking
compilations or calculations on request.109 The persons who carry out the inspectionsmust
be able to access the facilities and premises of the entity in the presence of one of its repre-
sentatives and to move freely within the premises without requiring a permit.110 The
inspectors can deliver post-inspection recommendations to the President of the Polish
National Bank.
Operating a nursery or kindergarten
Based on the Act of 4 February 2011 on care of children up to three years, the mayor/city
president is the competent authority for registering the operation of a nursery or kinder-
garten.111 Both public (municipalities) and private actors may engage in this economic
activity (this is another example of the ‘privatization’ of public tasks).
In accordancewithArticle 18 of theAct, the director of the nursery, as well as all persons
working with children in the nursery or kindergarten (e.g. caregivers, nurses, midwives,
and volunteers)must be of good conduct.112 Theymust guarantee due care for the children
and must not have been deprived of parental authority or suspended from or restricted in
their parental rights. Furthermore, they must satisfy the maintenance obligation if this has
been imposed on them following a court judgment. Another requirement is the absence
106 Official Journal of 2012, item 826 – consolidated version with amendments.
107 Article 12 of the Act.
108 Article 13 of the Act.
109 Article 35 (1) and (2) of the Act.
110 Article 35 (3) of the Act.
111 Official Journal of 2013, item 1457 – consolidated version.
112 Regulations concerning teachers discussed in the second section apply only to persons taking care of older
children.
336
M. WĄsek-Wiaderek & A. Zbiciak
of convictions for intentional crimes and of bans on conducting economic activities covered
by the registration.113
Article 25 of the Act states that a nursery or kindergarten can be operated in premises
that meet the requirements set by the minister responsible for family affairs. The comman-
der of the district (municipal) State Fire Service and the competent sanitary inspector must
issue a positive opinion as to whether this is the case. In accordance with Articles 54 and
56 of the Act the registration authority competent to exercise supervision of nurseries and
kindergartens may appoint inspectors. They are entitled to enter the buildings, facilities,
premises or parts thereof on the days and at times when the activity is being or should be
conducted; demand oral or written explanations, documents or other information; access
information relevant to the subject of monitoring activities; and access all documents
concerning the personnel of the monitored nurseries or kindergartens.
If the entity operating the nursery or kindergarten does notmeet the required standards
of care, it must correct the irregularities within a prescribed period. The entity is entitled
to submit written objections to post-inspection findings within seven days of the date of
receiving information on irregularities. If the irregularities are not corrected before the
deadline, the registration authority removes the entity from the registry.114
9.3.2.3 Activities requiring a permit
Apermit allows entrepreneurs to conduct an economic activity if they satisfy the conditions
set in specific legal acts. The basic difference between a permit and a concession is that a
granting authority cannot refuse a permit if the applicant satisfies the conditions provided
for by law, whereas concessions are granted on a discretionary basis.
Currently, 28 economic activities require a permit.115 These areas of business are con-
sidered especially important to the public interest and to the protection of constitutionally
guaranteed rights and freedoms. A separate legal act regulates each specific activity and
sets the requirements for obtaining a permit. The granting authority has to verify these
requirements before issuing an administrative decision granting or refusing a permit.
Granted permits are not recorded in any register. The entrepreneur receives a certificate,
which he or she must show in the event of an inspection.116 Below we describe selected
economic activities that are particularly susceptible to criminal exploitation.
113 Article 31 point 2 of the Act, a contrario.
114 Article 57 of the Act.
115 The list included in Article 75 of the FEA Act is open and subject to change.
116 Zdyb 2013, commentary to Article 75, item 2, 10 and 11.
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Activities related to the distribution of alcohol
The Act of 26 October 1982 on Upbringing in Sobriety and Counteracting Alcoholism
(hereafter referred to as USCA) regulates the distribution of alcohol.117 Various public
organs are competent to grant a permit, depending on the type of distribution. The
Minister of EconomicAffairs is the competent authority for the wholesale trade in products
containing 18% or higher levels of alcohol. The Marshal of the Voivodship grants permits
for the wholesale trade in products containing less than 18% alcohol. The local
mayor/president of the city is entitled to grant permits for the retail trade in shops, bars
or clubs.118
Obviously, all the administrative rules governing the distribution of alcohol were
introduced with the aim of reducing the consumption of alcoholic beverages and in order
to change the structure of their consumption by limiting access to alcohol.119 Article 94 of
theUSCA set numerous requirements for granting and renewing permits for thewholesale
trade in alcohol products. The most important obligations are to report the volume of
alcoholic beverages sold every year; to sell alcoholic beverages specified in the permit only
to entrepreneurs holding permits for the wholesale or retail sale of such beverages; to sell
only alcoholic beverages bearing a mandatory official stamp unless this is not required by
law; to obtain alcoholic beverages specified in the permit fromproducers and entrepreneurs
holding permits for wholesaling such beverages; the absence of any arrears in the payment
of taxes and social insurance.
With reference to the retail trade in alcohol products, there are three types of permits.
Each is granted by the mayor/city president having jurisdiction over the prospective point
of distribution. These permits concern beverages with an alcohol content of up to 4.5%
and beer; beverages with an alcohol content of 4.5% to 18% (except beer); and beverages
with more than 18% alcohol content.120
Any application for a retail permit for alcohol must meet the requirements set in
Commune Council resolutions. Article 12 (1) of the USCA states that the Council of the
commune determines, byway of resolution, the number of operators thatmay sell alcoholic
beverages with an alcohol content in excess of 4.5% (except for beer) in the territory of the
given commune (city). The Commune Council establishes, by way of resolution, the
locations within its jurisdiction where alcohol can be sold. The Council may for instance
forbid the sale of alcohol near schools and churches.
117 Official Journal of 2012, item 1356 – consolidated version.
118 It should be pointed out that the Polish legal system does not include a separate regulation for running a
bar or club. In the Act on Upbringing in Sobriety and Counteracting Alcoholism, the provisions concerning
permits for the retail trade in alcohol also apply to all activities connected with selling alcohol to private
customers. Revocation of such a permit usually leads to the closing of a bar or club. Thus, the provisions of
the Act offer instruments to combat crimes connected with this economic activity.
119 Preamble of the Act and Article 1.
120 Article 18 (3) of the USCA.
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An administrative decision on granting a permit for the distribution of beverages with
more than 18% alcohol content can be issued after the Communal Commission for
ResolvingAlcohol-Related Problems issues a positive opinion on the applicant’s compliance
with the communal resolutions.121 Article 18 (7) of the USCA indicates several conditions
for the lawful distribution of alcoholic beverages. In general, the alcohol offered for sale
(served in bars and clubs) must originate from legal sources and must be distributed in
accordance with the rules indicated in the permit.
As the granting authorities, the municipal police or members of the Communal Com-
mission for Resolving Alcohol-Related Problems are entitled to monitor compliance with
regulations and conditions of the permit.122 They must conduct their inspections in
accordance with the general provisions of the FEA Act.
The USCA does not require the absence of a criminal record. Consequently, natural
persons or legal entities applying for a permit are screened only upon their registration as
entrepreneurs. However, a permit for thewholesale tradewill bewithdrawn if the operator
of the business has committed an offence for financial gain, and if he or she, or the legal
person, has been banned from operating the business activity covered by the permit.123
The same applies to a permit granted for the retail trade, including the distribution of
beverages in bars or clubs.124
Article 19 of the USCA offers the Council of Ministers a special instrument. It allows
the Council to adopt a resolution that imposes a full or partial ban on the distribution of
alcoholic beverages for a fixed period, either in the entire country or in selected areas if
this is deemed necessary for the protection of public safety and public order. In urgent
cases, the Council of Ministers may introduce the ban without a resolution.
Activities related to producing, processing, converting and marketing medicines or
psychotropic substances (medicinal and non-medicinal products)
This section addresses the production, processing, converting andmarketing ofmedicines
or psychotropic substances (medicinal and non-medicinal products). The Act of
6 September 2001 on Pharmaceutical Law125 and the Act of 29 July 2005 on Counteracting
Drug Addiction126 (hereafter referred to as the CDA) provide the legal basis for these
activities.127 The Main Pharmaceutical Inspector is the competent authority for granting
a permit.
121 Article 18 (3a) of the USCA.
122 Article 18 (8) of the USCA.
123 Article 95 (1) of the USCA.
124 Article 18 (10) of the USCA.
125 Official Journal of 2008, no. 45, item 271, with amendments.
126 Official Journal of 2005, no. 7, item 29, with amendments.
127 Pursuant to Article 3 of the CDA, its provisions shall apply to:
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According to Article 35 (1) of the CDA, only an entrepreneur who has obtained two
separate permits from the Main Pharmaceutical Inspector can produce, process or convert
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances that are medicinal products. The first is a general
permit for the production of medicinal products (manufacturing permit). After obtaining
this permit, the operator can apply for the second permit, which identifies the specific
drugs or substances that he may produce, process or convert.
If the entrepreneurwants to produce, process or convert narcotic drugs or psychotropic
substances that are not medicinal products or the precursors of category 1,128 he or she only
needs the second permit.129 Both permits may be granted only after the Voivodship Phar-
maceutical Inspector has issued a statement that the entrepreneur applying for a permit
can guarantee that the narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances will not be used by
unauthorized persons or for purposes other than those specified in the permit. The permits
specify the amount of narcotic products allowed and the purpose for which the permit has
been granted.130 The above requirements also apply to entrepreneurs involved in the import
or export of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.
A permit from the Main Pharmaceutical Inspector is also required for the wholesale
trade in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, whether or not they are medical
products.131 This permit may be granted on the conditions mentioned above (i.e. the
statement required from theVoivodship Pharmaceutical Inspector). In addition, the trader
in these products must keep records of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and
must take measures to prevent theft, for instance.132
Pursuant to Article 38 of the CDA, all entrepreneurs operating a business involving
drug precursors are required to provide the competent pharmaceutical inspectors with
information about any suspicious transactions. The appropriate pharmaceutical inspectors
record all information on such transactions in special databases.
In accordance with Article 41 of the CDA, pharmacies and pharmacy outlets are
retailers in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances formedical use. Pharmacy operators
must ensure appropriate storage conditions and apply othermeasures to prevent unautho-
rized access to these goods. The Pharmaceutical Law lists the conditions for operating
1. medical products which are narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances or precursors, within the scope
not regulated by the provisions of the Pharmaceutical Law;
2. chemical substances and mixtures of chemical substances which are ‘precursors’.
128 Substances that can be used for the production of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances referred to in
Article 2 point a) of Regulation 273/2004 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 February 2004,
specified in the Annex 1 to this Regulation.
129 Article 35 item 2 of the CDA.
130 Article 35 item 8 of the CDA.
131 Article 40 (1) and (2) of the CDA.
132 Article 40 (4) of the CDA.
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pharmacies and contains detailed requirements for obtaining the above-mentioned per-
mits.133
The CDA also encompasses detailed regulations for obtaining a special permit for the
cultivation of poppy and fibrous hemp.134 The commune mayor with jurisdiction over the
crop location is the competent authority for granting a permit. Applicants must be free of
convictions for criminal offences or petty offences related to narcotic substances, such as
the cultivation of poppy without a permit and the theft of narcotic and psychotropic sub-
stances. As transpires fromArticle 45 of theCDA, the cultivation of poppy is only permitted
to meet the needs of the pharmaceutical industry and for seed production. An exception
is made for low-morphine poppy, which may be cultivated exclusively for food and seed
production purposes. Cultivation of fibrous hemp is only allowed to meet the needs of the
textile, chemical, cellulose and paper, grocery, cosmetics, pharmaceutical, construction
materials and seed production industries. Cultivation of hemp for purposes other than
those listed above is prohibited.
The CDA forbids illegal possession of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and
their precursors. Law enforcement authorities or Customs will seize illegal products in
accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.135 As mentioned in
Section 9.1, if no criminal proceedings have been instituted, the court decides on the for-
feiture of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and category 1 precursors at the request
of the competent pharmaceutical inspector. In such cases, the above-mentioned substances
will usually be destroyed.136
Article 44b of the CDA prohibits the manufacture and marketing of replacement sub-
stances, more commonly known as new psychoactive substances. Under Article 52a of the
CDA, the competent State Sanitary Inspectormay impose administrative financial penalties
on an entity that violates this legislation.
Authorization to establish a bank, as a joint-stock company or as a cooperative bank
The legal basis for establishing a bank is the Act of 29 August 1997 on Banking Law.137 The
Polish Financial Supervision Authority is the competent authority for granting a permit.
In accordance with Article 30 (1) of the Banking Law, a bank may be established if it
is ensured that the bank will be provided with its own funds, commensurate with the
anticipated banking activities and the intended scale of operations, and that its premises
will be equipped with technical facilities appropriate for the proper safekeeping of funds
133 For details, see the English version of the Pharmaceutical law available at: http://www.gif.gov.
pl/rep/gif/pliki/Pharmaceutical%20Law%20-%20June2009.pdf.
134 Article 47 of the CDA.
135 Article 34 (2) of the CDA.
136 Article 34 (3) and (4) of the CDA.
137 Official Journal of 2012, item 1376 – consolidated version.
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and valuables, taking into account the scope and banking activities to be conducted. Fur-
thermore, the founders and persons proposed as members of the bank’s management
board, including the president,must be able to adequately guarantee the sound and prudent
management of the bank, and at least two of the persons proposed as members of the
bank’smanagement boardmust be adequately trained and have the professional experience
necessary to manage a bank, as well as proven knowledge of the Polish language. Finally,
the founders must submit a business plan for the bank covering at least three years and
indicating that this activity will not endanger the funds held in the bank.
A bank’s initial capital may not come from a loan or credit or be derived from undoc-
umented sources.138 Article 33 of the Banking Law allows the Polish Financial Supervision
Authority to request additional information if it has questions about the application. If it
deems it essential to decide on granting the permit, the Authority can also request infor-
mation or documents concerning, in particular, the founders and persons proposed as
members of the bank’s management board, including information on their financial and
family situation.
Article 36 (3) of the Banking Law states that a permit to establish a bank may be issued
if the bank is capable of commencing business in organizational terms, has assembled the
full amount of initial capital, has the facilities suitable for safekeeping monetary funds and
other valuables in the context of the scope and nature of the intended banking activities,
and meets any other conditions stipulated in the decision to grant the permit.
According toArticle 37 of the Banking Law, the Polish Financial SupervisionAuthority
may refuse to grant a permit if the requirements for establishing a bank have not been
fulfilled, if the intended banking activities would contravene the provisions of the law or
endanger the interests of its customers, if the safety of the funds held by the bank is not
guaranteed, and if the provisions of law applicable in the location of the founder’s registered
office or residence or its relations with other parties could prevent effective supervision
of the bank.
The Code of Commercial Partnerships and Companies regulates the establishment
and activity of banks operated by joint-stock companies, unless the Banking Law provides
otherwise. Banksmust inform thePolish Financial SupervisionAuthority of the composition
of the supervisory board immediately after it has been installed and of any changes in its
membership.139 The same applies to the management board.140
The appointment of two members of the management board, including the president,
is subject to the approval of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority. The Financial
138 Article 30 (5) of the Banking Law.
139 Article 22 of the Banking Law.
140 Article 22a of the Banking Law.
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SupervisionAuthoritymay request information and documents concerning these persons
to the extent necessary to decide on the approval.
The approval shall be refused, if the candidates for the members of the management
board:
– have been convicted for intentional or fiscal offences, excluding the offences that are
prosecuted upon private accusation,
– were responsible for documented losses at their places of employment or in connection
with their functions as members of bodies of legal persons,
– have been prohibited from carrying out business activity on their own behalf or from
performing functions of representatives or attorneys of an entrepreneur, members of
supervisory boards or audit committees in a joint-stock company, limited company
or cooperative,
– do not fulfill the requirements stipulated in Article 30 (1), subparagraph 2 of the
Banking Law, as indicated above.
– The Polish Financial Supervision Authority may refuse approval for the appointment
of 2 members of the management board, where such persons:
– are the subject of criminal proceedings or court proceedings involving fiscal offences,
– have been convicted of criminal offences other than those referred to above.
The members of the management board do not require approval to be reappointed for a
new term if they have already been approved as members of the first management board.
However, if the above-mentioned grounds for refusal of the approval (obligatory or discre-
tionary) are fulfilled, the supervisory board shall initiate the approval proceedings before
the Polish Financial Supervision Authority.141
As mentioned above, banks may also operate as joint-stock companies. Pursuant to
Article 18 § 2 of the Code, a person convicted in a final judgment of offences against the
protection of information, document fraud, property offences, offences against trading in
currency and securities, and a number of offences indicated in the Code of Commercial
Partnerships and Companies cannot be appointed as a member of the management or
supervisory boards. As described in Section 9.1.3, information about prior convictions is
sent automatically from the NCR to the National Court Register. In such cases, convicted
members of themanagement and supervisory boards will be dismissed from their function
ex lege, following from Article 18 § 2 of the Code of Commercial Partnerships and Com-
panies.
141 Article 22b (6) of the Banking Law.
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Waste collection and processing
The Act of 14 December 2012 the Law on Waste constitutes the legal basis for exercising
activities in the field of waste collection and processing.142 The county governor (or, for a
city with county rights, the city president) is the competent authority for granting a permit.
Permits for processing infectious medical and veterinary waste also require the approval
of the General Sanitary Inspector.143 The Act lists very detailed requirements. A permit
will be refused if the intended method of waste management poses a threat to human life
and health or to the environment or if it is incompatible with waste management plans or
local rules.144 If such is the case, the competent authority will order the operator to cease
the infringements within a given time limit. If the operator fails to comply, the permit will
be withdrawn.
9.3.3 Government tenders
This section concerns cooperation between public and private enterprises that pose a crime
risk. For many years now, corruption has been one of the biggest problems associated with
the activities of public authorities in Poland, although the situation is improving from year
to year.145 To prevent such irregularities, the delegation of specific tasks to the private
sector and the granting of public contracts are subject to regulations intended to ensure
the lawful exercise of public duties in the area of public procurement and state aid.
9.3.3.1 Public procurement
The legal basis for procurement is the Act of 29 January 2004 on public procurement
(hereafter referred to as the PP).146 The procurement process is decentralized and is the
responsibility of the individual budget units of the Treasury. These entities determine the
detailed terms and conditions of the contract, following the general requirements of the
PP Act.
The President of the Public Procurement Office, appointed by the Prime Minister,
exercises general supervision over public procurement procedures. The contracting
142 Journal of Laws 2013, item 21.
143 Article 41 (7) of the Act.
144 Article 46 (1) of the Act.
145 According to the reports of Transparency International, since 2006 Poland has moved up the list of countries
with the lowest rate of corruption in public life. In 1998 Poland scored 4.6 on the perceived corruption index
(where 0 is the highest level of corruption and 10 the lowest) and the situation worsened thereafter: 4.2 in
1999, 4.1 in 2000, 4.1 in 2001, 4.0 in 2002, 3.6 in 2003, 3.5 in 2004, and 3.4 in 2005. Since 2006, the perceived
level of corruption has decreased: 3.7 in 2006, 4.2 in 2007, 4.6 in 2008, 5.0 in 2009, 5.3 in 2010, 5.5 in 2011,
5.8 in 2012 and 6.0 in 2013 (38th out of 177 countries classified). Reports are available at:
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.
146 Official Journal of 2013, item 907.
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authority prepares an annual report for the President of the Public Procurement Office
concerning the contracting procedures finalized that year.147
Persons working for public bodies are excluded from procurement procedures if they
are related to the economic operator, his legal deputy or members of the management and
supervisory boards of these operators by matrimony, consanguinity or affinity, either
directly or up to the second degree, or if they are related bymeans of adoption, legal custody
or guardianship. This also applies to civil servants who were once employed by or in the
service of the operator that is competing for a contract, or if they were members of the
management or supervisory board in the three years preceding the start of the contract
award procedure. Civil servants are also excluded if they have a legal or actual relationship
with the economic operator that raises justified doubts as to their impartiality, and if they
have been sentenced for an offence committed in connection with a contract award proce-
dure, for bribery, for offences against business transactions, or for any other offence
committed with the aim of gaining financial profit.148
Persons performing actions in connectionwith a contract awardproceduremust provide
awritten statement as towhether the above-mentioned circumstances are absent. Providing
a false statement is a criminal offence.149 According to Article 24 of the PP, operators can
be excluded from competing for a government contract if they are, inter alia:
– natural persons who have been sentenced for an offence committed in the context of
a contract award procedure; for an offence against the rights of people performing paid
work; for an environmental crime; for bribery; for an offence against business transac-
tions; and for any other offences committed to gain financial profits, as well as for fiscal
offences or for participating in an organized group or association aimed at committing
a criminal or fiscal offence.
– collective entities whose partners, management board members or general partners
have been convicted of the above-mentioned offences. This applies to registered part-
nerships, professional partnerships, limited partnerships and limited joint-stock part-
nerships and legal persons;
– economic operators who have performed actions directly in connection with the
preparation of the procurement procedure or have provided false information that
impacted or might have impacted the outcome of the procedure.
If an economic operatorwants to participate in a contract award procedure, hemust declare
that he satisfies the conditions. At the request of the contracting authority, he must also
submit documents that verify the declaration.
147 Jerzykowski 2013, commentary to Article 152, item 1-3.
148 Article 17 (1) of the PP.
149 Article 17 (2) of the PP.
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Article 180 PP includes a special appeal procedure. It states that an appeal is admissible
only if the contracting authority violates theAct in the course of a contract award procedure
or if it fails to act when the Act on PP so requires. The appeal must be filed with the Presi-
dent of the National Appeal Chamber of the Public Procurement Office and is examined
by the National Chamber of Appeal. If the appeal is admissible, the Chamber may rule as
follows:150
a. if the public contract has not yet been concluded, the Chamber may demand perfor-
mance or repetition ormay demand cancellation of action performed by the contracting
authority (but shall not order the conclusion of a contract).
b. if the public contract has been concluded in violation of the Act, the Chamber may
invalidate the contract or the parts regarding the unfulfilled obligations and impose a
financial penalty in justified cases, in particular when the benefits gained as part of the
invalidated contract cannot be returned. It may impose a financial penalty and decide
to shorten the duration of a contract if an important public interest, in particular in
the field of defence and security, requires the continuation of the contract.
c. State the violation of the provisions of the Act if the contract was concluded in circum-
stances permitted by the Act.
TheChamber cannot order the conclusion of the contract. Pursuant to recently introduced
amendments of the Act on PP, the Chamber cannot terminate the contract if such termi-
nation would endanger the security of the State.151 The Chamber can impose financial
penalties on the contracting authority up to a maximum of 10% of the contract value,
taking into account the nature and scope of the violation as well as the total amount of
money involved in the contract.152
9.3.3.2 Public aid for entrepreneurs
The legal basis for the supervision of public aid is theAct of 30April 2004 on the procedural
issues concerning state aid.153 The President of the Office of Competition and Consumer
Protection is the competent administrative authority.
According to Article 31 of the Act, monitoring of state aid includes the collection,
processing and transfer of information regarding state aid that has been granted, in partic-
ular the types, forms and amounts of aid, as well as compliance with limitations on
cumulative amounts of de minimis aid in the agriculture or fisheries sectors. The President
of theOfficemonitors state aid in general, whereas theminister responsible for agriculture
monitors state aid in the agricultural and fisheries sectors.
150 Article 192 (3) of the PP.
151 Article 193 under 6 and 6a of the PP.
152 Article 193 of the PP.
153 Official Journal of 2007, no. 59, item 404, with amendments.
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Bodies granting aid are obliged to prepare periodic reports on state aid that has been
granted as well as refused (except in the agricultural and fisheries sectors). These reports
must be submitted to the President of the Office and specifically include information on
aid beneficiaries as well as on the types, forms, volume and purpose of the aid.154
If the entity receiving a subsidy shows inappropriate performance of the duties (espe-
cially with reference to providing relevant information), and obstructs inspections, it may
be subject to administrative penalties imposed by the President of the Office, up to a
maximum of €10,000 (Article 44 of the Act).
9.4 Screening and monitoring of entrepreneurs – the procedures
Public authorities are allowed to screen the background of natural and legal persons
applying for licences, permits or tenders. They can do this at two stages: at the start of the
business activities, and in the course of their execution.
In the previous sections, we briefly described the instruments of verification and control
applicable during the application process for a licence for a regulated (limited) economic
activity. These instruments primarily require prospective entrepreneurs to provide the
administrative authorities with certificates to prove that they comply with the conditions
set for them. This obligation aims to guarantee that only entities that satisfy certain
requirements and have appropriate competences and professional skills engage in economic
activities in the most important areas for the state. Apart from this, all natural persons and
collective entities that wish to start up a business in Poland must obtain the status of
entrepreneurs, regardless of whether the economic activity is regulated. This requires
registration in two separate registers. The preliminary registration of natural and legal
persons is discussed in Section 9.4.1.
Equally important is to monitor the activity of the entrepreneur after he or she has
been entered in the relevant register and after being granted a licence or permit. The pre-
vious sections briefly discussed the instruments of control listed in specific acts for selected
areas of economic activity. Section 9.4.2 describes the general monitoring procedures that
apply to all entrepreneurs, regardless of the type of economic activity.
9.4.1 Data in central registers
There are two separate central registers for entrepreneurs in Poland: the Central Registry
and Information about EconomicActivity, which covers natural persons, and theNational
Court Register, which covers collective entities.
154 Article 32 of the Act.
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9.4.1.1 The Central Registry and Information about Economic Activity (CRIAEA)
Articles 23-39 of the FEA Act regulate the CRIAEA. The Minister of Economic Affairs
administrates the registry and its database.155 The register is public. Article 25 of the FEA
Act lists the information that must be entered into the register, i.e. the name of company,
its personal identification number, its Tax Identification Number, its address and the types
of economic activity it will engage in, as well as:
– information on any ban on conducting the economic activity (for example imposed
as a penal measure or as a preventive measure in the course of criminal proceedings);
– information on any ban on exercising a specific profession (if registration in CRIAEA
is required to do so);
– information on any ban on performing activities related to raising, educating or
training minors, or caring for them.
The above-mentioned bans are registered only after being imposed on the applicant in a
final judgement by a competent court.156 However, a temporary ban on exercising a specific
profession or on conducting a specific activity may also be imposed on the applicant as a
preventive measure in a pending criminal procedure. As mentioned in Section 9.1, the
public bodies responsiblemust inform the appropriate administrative authority about this
preventive measure.
Initially, when submitting an application for registration in the CRIAEA, the applicant
must provide a statement declaring that no adjudicated bans have been issued. Providing
a false statement is a criminal offence. In accordance with Article 26 of the FEA Act, the
application can be submitted electronically on a form available on the CRIAEA website
or at the competentMunicipal Office (whichmunicipality is competent depends onwhere
the economic activity is located).
If the activity is not subject to special regulations, the entrepreneur may start it on the
day he applies for registration in the CRIAEA database.157 Entry into the register is effective
no later than the next working day following receipt of a correct application.158 After this
date, the certificate of entry into the CRIAEA is also available on its website. Entry into
the CRIAEA does not require an administrative decision.
The registration office can screen the applicant, for instance on his/her criminal past,
via the National Crime Register.159 If the applicant is banned from operating business
activities, the system will automatically refuse the registration.160 If the entrepreneur no
155 http://ceidg.gov.pl.
156 All prohibitions indicated in CRIAEA belong to the ‘penal measures’ as defined in Article 39 of the Criminal
Code (see Section 9.1 of this report).
157 Article 14 of the FEA Act.
158 Article 25 (3) of the FEA Act.
159 Article 27 (5) of the FEA Act.
160 Article 27 (3) of the FEA Act.
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longer satisfies the requirement of good conduct, he or she will be removed from the
CRIAEA ex officio by an administrative decision issued by the minister competent for
economic matters. This applies when the entrepreneur has been banned from conducting
economic activity in a final decision and if the entry into the register violates the law.161
If the person is banned from conducting activities connected with raising, educating
or training minors, or caring for them, appropriate information is provided ex officio in
the registry. Article 31 (5) of the FEA Act states that the National Crime Register must
send this information to CRIAEA immediately after the judgment or decision concerning
the prohibition becomes final.
Authorities competent to grant a concession or permit or to maintain the Regulated
Activity Register have the option – but not the legal obligation – to screen an applicant
and check information in CRIAEA (as well as in other registers) on any person applying
for a given concession/permit/registered activity (Article 50 FEA Act).
The National Court Register (NCoR)
The National Court Register is a public database of legal persons. The district courts
maintain the NCoR. Registration has the same status as a court decision. The legal basis
for the NCoR is the Act of 20 August 1997 on the National Court Register.162 The Code of
Civil Procedure163 onnon-litigious procedures applies to registration.164 Every entity entered
into the Register has its separate register files, including the documents that justify regis-
tration.165 The registered entity is liable if it causes damage by providing false information
to the Register or fails to provide information within the statutory time limit required for
entry into the Register.166
Pursuant to Article 21 of the NCoR, government and local authorities, courts, banks,
bailiffs and notaries are obliged to inform the registration court immediately and ex officio
about events that should be entered into the Register.
Cooperation between the registration court and theNational CrimeRegister is essential.
As stated in Section 9.1, the National Crime Register automatically provides the National
Court Register with information about convictions and sentences. The competent courts
may also request information from the National Crime Register before deciding on regis-
tration. Criminal records are relevant in such cases because persons convicted of specific
offences167 are not allowed to act as members of the management and supervisory boards,
161 Article 34 (2) of the FEA Act.
162 Official Journal of 2013, item 1203 – consolidated version.
163 Act of 17 November 1964, Official Journal of 2014, item 101 – consolidated version.
164 Article 7-8 of the NCoR.
165 Article 9 of the NCoR.
166 Article 18 of the NCoR.
167 Any offences against the protection of information, document fraud, property crimes and economic crimes
and offences against the trade in money and securities.
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the audit committee or as a receiver for the collective entities.168 The NCoR will automati-
cally detect compliance or non-compliance with these requirements and issue a ‘protocol
of distrust’. The registration court will subsequently ask the entity to take appropriate
action and make the necessary changes in personnel. If the entity fails to comply, the court
will refuse or revoke registration.169
9.4.2 The monitoring procedure
This section concerns the monitoring of entrepreneurs in order to detect business-related
criminal activities on the one hand and irregularities on the other. The latter usually involve
violations of the conditions set in a concession/permit/regulated activity. With reference
to criminal activities, monitoring (control) can take place at three levels.
The first level of control, concerning the basic requirement of good conduct, is exercised
upon the entrepreneur’s entry into the CRIAEA or the NCoR, and afterwards if his or her
criminal record changes. It relates only to the general prohibition to conduct economic
activity or to specific prohibitions to conduct the economic activity. When the competent
authorities impose a ban, the National Crime Register immediately notifies the CRIAEA
or the NCoR.170 As explained in Section 9.1, criminal courts are obliged to forward the
decision to impose a ban to the competent administrative authorities.
Second, the administrative authorities competent to oversee regulated activities exercise
the next level of control. This can be viewed as an additional requirement of good conduct.
Compliance is monitored permanently after the concession/permit/access to a specific
register has been granted. As described in the previous sections, usually entrepreneurs
applying for access to regulated activities shall fulfil the requirement of not being convicted
for any criminal and fiscal offence or of not being convicted for specific type of offence.
Thus, he/she could not access this regulated activity or must be withdrawn from the Reg-
ulated Activity Register in case of final conviction for this offence. Information on
entrepreneurs is not forwarded automatically. In particular, convictions for criminal
offences not resulting in prohibitions mentioned in the FEA Act are not registered in
CRIAEA. However, if a final conviction concerns a collective entity, more information on
final convictions is available in the NCoR automatically. All authorities granting conces-
sions/permits/entry into a regulated activity have the statutory competence to ask the NCR
for the criminal records of entrepreneurs.171
168 Article 18 of the Code of Commercial Partnerships and Companies.
169 Michnik 2013, commentary to Article 21a.
170 Based on Article 31 (5) of the FEA Act – with reference to CRIAEA and on Article 20a of the NCR Act –
with reference to National Court Register.
171 Article 6 (1) point 9 of the NCR.
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The third level of control, which can be defined as the highest requirement of good
conduct, applies to entrepreneurs who perform a regulated economic activity in very sen-
sitive areas. A person need only be suspected of having committed certain categories of
offences to be banned from the economic activity. This requirement applies, for example,
to persons running a casino or to persons offering services of protection to persons or
property under the relevant concessions. This control involves the activity of the Police
or, in case of concession to run casino – customs services. A was mentioned in the first
chapter, the authorities granting concession for running a casino shall have access to the
NCCI.
Conducting an economic activity without the necessary concession, permit or entry
into a register or despite being removed from such a register qualifies as a petty offence.172
In addition, other acts criminalize engaging in a regulated activity without the required
concession, permit or entry into the register.
Irregularities in the conduct of economic activities
The competent administrative authorities also have instruments to respond to irregularities
in the conduct of economic activities. The FEA Act (Article 77ff) provides the general basis
and rules for monitoring the activity of entrepreneurs. The competent authorities for
granting a concession or permit and the tax inspectors173 can exercise this control, as can
the inspectors of the State Labour Inspectorate174, the inspectors of the State Sanitary
Inspectorate175, and the inspectors of the Inspectorate for Environmental Protection.176
All these authorities are legally obliged to inform law enforcement agencies of any
suspected on-going crimes, following Article 304 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
This provision also obliges the state or local government institutions that have been
informed (by any source) of an offence prosecuted ex officio in connection with their
activities to immediately forward this information to the state prosecutor or the police. In
addition, theymust immediately ensure that traces and evidence of the offence are preserved
until the officials of an agency authorized to prosecute such offences are present, or until
that agency issues a suitable ruling.
172 Article 601 Code of Misdemeanours – Act of 20 May 1971. Official Journal of 2013, item 482 – consolidated
version.
173 Based on the Act of 28 September 2001 on Fiscal Control. Official Journal of 2011, no. 41, item 214, with
amendments.
174 Based on the Act of 13 April 2007 on the State Labour Inspectorate. Official Journal of 2012, item 404 –
consolidated version.
175 Based on the Act of 14 March 1985 on the State Sanitary Inspectorate. Official Journal of 2011, no. 212, item
1263, with amendments.
176 Based on the Act of 20 July 2001 on the Inspectorate for Environmental Protection. Official Journal of 2013,
item 686 – consolidated version.
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The inspection authority must inform the entrepreneur if it wishes to conduct an
inspection, unless such inspection (1) follows from directly applicable European Union
law or a ratified international agreement, (2) the inspection is necessary to prevent the
commission of the offence, a fiscal offence or a petty offence or to preserve evidence of the
commission or (3) if there is an immediate threat to life, health or the environment.177
Inspectionsmust be carried out in the presence of the entrepreneur or his/her authorized
representative178 unless ratified international agreements state otherwise; the inspection
is necessary to prevent an offence, fiscal offence or petty offence or to secure evidence, the
inspection is conducted under relevant provisions of the Act on the Protection of Con-
sumers and Competition; or the situation proposes an immediate threat to human life and
health and a considerable risk to the environment. If the entrepreneur is unable to be
present, he or she is required to appoint a representative to act on his or her behalf during
the inspection.179
Pursuant to Article 82 of the FEA Act, no more than one inspection shall be carried
out at the same time. It is possible to deviate from this rule if (inter alia) ratified interna-
tional agreements allow this; the inspection is necessary to prevent an offence, fiscal offence
or petty offence or to secure evidence of such criminal acts; the inspection is exercised
under the specific provisions of the Act on Protection of Consumers and Competition;
there is an immediate threat to human life and health and a considerable risk to the envi-
ronment; the inspection concerns the issue of the VAT return before the return is made;
and the inspection is carried out based on obligations stemming from EU law aimed at
protecting the financial interests of the EU.
Inspections are also subject to time limits. For micro-entrepreneurs the maximum is
12 working days; for small entrepreneurs it is 18 working days; for medium-sized
entrepreneurs 24 working days; and for other entrepreneurs 48 working days per year –
with exceptions as indicated above.180
The inspection authority is authorized tomonitor economic activity to check compliance
with the scope of the concession/permit/regulated activity and the requirements set for
the conduct of the economic activity and for state defence and security as well as the
security and personal property of citizens. Authorized inspectors may enter premises,
property, facilities or parts of facilities where the economic activity covered by the conces-
sion or permit is conducted on working days and during working hours. They are entitled
to demand verbal or written clarifications as well as relevant documents and other infor-
mation carriers, and must be given access to all information related to the scope of the
177 Article 79 of the FEA Act.
178 Article 80 (1) of the FEA Act.
179 Article 80 of the FEA Act.
180 Article 83 (1) of the FEA Act.
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inspection. The granting authority may ask the entrepreneur to rectify infringements
within a fixed time limit.
9.4.3 Instruments directed at preventing the disturbance of public order
9.4.3.1 General instruments
The inspecting authoritymay uncover indications of crimes and other activities that could
threaten public safety during its own inspections or receive them from other sources such
as law enforcement authorities and citizens. Article 78 (1) of the FEA Act states that if the
economic activity is not conducted in compliance with the provisions of the FEA Act or
if it poses a threat to life or health or the risk of considerable damage to property or the
environment, the head of the commune (or the mayor or the city president) is obliged to
immediately notify the competent administrative authorities. Upon notification, these
authorities must immediately inform the head of the commune (or the mayor or city
president) of the actions they have undertaken to correct the situation.
According to Article 78 (3) of the FEA Act, the head of the commune (or the mayor
or the city president) can decide to suspend the economic activity for no more than three
days, if notification is not possible. If life or health is threatened, or there is a risk of con-
siderable damage being inflicted to property or the environment, the economic activity
will be suspended immediately. This general instrument applies to all types of economic
activity. The FEA Act does not prescribe an exact notification procedure and does not
state what is required if the competent (central) authority does not take action within the
three-day period. The FEA Act provides no legal basis for the expropriation of premises
or administrative closure lasting more than three days. The State Sanitary Inspectorate
does have this power, however, based on Article 27 (2) of the Act on the State Sanitary
Inspectorate. This article states that violations of hygiene and health requirements causing
a direct threat to human life or health allow the competent state sanitary inspector
(Voivodship or the Main) to order the shutdown of all or part of a plant (workplace,
machinery or other devices), as well as the closure of public facilities, the shutdown of
transport, and the withdrawal of food products from the market. This provision applies
to factories, shops, bars, and restaurants but also to school cafeterias. The decision is
effective immediately. Any information about the threat must also be forwarded to the
competent law enforcement authorities.
Article 27c (1) of the Act on the State Sanitary Inspectorate also offers an important
controlmeasure that applies to economic activities related to the trading in andmanufacture
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. This provision states that if there is a justified
suspicion that a product (e.g. a new psychoactive substance) is dangerous to life or health,
the competent state sanitary inspector must decide to suspend its production or marketing
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or order the withdrawal of the product from the market for a maximum period of 18
months, in order to assess its safety. For the purpose of this decision, the state sanitary
inspector will seize the product and order the closure of the premises or facilities used to
manufacture or market the product for as long as needed to eliminate the threat, up to a
maximum of three months.
9.4.3.2 Refusing and revoking a concession/permit, removal from the register of
regulated activity
Most of the laws concerning regulated business activities contain specific provisions related
to the refusal or revocation of concessions/permits/or entries into a register of regulated
activity. They also, however, often refer to or even repeat the general rules of the FEA Act.
Below we address the most important administrative instruments that provide for the
termination of a regulated economic activity. These are revocation of a concession, revo-
cation of a permit, and the decision to ban the entrepreneur from a registered activity,
resulting in his or her removal from the register.
Revocation of a concession
Article 58 of the FEA Act states that the competent authority will revoke a concession if a
final decision/judgment is issued banning the entrepreneur from the economic activity
covered by the concession, or if the entrepreneur failed to undertake the economic activity
covered by the concession within a fixed time limit or has permanently ceased to conduct
the economic activity covered by the concession.
The competent authority will also revoke the concession or alter its scope if the
entrepreneur grossly breaches its conditions or other requirements related to the economic
activity and fails to make the necessary rectifications within a fixed time limit. The granting
authority may also take such a decision if the security or defence of the state or the security
of citizens is threatened, or if the entrepreneur is declared bankrupt or his company is
liquidated. Similar reasons apply for revoking or altering a permit or removing someone
from the special register.181
One exception is the Gambling Law, which has its own rules for the revocation of
concessions and is explicitly excluded from the provisions of the FEA Act, although most
of the conditions are similar. In accordance with Article 59 of the Gambling Law, the
granting authority shall revoke the concession, apart from cases similar to those set out in
the FEA Act, (i) if the initial capital of the company operating a casino drops below the
level indicated in the Gambling Law, (ii) if a shareholder (natural person) or a member of
181 Sieradzka 2013, commentary to Article 58, item 7. See, for instance: Article 17 of the Act on economic
activity in the production and trafficking in explosive materials, weapons, ammunition and technology for
military or police, Article 33 of The Energy Law, Article 22 of the Act on protection of persons and property.
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the management or supervisory board has been convicted of money laundering, or (iii) if
more than once, persons under the age of 18 have engaged in gambling activities or collect-
ing bets in the casino. These grounds for revoking a gambling licence are independent and
hence do not have to occur in combination with other grounds in order for the licence to
be revoked.
Moreover, Article 62 (1) of the Gambling Law offers the Minister of Public Finance a
special instrument. If a gambling company offering games within the scope of a state
monopoly violates the law or breaches the gambling regulations, the Minister will order
the company to rectify this within 30 days. The Minister may revoke the concession if the
company fails to comply.
Termination of a regulated activity
Article 68 of the FEA Act states that an entrepreneur who is banned from a specific eco-
nomic activity in a final decision/judgment by the competent organ will not be entered
into the register or will be removed from it. The authority responsible for keeping the
register may also decide to ban the entrepreneur from the activity covered by the entry.
This decision results automatically in the entrepreneur’s removal from the register. In
accordance with Article 71 (1) of the FEA Act, reasons for a ban are the submission of a
false statement regarding the conditions necessary to conduct the activity, failure to correct
a breach of the conditions within the time period set by the authority, or a major breach
of the conditions required for the performance of the regulated activity.
The decision to ban the entrepreneur from the activity covered by the entry becomes
effective immediately. The competent authority removes the entrepreneur from the Regu-
lated Activity Register ex officio.182
In accordancewithArticle 72 (1) of the FEAAct, an entrepreneurwhohas been removed
from the Regulated Activity Register may be re-entered no less than three years after the
date of the decision to remove him or her from the register. These regulations apply to all
branches of regulated activity.
Withdrawal of a permit
The FEA Act does not include general provisions for the revocation of permits. Below we
give examples of specific instruments available to the authorities competent to grant permits
for specific economic activities. In addition, we present some examples of other preventive
and repressive administrative instruments.
182 Article 71 (2) and (3) of the FEA Act.
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Operating a bank
In accordance with Article 138 (3) of the Banking Law, if a bank fails to comply with set
requirements and if its activities contravene either the law or the bank’s internal rules, or
if it is jeopardizing the interests of account holders, the Polish Financial Supervision
Authority, after issuing a written warning notice, may take a number of measures. It may
request the discharge of the president, vice president or any other member of the manage-
ment board found directly responsible for the irregularities noted or suspend from office
the members of the management board referred to above, pending the adoption of a reso-
lution to apply for their discharge at the next meeting of the supervisory board. These
persons are then excluded from taking decisions on behalf of the bank in respect of its
rights and obligations concerning assets. The Financial Supervision Authority may also
limit the scope of the banking activity or the activities of its organizational units; impose
a financial penalty on the bank of up to 10% of its income indicated in the most recent
audited financial statement or, if such a statement is absent, a financial penalty of up to
10% of the estimated income up to a maximum of PLN 10,000,000. It may also decide to
revoke the operating permit and to order the bank’s liquidation. The latter is an ultimate
measure that can be imposed if the above-mentioned instruments have not had the desired
effects.183 Finally, Article 138 (4) of the Banking Law states that the Polish Financial
Supervision Authority may also suspend from office a member of the management board
if that person is charged with a criminal or a fiscal offence or if he or she has caused the
bank major financial losses.
In accordance with Article 138 (6) of the Banking Law, the scope of a bank’s activities
may also be limited and its operating permit revoked if it no longer complies with the
conditions laid down in the permit; if the permit was granted based on falsified documents,
untrue statements, or other unlawful actions; if the permit holder has not engaged in any
banking activities for more than six months; or if the Polish Financial Supervision
Authority has been obstructed in its efforts to effectively supervise the bank.
Trade in alcohol
In accordance with Article 95 (1) of the Act on Upbringing in Sobriety and Counteracting
Alcoholism, theMinister of EconomicAffairs or the competentMarshal of theVoivodeship
will revoke permits for the wholesale trade in alcohol if the holder sells alcoholic beverages
obtained from illegal sources, if a person who works for the permit holder commits a crime
for financial profit, if a final decision/judgment bans the entrepreneur from the activity
covered by the permit, or if he commissions the trading in alcoholic beverages to other
entrepreneurs on the basis of agreements. The permit may also be revoked if public order
183 Kohutek 2005.
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is repeatedly disturbed at the locations where the company conducts its business.184 Fol-
lowing revocation of the permit, the entrepreneur can only reapply three years after the
decision to revoke is taken.185
According to Article 18 (10) of the Act on Upbringing in Sobriety and Counteracting
Alcoholism, the competent authority revokes a permit for the retail trade in alcohol if the
holder does not comply with the rules specified in the Act. This particularly concerns the
selling and serving of alcoholic beverages tominors or to people already under the influence
of alcohol, or the selling and serving of alcoholic beverages on credit or in pledge. Revoca-
tion may also follow if the permit holder does not comply with the conditions set in the
Act, or if the sale of alcoholic beverages results in public order disturbances at the point
of sale or its vicinity at least twice within a period of six months and the manager of the
point of sale fails to notify the authorities responsible for protecting public order. Other
reasons for revocation are if alcoholic beverages obtained from illegal sources are sold; if
the manager of the business activities commits a crime for private financial gain; or if the
entrepreneur is banned from the economic activity covered by the permit in a final deci-
sion/judgment. This also applies to natural persons whowork for the entrepreneur holding
the permit. After revocation of the permit, the entrepreneur may only reapply three years
after the decision to withdraw the permit is taken.186
A good example of the closure of a business activity based on various administrative
controls is the ‘Cocomo clubs’ case. In 2013 and 2014, law enforcement authorities received
several reports of crimes being committed by the staff or owners of ‘Cocomo’, a company
that operated a network of 12 strip clubs in Poland. These nightclubs were often located
in city centres, near historic churches or buildings. A number of customers complained
that, after having spent the night in the nightclub, the bill amounted to tens of thousands
of PLN, with a maximum of PLN 1 million or about EUR 250,000. Customers suspected
that something had been added to their drinks causing them to lose consciousness or
control over their bankcards. Employees working at the clubs stated that customers became
generous under the influence of alcohol and started buying expensive drinks for themselves
and the dancers. Unfortunately, the police investigation resulted in only a few accusations
because it was extremely difficult to prove that customers had been the victims of fraud.
In addition, there was no evidence that the strippers were engaged in prostitution. After
media reports, protests against the Cocomo clubs followed. Next, the local authorities
began to checkwhether the alcohol that was sold in theCocomo clubswas being distributed
in accordance with the requirements of the Act on Upbringing in Sobriety and Counter-
acting Alcoholism. In some cases the checks revealed irregularities that allowed the
184 Article 95 (2) of the Act on Upbringing in Sobriety and Counteracting Alcoholism.
185 Article 95 (5) of the Act on Upbringing in Sobriety and Counteracting Alcoholism.
186 Article 18 (11) Act on Upbringing in Sobriety and Counteracting Alcoholism.
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authorities to withdraw the liquor permit; this usually resulted in the closure of the club
because the profits largely depended on the sale of very expensive drinks. However, the
inspections did not always prove that the club had violated the requirements of the Act.
Other agencies, such as the sanitary inspectorate, the labour inspectorate, the tax authorities
and the building inspectorate therefore carried out additional inspections. In most cases
their findings resulted only in fines and not in the closure of premises. In some instances,
however, social pressure and protests discouraged customers and forced the clubs to close
owing to a lack of business. This was the casewith theCocomonightclub located inWarsaw
city centre inKrakowskie Przedmieście Street. The owner himself decided to close the club
because, in his opinion, the ‘smear campaign’ had made it impossible to run a profitable
business.
The trade in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances
Article 37ap (1) of the Pharmaceutical Law provides general grounds for revoking a permit
for this particular activity. One reason is a final judgement/decision banning the
entrepreneur from the economic activity. Another is if he or she no longer meets the
requirements laid down in legislation relevant for the economic activity covered by the
permit.
A permit for the wholesale trade in products subject to the Pharmaceutical Law is
revoked if the entrepreneur trades in unauthorizedmedicinal products.187 The permitmay
also be revoked if the entrepreneur obstructs the Pharmaceutical Inspector from carrying
out his duties; if the entrepreneur stores medicinal products in violation of the terms set
in the permit; if the entrepreneur is unable to start his business within four months of
obtaining the permit; or if he is unable to carry out the business covered by the permit for
a period of at least six months.188
In accordance with Article 82 of the Pharmaceutical Law, the Main Pharmaceutical
Inspector notifies the competent Customs authorities if he has revoked a permit.
The Voivodship Pharmaceutical Inspector is obliged to revoke a retail permit if the
pharmacy offers unauthorizedmedicinal products.189 The inspectormay revoke the permit
if shortcomings are not dealt with within a designated period; if, despite prior notification,
the Pharmaceutical Inspector or theNationalHealth Fundwere obstructed fromperforming
their duties; if the pharmacy is repeatedly unable to serve its customers; if the pharmacy
was not open for business within four months of the permit being granted; or if the phar-
macy is unable to carry out the business covered by the permit for a period of at least six
months.190
187 Article 81 (1) of the Pharmaceutical Law.
188 Article 81 (2) of the Pharmaceutical Law.
189 Article 103 (1) of the Pharmaceutical Law.
190 Article 103 (2) of the Pharmaceutical Law.
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9.4.4 Legal protection
This section concerns legal protection for entrepreneurs against whom the competent
authorities have issued decisions related to their activities. Here, we address two general
situations. The first applies to cases in which the competent authority has refused to grant
a concession, permit, or entry into the appropriate regulated activity’s register, or has
revoked the concession or permit, or removed the entrepreneur from the relevant register
or the CRIAEA. All of these actions constitute administrative decisions. The second refers
to decisions taken by the administrative authorities during inspections, for instance con-
cerning the cessation of activities.191
Protection granted in an appeal procedure
Entrepreneurs may appeal administrative decisions concerning an economic activity as
well as those imposing administrative penalties to a higher authority in the framework of
an extrajudicial procedure. The Act of 16 June 1960 of the Code of Administrative Proce-
dure (hereafter referred to as the CAP) regulates the appeal procedure.192 Pursuant to
Article 127 of the CAP, an administrative decision taken in the first instance is open to
appeal to the administrative authority of the next-highest level. Article 17 of the CAP states
that for local authorities, this is the Local Government Appellate Board, and for other
public authorities it is the competent minister. Pursuant to Article 127 §3 of the CAP,
appeal is not possible if the minister or the local government appeal board has issued a
first instance decision. However, a party dissatisfied with the decision can request the same
body to review the case and for this procedure, the rules applicable in an appeal procedure
apply.
An administrative decision only becomes effective after the deadline for appeal has
expired, except when the decision is immediately enforceable.193 In justified cases, the
authority competent to hear the appealmay suspend execution of immediately enforceable
decisions.194
After consideration of the appeal or the request to review the case, the higher-level
authority or the competent minister takes an independent decision. The outcome may be
that the authority or minister upholds the disputed decision; revokes part of all of the
disputed decision and rules on the merits of the case; revokes the disputed decision and
discontinues the proceedings; or discontinues the appeal proceedings.195 The decision in
appeal is final and terminates the extrajudicial procedure for the administrative authority.
191 For example based on Article 78 of the FEA Act or Article 27 Act on the State Sanitary Inspection.
192 Official Journal of 1960, no. 30, item 168, with amendments.
193 Article 130 § 1 of the CAP.
194 Article 135 of the CAP.
195 Article 138 § 1 of the CAP.
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The final decision of an administrative authority may be subject to appeal (action) to
the administrative court. The role of administrative courts is to exercise judicial control
over public administration. Such an appeal initiates a judicial procedure regulated by the
Act of 30August 2002 on the Proceedings before Administrative Courts (hereafter referred
to as the PBAC.196
In accordance with Article 145 of the PBAC, after having considered the action, the
court issues its judgment. With regard to the action against the decision, it may wholly or
partly revoke the decision if substantive law has been violated in a way that had an impact
on the outcome of the case; if the law has been violated and there are grounds for resuming
the administrative proceedings; or if proceedings have been otherwise infringed in a
manner that had a significant impact on the outcome of the case. The courtmay also dismiss
the decision based on Article 156 of the CAP or state that the decision was incompatible
with the rule of law. The latter implies that the decision is still legally binding, but such a
ruling opens up the opportunity for civil action to claim compensation.
Legal protection granted in the context of the FEA Act
Article 84c of the FEA Act provides a separate and independent opportunity to object to
inspections. Substantiated objections must be lodged within three working days of the
date on which the authority began its inspection. The inspection activities are then sus-
pended, but the inspection authority may still order evidence related to the inspection to
be secured while the objection is being considered. This refers to documents, information
and samples of products.197 The inspection authority must examine the objection within
three working days and decide whether inspection should be continued. If it fails to
examine the objection within this period, the inspection is discontinued.198
In October 2010, the media reported several cases of poisoning by psychotropic sub-
stances, resulting in the death of about twelve people, most of them young. Basing himself
on Articles 27, 27c and 31a of the Act on the State Sanitary Inspection, the Main Sanitary
Inspector ordered that all psychoactive substances known as tajfun (typhoon) and similar
products be withdrawn from the market throughout the entire country. The Inspector
also ordered the closure of all facilities for the production and sale of these substances,
which were sold as ‘collectibles.’ The Main Sanitary Inspector based his decision on the
fact that these products posed a direct threat to human life or health. The orderwas enforced
immediately. On a single day, hundreds of sanitary inspectors, assisted by the police, closed
the sales points and secured samples of the products. Some of the shop owners appealed
against the closure, but without success. Later on, however, the court revoked the closure
196 Official Journal of 2002, no. 153, item 1270 with amendments.
197 Article 84c item 8 of the FEA Act.
198 Article 84c (12) of the FEA Act.
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because the Main Sanitary Inspector had not analysed the products after seizing them and
was thus unable to prove that they did indeed pose a threat to human life and health. The
Inspector should have produced the results of toxicological tests, and data on the number
of poisonings, medical interventions and hospitalizations.199
Protection under civil law
If there are irregularities in the proceedings conducted by public authorities in relation to
screening or monitoring activities, an entrepreneur may claim legal protection by way of
civil action. In accordance with Article 77 (4) of the FEA Act, an entrepreneur who has
suffered damage because of illegitimate inspection activities is entitled to compensation.
Article 417 of the Civil Code of 23 April 1964 states that the State Treasury and local gov-
ernment units are liable for any damage caused by an unlawful action or omission while
exercising public authority.200
9.5 Other administrative instruments to combat or prevent crimes
9.5.1 Administrative instruments to counteract money laundering and
financing of terrorism
9.5.1.1 Introductory remarks
Poland is party to international instruments aiming at the prevention and repression of
money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Since 2008, Poland has been a party to
the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of
the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism. In order to meet with
international standards in this field, on 16 November 2000 the Polish Parliament adopted
the Act on counteracting money laundering and terrorism financing201 (hereafter referred
to as: the AML).202 The AML includes administrative requirements for the reporting and
monitoring of suspicious financial transactions and tools for the immediate freezing of
suspicious bank accounts and transactions by way of administrative decision. It also pro-
vides for administrative penalties for not cooperating with the appropriate institutions.
These measures correspond with the requirement provided by Article 22 of the FEA Act
199 Judgment of the Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw of 20 February 2012, VII SA/Wa 2338/11.
200 Official Journal of 2014, item 121 – consolidated version.
201 The consolidated text of the Act was published in the Official Journal of 2010, no. 46, item 276, with
amendment.
202 The English text of the Act is annexed to the Report of the FourthAssessment Visit to Poland onAnti-Money
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, issued on 11 April 2013 and available at:
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Evaluations/round4/PL4-MERMONEYVAL(2013)2_en.pdf.
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that all transactions connectedwith business activitiesmust bemade through bank accounts
if the amount of the transaction exceeds €15,000. We will briefly discuss these measures
below.
9.5.1.2 The system for reporting suspicious transactions
Article 3 of the AML appoints the Minister of Finance and the General Inspector of
Financial Information (hereafter referred to as GIFI), who is appointed by the Prime
Minister and holds the post of the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Finance, as
the two administrative authorities responsible for combatting money laundering and ter-
rorist financing. A special organizational unit within the Ministry of Finance assists the
GIFI.
‘Obligated institutions’ listed inArticle 2 (1) of theAMLmust report cash and suspicious
financial transactions to the GIFI. The lists comprises 20 types of institutions and includes,
inter alia, national banks and branches of foreign banks, financial institutions, credit
institutions, foreign legal entities carrying out brokerage activities and commodity brokers,
insurance companies offering life insurance, investment funds, notaries, lawyers, legal
advisers, foreign lawyers providing legal services apart from their employment, tax advisers,
foundations and associations. The list also includes entities that operate in the fields of
gambling and currency exchange and entrepreneurs acting under the FEAAct who receive
cash payments for goods worth €15,000 or more, including when the money is paid in
instalments. The above-mentioned ‘obligated institutions’ are obliged to register such
transactions203 and all other transactions irrespective of the limit of €15,000 if circumstances
suggest that they were related to money laundering or terrorist financing (suspicious
transactions).204
The duty to register also applies when the obligated institution refuses the request to
undertake a transaction but is aware or – with due diligence – should be aware that the
intended transaction is suspicious.205 Transactions equal to or exceeding €15,000 that fall
under Article 8 (1e) are exempt from registration. This covers situations in which a person
transfers money between accounts that he holds at the same bank. Special rules apply to
casino operators. They are obliged to register all purchases or sales of gambling chips worth
€1000 or more.206
Records of suspicious transactions as well as information and documents related to
these transactions must be kept for a period of five years, starting from the first day of the
year following the year in which transactions were registered.207 The obligated institutions
203 Article 8 (1) of the AML.
204 Article 8 (3) of the AML.
205 Article 8 (3a) of the AML.
206 Article 8 (1a) of the AML.
207 Article 8 (4) and (4a) of the AML.
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are also required to analyse the registered transactions, document their analysis on paper
and keep these documents for the same period.208
Pursuant to Article 8b (3) of the AML, the obligated institutions must also take
‘financial security measures’ with regard to their clients. This entails identification of the
client and verification of his identity based on documents or publicly available information;
taking steps, with due care, to identify beneficial owners and taking risk-based measures
to verify their identify, including information on the ownership and control structure of
the customer; obtaining information regarding the purpose and the nature of economic
relationships intended by a client; constant monitoring of current economic relationships
with a client, therein surveying transactions carried out to ensure that transactions are in
accordance with the knowledge of the obligated institution on the client and the business
profile of his operations and with the risk; and, if possible, surveying the origins of assets
and constant update of documents and information in possession.
These financial security measures apply when the obligated institution concludes a
contract with a client as well as when a transaction with a client with whom it has not
previously concluded agreements is worth €15,000 or more, including payments in
instalment.209
Gambling operators are obliged to establish the identity of clients and check their
identity at the entrance to the casino or a cash bingo room, regardless of the value of the
gambling chips or cards the customer purchases.210
As transpires from Article 11 of the AML, the GIFI shall be informed of all registered
transactions. The obligated institutions must report non-suspicious transactions worth
€15,000 or more within 14 days of the end of each calendar month. They are required to
report suspicious transactions immediately.211 The report must include the date of the
transaction, the identity of the parties, the amount, currency and type of the transaction,
and the account numbers used to conduct the transaction if applicable.
In the event of a suspicious transaction, Article 12 (1) item 7 of the AML requires that
the obligated institutions explain to the GIFI why the transaction was deemed suspicious
as well as the information mentioned above. They must also provide the GIFI with addi-
tional information on the parties that engaged in the transactions, including data on their
private and business accounts, regardless of their use in the suspicious transaction.212
The number of ‘ordinary’ cash transactions reported to GIFI is very high. For example,
in 2005, 21,000,000 transactions were reported and in 2009, the number had risen to more
than 31,000,0000. In 2010, the number of reported transactions exceeded 30,200,000. The
208 Article 8a of the AML.
209 Article 8b (4) of the AML.
210 Article 9c of the AML.
211 Article 12 (2) of the AML.
212 Article 12a of the AML.
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average worth of the transactions reported every month is €2,500,000.213 By comparison,
the reported number of suspicious transactions with reasons and other required data was
considerably lower. For example, in 2008 1287 reports were filed and in 2010 the obligated
institutions reported 1462 transactions. Themajority of suspicious transactions are reported
by banks.214
9.5.1.3 The role of the General Inspector of Financial Information (GIFI) and the
financial intelligence unit
The main tasks entrusted to the GIFI are to gather and analyse information on reported
(i.e. suspicious) transactions; to suspend transactions and block bank accounts; to decide
on the release of frozen asset values; to transmit documentation supporting a suspicion of
a criminal offence to law enforcement agencies; to impose administrative penalties.215
The GIFI analyses reports of suspicious transactions, taking into account information
provided by other state institutions listed in Article 14 (2) of the AML, such as the Public
Prosecution Office, the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and the tax authority. If the GIFI
establishes that money laundering (Article 299 of the Criminal Code) or the financing of
terrorism (Article 165a of the Criminal Code) is involved, it transfers the case to the
competent law enforcement authorities.
As indicated above, the GIFI also has the administrative power to suspend suspicious
transactions or to terminate and block bank accounts. The procedure is as follows. Pursuant
to Article 16 of the AML, any obligated institution that receives a customer request to
conclude a suspicious transaction, has carried out such a transaction, or has information
on intentions to carry out a transaction identified as offences under Articles 165a or 299
of the Criminal Code (financing terrorism and money laundering respectively), is obliged
to inform the GIFI promptly in writing and to hand over all data concerning this transac-
tion. The obligated institutionmust alsomention the prerequisites in favour of suspension
of the transaction or blockage of the account, and indicate the expected date of their
implementation. If the notifying obligated institution is not the one that would carry out
the transaction, it must clarify which other institution is competent to suspend the trans-
action or block the account. After the GIFI has confirmed receipt of the notification, the
obligated institution must wait 24 hours for a decision as to how to proceed with the
transaction covered by the notice.216
The GIFI analyses the notification and if it concludes that the (intended) transaction
is related to a criminal offence referred to in Article 165a and Article 299 of the Criminal
Code, it may –within 24 hours of the date and time indicated in the confirmation of receipt
213 Wójcik 2011, p. 387.
214 Wójcik 2011, p. 389.
215 Article 4 of the AML.
216 Article 16 (4) of the AML.
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of the notification – issue awritten request to suspend the transaction or block the account
for amaximumof 72 hours. TheGIFI can initiate this procedure ex officio without notifying
the obligated institution.217 However, the competent public prosecutorwithin the framework
of a criminal investigation must decide whether this period is to be extended.218 Parallel
to the request to suspend the transaction or block the account, the General Inspector
informs the competent public prosecutor of the fact that a crimemay have been committed
and forwards to him all information and documents concerning the suspended transaction
or the blocked account.219 The obligated institution is bound by the decision of the GIFI
and obliged to execute the decision immediately upon receipt.
In practice, it is considered much more effective to block an account than suspend a
transaction. This is illustrated by the low and declining number of suspended transactions
(from 26 in 2002 to two in 2011), whereas the number of blocked accounts increased from
eight in 2003 to 314 in 2011.220
Chapter 5a (Article 20d-20e) was added to the AML in 2009 for anti-terrorism pur-
poses.221 It obliges the obligated institution to freeze assets, except for movable and
immovable property, following provisions included in European Union law and domestic
legislation adopted to comply with obligations under international agreements or resolu-
tions to which the Republic of Poland is party. The GIFI takes an administrative decision
ex officio concerning the release of frozen asset values.222
9.5.1.4 Control of obligated institutions and imposition of administrative penalties
The GIFI and the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) have the important preventive role of
monitoring the duties of obligated institutions to register and report financial transactions.
Pursuant to Article 21 (2) of the AML, FIU inspectors, authorized in writing by the GIFI,
carry out the inspections. In specific cases institutions other than the GIFI are responsible
formonitoring: the President of theNational Bank of Poland inspects operators of currency
exchange offices and the competent heads of Customs inspect operators of games of chance,
mutual bets, and electronic gambling machines.223 Inspectors have the following powers:224
– On request, the obligated institution is required to disclose and immediately present
all documents and materials necessary for the inspection, with the exception of docu-
ments and materials containing classified (secret) information.
217 Article 18a of the AML.
218 See Rutkowska-Tomaszewska 2013, p. 546-547. Article 19 of the AML.
219 Article 18 (1) of the AML.
220 Szczuciński 2013, p. 175.
221 Act of 25 June 2009 amending the AML, Official Journal of 2009, no. 166, item 1317.
222 Article 20e (5) of the AML.
223 Article 21 (3) of the AML.
224 Articles 22 and 23 of the AML.
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– The obligated institution must provide timely explanations to the inspectors at their
request.
– Inspectors are entitled to access the facilities and premises in the presence of a repre-
sentative of the obligated institution.
– Inspectors can access documents and other documentation covered by the scope of
the inspection and obtain certified copies.
– Inspectors may demand oral and written explanations from the employees of the
obligated institution relevant for the inspection.
– Inspectors can move freely within the premises of the obligated institution.
The inspection report is to be sent to the GIFI within 14 days. The outcomes are also pre-
sented to the obligated institution. The latter has the right to notify the GIFI of any sub-
stantiated objections it has with regard to the inspection report. The GIFI considers the
objections and gives its written opinion to the complainant within 30 days.225
The GIFI submits the inspection report to the authorities exercising supervision over
the obligated institutions as well as to the authority appointed to prosecute offences, in
the case of substantiated suspicions of an offence.226 If the obligated institution is regulated
by the FEA ACT, the inspection report is submitted to the authorities competent to grant
concessions or permits for the business activity.
Furthermore, in accordance with Article 21 (3c) of the AML, the inspection may be
carried out at the request of the Ministry of Finance if the obligated institution is in the
process of applying for a concession or a permit for an activity regulated by the Gambling
Law of 19 November 2009.
TheGIFI is also competent to impose administrative penalties on obligated institutions
if they do not comply with their duties following from the AML. A maximum penalty of
PLN 100,000 applies to, inter alia, the following breaches of the AML:227
– failure to register ordinary and suspicious transactions;
– failure to provide the GIFI with the documents relating to these transactions;
– failure to keep records of the transactions or documents relating to these transactions
for the required period of time;
– failure to carry out the risk analysis essential for applying appropriate financial security
measures;
– failure to apply financial security measures.
225 Article 25 of the AML
226 Article 27 of the AML.
227 These are listed in Article 34a of the AML.
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Higher penalties up to a maximum of PLN 750,000 may be imposed for breaches of EU
law (Regulation 1781/2006) or for refusal to freeze the asset values, as required by theAML
(Article 34b and 34c of the AML).
9.5.2 Temporary blocking of suspect funds by banks
The GIFI may request temporary blocking of a bank account if it suspects that the account
has been used to finance terrorism or for money laundering.228 The Banking Law offers a
separate legal basis for blocking funds in bank accounts when there are substantiated sus-
picions of criminal activity. Pursuant to Article 106a (3-8) of the Banking Law, if there are
indications that some or all of the funds held in a bank account stem fromor are connected
with an offence other than those referred to in Article 165a and Article 299 of the Criminal
Code, the bank may block the funds. The bank’s decision to block the funds is not open
to appeal.
The funds blocked cannot exceed the amount suspected of coming from criminal
activities and theymay not be blocked for longer than 72 hours. Immediately after blocking
the funds, the bank notifies the public prosecutor. Before the 72-hour time limit expires,
the prosecutor must decide whether to initiate criminal proceedings and notify the bank
of his decision. The block is lifted if the public prosecutor decides not to initiate criminal
proceedings. Customs may also request the blocking of suspected funds in bank accounts.
9.5.3 Permit required for possession of firearms or ammunition
The Act of 21 May 1999 on weapons and ammunition (hereafter referred to as the AWA)
regulates the possession of firearms and ammunition.229 According to theAWA, possession
of firearms, including military firearms, firearms for hunting, sporting firearms, gas
weapons, alarm and signal weapons as well as ammunition for firearms, is not allowed
without a permit issued by theVoivodship Police Commander who holds jurisdiction over
the applicant’s place of residence.
As transpires from Article 10 of the AWA, the competent policy organ may issue a
permit if there is no risk that the applicant will use the weapon on himself; if the applicant
does not pose a threat to public order and public security; or if the applicant has a justified
need for the weapon. The latter may apply if there is a real and above-average risk to
applicant’s life, health or property. These are applicants who request a permit for the pur-
pose of personal protection and the protection of persons and property.230 Permits may
228 Article 165a or Article 299 of the Criminal Code.
229 Consolidated text published in: Official Journal of 2012, item 576.
230 Article 10 (3) point 1 of the AWA.
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be granted for activities such as personal protection, the protection of persons and property,
hunting and sports (this list is not exhaustive).
The firearms permit is issued in the form of an administrative decision that mentions
the purpose for which the permit was granted as well as the type and number of firearms
covered by the permit.231 In accordance with Article 15 of the AWA, the firearms permit
cannot be issued to persons who:
– are under 21 (unless the firearm is used exclusively for hunting or sport);
– suffer mental disorders as defined in the Act of 19 August 1994 on the protection of
mental health;232
– have significantly reduced mental and physical abilities;
– suffer from a significant psychological dysfunction;
– are addicted to alcohol or psychoactive substances;
– do not have permanent residence in Poland;
– pose a threat to themselves, public order or public security (this prerequisite concerns:
a) persons convicted in a final judgment of the court of an intentional criminal or fiscal
offence; b) persons convicted in a final court judgment of an unintentional crime
against life or health or of an unintentional crime againstmotor traffic safety committed
in a state of insobriety, under the influence of an intoxicant, or when the perpetrator
fled the scene of the crime).
The applicant must furnish the police with certificates issued by authorized doctors and
psychologists proving that he or she complies with the above-mentioned medical and
psychological requirements. Moreover, the permit holder must submit such certificates
to the police every five years.233 If a doctor or psychologist concludes that the applicant
does not complywith the requirements, hemust immediately inform the police accordingly.
As transpires from Article 18 of the AWA, the competent police department will
withdraw the permit if the person to whom it was issued:
– does not comply with the conditions specified in the permit;
– no longer complies with the requirements set in Article 15 of the AWA (see above);
– breaches the duty to report the loss of his firearms;
– carries discharged weapons or holds the weapons when intoxicated with alcohol or
psychotropic substances.
The permit may be withdrawn if the person to whom it was granted breaches one of the
requirements set in the AWA. This may concern obligations to register the firearms, to
231 Article 12 (1) of the AWA.
232 Official Journal of 2011, no. 231, item 1375.
233 Article 15 (4) of the AWA.
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undergo medical and psychological examination or to report moving to another place of
permanent residence, and the prohibition on placing the weapons into the hands of
unauthorized persons.234
The firearm may only be sold to persons who have a valid permit for the specific type
of firearm.A person selling a firearmor the relevant ammunitionmust immediately inform
the competent police organ.
The police keep records of all legal firearms in Poland and of the permit holders in a
central national register administrated by theNational PoliceCommander. The information
stored in the register is very detailed and comprises:
1. personal data on all permit holders; personal data on all persons allowed to possess a
firearm under specific regulations (such as police officers); personal data on all persons
applying for a permit; personal data on all persons in possession of a registration card
for the weapon;
2. all official information and opinions concerning the above-mentioned persons collected
in the course of the permit application procedure;
3. information about the number, type and identification features of all firearms in pos-
session of the persons indicated above.
Illegal possession of firearms or ammunition constitutes a criminal offence subject to a
sentence of between six months and eight years.235 Production of or trading in illegal
firearms is subject to a penalty of up to ten years.236 Breaches of duties stemming from the
AWA constitute petty offences and are subject to a fine.237
234 Article 18 (5) of the AWA.
235 Article 263 § 2 of the Criminal Code.
236 Article 263 § 1 of the Criminal Code.
237 Article 51 of the AWA.
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10 The administrative approach in Spain
A. Huesca & J.E. Conde
10.1 Introduction
10.1.1 Context
As a starting point, it is important to note that Spain has no national policy concerning
an administrative approach to crime. Under Spanish national law, administrative author-
ities cannot have the same competences as law enforcement authorities. There are
administrative measures and tools that can be used in the Spanish context, however.
Given this context, this country report will discuss the Spanish administrative structure
and traditional law enforcement in order to address the various topics proposed in the
underlying ISEC research. The report focuses on the following main question:
Which administrative instruments exist in Spain to prevent serious and organized
criminals from using/misusing the legitimate system of public administration
(‘administrative approach’)?
One needs to bear in mind that there is no link between the everyday workings of public
administration and the security services in Spain. Currently, there is no systemof organized
crime prevention. The police or the judicial system tackles organized crime using traditional
law enforcement measures. Punitive actions are the main tool used to address organized
crime in Spain. The information in this report has been updated to March 2014.
10.1.2 A brief description of current police action
Organized crime is more a political concept than a legal one, which allows for a wide range
of different interpretations. From a criminological and sociological standpoint, various
theories have been put forward to explain crime and criminal behaviour. For instance,
Vélez1 points out that explanations of the specific aetiology of organized crime are rare.
Modern theories are based on the notion that organized crime and legitimate markets
1 Vélez Rodríguez 2008, p. 93.
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coexist and are closely related. The line that separates ‘good from evil’ is unclear: ‘organized
crime is the response to a market, rather than a creation of it, as it was originally thought.’2
This theory suggests that if legitimate markets are part of a globalized economy, this
creates space for organizations and groups considered illegitimate.3 The preventive
administrative approach to organized crime, which proposes the use of administrative
measures, is based precisely the notion that organized crime is an adapted form of delin-
quency within the context of national socio-economic reality.
However, the Spanish system continues to use the traditional law enforcement approach
to organized crime, based on the application of the Spanish Penal Code andwhat is known
as ‘police action’. The Spanish security forces at the national level are the Cuerpo Nacional
de Policía (CNP) and theGuardiaCivil. Both havemainly the same functions, the difference
being that the CNP acts only in urban areas. These are the two main law enforcement
authorities assigned to tackle organized crime, and they play a special role in the areas of
drug trafficking, financial fraud,money laundering, corruption and contraband. TheCNP
resides hierarchically under the Ministry of the Interior, the Guardia Civil under the
Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence. There are also autonomous police
forces (which are part of theAutonomous InteriorMinistries4) and, to a lesser extent, local
police forces (which fall within the scope of local administrations5). Thework of the customs
monitoring services, which is part of the Tax Office’s Department of Customs and Excise
Duty (AEAT), should also be noted.6
The profile of organized crime in Spain is shown in the following table.7
Main illegal activities:
– drug trafficking;
2 Gómez Céspedes 2003, p. 79.
3 Vélez Rodríguez 2008, p. 93.
4 There are four autonomous police forces: The Foral Police of Navarra (created in 1928); the Ertzainza, in
the Basque country (created in 1982); the Mozos de Escuadra, part of the Catalonian Government (created
in 1983) and the Canarian Police (created in 2010). The Valencian Government, the Principality of Asturias,
the Autonomous Community of Aragón, the Autonomous Community of Andalucía and the Autonomous
Community of Galicia were assigned autonomous police forces, i.e. part of the National Police organization.
In the remaining Autonomous Communities (up to 17), the National Police acts directly.
5 Local police are subject to the legal regime of Organic Law 2/86 of 13 March of the state’s security bodies
and forces.
6 The Customs Security Forces (SVA) are of special interest with regard to organized crime, given that their
responsibilities include drug trafficking, financial fraud, money laundering, organized crime, corruption
and contraband. Law 31/2010 of 27 July recognizes its civil servants as Public Officers and the SVA as a State
Security service. Customs Security collaborates with European bodies such as the European Office Against
Organised Crime or the World Customs Organisation and has a presence within the Central Intelligence
Agency Against Organised Crime (CICO) together with members of the Security Forces. Source: SVA News
Journal, http://noticiassva.blogspot.com.es/.
7 Ministry of the Interior 2010.
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– crimes against property and the socio-economic order;8
– money laundering;
Other illegal activities:
– illegal migration routes and networks control;
– human trafficking;
– document forgery;
Emerging activities (integrated within those mentioned above)
– cybercrime.
Spain’s Strategy Against Organized Crime 2005-2010 created the Centre of Intelligence
against Organized Crime (CICO) in 2006. It was entrusted with: ‘the elaboration of intel-
ligence as well as the establishment of criteria for operational coordination between services
in the event of overlap between investigations, if necessary.’ The CICO consists of police
officers and civil guards.9
The years thereafter saw an increase in the number of specialists working within the
National Police and the Guardia Civil, the creation of the Response Against Organized
Crime Group (GRECO) and the Guardia Civil teams against Organized Crime (ECO),
and the reinforcement of intelligence units. At the same time, police, customs and national
and international judicial coordination was enhanced and legislative changes were intro-
duced.
Both GRECO and ECO are operative units empowered to tackle organized crime, such
as vehicle trafficking, the copying of credits cards and their fraudulent use, forced robbery,
illegal immigration for the purpose of prostitution, arms trafficking and drug trafficking.
In their regular investigatory work, they can seek to cooperate with other government and
private institutions in order to make effective progress in their enquiries, as in any other
crime investigation. Cooperation is mostly intended to collect information.10
8 ‘Crimes against property and the socio-economic order’ replaces ‘crimes against property’ in the Criminal
Code of 1995 and are: the crimes listed in Title XIII, Book II of the Criminal Code of 1995, which includes
theft, robbery, extortion, the theft and use of stolen vehicles, fraud crimes (fraud, misappropriation, theft of
electricity and similar), punishable insolvency, changing prices in public tenders and auctions, damage,
offences relating to intellectual property, themarket and consumers, subtraction of goods of social or cultural
value, including corporate crimes as well as related behaviours. Jurídica (via: http://www.enciclopedia-
juridica.biz14.com/).This new introduction of crimes against the social economic order ‘reflects the quietness
of the Economic Criminal Law legislator against ‘white collar’ crimes.’
9 Montes López 2011, p. 1-23.
10 Some of the successes are: the Ballena Blanca or White Whale operation, which resulted in the dismantling
of a major organization dedicated to money laundering; the Wasp operation, which was developed on the
Mediterranean coast against criminal groups in Eastern Europe; the Nile operation, culminating in the arrest
of over 300 Nigerians who were conducting massive scams, both nationally and internationally; Operation
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As a result of these efforts, the police are more efficient and there has been a sustained
increase in the number of detainees, as shown in Figure 10.1.
Number of organized crime detainees 2004-201011Figure 10.1
Following the success of this first plan, the measures set out in the Strategy Against Orga-
nized Crime 2011-2014 are currently being implemented, with police forces following up
with pursuit and prosecution. The measures intend:
1. to strengthen intelligence (reinforcing the CICO, creating a Commission of Coordina-
tion against Organized Crime12);
2. to attack the organized criminal economy (promoting legal changes which allow for
the identification of the owners of businesses and funds, access to bank accounts,
tracking of financial operations, and more efficient seizure and management of confis-
cated assets);
Tull, which led to the capture at sea of a ship carrying a large amount of cocaine and the dismantling of a
drug cartel. (See: Press Office of the Government of Spain http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/).
11 Ministry of the Interior 2010.
12 This Commission, presided over by the secretary for State Security, is formed by: the director-general of the
Police and the Guardia Civil; the director of the CICO; the director of the CNCA (National Centre of
Antiterrorism Coordination); the CNI manager (National Intelligence Agency); the SEPBLAC manager
(Executive Service for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Monetary Fraud); the chief prosecutor for
Drug and Corruption Prevention and the Commissioner General and Judicial Police Director of the CNP
and Guardia Civil. See Ministry of the Interior 2010.
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These measures are always executed following prosecution and not used preventively:
1. to attack organized crime’smain agenda: drug trafficking, corruption,money launder-
ing, Internet crime, human trafficking, crimes against intellectual or industrial property,
value-added tax fraud, falsification and forgery;
2. to reinforce the operative capacity of the National Police and the Guardia Civil by
providing further resources and to develop programmes for undercover agents, witness
protection, European warrants of arrest, etc.;
3. to encourage international coordination and cooperation;
4. to promote the participation of the public and private sector by creating cooperative
channels with the industrial, financial and economic sectors.13
10.1.3 Introduction to Spanish public administration
The purpose of this section is to describe some of the most important characteristics of
public administration Spain in order to provide a basis for understanding the remainder
of the report.
Following the same path as other advanced western democracies, the most significant
overall change that Spain has experienced in recent decades concerns the presence, size
and mission of public administrative bodies within society. Taking Colino’s14 ideas as our
starting point, we can state that:
there have been changes in administrative bodies, such as changes in institutional
design, the decentralization or opening up of political-administrative structures
to new types of cooperation, formerly in the minority, with other agents and non-
public organizations.
Public administration is made up of institutions that have undergone several changes in
western democracies in recent decades, for example due to decentralization; the globaliza-
tion of regulations, and the re-evaluation of that which is singular and local.15
Before considering public administration in Spain, wemust review its historical context
and the peculiarities that have contributed to its transformation, which have differed from
13 In the scope of their competence.
14 Olmeda, Parrado & Colino 2012, p. 11.
15 In this sense, a bi-directionalmovement can be seen in Spain: centrifugal, for example the internationalization
of the economy, culture, social habits, etc., and centripetal, e.g. key features and local particulars, territorially
speaking closer to the lives of citizens. These are simultaneous movements in line with what Roland
Robertson calls Beck globalization. Administratively, they have given more power to the sub-national levels
of government, primarily the regions, but also municipalities, something that can be problematic because
the latter, in particular, have not seen an equivalent increase in financial resources.
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those of other countries in the past few years.16 These peculiarities are based on a series of
transitions, including:
– from an authoritarian regime to a democratic system;
– from a regime of mere administrative legality which ignored political liberties and the
majority of civil and social rights, to a state governed by the rule of law;
– from a centralist and uniform state to a state made up of Autonomous Regions which
formally guarantees the right of the nationalities and regions to self-government and
which institutionalizes local autonomy;
– from a state which created a predominantly internal market to a state which abides by
the European and international market;
– from a state with very limited social action to a welfare state;
– from an isolated and internationally subordinated state to a state that acts in interna-
tional political, economic, cultural, development cooperation and humanitarian aid
affairs;
– from a closed and authoritarian society to an open society that is appreciative and
respectful of diversity, tolerant and plural, enterprising, responsible and caring, politi-
cally demanding and active, and increasingly respectful of the constitutional and legal
order;
– from an unequal industrialized society to a globalized knowledge-driven society which
is demanding a drastic reassessment of the institutional frameworks.
Among all the peculiarities of the Spanish State, the most complex is the system of differing
administrative levels that has traditionally accompanied the decentralization processes
that run parallel to the expansion of the welfare state. In general, there are three levels: the
central level (which also administrates territory by means of government delegations and
sub-delegations); the regional level, with seventeen Autonomous Communities whose
power is superior to similar tiers of government in many western federal countries; and
the local level, where local governments differ from the Provincial Councils.
The subnational scope of government has been revitalized in Spain in recent years (as
it has in other European countries), either for functional reasons or owing to socio-political
demands linked to the decentralization processes that run parallel to the expansion of the
welfare state. This involves administrative agents at a sub-state level playing a key role in
the development of key public policies. The reinforcement of autonomous and local gov-
ernments and administrations has had a very strong impact in Spain on the configuration
and functioning of public administration.
16 Prats 2004, p. 27-102.
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Colino17 highlights the redistribution of human and material forces in the service of
different organizations and the creation of strong sub-state bureaucracies. Froma functional
point of view, this means the redistribution of the roles that administrators carry out as
well as changes to the relationship between different government and administrative levels
and the citizens, whom receive the closest and most receptive administrative policies.
Public administrators are therefore forced to have everyday relationshipswith administra-
tors at other territorial levels of government:
These levels can be somewhat subordinated to them, formally or informally,
and are obliged to institutionalize policies or regulations issued by the admin-
istrative unit, or they can be subordinated to others, being funded and regulated
by superior levels and obliged to comply or act in a manner conditioned by the
superior level. These relationships can reflect legal instruments as well as inter-
administrative agreements or committees.18
Regarding the competences of Spanish public administration, it is very difficult to create
a complete overview here. In general terms, based on the Spanish Constitution of 1978
and the different Statutes of Autonomy, there is a quasi-federal model with exclusive
competences divided between the Central State (i.e. citizenship, immigration, emigration,
international relations,military defence and armed forces) and theAutonomousCommu-
nities (i.e. trains or navigable canals inside their territory). There are also shared compe-
tences (including penitentiary regulation, intellectual and industrial property and labour
law) and concurrent competences. The latter implies that the Central State approves the
basic legislation and the Autonomous Communities approve the legislation and see to its
enforcement. This is the case for health care, education and the economy.
According to Article 26 paragraph 1 of Law 7/85 establishing the Framework for the
Local Regime, all municipalities are responsible for such services as city lights, cemeteries,
sanitation, remediation, water supply, pavements and food safety inspections. Depending
on the number of inhabitants of the municipality, more duties are added. For example, a
municipality with more than 20,000 inhabitants assumes such duties as civil protection,
social services and fire-fighting. Municipalities with 50,000 inhabitants or more assume
additional responsibilities in the fields of environmental protection and public transporta-
tion. All municipalities with a population of more than 30,000 persons must implement
the following public policies:19
17 Olmeda, Parrado & Colino 2012, p. 30.
18 Olmeda, Parrado & Colino 2012, p. 30.
19 Brugué & Gomá 1998, p. 33.
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– local and economic promotion policies, including business innovation, attracting
businesses, labour supply, infrastructures, etc.;
– urban and territorial policies, including housing, equipment, transportation, etc.;
– local welfare policies, including socio-sanitary policies (health, social services, consump-
tion) and socio-cultural policies (culture, education, youth).
10.2 Screening and/or monitoring of natural persons for criminal
activity
10.2.1 Certificado de Antecedentes Penales (CAP)
The first screening instrument that we will analyse is the Certificado de Antecedentes
Penales (CAP). The CAP is a criminal record and is subject to the Registro Central de
Penados (Central Convicts Registry), formally coming within the scope of the Administra-
tive Registries for Judiciary Support20 alongwith theDomesticViolence andGenderVictims
Registry or the Registry of Judgments concerning the Criminal Responsibility of Minors.
The CAP is a document issued by the Central Convicts Registry and includes all the
crimes for which a person has gone to trial and been convicted. It encompasses all the
information collected by the Registro Central de Penados, with Article 252 of the Criminal
Procedure Code obliging the court clerks to send all the information on a specific case
immediately to the Registry after judgment is passed.21
According to Article 5 of Royal Decree 95/2009, all the information contained in any
of the Administrative Registries for Judiciary Support are accessible to the institutions
listed below, subject to prior authorization by the Ministry of Justice:
– the Courts, through the clerks and for the sole purpose of being used in any pending
enquiries and/or investigations;
– the Prosecution Office, when necessary to fulfil their duties according to the Criminal
Procedural Code, Organic Law 5/2000 on the Minor’s Criminal Responsibility and
Law 50/1981 of December 30 on the Regulation of the Prosecution Office;
– the person to whom the information in the Registries applies, after proving their
identity.
20 Royal Decree 95/2009, of February 6, in which the Administrative Registrar support to the Administration
of Justice system is regulated. BOE n. 33, 7 February 2009.
21 Royal Decree of 14 September 1882 in which the Criminal Procedure Code is approved. BOE n. 260, of
17 September 1882.
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Apart from such general access, the Central Convicts Registry involves other authorities
that have access to the information, including:22
– the Judiciary Police;23
– the Weapons and Explosives Intervention Unit of the Guardia Civil;
– the Cuerpo Nacional de Policía units in charge of issuing passports;
– the Cuerpo Nacional de Policía units in charge of customs and entry into Spain.
According to Article 8 of Royal Decree 95/2009, the CAP contains general personal
information such as a person’s name, alias, gender, date of birth, address, nationality,
national identity document or passport number as well as information related to their
prosecution or police report. Concerning legal persons, the information consists of their
object, nationality, official address, tax address, main activities and tax identification code.
Along with the general personal details, the CAP has information on all convictions, both
for natural and legal persons. Concerning legal persons, liability is linked to its managers;
consequently, the information included into the Registry relates to both the legal person
and the manager or managers. The CAP includes the date of the judgment, the date on
which it entered into force, the Court that issued the judgment and the relevant articles
of the Criminal Code, i.e. the crime24 itself. Moreover, it includes the punishment, along
with other relevant procedural information.25,26
As mentioned above, the Central Convicts Registry is not public, which means that
save for a few exceptions, only the natural or legal person to whom/which the information
refers may request a CAP. This implies that most administrative bodies do not have access
to it. Such access is, however, required to prevent organized crime by means of the
administrative approach as referred to in the underlying ISEC research. This limitation is
contained in Article 136 paragraph 4 of the Spanish Criminal Code:27
Criminal records entered into the various Sections managed by the Central
Criminal Records Bureau shall not be public. While they are in force, certifica-
tions shall only be issued subject to the limitations and guarantees provided
for in the specific rules and in the cases established by law. In all cases, certifi-
22 With the exception of cancelled entries; Article 6 of Royal Decree 95/2009.
23 A special police officer in charge of collecting evidence and assisting in trials.
24 Also, from2011 on, theRegistry has included information onminor criminal offences.Moreover, an electronic
system is provided for according to the second additional Provision toOrganic Law 5/2010: ‘TheGovernment,
in collaboration with the Autonomous Communities with competence in this matter, will establish, within
a year, an electronic system for the registration of minor criminal offences.’
25 SeeArticle 9 ofOrganic Law 5/2010. This information consists of the location of the court sitting in judgment,
registry information, degree of responsibility, preliminary actions, etc.
26 See Article 9 Royal Decree 95/2009 of 6 February 2009.
27 Organic Law 10/1995, of 23 November, Criminal Code. BOE-A-1995-25444.
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cations requested by judges or courts of law shall be issued, whether or not
they refer to entries that have been expunged, and specifically stating the latter
circumstance when applicable.
This article may seem contrary to what is specified in Article 120 paragraph 1 of the
Spanish Constitution,28 which says:
Judicial proceedings shall be public, save for exceptions set out in the laws on
procedure.
These exceptions have been implemented through a system in which the names and main
data of those convicted are replaced by a pseudonym or a false name in order to protect
the reputation and privacy of the criminal.29 Using this system, all judgments are publicly
accessible. They are usually collected in databases, subject to the aforementioned protection
of the right to privacy of the persons concerned.
Concerning the limits placed on public and even administrative access to the data
included in the CAP, the Constitutional Court, in Judgment 144/1999 of 22 July 1999,30
ruled that a non-authorized administrative body that requires a CAP is infringing Article
18.1 of the Spanish Constitution.31 This ruling makes the CAP a matter of privacy and
private data, although judgments must be published.
This is unlike other legal systems, for example in the United States, where instruments
such as Megan’s Law32 are applied and information on persons convicted of sexual assault
is published in their communities. In the USA, the Convicts Registry is published for social
reasons; in Spain, it is conceived of as amere judiciary instrument for evaluating recidivism
with a view to future judgments and suspended sentences.33 This makes the Spanish CAP
an instrument of social restitution for former convicts, that upholds such cultural values
as privacy, freedom of speech, and rehabilitation.34
Generally, a CAP is always required when applying for a job or working in public
administration, according to Article 56 of Law 7/2007, of 12 April on the Basic Statute of
the Public Worker. Every person who applies for a job as a public servant must therefore
obtain and present this document.
28 Spanish Constitution of 1978. BOE-A-1978-31229.
29 Larrauri & Jacobs 2011.
30 STC 144/1999, BOE Núm, 204 22/08/1999.
31 In which ‘The right to honour, to personal and family privacy and to one’s own image is guaranteed.’
32 Zgoba et al. 2008.
33 Article 22 paragraph 8 states that aggravating circumstances include the presence of a criminal record and
Article 66 paragraph 5 of the Criminal Code sets out the procedural rules regarding Article 22 of the Spanish
Criminal Code.
34 Larrauri & Jacobs 2011.
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The CAP can only be obtained by the person to whom the information pertains. That
person must request the CAP from the Ministry of Justice or the Civil Registry and pay
€3.66. The procedure is simple and open to every interested citizen who wishes to consult
his or her CAP; applicants can submit their request in person, along with a valid ID, to
any office of the Ministry of Justice, the Civil Registry or the Public Service Office (the
latter only in the Autonomous Community of Madrid). The whole process does not take
more than a week.
The absence of a criminal record is required for persons applying for certain public
and semi-public jobs or for the issuing of certain licences and administrative authorizations.
In the following pages, we review several areas in which a CAP is required (Table 10.1).
Areas in which a CAP is required.35Table 10.1
ProcedureDescription/ContentLegislationProfession/Licence




Art. 13.2a) of the Gen-
eral Statute of the
Lawyers
to the Bar Associationa person from working
as a lawyer’
Spanish Legal Profes-
sion (RD 658/2001, of
22 June)
documents such as
their law degree, a copy
of their ID and a receipt
for the payment of
association fees, as well
as their CAP. If the
CAP shows no criminal
record, they are admit-
ted to the Bar Associa-
tion and can work as
lawyers.
In the case of Lottery
andGamblingLicences,
‘Have you been con-
victed in a judgment
Art. 13.2a) Law




the CAP is onlyissued in the four years
required for the ownerpreceding the date of
of the business when heapplication for the
applies for an activity
licence on the premises.
authorization certifi-
cate’
In this case both own-
ers and employees of
‘That is directed and
administered by persons
Art. 5.9 Royal Decree
142/1996, of 1 October
International adoption
agencies
the Adoption Agencyqualified by their ethicalon the legal regime for
must submit their CAPstandards and by train-the operation and
to the Administrationing and/or experience toenabled associates in
international adoption showing that they dowork in the field of
international adoption’ not have previous
crimes related to or
having a potential effect
on adoption.
35 Larrauri & Jacobs 2011.
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ProcedureDescription/ContentLegislationProfession/Licence
All agents at currency
exchange offices are
‘In the recruitment of its
agents, owners should




required to present arequire accreditation of
clean CAP when beingthe agents having paid
recruited; the CAP willthe corresponding busi-
be analysed along with
their job application.
ness tax and, in the case
of natural persons, of
the absence of a crimi-
nal record’
Public Auditors who
wish to be registered in
‘Persons wishing to be
registered in the Official
Art. 7.1c) Law 19/1988,
of 12 July concerning
Auditing
Auditors
the Official Register ofRegister of Auditors
must:
- be an adult.
- have Spanish national-
ity or the nationality of
Auditors must provide
a clean CAP; if they
have a criminal record,
they will not be able to
register.any of the Member
States of the European
Union, subject to the
rules on the right of
establishment…
- have no criminal
record for fraud’
All agents and employ-
ees of Bank of Spain are
‘Regulates removal for
conviction of a felony,
Art. 25.4d) Law
13/1994, of 1 June36
Bank of Spain
required to present aapplicants are required
cleanCAPwhen apply-to submit certificates
ing for a job at a bank;concerning their crimi-
theCAP is examined bynal backgrounds in
the employer whenorder to apply for the









expressly required tocant has not been dis-Barcelona: Article 2f of
present their CAPqualified from the exer-the framework govern-
alongwith their applica-cise of public functionsing the call-by opposi-
tion for evaluation; likeor has been removed fortion to tender for the
other prospective pub-disciplinary reasonsprovision of 30 job
lic servants, they must
have a clean record.
from any public admin-
istration position’
offers in the category of
prevention service fire-
fighter, firefighting and




5766, of 30 November
2010)
36 Law 13/1994, of 1 June on the Autonomy of the Bank of Spain, BOE-A-1994-12553.
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ProcedureDescription/ContentLegislationProfession/Licence
Apart from having a
valid driver’s licence
‘For the purposes of this
Act, persons are deemed
Article 44 of Law




and having passed theto be of good repute if
driving theory andthey have no record of
any of the following:





fraud, subject to a sen- that they have not com-
tence equal to or less mitted crimes related to
than prison, for as long their future activities in
transport.as the sentence has not
been cancelled…’
Among other personal
(residence in Spain and
‘Within fifteen working
days of publication of
Depends on the specific
Municipality, e.g.
Taxi drivers
a valid driving licence),the results of the exami-Madrid: Article 28.3 c)
tax-related (payingnation, candidates willof theOrdinance Regu-
fees) or mechanical (ahave to submit docu-lating the Service Vehi-
taxi meter or all techni-ments that meet the fol-
lowing requirements:…
c) No criminal record’
cle Rental Taxi Meter
Apparatus38 cal vehicle inspections)
requirements, taxi
drivers must show that
they have a clean crimi-
nal record when apply-
ing for a licence.
In the case of public
contracting, which we
‘Persons may not con-
tract with the public
Article 49 Law 30/2007,
on Public Contracting39
Public contractors
will discuss in Sectionsector in either of the
10.2.4, all personsfollowing circumstances:
applying for a govern-a. if they have been con-
mental tender need tovicted in a final judg-
present their CAP andment of offences of con-
confirm that they havespiracy, corruption in








crimes against the rights
of workers, embezzle-
ment and receiving and
related behaviours,
offences relating to envi-
ronmental protection or
special disqualification
for the exercise of a pro-
fession, trade, industry
or commerce’
37 Law 16/1987 of 30 July, regulating land transport. BOE-A-1987-17803.
38 Ordinance Regulating the Service Vehicle Rental Taxi Meter Apparatus of Madrid. Official Bulletin of the
Comunidad de Madrid 13/12/2012 N. 297 p. 52-88.
39 Law 30/2007 on Public Contracting. BOE-A-2007-18874.
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ProcedureDescription/ContentLegislationProfession/Licence
Persons taking the apti-
tude tests and undergo-
‘Not have been con-
victed of a crime, or
Resolution 30 April
2010 (last call for
Cuerpo Nacional de
Policía & Guardia
Civil ing the physical exami-removed from the ser-vacancies) Article
2.1.f)40 nation for acceptancevice of State, Regional,
into the CNP or theLocal and Institutional
Guardia Civil mustManagement, or be dis-
submit a clean CAP
with their applications.
qualified from the exer-
cise of public functions’
In addition to other
physical, psychological
‘To participate in the
selection processes, per-
Art 56 Law 7/2007, the
Basic Statute of Public
Employees
Penitentiary staff
and personal require-sons need to meet the
ments, all applicantsfollowing requirements:
…
d) Not have been
removed for disciplinary
must present their
CAP; its absence or the
presence of a criminal
reasons from any govern- record will result in
ment or constitutional their application not
being considered.or statutory bodies of
the Autonomous Com-
munities, or be in abso-
lute or special disqualifi-
cation from public office




‘unable to enter in the
legal profession to the
Art. 303 Law 6/1985 of
1 July on the Judiciary41
Judges
when applying; anyjudiciary: the physically
application thator mentally disabled,
includes a criminalthose convicted of a
record is not consid-
ered.
felony unless they have
obtained the rehabilita-




absence of a dismissal
order, as well as those
without the full exercise





Art. 12.d Royal Decree
276/2007, of 23 Febru-
ary42
Teachers
when applying forproceedings from the
admission to the publicservice of any public
examination; any appli-authorities or have been
cation that includes adisqualified from the
criminal record is not
considered.
exercise of public func-
tions.’
40 See Organic Law 2/86 of 13 March, on Security Forces. BOE-A-1986-6859.
41 Law 6/1985 of 1 July on the Judiciary. BOE-A-1985-12666.
42 Royal Decree 276/2007, of 23 February. BOE-A-2007-4372.
386




‘lack of fitness to enter
the notarial profession,
Article 7.2 of Notary
Regulation, approved
Notaries
when applying formaking them ineligibleby Decree of 2 June
194443 admission to the publicto exercise public func-
examination; any appli-tions as the result of a
judgment’ cation that includes a




‘9.2c) c) Not be disquali-




when applying for apublic functions by final
judgment’
greso.es/por-
tal/page/portal/Con- place on the public
greso/Con- examination; any appli-
greso/Organos/Sec-
Gen/CG_B073.pdf
cation that includes a
criminal record is not
considered.
When requesting a Pri-
vate School Licence
‘They may not own a
private schools if they:
a) provide services to the
state, regional or local
education authority.
b) have a criminal
record for fraud.’
Article 21.2 b, LO
8/1985, of 3 July, regu-
lating the Right to Edu-
cation44
Private school owners





ments, provide a copy
of their CAP; those
with a criminal record






Art 8.2b and 10.2 e, f




for the licences at thethat appear in the Regis-
Ministry of the Interior,ter referred to in para-
owners of private secu-graph 1 of the preceding
article must have.
b) No criminal record’
rity companies must
provide their CAP and
validate the absence of
a criminal record.
For all the cases listed in Table 10.1, the CAP requirement is evaluated in relative terms.
This implies that even if the absence of a criminal record is required, the CAP will only be
taken into account in cases where a certain criminal record is related to the activity of the
job.
43 Notary Regulation, approved by Decree of 2 June 1944. BOE-A-1944-6578.
44 LO 8/1985, of 3 July, regulating the Right to Education. BOE-A-1985-12978.
45 Law 23/1992 of 30 July, of Private Security. BOE-A-1999-2332.
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10.2.2 General requirements for starting a business
The financial and economic crisis, an overall unemployment rate46 of more than 26%47
and a youth unemployment rate of 57%48 have led since 2008 to more liberalized and
simplified access to economic activities. Before, not only did such activities require a
business licence but entrepreneurs also had to satisfy other requirements for the opening
or transfer of businesses.
The economic downturn has led to a series of legislative amendments that allow for
quicker, simplified processing of the relevant documents and issuing of licences or regula-
tory approvals (authorizations). These will be discussed below.
In Spain, economic activity can be subject to an administrative licence or prior autho-
rization by the local board, following the provisions of Article 84 paragraph1 sub b of Law
7/1985.49
1. Local authorities may intervene in the activity of citizens by the following means:
a. …
b. b) Prior licensing and other acts of preventive inspection.50 However, when concerning
access to and the carrying out of service activities fallingwithin the scope of Law 17/2009
of 23 November on free access to service activities and their use,51 the economic activity
is subject to the provisions therein;
c. …
d. Follow-up inspection at the start of the activity, in order to verify compliance with the
regulations.
Local bodies are responsible for ensuring the safety of and licensing procedures for eco-
nomic activities within their territory, as long as these bodies act in compliance with the
principles of equality, necessity and proportionality, as is set out in paragraph 2 of the
same article:
2. Any intervention by the local authorities will comply with the principles of
equal treatment, necessity and proportionality to the aim pursued.
46 Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social. Servicio Público de Empleo. http://www.sepe.es/contenido/estadis-
ticas/datos_avance/pdf/empleo/evolparoseries.pdf.
47 Expansión: http://www.expansion.com/2014/01/08/economia/1389175910.html.
48 El diario: http://www.eldiario.es/economia/Espana-vuelve-record-juvenil-Europa_0_215928557.html.
49 Law 7/1985 of 2 April, establishing of the Foundations of the Local Regime. BOE-A-1985-5392.
50 I.e. if municipal by-laws impose special requirements for a certain activity.
51 Law 17/2009 of 23 November on free access to activities and their use. BOE-A-2009-18731.
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The general rule set byArticle 84bis of Law 7/1985 is that no licence or ‘any other preventive
means of control’ is required to carry out economic activities. However, exceptions apply:
– in cases where, due to considerations of public order, public security, public health or
environmental protection,52 the activity requires a communication to be issued to the
administrative authorities or a statement of accountability;53
– in cases of scarcity of natural resources, technical impediments are imposed to the use
of public domains in the form of a tariff or in reducing the economic operators in the
field.
The aforementioned exceptions allow the Spanish administrative authorities to require a
licence to open any business (bars, restaurants and other services to the public) that could
affect its surroundings or the establishment itself. This contrasts with ‘regular activities’,54
where a licence is not required. It is important to note that the issuing of this licence can
never be based on the personal situation of the applicant. Instead, the licence is based on
‘technical’ conditions. These technical requirements are intended to ensure that the service
provided to citizens is safe, and they are usually based on parameters such as the maximum
capacity of the establishment (for example for a nightclub), the electrical system, measures
to prevent or avoid noise pollution, protectivemeasures when storing ormoving hazardous
materials or the protection of heritage objects.
The task of public administrators when implementing the requirements for issuing
licences is to prevent or avoid the ‘negative consequences’ that a business might have. This
means that the issuing of licences or administrative authorizations is proportional in nature:
the more the economic activity impacts its surroundings, the stricter the requirements.
The Royal Decree of 25 May 2012 concerns urgent measures to liberalize the market
and certain services.55 The decree came into effect on 28 December 2012. Through this
‘ephemeral norm’, the requirement of ex ante licences became void for ‘retail economic
activities and the provision of certain services identified in the annexes to this decree,
taking place through permanent establishments, situated in any part of the national territory
and whose useful public surface area will not be over 300 square metres’, as long as such
establishment did not affect the environment or heritage objects.
52 Regulated by Municipal by-laws on Public Health, Zoning Plans or Environmental Protection Plans.
53 A statement of accountability is a document signed by the claimant in which he states that he is accountable
for complying with the requirements and the rules governing access to or the exercise of a right, by which
statement the documentation is accredited and he agrees to maintain compliance during the period implied
by the recognition or exercise of the right. In contrast, a communication is a document in which an interested
party brings his identification data and other applicable requirements for the exercise of a right or for the
start of an activity to the attention of the competent public authority.
54 The municipal authority itself makes this distinction. It is beyond the scope of this report to describe all the
distinctions made.
55 RoyalDecree 19/2012, of urgentmeasures for commerce liberalization and of certain services. BOE-A-2012-
6929.
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This decree was received positively in Spain, as it was considered a necessary measure.
In the words of the vice-president, Soraya Sáez de Santamaria, it ‘seeks to change adminis-
trative culture, liberate commerce, simplify procedures, speed up agreements, end
bureaucracy and, above all, back entrepreneurs, because at this moment of crisis public
administration should open doors for them, not close them.’28 The decree substituted
licence applications by a system of statements of accountability and/or communications
for establishments of less than 750 square meters.56 This new system, commonly known
as Licencia Express, substitutes the preventive control of activities by an ex post system that
seeks to ensure compliance with the content of the statement or communication.
This decree is a response to the economic crisis in that it promotes economic investment
and consumption in Spain. In 2012 the process of applying for a licence could take up to
24months. This was a deterrent for entrepreneurs and small andmedium-sized enterprises
and discouraged communities from zoning more surface area for economic activities.
Another economic measure is Law 11/2007 of 22 June on electronic access for citizens
to public services.57 This law allows for online access to administrative procedures (Art
3.2) by permitting documentation services and licence applications to be requested online.
In addition, every citizen has access to information held by public administrative bodies.
Law 25/2009 of 22 December 200958 modified free access to activities and services and
their use. It established a ‘single electronic portal’59 by amending Article 70bis of Law
7/1985 of 2 April establishing the Framework for the Local Regime:
In the case of procedures and processes pertaining to service activities and their
being carried out under Law 17/2009 of 23 November concerning free access
to activities and their use, the people carrying them out will be able to do so
through a single economic portal, electronically and long distance, unless the
inspection of localities or equipment is involved.60
Similarly, local entities, limited of course by their own competences, will guarantee that
the providers of said service can access the relevant information and forms required for
accessing and carrying out an economic activity. The providers will also gain access to the
56 The decree was extended substantially and amended by Law 127/2012 of 26 December on urgent market
liberalization measures and certain services, as developed by the previous decree.
57 Law 11/2007 of 22 June on electronic access for citizens to Public Services. BOE-A-2007-12352.
58 Law 25/2009 of 22 December 2009 of modifications for its adaptation to free access to activities and services
and its deployment. BOE-A-2009-20725. Known as the ‘omnibus’ law because it amended 47 different state
laws.
59 This system, which includes a Digital ID card, gives every citizen the right to access information held by the
administrative body of the State or of an Autonomous Community digitally, without any need to request it
from a public office.
60 Referring to activities with environmental effects.
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results and other communications related to these applications. Local entities will push to
coordinate and standardize the necessary forms for accessing and carrying out an economic
activity.
Due to this system, all Spanish nationals, especially professionals, have complete access
to all the information and requirements needed to start a business or to continue their
relationship with any level of public administration. If the application cannot be submitted
through this single electronic portal, the administrative authorities will at least provide
access and information allowing the applicant to submit the application in person at the
administrative offices. This is thought to save both administrators and Spanish citizens
resources and time.
Since screening or monitoring an applicant’s personal criminal history is not possible
in Spain within the scope of licensing, as described above, this procedure will not be dis-
cussed further here. As explained above, the different activities contained in Law 12/2012
of urgent measures on the liberalization of commerce and certain services61 are based on
the submission of a statement addressed to the local authorities that will be verified at a
later moment by administrators.
10.2.3 Requirements concerning subsidies
10.2.3.1 Granting of subsidies
Law 28/2003 describes what is meant by a subsidy62 and sets out the basic requirements
for subsidy recipients. Article 2 defines ‘subsidy’ as follows:
1. In this law, a subsidy is the lending of money by any of the subjects listed
in Article 3 of this law to public or private persons in compliance with the
following prerequisites:
a. themoney is providedwithout direct compensation from those benefit-
ting.
b. themoney provided in order tomeet certain objectives, execute a project,
undertake an activity, adopt a singular behaviour, whether that has
already happened or yet to be done or to approve a certain situation,
with the beneficiary being obliged to adhere to the material and formal
obligations that had been agreed upon.
c. the project, action, behaviour or situation so funded has as its aim the
dissemination of a publicly useful or socially interesting activity or the
promotion of a public aim.
61 See Annex 1, Law 12/2012, BOE-A-2012-15595.
62 Law 28/2003. BOE-A-2003-18089. Lastly amended by Law 17/2012.
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Subsidies may be granted to both natural and legal persons. Within the meaning of this
particular law, subsidies do not include inter-administrative contributions or the contri-
butions made by the central administration to local administrations. Article 2 paragraph
1 sub 4 states that the following financial benefits will not be considered a subsidy:
– social security provisions;
– old-age pensions for non-Spanish residents;
– aid provisions and economic subsidies for non-residents;
– provisions and aid to persons with toxic oil syndrome,63 congenital haemophilia or
coagulopathies, as well as hepatitis C;
– war pensions and those granted to victims of terrorism;
– pension contributions to the fund for salary guarantees;
– fiscal benefits;
– official credit.64
As we can see, only those benefits that pertain strictly to Article 1 of Law 28/2003 are
included within the system of subsidies. Moreover, the benefit needs to cover a public aim
or empower a certain sector of productivity, be it educational or in assistance. The
administration cannot make a profit due to the subsidy.
Subjective criteria for application are included in Article 3, referring to all administra-
tions, whether that is the general administration of the state, the communities or local
entities. The article provides a list of persons whom are eligible to receive a subsidy.
10.2.3.2 Revocation of subsidies
The revocation of subsidies is regulated by Law 38/2003 of 17 November on subsidies.65
Article 32 of this law provides for the monitoring of subsidies, saying: ‘the licensing
authority shall verify that the grant is properly justified, that the activity is performed and
the purpose for which the subsidy has been granted or is being enjoyed has been fulfilled.’66
The verification mentioned in Article 32 is regulated by Article 15 paragraph 1 sub b.
It imposes a duty on subsidy recipients to:
submit to an audit regarding the management of these funds, to be conducted
by the licensing authority, and any other test and financial control that can be
performed by the responsible supervisory bodies, both national and at Com-
63 The Spanish toxic oil syndrome case is a well-known event in which more than 600 people were poisoned
and died because they had ingested oil originally intended for mechanical and industrial purposes but sold
as olive oil.
64 Credit granted by the Spanish Institute of Official Credit (a lending institution that promotes and assists
entrepreneurs).
65 Law 38/2003 of 17 November on subsidies. BOE-A-2003-20977.
66 The administration publicizing the subsidy will be entitled to grant and, if necessary, revoke it.
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munity level, providing as much information as required to undertake the
above actions.
Article 36 lists reasons for declaring an administrative resolution granting a subsidy invalid,
including cases in which it has been demonstrated that credit is inadequate or that the
administrative resolution granting the subsidy is fraudulent. Article 37 regulates the
invalidity of a subsidy and the recipient’s subsequent duty to return the funds (as well as
default interest charges). The reasons include:
a. obtaining the subsidy by distorting the conditions required or hiding facts that would
have prevented the recipient from being awarded the subsidy;
b. breaching some or all of the object of the activity or project or failing to adopt the
behaviour underlying the award;
c. failing to adhere to the obligations or providing no or insufficient justification, under
the terms set out in Article 30 of this law and in the rules pertaining to the subsidy,
where applicable;
d. failing to adopt the dissemination measures contained in Article 18 paragraph 4 of this
law;
e. resisting, avoiding, obstructing or refusing to permit tax and financial audits under
Articles 14 and 15 of this Act, and breaching accounting, registration or document
retention obligations where such makes it impossible to verify the use of the funds
received, the actual fulfilment of the object and the regularity of the subsidized activities,
or the simultaneous award of subsidies, grants, incomeor resources for the samepurpose
by any government or public or private entity, national, EU or international organiza-
tion;
f. failing to comply with the obligations imposed by the administration on associates and
beneficiaries or with the commitments made by them on the award of the subsidy,
provided that they affect or relate to the way they must meet the objectives, undertake
the activity, run the project or adopt a behaviour underlying the award;
g. failing to comply with the obligations imposed by the administration on associates and
beneficiaries or with the commitments made by them on the award of the subsidy,
other than the above, when it is impossible to verify the resulting use made of the funds
received, the actual fulfilment of the objective and the regularity of the subsidized
activities, or the award of subsidies, grants, income or resources for the same purpose
by any government, public or private parties, national authorities, the European Union
or international organization;
h. adopting a decision which derives a need for reinstatement, pursuant to the provisions
of Articles 87 and 89 of the Treaty on European Union;
i. in all other cases provided for in the regulations.
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Based on the above, the responsible authorities, i.e. any institution providing the subsidy,
have a double duty. On the one hand they are responsible for publishing, checking,
receiving and evaluating all subsidy requests. On the other hand, they are obliged to
monitor the compliance of the applicants and/or recipients with the law, in particular
Article 37.
10.2.4 Requirements concerning government tenders
10.2.4.1 Award of tenders
The applicable legislation on tenders is the revised text of the Law on Public Sector Con-
tracts67 and the General Regulation of the Law on Public Sector Contracts.68 Government
tenders are defined under Spanish law as ‘the process by which any public sector entity
selects a person (either natural or legal) to perform any work, provide a service or meet a
public need.69
The huge variety and number of performance options that this public contracting
system offers affects all parts of the Spanish administrative system, whether the authorities
are national, regional, or local. All the related activities must be in compliance with the
LawonPublic SectorContracts, which regulates the basic conditions for issuing government
tenders. A key instrument in the system of Spanish public procurement is ROLECE. This
is theOfficial Registry of Tenderers andClassifiedCompanies. ROLECEhas been integrated
into the structure of the Tax Office and the Public Administration Ministry.70 However,
the norms concerning government tenders are not applied uniformly to all public entities.
Instead, the legislation applies at three different levels, for the following categories of entity:
– public administration;
– public sector entities that have the character of public administration but are subject
to Directive 2004/18/EC (not civil contracting authorities);71
– public sector entities that are not part of public administration and are not subject to
this Directive.
Entities not considered part of public administrationmust issue instructions ensuring that
recruiting procedures are, in all cases, subject to the principles of openness, competition,
transparency, confidentiality, equality and non-discrimination. Furthermore, they need
67 Approved by Legislative Royal Decree 3/2001 of 14 November.
68 Royal Decree 1098/2001, of 12 October.
69 As expressed in Article 2 paragraph 1 of the revised text of the Law on Public Sector Contracts, approved
by the legislature via Royal Decree 3/2001.
70 Rule 817/2009, dated 8 May.
71 Directive 2004/18/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination
of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts.
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to ensure that the contract is awarded to the person submitting the most economically
advantageous tender. The most common contracts awarded by the administrative
authorities are:
– work performance contracts;
– service contracts;
– supplies contracts;
– management of public services contracts;
– public works concession contracts;
– partnership contracts between public services and the private sector.72
Individuals or corporations are entitled to contract with the public sector, whether they
are Spanish or foreign and provided they have full capacity to act. They cannot be banned
from being hired and they must prove their economic, financial and technical or profes-
sional competence and, when necessary, be properly classified.73 The prohibitions against
contracting are identified as impediments,making the participation of natural, legal private
and public persons legally feasible in the public tendering system.
The Spanish legal system imposes other general requirements for public contracting,
such as capacity requirements and financial solvency, and rules for ensuring ‘fairness’74
and equal opportunities. Additionally, direct recruitment is expressly prohibited for specific
reasons. These reasons are linked to the prior behaviour of candidates or their current
personal situation, for example if that person acted unlawfully when contracting with the
administration in the past.
Furthermore, an entity that is disqualified from contracting with government because
it fails tomeet the capacity and solvency requirementsmay be subject to the nullity sanction.
As mentioned above, the law requires fitness to contract and consequently puts limits on
the possibility of contracting with the public sector. If these requirements are violated,
existing contracts are declared null and void. A contract can be declared null and void any
time irregularities arise. Consequentially, any effect created in line with that contract legally
ceases to exist. Nullity is declared when a violation of the requirements for public contract-
ing is discovered. The contract will be declared null and void if it has already been awarded,
and the contract will be terminated by its being dissolved. To prevent damage to the public
interest, the contracting authoritymay decide to continue the contract for as long as needed.
72 Partnerships differ from other public contracts in duration. Most public contracts are intended for a limited
time and/or for a concrete project carried out by the private sector. Partnerships suppose a longer contractual
relationship in which several projects can be carried out.
73 Article 3 of the revised text of the Law on Public Sector Contracts, approved by Legislative Royal Decree
3/2001.
74 Understood as the transparency and integrity of the future contractor. When reviewing the documentation
submitted to obtain a tender, the authorities should preferably select enterprises that have no prior record
of insolvency or corporate sanctions.
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Public contracting is prohibited for certain natural or legal persons. These prohibitions
aim to prevent those who have committed unlawful acts from obtaining public contracts,
for example persons guilty of fraudulent or criminal activity, fraud involving subsidies,
non-compliancewith tax or labour law, etc. Section 60 of the LawonPublic SectorContracts
(TRLCSP) provides for several kinds of impediments. Some are based on convictions
relating to certain criminal offences such as labour offences, tax offences, fraud, bribery
and environmental crimes. Other impediments relate to previous breaches of obligations
by the tenderer. These might have been either legal obligations provided for in Public
Procurement Law or other legal provisions (e.g. tax provisions referring to the obligation
of being up to date on payment of taxes), or obligations set out in previous contracts
awarded to the tenderer. There are also impediments related to administrative offences,
such as tax administrative offences and social security offences. In these cases, the law
requires the administrative offence to be enforced. The relevant authority must register
established impediments in ROLECE. This way the contracting authority can verify that
tenderers to a specific tender are not affected by any kind of impediment. It is important
to highlight that the contracting authority must check ROLECE in all public procurement
procedures during the selection process.
In accordance with community planning, in addition to applicants having committed
certain crimes, administrative offences or irregularities committed in prior contracts can
also lead to their being banned from public contracting.
Under Spanish law, prohibitions onhiring are basically directed at individuals.However,
more recently Spain has recognized – in part owing to the influence of Community law –
that legal persons also commit crimes. Nonetheless, the criminal liability of the legal person
depends on the actions of the natural persons involved, as they act for the legal person.
(Legal) persons are prohibited from tendering when they have been convicted of a crime
under Spanish contract law and a judge or the court considers that there are enough
grounds for direct exclusion and verifies this. The contracting authority itself can evaluate
or estimate the contractual impediment and any other tenderer may show that such an
impediment exists, provided that the court in question has also ruled on the scope and
duration of the ban.
This procedure is based on a prior statement indicating a prohibition on contracting.
The Ministry of Finance is competent to commence the procedure for issuing a ban. The
decision is issued at the recommendation of the Administrative Contracting Advisory
Board. Moreover, the scope and duration of the ban is registered in the Official Register
of Tenderers and Classified Companies. In general terms, this provision only applies for
impediments that require a resolution issued by a third party, either a judicial authority,
or an administrative body that is not the contracting authority. It is important to note that
this third party has a legal obligation to report such sentences or statements to the
authorities in charge of ROLECE and, likewise, that the latter authorities can request data
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from the third parties mentioned above, ensuring that the relevant information is duly
transmitted.
When a tender is granted or refused, the interested individual or company may partic-
ipate in further tenders if there is no cause for invalidity or impossibility as mentioned
before. However, the whole application process on which the offer and the candidate will
be screened recommences on the submission of a new application.
10.2.4.2 Refusal or revocation of a tender
As discussed in paragraph 10.2.4.1, government tenders are regulated by the revised text
of the Law on Public Procurement, approved by Legislative Royal Decree 3/2011,75 on
14 November. Regarding the revocation or refusal of tenders, two different forms exist:
invalidity and nullity.
Invalidity is regulated in Article 31 of the aforementioned law. All contracts with the
public administration system are invalid if the clauses in the tender are illegal or the
preparatory acts or the process undertaken to gain the tender are illegal. Another cause
for invalidity is contained in Article 36 of Law 30/2007, which refers to invalidity as
encompassed by the general Spanish civil law on contracts. After all, contracts with the
public sector must adhere to the regulations on regular contracts as well. The monitoring
process for detecting these invalidities is subject to the general administrative process as
regulated by Law 30/92 and Article 34 of Law 30/2007.
Nullity exists when, according to Article 37 of Law 30/2007, there are procedural mis-
takes that do not permit all (potential) contractors to participate freely in the tender, i.e.
a government tender will be null and void if it is not publicized.
All legal claims against the award of public contracts subject to either the EUDirectives
on Public Procurement or the Spanish national rules discussed above can be submitted to
independent administrative bodies known as ‘public procurement tribunals’. These inde-
pendent administrative bodies will rule on the claim and can declare the award or the
phase that has been the subject of the claim null and void, with full effect. In fact, this
declaration has the effect of a judicial resolution and can only be revoked by a judicial
court.
Needless to say, this declaration has mandatory consequences for the contracting
authority. It should be noted that under Spanish law, legal claims against the award of
these contracts automatically mean the suspension of the public procurement procedure
until the independent administrative body rules on the claim. In the case of a legal claim
against the recipient, then, the public contract will not be concluded until the award has
been declared legal by the relevant independent administrative body.
75 Revised Text of the Law on Public Sector Contracts, approved by Legislative Royal Decree 3/2001.
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10.2.5 The legal protection in place for the natural or legal person subject to
screening and/or monitoring
10.2.5.1 Personal data protection in Spain
Article 20 of the Spanish Constitution regulates freedom of information.76 Article 105 of
the SpanishConstitution furthermore dictates the right to access archives and administrative
registers,77 provided such access does not affect national security and defence, the investi-
gation of crimes and a person’s right to privacy.
As the Supreme Court states in Ruling 312/2012, 7 May, Civil Court, 1st section, this
precept:
refers specifically to the legal configuration in the exercise of the right to access
archives and administrative registers, as a non-fundamental right, not related
to political participation, with the freedom of information and the right to
effective judicial protection.
Article 18 paragraph 4 of the Spanish Constitution78 recognizes the right to personal data
protection. This encompasses the protection of rights and powers so that a citizen can
know of the existence and purpose of, and the persons responsible for, the automated
archive. The personal data that is included in the archive must be necessary with a view
to the interests protected by Article 18 of the Spanish Constitution, with the fundamental
right to privacy being given real and effective protection.
Said powers and rights are part of the right to privacy, which is directly binding on
public administration. The protection of personal data is regulated inOrganic Law 15/1999,
13 December, of Protection of Data of Personal Characteristics79 (LOPD), and by Royal
Decree 1720/2007, of 21December, Regulation of the development of said Law (RLOPD).80
The LOPD establishes an extensive and inclusive concept of personal data; it does not
establish different ranges or types of data. Instead, it defines personal data as any data
referring to natural persons who are identified or identifiable. It further identifies the
media in which this personal data can be recorded. Even though it does not define specific
76 Article 20 paragraph 1: ‘the following rights are recognized and protected… d) the right to freely communicate
or receive accurate information by any means of dissemination whatsoever….’
77 Article 105: ‘The law shall regulate:
a. the hearing of citizens directly, or through the organisations and associations recognized by law, in the
process of drawing up the administrative provisions which affect them;
b. the access of citizens to administrative files and records, except as they may concern the security and
defence of the State, the investigation of crimes and the privacy of individuals…’
78 ‘The law shall limit the use of data processing in order to guarantee the honour and personal and family
privacy of citizens and the full exercise of their rights.’
79 Law 15/1999, 13 December, on Protection of Data of Personal Characteristics. BOE-A-1999-23750.
80 Royal Decree 1720/2007, of 21 December, Regulation of the development of said Law. BOE-A-2008-979.
398
A. Huesca & J.E. Conde
types of data which necessarily fall under the regime of data protection, several articles do
establish types of data that need special protection. Any data about an identified or identi-
fiable person is in any case considered personal data under the terms of the LOPD and as
such should enjoy its full protection.
The aforementioned legislative rules consequently see to it that the personal data con-
tained in administrative and other files or administrative data support systems is protected
by the LOPD. Access to said files can thus be considered the disclosure of personal data
in Spain, especially if third-party data is involved. Under the LOPD, this would be consid-
ered a communication of data, which is subject to the protective system established in the
LOPD.Article 11 LOPDdetermines that personal data can only be communicated to third
parties with the previous consent of the person concerned. However, Article 11 LOPD
identifies exceptions to the rule of consent. For the purposes of this country report, this is
the case when ‘a law allows for disclosure.’ When public administration intervenes by
collecting information on citizens, the legislation governing access to documents and files
in its possession and archives is Law 30/1992, 26 November of Judicial Regime and the
Common Administrative Process (LRJPAC).81 Article 35 and 37 of the LRJPAC regulate
the right of citizens to access administrative archives and registries and request procedural
documents.
Article 35:
Citizens, in their relations with public authorities, have the following rights:
to know, at any given time, the status of the procedures as interested parties,
and to obtain copies of documents involved in them…
Article 37:
Citizens have the right to access public information, files and records under
the terms and conditions set out in the Constitution and in the Law of trans-
parency, public access to information and good governance, and other laws
that may apply.
Articles 35 and 37 of the LRJPAC differentiate between administrative documents and
two types of data. The differences are significant because they propose different means of
accessing them, influenced by diverse factors such as the status of the file in an administra-
tive process and the type of personal data collected by the administration.
As such, if a citizen requests access to documents that are a part of a procedure that is
closed at the time of the request, the following two situations may arise:
81 Law 30/1992, 26 November of Judicial Regime and the Common Administrative Process. BOE-A-1992-
26318.
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– The documents contain data which affects a person’s right to privacy, in which case
they will only be accessible to the person to whom the data belongs. This is separate
from accessing information included in the CAP. In this situation, all information is
considered personal information, while the information contained in the CAP
encompasses only judicial information.
– The data present in the documents is ‘nominative’ in nature, but there is no data
affecting a person’s privacy, in which case access is permitted by the data holders, as
well as third parties that can show that they have a legitimate and direct interest whereby
they can use the contents to exercise their rights.
We see, then, that the general rule is that parties have the right to access files and documents
held by administrative bodies, and that denial or rejection of access is the exception, where
motivated and requested for reasons of public interest, in the interests of third parties in
need of protection, or when mandated by law.
Furthermore, if a citizen requests access to the documents of an open or pending file,
access may be permitted if the citizen is an ‘interested party’ in the file.
Moreover, in accordance with Article 11 LOPD, the regulations allowing for the
transfer of data must be applied. Authorization to access the files on proceedings and
administrative archives is granted by the LRJPAC. In doing so, it takes the distinction
between types of personal data and other circumstances into account, which requires a
case-by-case analysis. Even when an authorization has been issued to access data, the
principles and obligations of the LOPD must still be taken into account.
Last, the LOPDgrants all owners of personal data ‘ARCO’ rights (Acceso, Rectificación,
Cancelación y Oposición). This involves the right to access, modify, cancel and oppose.
Particularly when a law allows the disclosure of personal datawithout the owner’s consent,
the right to oppose is regulated in Article 6 paragraph 4 of the LOPD and 34 of its imple-
mentation by-law. These entitle any person affected to oppose the request to process per-
sonal data as well as the option of cancelling processing when consent to treat data is not
required for legitimate and grounded reasons.
Public administrators are therefore obliged to inform the owner of the personal data
of any application to access that person’s documents at the time of the request so that he
or she can oppose this request. This includes a request from another body in the Spanish
public administrative system.
10.2.5.2 Other rights
The main duty of the person who is being inspected is to provide information and facilitate
verification in accordance with the principles of proportionality and consistency. Article
39 of Law 30/1992 requires citizens to provide the administration with reports and to
cooperate in inspections and other investigative acts only in the cases provided for in the
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Act. If a citizen fails to do so, he has committed an administrative offence under Article
129 of this Law. Such failure can be established by means of inspections by the administra-
tive authority. In compliance with the principles governing inspections, the inspection
subject has the following rights:
– the right of intervention, presence and representation in administrative oversight.
However, the inspection may take place in the absence of the inspection subject when
required in the interests of the inspection;
– the right to be informed about the rules, content and purpose of gathering evidence
(Article 35g of Law 30/1992);
– the right to be treated with respect, deference, courtesy and consideration (Article 35i
of Law 30/1992);
– the right to demand identification and accreditation of the inspectors (Article 35b of
Law 30/1992).
– the right to present arguments and documentary evidence (Article 35e of Law 30/1992).
10.3 Instruments directed at preventing the disturbance of public
order
10.3.1 Spatial planning
The revocation of licences or administrative authorizations following a review is regulated
in Law 30/1992. The review is based on Article 302 of Royal Legislative Decree 1/1992 of
26 June, approving the revised text of the Law on Land and Urban Scheme:82
Local authorities will conduct an official review of their actions and agreements
in urban planning in accordance with Articles 109 and following the Code of
Administrative Procedure.
The review process, as related in Article 302 paragraph 4 of Law 30/1992, makes it possible
‘to declare invalid a provision or act; in the same resolution, allowances for the appropriate
stakeholders may be recognized.’
The review process can be initiated by the administrative authority that has granted
the licence, or it can be started on request. There are several grounds on which the compe-
tent administration can revoke a licence following review.
82 Royal LegislativeDecree 1/1992 of 26 June, approving the revised text of the Law on Land andUrban Scheme.
BOE-A-1992-15285.
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First, a licence may have been granted in error. If so, it can be revoked, with a financial
reimbursement for the person who was granted the licence by mistake. However, if the
mistake can be attributed to that person, no reimbursement will be paid.
Second, there may be ‘opportunity’ reasons for revoking a licence. This is regulated by
Article 42 of Law 6/1998 related to the soil and zoning.83 If a new spatial planning pro-
gramme has been approved regarding the use of the soil and/or zoning in the municipality,
the authorities can revoke a licence and reimburse the licence holder. For instance, a
nightclub has to close because of a change in the spatial plan, with the area being rezoned
as a residential district subject to noise restrictions.
The third reason includes a change in policy or if the conditions of the licence have
not been met. This reason can only be given in rare cases, due to the regulated nature of
such activities. With the current deregulation of licences in Spain in the wake of the eco-
nomic crisis, examples are few and far between. One instance is when a sanitation business
has its licence revoked because of a change in the municipality’s environmental policies
(by promoting recycling for instance) or in cases where certain licences are linked with
social or environmental policies. For example, in the city of Ourense,84 the municipality
offers pub licences inside public swimming pools, but the applicant must hire a certain
percentage of mentally challenged people as employees. If the owner does not, the licence
is revoked.
Last, a licence can be revoked if the licence holder has seriously infringed an urban
regulation. In this case there is no entitlement to reimbursement and the infringement
can also lead to sanctions. An example is the following: restaurants in Spain must have a
smoke extractor, as well meet as other safety requirements, in their kitchens. If they ignore
these requirements, their restaurant licence will be revoked immediately.
10.3.2 Inspection
10.3.2.1 The proceeding principles
The power of inspection in public administration is a regular administrative activity in
which the authorities intervene in order to determine the compliance of a particular
activity with the legal system.85 In the Spanish legal system, ‘inspection’ is defined as ‘a set
of coercive measures used by management to force individuals to adjust their activity to
for the benefit of the public good.’
An inspection serves to determine whether a given activity complies with the legal
system. The principle of prevention is a general principle for this type of administrative
83 Law 6/1998 related to the soil and zoning, of 13 April. BOE-A-1998-8788.
84 In the Automous Community of Galicia.
85 The Central State, the Autonomous Community or the Municipality.
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intervention. The prevention measures are closely linked to the administrative duty to
inform, with all interested individuals having access to all information related to obtaining
licences, their obligations and fines for infringements.
In an ‘administrative procedure’, the authorities prescribe a series of acts to be carried
out by citizens, with the legal effects being linked together to produce an administrative
decision. The inspection authorities dictate the acts but are not entitled to halt proceedings
(Article 89 paragraph 1 of Law 30/1992).
The Spanish Constitutional Court has stated that inspection serves to investigate and
document the results of an enquiry, as evidence for imposing a subsequent penalty or even
– if there are grounds – for criminal prosecution. During the inspection, the person being
inspected must know the purpose of the inspection. Moreover, the authorities must notify
the person being inspected of the inspection, under the terms of Law 30/1992.
Administrative activity must be based on a set of principles. These are crystallized in
legal doctrine as:
i. the principle of legality, according to which the inspection should be given adequate
legal coverage;
ii. the principle of objectivity, to ensure the fairness of the administration’s staff;
iii. the principles of efficiency and speed, according to Article 103 of the Spanish Consti-
tution and SupremeCourtDecision 178/1989 of 2November. Efficiency is a fundamen-
tal principle of inspection, not only so as to avoid prescribing offences, but also with
regard to the expiration of the legal activity;
iv. the principles of consistency and proportionality. As an administrative intervention,
inspection must always seek the least burdensome alternatives. Article 552 of the
Criminal ProcedureAct states that ‘…useless inspections of records should be avoided,
with care being taken not to harmor bother the interested partiesmore than necessary,
and with every kind of precaution being taken to avoid compromising their reputation
and to respect their secrets’
In accordance with the above principles, the administrative authorities must seek ‘minimal
intervention’, i.e. without disrupting the lives and issues of those beingmanaged. Therefore,
the inspection will be performed:
– at convenient times;
– with limits place on the time spent on inspection;
– andwhile respecting the right of interested parties not to submit documents other than
the ones required by law.
v. the principles of transparency and secrecy in the inspection activity. Those interested
in knowing the contents of the file to be compiled by the administrative authorities
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must be guided by the provisions of Article 84 paragraph 1 of Law 30 /1992, which
provides for the interested parties to be heard, concerning:
Instructed procedures, and immediately before writing the draft resolution,
will be apparent to those concerned or, where appropriate, their representatives,
except when affecting the information and data referred to in Article 37 para-
graph 5.
Thus, whenever administrative proceedings are held, the persons concerned are entitled
to be heard by the same entity that will issue a decision on the matter (whether or not that
is a sanction), within the limitations imposed in Section 37 paragraph 5 of the Law:
b. Access by citizens to administrative files and records, except for those
affecting the security and defence of the State, the investigation of crimes and
the privacy of individuals.
Access is also limited by the restrictive provisions of Article 105 of Law 30/1992 regarding
the ‘ending on the date of application procedures’ and 37 paragraph 2 of Law 30/1992,
which states that ‘access to documents containing information relating to the privacy of
individuals shall be reserved for them.’ Article 37 paragraph 3 of Law 30/1992 allows access
to registered documents whose owners have made no reference to privacy and by ‘third
parties having a direct and legitimate interest.’ Last, Article 37 paragraph 5 under d excludes
access to records ‘relating tomaterials protected by industrial or commercial secrecy.’This
is important in preventing access to documentation covered by intellectual property law.
10.3.2.2 Spanish administrative procedure
An administrativemonitoring procedure can be initiated for two reasons, namely a) during
the course of a regular inspection and b)when a complaint has been submitted by a private
party.
The aim of this procedure is to obtain knowledge of the actual facts underpinning the
administrative action in order to better comply with its public purpose. During the proce-
dure, the authorities analyse all situations, statements, facts or activities which, directly or
indirectly, are relevant to the public interest. The most common measures, which are
executed by administrative police, are public registration, inventories, and the evaluation
of the communication between the population and administrators.
Themost commonmonitoring activity is the inspection itself, in which public servants,
while respecting the rights of those being inspected and adhering to the principles noted
in the previous paragraph, inspect all aspects subject to publicmonitoring, either technical
or documentary, and required to operate a certain regulated activity, i.e. a licence.
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Expropriation of premises is regulated in Article 33 paragraph 3 of the Spanish Consti-
tution and the Law of 16 December 1954, on expropriation. It consists of the guided
administrative transfer of private property from the rightful owner to the state. For this
to happen, there must be a public, legal and constitutionally considered interest of public
necessity or interest. Once private property has reverted to the state, the previous owner
must receive financial compensation. If the public benefit of state ownership disappears
or is otherwise covered, the expropriated property can be returned to its former owner.
In Spain there is no preventive expropriation. There is no policy of using expropriation
to combat organized crime, and we will therefore not elaborate on it further.
10.4 Seizing of assets
As in most issues in the fight against organized crime, the Spanish system uses mostly
traditional law enforcementmeasures, stemming from criminal law, instead of administra-
tive law. This is also the case for the seizing of assets.
However, as Ros states:
Formany years the notion of seizing assets as found in the Penal Code has been
relegated to the background, as a natural and final consequence of a judgment
and has not been addressed as a mean of developing a specific criminal policy.
Seizure was therefore traditionally a ‘secondary’ criminal penalty, but in recent
years a new perspective has emerged concerning its use – by itself – as a
mechanism to combat crime.86
Belowwe provide amodest overview of current legislation on the seizing of assets in Spain,
in order to highlight the potential of the instruments.
The seizure of assets is regulated in Article 127 of the Spanish Criminal Code of 2010.87
Article 374 of the Code determines the procedure relating to the seizure of assets.
The fight against drug trafficking gave rise to normative developments regarding the
seizure of assets. Organic Law 1/1988 amended the SpanishCriminal Code.88 More recently,
86 Fernández Ros 2011.
87 Organic Law 10/1995, of 23 November, Criminal Code. BOE-A-1995-25444.
88 The recent reformof the SpanishCriminal Code has been inspired by the FrameworkDecision 2005/212/JHA
of 24 February 2005 on confiscation of proceeds, instrumentalities and property-related crime. The content
of the FrameworkDecision 2006/783/JAI of the Council of 6October 2006 on the application of the principle
of mutual recognition to confiscation orders is also relevant. Incorporation into Spanish law was effected
by Law 3/2010 of 10 March, Modifying the Organic Law of Judiciary Power and complementary to Law
4/2010 of 10 March for implementation in the European Union of judicial confiscation.
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the (amended) Criminal Code of 2010 established the basis for seizing assets in Article
127. Article 127 paragraph 1, first sentence, of the Spanish Criminal Code states:
All penalties imposed for amalicious felony ormisdemeanour shall lead to loss
of the assets obtained therefrom and of the goods, means or instruments with
which they were prepared or executed, as well as the gains obtained from the
felony or misdemeanour, whatever the transformations these may have
undergone. All shall be seized, unless they belong to a third party in good faith
who is not responsible for the felony, who has acquired them legally…89
Paragraph 3 of Article 127 (in conjunction with Article 374 paragraph 1 under 4 and 5 of
the Spanish Criminal Code) provides that if the assets meant in paragraph 1 cannot be
seized, the assets of the person in question which have an equivalent value and which
pertain (legally) to those criminally accountable for the act shall be seized. Paragraph 4
provides for preventive seizure:
[…] the Judge or Court of Law may order the seizure foreseen in the preceding
Sections of this Article even when no punishment is imposed on any person
due [to] exemption from criminal accountability or due to the statute of limi-
tations, in the latter case, as long as the unlawful status of the assets is proven.90
Paragraph 5 regulates the sale and/or destruction of confiscated property.
The aim of Article 127 of the Spanish Criminal Code is clearly punitive, as it seeks to
seize ‘…from those responsible for the crimes both the instruments used to commit the
crime and the assets obtained with the same.’91
This punitive character was further highlighted by Judge Congil of the Court of
Cantabria: ‘the notion of “confiscation” in our criminal justice system has played a sec-
ondary role and is always subordinate to the penalty.’92
Article 374 regulates special rules regarding the seizure of assets under Article 127.
Relevant for this country report is paragraph 1 under 2, which allows for the assets ordered
by the relevant judicial authority to be held in deposit. Moreover, paragraph 2 stipulates
the conditions for disposing of seized goods and assets (e.g. hazardous materials).
89 English translation of the Spanish Criminal Code by the Spanish Ministry of Justice via:
http://www.sanchezcervera-abogados.com/en/files/2012/06/Criminal_Code_Código_Penal.pdf.
90 English translation of the Spanish Criminal Code by the Spanish Ministry of Justice via:
http://www.sanchezcervera-abogados.com/en/files/2012/06/Criminal_Code_Código_Penal.pdf.
91 Quintero Olivares 2010, p. 76.
92 Congil 2011, p. 112.
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As mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph, the seizing of assets falls within the
scope of criminal law. Therefore, this subject will not be explored further here.
10.5 Other relevant measures in Spain
10.5.1 Money Laundering Prevention
Spain has a long tradition of fighting money laundering. Its proximity to Gibraltar, a well-
known tax haven, and the fact that many Eastern European gangs have decided to focus
their operations in Spain93 have made police and administrative authorities prioritize this
particular crime.
There are many examples of law enforcement actions aimed at combating money
laundering. One of the best is Operación Ballena Blanca.94 In this case, amoney laundering
networkwas discovered inwhich several law firms andnotaries were involved in laundering
EUR 250 million through subsidiary offices in Gibraltar, the Isle of Man and other tax
havens. The laundered money came from criminal groups that made their money by –
among others things – kidnapping, drug trafficking, arms trafficking and prostitution and
laundered it by investing heavily in real property in the Costa del Sol.95
Money laundering is an offence, regulated in Articles 301 and 302 of the Spanish
Criminal Code. In general, money laundering is divided into three different phases:
1. placement. This involves placing the money from illegal activities into the ordinary
course of trade either by buyingwinning lottery tickets, swapping houses or by running
a public business;
2. layering. This encompasses moving capital raised by illegal means to try and mask its
illegal origin;
3. integration of funds into the legal market. This involves using legitimate companies
that handle large amounts of cash, such as casinos or restaurants, by buying up closed
or bankrupt companies or by investing in property through interceding companies.
In legal terms, the fight against money laundering in Spain is based (for the purposes of
this report) on Law 19/1993 on certain measures to prevent money laundering. This law
implementedDirective 91/308/EEC. Law 10/2010 on prevention ofmoney laundering and
terrorist financing supplemented the 1993 legislation.96
93 La Razón: http://www.larazon.es/detalle_hemeroteca/noticias/LA_RAZON_444269/3622-mas-de-650-
grupos-criminales-organizados-operan-en-espana.
94 ‘Operation White Whale’ in English.
95 El País: http://elpais.com/elpais/2011/03/31/actualidad/1301559423_850215.html.
96 Law 10/2010, of April 28th, on prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. BOE-A-2010-6737.
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Law 19/1993 sets the basic requirements for combatting money laundering. Article 2
determines the scope of ‘bound subjects’. These are entities obliged to notify the authorities
if they notice any suspicious activity. They include:
– credit institutions;
– insurance companies authorized to sell life insurance and insurance brokers who deal
with life insurance and other investment-related services;
– investment services companies;
– the management companies of collective investment institutions and investment
companies whose management is not assigned to a management company;
– the managing body of pension funds;
– the management companies of venture private equity and venture capital companies
whose management is not assigned to a management company;
– mutual guarantee companies;
– payment institutions and electronic money institutions;
– people who conduct exchange business professionally;
– postal services in respect of activities of spin transfer;
– persons professionally engaged in brokering loans or credits;
– developers and those who run a real property business professionally, by means of
agency, commission or brokerage;
– auditors, external accountants and tax advisers;
– notaries and property, commercial or real property registrars;
– lawyers, attorneys or other independent professionals who participate in designing,
implementing or advising on transactions for clients concerning the sale of real property
or business entities,managingmoney, securities or other assets, opening ormaintaining
checking or savings accounts, organizing contributions necessary for the creation,
operation or management of companies or the creation, operation or management of
trusts, companies or similar structures; or acting on behalf of clients in any financial
or real property transaction;
– people who act on a professional basis and in accordance with the specific regulations
applicable in each case to provide the following services to third parties: forming
companies or other legal persons; acting in the function of a director or secretary of a
company, a partner in a partnership or similar functions in relation to other legal
entities or arranging for another person to act as such; providing a registered office or
business address, administrative and related services for a company, association or any
other instrument or legal person; exercising the function of trustee in a trust express
or similar legal instruments or arranging for another person to act as such; performing
the function of shareholder for a person other than a company listed on a regulated
market that is subject to disclosure requirements consistent with Community law or
equivalent international standards, or arranging for another person to act as such;
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– casinos;
– people who deal professionally with jewels, precious stones or metals;
– people who deal professionally with art objects and antiques;
– persons professionally engaged in the activities referred to in Article 1 of Law 43/2007
of 13 December on the protection of consumers in the procurement of sale goods to
offer to refund the money;
– people who provide business deposit, custody or professional cash transport or means
of payment services;
– those responsible for the management, operation and marketing of lotteries or other
gambling operations regarding payment of prizes;
– individuals performing movements of means of payment;
– persons who trade goods professionally;
– foundations and associations;
– managers of payment systems and systems for the clearing and settlement of securities
and financial derivatives, as well as managers of credit cards or debit cards issued by
other entities.
It does not matter whether the bound subject is domestic or foreign, as the legislation also
applies to ‘persons or entities not resident, through agents or branches or by providing
services without a permanent establishment in Spain to develop activities of the same
nature.’
The system assumes the obligation to identify the people with whom they are going to
carry out their activity and prohibits operations involving natural or legal personswho/that
have not been properly identified. The activity is also subject to prohibitions if its purpose
has not been identified.97
The aforementioned bound subjects are obliged to notify the Executive Service of the
Commission for the Prevention ofMoneyLaundering andMonetaryOffences (SEPBLAC)98
of any operations that are suspicious or in which the risk of money laundering exists.
SEPBLAC is part of the Spanish Ministry of Economic Affairs. Notification to SEPBLAC
is mandatory in the case of capital movements of € 3000 nationally or € 30,000 internation-
ally.
The regulations discussed above implemented the recommendations of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision99 as well existing European Union legislation. These
measures have been effective in the fight against money laundering and the financing of
97 Understood as any money- or currency-related operation that they come across in their duties.
98 Servicio Ejecutivo de la Comisión de Prevención del Blanqueo de Capitales e Infracciones Monetarias.
99 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, via: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/.
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organized crime. However, Spain continues to be one of the main destinations for money
laundering in the European Union, especially since the start of the economic crisis.100
10.5.2 The case of EuroVegas
EuroVegas was a project by casino magnate Sheldon Adelson. Adelson decided to situate
his project in Spain, due to the location and the influx of tourism. He ultimately settled
on Alcorcón, a city located about 30 km south of Madrid.
The project was problematic from the outset due to the risk of its attracting organized
crime to the region. Furthermore, it would create a ‘judicial bubble’ in which laws relating
to gambling, immigration, and the regulation of smoking and alcohol would not apply, as
Sheldon’s business group had demanded a series of legislative changes at both the state
and regional levels. Adelson required the following before he would commence the
EuroVegas project:101
i. two years’ exemption from paying social security contributions for EuroVegas
employees;
ii. two years’ exemption from municipal, regional and state taxes;
iii. tax benefits on land and property for ten years;
iv. state guarantee of a loan of EUR 25 million, which would basically be issued by the
European Investment Bank;
v. transfer of all public land needed, including expropriations, with the relocation of
public housing, if any. Exclusive use of land for a ten-year period;
vi. no collective agreements for EuroVegas staff by amending the Workers’ Statute;
vii. legal privileges for hiring foreign staff, including fast-tracking the granting of work
permits;
viii. changes in legislation on the prevention of money laundering, with flexible controls;
ix. authorization to permit minors to enter the casinos;
x. elimination of the smoking ban in the casinos;
xi. authorization to permit gamblers legally recognized as such to enter the casinos;
xii. construction of infrastructure on request, or additions to existing infrastructure.
An article in Cinco Días102 reported on the legislative changes induced by the project:
100 RTVE: http://www.rtve.es/alacarta/videos/telediario/espana-primer-pais-europa-blanqueo-dinero/1741956/.
101 Preferente.com. ‘Las doce exigencias de Euorovegas para desembarcar en Madrid o Barcelona.’ Via:
http://www.preferente.com/noticias-turismo-destinos/las-12-exigencias-de-eurovegas-para-desembarcar-
en-madrid-o-barcelona-208380.html.
102 CincoDías: ‘Las leyes que cambióMadrid para cumplir las condiciones deEurovegas’, www.cincodias.com/cin-
codias/2013/12/13/…/1386937762_118969.html.
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The Madrid Government approved a ‘broom law’ called the Fiscal and
Administrative Measures Law, which creates the notion of the Integrated
Development Centre (macro-casinos), i.e. a ‘privately developed complex of
considerable dimensions, aimed at providing integrated activities of a very
diverse nature (industrial, tourist, conventions and conferences, entertainment,
gaming, cultural, commercial, health), with the law accepting that these centres
pose new and unknown situations in gaming that must be addressed.
The adoption of the Law of Fiscal and Administrative Measures also reduced the tax base
of the casinos – previously the ‘gross revenues of casinos from gaming or the amounts that
players spend to participate in games’ – because, according to the new rule, ‘the amount
spent on prizes’ could be deducted.
In addition, the applicable tax rate was lowered. Prior tax rates of 55% were based on
casino revenues of up to EUR 4.4 million. Now, the tax rate would remain at 10%. A
number of tax bonuses were also added, for example in property tax and Economic
Activities tax.
Moreover, the Law of Fiscal and Administrative Measures would apply a bonus for
creating andmaintaining employment and a 95% rebate on the share of transactions subject
to transfer tax. An annual bonus of 9% was added for investments regarding the purchase
of material.
The Heritage Act of the Community of Madrid, passed in June 2013, stated that ‘the
period during which no authorizations would be issued’ for the establishment of new
casinos in Madrid ‘would be 10 years to meet the monopoly requirement of EuroVegas.’
Also, the Heritage Act eliminated preventive archaeology projects before the start of con-
struction.
However, in December 2013 Mr Adelson’s business group publicly announced they
would not pursue the project, as not all of their conditions had been met.
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11 The administrative approach in Sweden
L. Korsell & M. Norlin
Preface
If an establishment is to have “full rights” printed on its menu while remaining within the
boundaries of the law, the restaurateur must have a permit to serve alcoholic beverages.
After inspection of the Swedish Criminal Records and Records of Suspected Persons,
individuals perceived as unreliable are denied such a permit. If, on inspection, it is revealed
that a granted permit has been mismanaged, it can be revoked.
When the public sector procures goods and services, a number of requirements are
imposed on the suppliers. A supplier may be excluded from the procurement if company
representatives have committed crimes in the course of business activities.
These two examples illustrate how the legislature, through applying administrative law
rather than criminal law, attempts to discourage criminals from exploiting legal companies.
Such “administrative measures” constitute a strategy that is discussed increasingly in
Europe. In Sweden there is also increased interest in using methods outside the field of
criminal law to approach a problem formulated in the Industry Report in the following
way almost twenty years ago.1
The serious businesses and society must protect themselves against crime, which takes
considerable resources and impairs the efficiency of the national economy. The most
serious threat to the free conditions under which trade and industry operate is perhaps
that economic and organised criminality exploits and abuses the free and legal systems
that apply to entrepreneurial activity.
In Sweden, however, there is no coherent strategy in terms of legislature to combat
economic and organised crime with the help of administrative measures. The authorities
instead apply the regulatory controls that have evolved through the years; after all, there
are no less than 230 different laws regulating supervision. More than 90 government
agencies (including the county administrative boards) as well as the country’s 290
municipalities have supervisory functions.2 Looking only to the authorities’ supervision
of activities, these figures illustrate that there is hardly a lack of administrative tools.
The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the regulations that are deemed
particularly significant to administratively combatting the type of criminality usually cat-
1 SOU 1997:111, p. 523.
2 Govt. Com. 2009/10:79, p. 5.
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egorised as economic and organised crime. Put another way, to create a system from an
incoherent flora of regulations.
The overview of administrativemeasures constitutes a “Swedish Report” to the univer-
sities in Tilburg and Leuven for the ISEC study on the possibilities to exchange information
between administrative bodies and traditional law enforcement organisations to apply
administrative measures within EU MS and at the EU level.
11.1 Introduction
11.1.1 Administrative measures – what are they?
The various country reports to the Dutch research project on administrative measures are
based on a common definition of the term. Administrative measures means combatting
the facilitation of criminal activity by preventing criminals from using society’s “adminis-
trative infrastructure”.
1. This is achieved by performing inspections on companies and individuals (for example,
through register checks, in some case in the Swedish Criminal Records and Records of
Suspected Persons) prior to:
a. authorities making decisions on permits, for example, to operate a taxi business or
allowing a restaurant to serve alcohol,
b. authorities disbursing aid or subsidies,
c. authorities, municipalities and other parts of the public sector purchasing goods or
services from private suppliers (public procurement).
These administrative measures function as a gatekeeper to stop criminals being released
into the public systems and infrastructures.
2. The administrative measures also allow authorities to shut down operations, or take
over buildings or premises, if they are being used in a disruptive or illegal manner. This
can be seen as a physical way to prevent certain activities in comparison with licensing
decisions.
3. Measures outside the criminal justice system aimed at re-appropriating criminal gains,
such as sequestration, also tend to belong to the administrative area. In this point, there
is thus an overlap between administrativemeasures (focusing on the administrative aspects)
and the strategy that falls under the heading asset-oriented law enforcement (focusing on
the money).
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General requirements that make it harder to abuse the infrastructure can also be classified
as a weak form of administrative measures, such as the size requirement for share capital.
11.1.2 The Swedish development of administrative measures
Economic and organised crime
Somewhat simplified, organised crime usually refers to a criminal operationwhich in itself
is illegal, such as the distribution of drugs. The difference with economic crime is that the
operations are legal but the crime takes place within the framework of the operations in
disregard of the regulations that apply to entrepreneurial activity, such as construction
companies hiring undocumented workers and not paying tax.
In practice, however, this distinction between illegal and legal operations is not as clear.
For example, people with links to organised crime can use companies as regulation-abiding
criminal tools for committing fraud and purchase tax evasion. In reality, these can then
hardly be considered legal operations.
One characteristic of crime where companies are involved is the interfaces that exist
with all of the legislation regulating various conditions within business activity as well as
the range of administrative authorities that grant permits, exercise control and supervision,
disburse subsidies or procure goods and services. Many of these interfaces are, in practice,
administrative measures against economic and organised crime. However, this does not
mean the concept of administrative measures is being used; that they fall under a common
strategy and that regulatory control is synchronised to achieve maximum impact. A char-
acteristic of the Swedish development of administrative measures is that there has never
been any comprehensive approach taken, instead various measures have been applied at
different points in time.
When economic and organised crime became a criminal-political issue in Sweden in
the early 1970s, these forms of crime were regarded as being closely connected. A task
force with representatives from the police, Swedish Prosecution Authority and Swedish
Tax Agency highlighted the need to perform a legislative revision in order to combat eco-
nomic and organised crime.3 It was possibly then that the first ideas were formed on
administrative measures having a larger and wider significance than individual reforms.
The Government initiated an investigative line of inquiry and commissioned the Swedish
National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) to conduct a legislative revision.4
3 AMOB 1977; Lindgren 2000; Korsell & Larsson 2011.
4 Romander 2000; Korsell 2000.
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Controlling the controllers
Brå took a series of initiatives in the legislative areas where there was an evident need.
Professional groups of relevance to the business community were also emphasised as being
of interest for administrative measures. This includes auditors and lawyers. They exert a
sort of indirect control over other activities in the business sector. Ethical rules for these
professional groups were emphasised. The idea is also that high access requirements for
establishing oneself in these professions, where the incidence of prior criminality is relevant,
contributes to the professions maintaining ethical and moral standards within large parts
of the business world. Stricter regulation of the activities of lawyers and auditors5 As will
be discussed in more detail later in the report, the controllers are now being controlled –
lawyers, auditors and even real estate agents – through conduct requirements.
Conduct assessment in critical industries
One administrative approach is to directly shine a spotlight on the industries that have
problems with economic and organised crime. To keep criminals from establishing
themselves as entrepreneurs in critical industries, there are basically two paths to take.
One is to impose the requirement of a trade permit, where the aspiring entrepreneur’s
conduct is examined. Educational requirements and financial guarantees can also be
included. Once the permit is granted, the business can be inspected and the permit can be
revoked in the event of violation.
The second strategy is to eliminate conduct assessment and open the doors to
entrepreneurship. Instead, control is exercised over existing businesses. If the business
proprietor is found guilty of an offencewithin their business, the authorities can set different
requirements that are followed up by control measures, obligations and penalties, which
hinder further criminal activity and prevent continued entrepreneurial activity. In the case
of serious crimes, the court can issue a ban on business activity.
The strategy involving trade permits for establishing oneself in critical industries was
broached by a Government Report in the beginning of the 1980s, Kommissionen mot
ekonomisk brottslighet.6 Oneof themany proposals from theCommission against Economic
Crime related to the requirement of trade permits to run a business in industries vulnerable
to problems with economic crime.7 This involved, for example, the restaurant, transporta-
tion, construction, automotive and cleaning industries.
Depending on the need, a trade permit could include different requirements: conduct,
education or financial guarantees. The proposal regarding trade permits is reminiscent of
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the Dutch system where businesses and entrepreneurs are inspected before a permit is
granted.
The Commission proposal regarding trade permits can be considered the clearest
example in Sweden of an attempt at an administrative strategy, in that it not only looked
to industry-specific measures but instead sought to introduce gatekeeper-type regulation
judged to work in a range of industries.
However, trade permits were never introduced. The Government considered that the
control measures would be both costly and not very efficient. “A comprehensive trade
permit system was assessed as (potentially) inhibiting establishment to a greater extent
than intended, as well as consuming significant resources considering that examination
would also need to include serious business proprietors”.8 A large number of the consultative
bodies, including central government agencies and business associations, were critical of
the Commission proposal for trade permit requirements.
The proposal, however, led to an amendment of the existing legislation regarding the
serving of alcohol and the operation of commercial traffic, by way of an extended conduct
assessment (which we will return to). As will be apparent in the survey presented later,
conduct assessment has however been introduced in a number of activities, despite the
Government’s aforementioned hesitant approach to the method. On the other hand, the
Commission proposal regarding trade permits on a broad front in critical industries has
never been realised.
In addition to trade permits and conduct assessment, the question of introducing some
form of “proprietor’s license” has been discussed off and on. The requirement for such a
permit would involve basic knowledge of business management, such as bookkeeping,
costing and tax legislation. The perception, however, has been that such a requirement
would have an excessive inhibitory effect on the willingness and ability to start businesses.
In the Government Bill on corporate finance as well as information and advice aimed at
businesses, it was not advocated that a proprietor’s license be introduced.9 In the Swedish
Business and Industry Committee processing of the Bill,10 the motions that were not in
line with the Bill were rejected, including a motion on the possibility of introducing a
proprietor’s license in government administration.11
General crime prevention requirements
It is primarily on the area of weak administrative measures – which in many cases can be
very strong in practice – that various legislative revisions over the years have focused on
themost. Some examples of suchmeasures include capital requirements for limited liability
8 Bill 1985/86:126, p. 27.
9 Bill 2009/10:148.
10 Committee Report 2009/10: NU25.
11 Motion 2009/10:N457.
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companies, rules for liquidation of limited liability companies, the presence of auditors
and their obligation to cooperate in criminal investigations or report the suspicion of
crimes, and a series of reforms within the tax system such as the requirement of certified
cash registers.
Asset-oriented law enforcement
In an official letter to the Parliament in 1995, the Government presented a strategy against
economic crime.12 It led to an extensive reform, which is reminiscent of both the aforemen-
tioned revisions carried out by Brå, and also the Commission against Economic Crime.13
One ofmany questions raised concerned the forfeiture of proceeds from crime.14 “Focusing
on the money” has gradually become an increasingly important issue for criminal policy.
Asset-oriented law enforcement applies regulatory systems from the criminal process, civil
law, administrative law as well as debt enforcement legislation. Parts of the asset-oriented
law enforcement – sequestration and lien – may be considered to constitute administrative
measures (developed later).
Money laundering also began to be regulated in the 1990s. The Finance Police was
established within the National Bureau of Investigation, and serves as Sweden’s Financial
Intelligence Unit for money laundering issues. A special Proceeds of Crime Unit has also
been created within the Swedish Economic Crime Authority. At a much later date, the
Swedish Social Insurance Agency gained a unit that focuses on organised crime and the
allowances received by criminals.
Agency collaboration and information sharing
Agency collaboration has been a common thread in the strategies against economic and
organised crime. As early as in the 1970s, the Task Force on Organised Crime (AMOB)
investigation had a clear agency-common profile. As more agencies become involved, the
potential for developing administrative measures has increased, as police and prosecutors
have opened their eyes to a perspective other than the purely criminal. During the 1990s,
specific collaborative bodies were formed at the county level in order to facilitate coopera-
tion. For example, the Police, Tax Agency, Enforcement Authority, emergency services
and alcohol licensing and supervision authorities were able to jointly agree to inspect local
restaurants based on the respective agency’s regulations and authority (“Operation Pub
Cleansing”). Agency collaboration also occurs to prevent erroneous payments from the
social security systems.15
12 Govt. Com. 1994/95:217.
13 Korsell 2000.
14 SOU 1999:147.
15 Swedish Agency for Public Management Memo, Ref 2009/60-5.
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In addition, agency collaboration requires the exchange of information, but the secrecy
rules have always been perceived as an obstacle. Opportunities to facilitate the exchange
of information, not least registry data, and to ease up on the secrecy rules have therefore
been recurring issues for decades. In the area of welfare, the opportunities have increased
to exchange electronic information between the disbursing authorities.16 Among other
things, a law has been introduced regarding the duty of notification17 in the event of erro-
neous payments from the welfare system, which applies when there is reason to believe
that a financial benefit from another authority has been wrongly awarded or disbursed in
too high an amount (Section 3).18 The degree of suspicion for a notification to be submitted
is set deliberately low, as the idea is that this will allow the prevention of as many erroneous
payments as possible. The law applies to grants, allowances and loans for personal purposes,
which in accordance with law or ordinance are decided by the Migration Board, Swedish
Social Insurance Agency, Swedish Pensions Agency, the Swedish Board for Study Support
(CSN), the SwedishEmployment Service, themunicipalities or the unemployment insurance
funds (Section 1).
Crime against the welfare systems
Following the economic crisis of the early 1990s, the Government launched the project
Kontrollfunktionen i staten.19 The aim was to strengthen the control of how state funds
were used but also how they were received by the State through taxes. Errors, fraud and
overuse of different subsidies ended up as the central focus, as well as fiscal control. Many
of the operations that were conducted are highly interesting from the perspective of
administrative measures; sharing information between agencies, registry runs, control
strategies and stricter control methods. For many agencies, the projects involved an
awakening, especially for disbursing authorities where the control issues had thus far only
had a minor role.
Neither was this initiative carried out under the umbrella of administrative measures.
The focus was on the care of the state economic systems rather than on the insertion of
the control function of the state in an operation directed against economic and organised
crime. It was more a matter of administrative policy than criminal policy.
Around the same time as the Control Function of the State was conducted, more and
more voices were raised among opinion-makers and politicians alleging that fraud
involving different subsidies was being perpetrated against the welfare systems.20 A special
16 SOU 2007:45; Bill 2007/08:160.
17 2008:206.
18 Also, see Bill 2007/08:48, p. 15.
19 Statskontoret 2002.
20 Korsell, Hagstedt & Skinnari 2008.
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delegationwas formedwhich instigated a number of initiatives to reduce the level of fraud.21
Some of the delegation’s key proposals to avoid erroneous payments included; increased
collaboration between the agencies of welfare systems, access to more accurate and reliable
information for the administrative authorities, more consistent concept formation (time,
income andhousing concepts) within thewelfare systems’ legislation, and stricter legislation
for social benefits fraud. These resulted in the following investigative reports: Bidragsspärr,22
Sanktionsavgifter på trygghetsområdet,23 Månadsuppgifter – snabbt och enkelt24 and Har-
moniserat inkomstbegrepp.25
The Benefit blocking report suggested that a temporary exclusion from the welfare
systems should be introduced for serious benefit fraud. TheMonthly data andHarmonised
income concept reports ordained that the requirement of monthly data on salary at the
individual level be introduced. All employers would be included, and the disbursing
agencies would gain direct access to the information. These reforms have so far led to very
limited regulation.
As with the Control Function of the State, the emphasis was not on economic and
organised crime but on reducing erroneous payments.
Nowadays, the leakage from the welfare system has gone from control issues in general
and the “regular people” cheating, to being directed toward serious fraud, systematic crimes
and criminals partially being supported by subsidies. Benefit crimes and fraud are therefore
found under the headings of “mobilisation against organised crime” and “focusing on the
money”. In the context of asset-oriented law enforcement, administrative measures are
applied (outside of criminal law), such as the reconsideration of subsidies, reclamation of
erroneously disbursed amounts, and seizure of debts.
Supervision and control
Supervision is a key feature of the Swedish system of administrative measures, whether or
not it is a step to reinforcing conduct assessment. In the mid-1990s it was suggested that
a general supervisory law be introduced with general rules for supervision of all areas.26
The Government argued, however, that a general law risked being too general and that
several supervisory areas needed specific rules. Instead of a new law, the Government








27 Govt. Com. 2009/10:79.
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In the same letter, the Government stated that the municipalities should continue to
be responsible for exercising supervision. The areas where the municipalities today have
supervisory responsibility are those that are of the greatest importance in society. To ensure
equality and public security, the State should, according to the Government, take clearer
and increased responsibility for the governance of the municipal supervisory duties.
Public procurement
For a long time, procurement issues have been important and referred to in different
reports. The public sector is a major client of industries with problems of economic crime,
such as the building and construction, cleaning and transportation industries.28 Yet it is
local rather than central initiatives that have been taken to ensure that no procurement
takes place with irresponsible parties. Various contract solutions are applied with penalty
clauses. Suppliers’ seriousness is examined, as well as that of their subcontractors. Collab-
oration is underway with the Swedish Tax Agency to investigate for which people taxes
are fees are paid. Access control is observed on construction sites.
11.2 Free enterprise and general prevention rules
11.2.1 Free enterprise – the core of Swedish business
A fundamental principle in Swedish law is that everyone has the right to engage in business
activities. This free enterprise is constitutionally protected (Chapter 2, Section 17 of the
Instrument of Government, RF). In the mid-1980s the Commission against Economic
Crime expressed that we “in Sweden today, from an international perspective, have an
almost unique freedom to establish businesses”, as the departure point froman international
perspective is that there are more or less comprehensive systems for the establishment
control of new entrepreneurs.29 The Instrument ofGovernment (RF) states that: “restrictions
on the right to conduct business or practice a profession can only be imposed to protect
essential public interests” (Chapter 2, Section 17 of the RF).30 This prudent limitation of
freedomof trade is in linewith the understanding that well-functioning business legislation
and free enterprise are vital for long-term corporate investment interest, and that these
business conditions are crucial for determining in which countries future investments will
be made.
28 SOU 1997:111.
29 SOU 1984:15, p. 200.
30 Historically, free enterprise in modern times has been protected by the free trade regulation of 1864.
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Considerations regarding human life, health, safety or privacy, or major economic
values, have been considered exempt from the principle of free enterprise, but in some
cases the risk of crime has also been deemed to justify restrictions. A ban on business
activity is the most restrictive limitation. According to the Trading Prohibition Act,31 the
court can issue a ban on business if a person has “grossly neglected what was incumbent
on him in the (previous) business and thereby become guilty of crimes not considered
minor” (more on trading prohibition below).
11.2.2 General requirements for engaging in business
Approval for corporate tax
Even with a substantial degree of freedom of trade, there are of course some general
requirements for those who intend to engage in business. In practice it is very difficult to
run a business, in a tax context, without being subject to corporate tax regulations. To be
approved for corporate tax means the right to be responsible for one’s own tax payments,
make provisional tax deductions on employee salaries and be responsible for employer
contributions for national insurance. It is the Swedish Tax Agency that decides whether
a proprietor is covered by corporate tax.
Reasons not to approve an application for corporate tax, pursuant to Chapter 9, Section
1 of the Tax ProcedureAct,32 include examples such as a natural person not having reported
or paid taxes or fees, not followed an injunction to submit an income tax return, having
been subject to trading prohibition or declared bankrupt.
Protection of capital in limited liability companies
According to Section 2 of the Trade Register Act,33 there are no financial requirements
imposed on a party who wishes to register a sole proprietorship or a partnership, but to
engage in business as a limited liability company requires, pursuant to Chapter 1, Section
5 of the Swedish Companies Act34 a share capital of at least SEK 50,000. The purpose of
this provision is to ensure an adequate protection of capital. In the preamble to the recent
reform of the share capital requirement – where the requirement was halved from SEK






35 Bill 2009/10:61, p. 5.
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A fundamental feature of the limited company is that the shareholders are not personally
responsible for the company’s debts. The idea has been that, in order to balance this lack
of personal payment liability, there must be rules about capital protection to ensure that
the company always has assets that are at least equivalent to the company’s obligations.
The share capital is a fundamental element of capital protection and aims to ensure that
there is a margin between the company’s assets and liabilities.
The Government’s aim with the reduction was to stimulate economic growth and
employment. A lower capital requirement should mean more people will want to start a
business and have the courage to do so.
The reform, however, seems to be somewhat restorative as, in 1973, the Parliament
increased the minimum capital tenfold from SEK 5,000 (a minimum capital that had
remained unchanged since 1895) to SEK 50,000.36 In conjunction with limited liability
companies being divided into two categories in 1995 (private and public), the Parliament
decided once again to raise the limit for the minimum share capital for private limited
companies fromSEK50,000 to SEK 100,000. Themotivationwas to strengthen the protec-
tion of creditors.
Despite the increase corresponding to a doubling of the capital requirement, the
Companies Act Committee did not reach a consensus about the capital requirement; two
members dissented, arguing for a quadrupling of the capital requirement.37 They referred
to the point that limited liability companies are often exploited for economic crime because
the owners have no personal liability for the company’s debts. High capital requirements
would thus make it more difficult to abuse this corporate form for criminal purposes.
However, it is a delicate task to place the capital requirement at the right level; on the
one hand, the protection of creditors should be ensured along with that the limited liability
company as a business form is not abused in order to avoid personal payment liability,
and on the other hand, it should not lead to the establishment threshold becoming too
high for new entrepreneurs.
11.2.3 Fiscal control, liquidation and auditors
Fiscal control
In the actual taxation procedure, there are measures that aim to prevent the occurrence
of, above all, economic crime. Key measures include the general and the (in some cases)
specific documentation requirements, company law provisions regarding compulsory liqui-
dation and the mandatory audit requirement for certain companies.
36 Bill 1973:93.
37 SOU 1992:83. See, inter alia, the motion 1993/94:L203.
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Documentation requirements
All proprietors are subject to a general documentation requirements under Chapter 39,
Section 3 of the Tax Procedure Act. The documentation requirements aim to ensure that
the disclosure obligation (referring, for example, to income statements, on-going book-
keeping and accounting) established by the law is fulfilled, while enabling the TaxAgency’s
verification of this obligation. The Tax Agency’s verification constitutes an administrative
measure which is partly enabled by the documentation requirements.
A far-reaching control form is auditing, as the tax auditor’s review powers are extensive.
After the audit decision has been made (Chapter 41, Section 4 of the Tax Procedure Act),
the auditor is entitled to review accountingmaterial, inventory the cash register and inspect
the business premises (Chapter 41, Section 7 of the Tax Procedure Act).
Staff ledger system
To combat undeclared work within the restaurant, hairdressing and laundry industries, a
thorough documentation requirement is stipulated. For these industries, there is an obli-
gation to keep a “staff ledger, and document in this the necessary data for identification
of the proprietor and continuously document the necessary data for identification of the
persons working in the business” (Chapter 39, Section 11 of the Tax Procedure Act). The
staff ledger facilitates the control of which people are working in the business, and therefore
the individuals for whom the employer needs to deduct tax at source and pay employer
contributions.38 The Government is considering whether the requirement to keep a staff
ledger should be extended to include additional (critical) industries, such as the construction
industry.39
Requirement of cash registers
For those industries involving the sale of goods or services for cash payment, a certified
cash register must be used (Chapter 39, Section 4 of the Tax Procedure Act). The require-
ment of cash registers was introduced in order to protect serious entrepreneurs fromunfair
competition from less reputable entrepreneurs.40 From 1 January 2014, the previous
exemption from the cash register requirement for plaza and market trade has been abol-
ished,41 which is why the same requirements now also apply to this type of business.
Compulsory liquidation
The rules on compulsory liquidation involve an obligation for the limited liability company
to be dissolved when there is reason to believe that the company’s equity is less than half
38 Ds 2009:43.
39 Bill 2012/13:34.
40 Bill 2012/13:129, p. 21.
41 Bill 2012/13:129, bet.2012/13:SkU32.
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of the registered share capital, or if the company lacks assets for full payment of a foreclosure
claim (Chapter 25, Sections 13-16 of the Companies Act42, ABL).
Of particular interest from an administrative measures perspective, however, are the
situations in which the Swedish Companies Registration Office decides on compulsory
liquidation. It is actualised when the company has not submitted notification regarding
the competent Board, CEO, special recipient of information or auditor, not submitted the
annual financial report and auditor’s report, and not reported if the share capital falls
below the minimum level.
Mandatory audit requirement
Asnoted in several reviews of the legislation against economic crime, the limited companies’
auditors perform a central control function. Auditing aims:43
[…] to satisfy, inter alia, the shareholders’, employees’, creditors’ and public’s
interests in there being appropriate control over a company’s business being
handled in a lawful and correct manner, and that the company’s financial
position and results are reported correctly.
Since 1999, auditors have had an obligation to alert the prosecutor if they suspect that
financial crime has been committed by the CEO or a board member in the company
(Chapter 9, Sections 42-44 of the Companies Act).
On 1 November 2010, a contextually relevant regulation amendment entered into
force, which meant that the previously unconditional requirement that a limited company
must have at least one auditor (Chapter 9, Section 1 of the Companies Act) was abolished.
Only limited liability companies that meet more than one of the following conditions are,
following the rule change, still required to have an auditor:
1. The average number of employees in the company during each of the past two financial
years has been more than 3,
2. The company’s reported balance sheet total for each of the past two financial years has
amounted to more than SEK 1.5 million.
3. The company’s reported net turnover for each of the past two financial years has
amounted to more than SEK 3 million.
If the individual limited company meets only one (or none) of the above conditions, it is
up to the company to decide whether or not it should have an auditor. The reform is an
42 2005:551.
43 Bill 2009/10:204, p. 56.
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attempt to reduce the regulatory burden on small business; the Government estimated
that the abolition of the mandatory audit covered about 250,000 companies.
The Government’s view was that the EU Accounting Directives aimed at creating a
“minimum common level of protection in the Member States for shareholders, creditors
and other stakeholders,” but that Sweden so far “had not taken advantage of the opportunity
afforded by EU legislation for exemptions for small businesses”.44
The partial abolition of the mandatory audit came as a relief to small business owners.
The Swedish Tax Agency, however, felt that abolishing mandatory auditing would “result
in an increase of both conscious and unconscious errors in company accounts and thus
the number of tax return errors will increase.”45
In its comments to the proposal, the Swedish Economic Crime Authority stated that
the report46 seemed to assume that the problems that might arise if companies choose not
to have an auditor would be solved through prosecution and sanctions. Penal measures
should not, however, be the primary tool to getting to grips with reckless or deliberate
regulation breaches in business, according to the Swedish Economic Crime Authority, as
crime prevention measures that provide a strong incentive for most companies to act
properly would be a more effective and appealing approach. A prerequisite for effective
law enforcement in the area of economic crime is properly functioning control systems,
and it is here that auditors play an important role according to the Authority.47
According to Brå’s consultation response, however, the functioning of the market
should not be underestimated; the issue of preventing economic crime does not stand or
fall with themandatory audit requirement. Not leastmarket actors in the form of creditors
and suppliers are expected tomake demands for control, and audit companieswere expected
to develop “voluntary” audit services that would suit a deregulated environment.Moreover,
they were assessed by the bookkeeping agencies hired by the companies as having an
“educative” effect on the businesses, thus ensuring the maintenance of high accounting
standards. The conclusion of Brå on the other hand was that the result of a mandatory
audit requirement abolition was too risky, which is why a more reliable basis than the
report needed to be developed before a decision on the possible removal of the audit
requirement was adopted.48
44 Bill 2009/10:204 p. 56.
45 Swedish Tax Agency 2008.
46 SOU 2008:32.
47 Swedish Economic Crime Authority 2008, p. 2.
48 Brå 2008.
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11.3 Ban on business activity
Asmentioned earlier, a ban on business activity constitutes the harshest sanction a propri-
etor can be subject to, as the ban in principle means that the proprietor must cease all
business activity for a certain period. If a person has grossly neglectedwhat was incumbent
on them in the business, and it is expedient in the eyes of public interest, a trading prohi-
bition shall essentially always be issued in the event of crimes not considered minor.49 A
ban on business activity is, however, not formally an administrative measure. Nor should
it be regarded as a penalty for a crime (punishment, etc.) but as a “special legal consequence”
(Chapter 1 of the Swedish Penal Code, BrB). Prosecutors may, as a rule, bring an action
for trading prohibition in connection with the prosecution of criminal offences (Section
8 of the Trading Prohibition Act).50
The reason why trading prohibition is nonetheless being dealt with in the context of
administrative measures is that there is an interaction between the trading prohibition on
the one hand, and on the other hand, permit, registration and notification requirements
(and associated supervision). The legislature can (as a control strategy) choose between
applying force at the establishment of a business (permit with subsequent supervision),
during the operation of that business (supervision, sometimes in combination with notifi-
cation), or when crimes have been committed within the business activities (trading pro-
hibition). Permit, registration and notification requirements should reduce the need to
issue a ban on business activity. The aforementioned administrative measures are aimed
partly at reducing the risk of crime, and consequently at reducing the amount of situations
where trading prohibition may be required.
The close connection between trading prohibition and permitswith conduct assessment
is clearly stated in the guidelines bill,51 in which Eko-kommissionen’s (Economic Commis-
sion) proposal for a system with trade permits was discussed. In the bill it is argued that
the proposed trade permit system and an expanded trading prohibitionmay be considered
as alternative ways to take action against irresponsible proprietors, and therefore should
be dealt with in that context.52
That the administrative measures are by far more important in preventing the abuse
of free enterprise than the ability to issue a trading ban can be illustrated by some statistics.
According to Statistics Sweden (SCB), there were no fewer than 1,051,257 active companies
in Sweden in 2012. In March of the same year, only 1,047 decisions were made to issue
49 Bill 1995/96:98.
50 1986:436.
51 Bill 1984/85:32 p. 81.
52 See also JuU1984/85:28, p. 28.
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trading bans,53 which represents 0.1 per cent of the total number of active companies.
However, the number of trading bans has increased significantly over the past decades.54
In addition to making it difficult for previously convicted persons to use companies
as a crime instrument, the trading ban can also be used to discourage the use of dummies
on company boards.55 In limited liability companies, it is common for those planning to
commit economic crime via a company to put in a “goalkeeper” as director of the com-
pany56. In a case before the Supreme Court,57 the court found that in view of public interest,
it waswarranted to impose a five-year trading ban on a personwho had acted as goalkeeper.
He had, among other things, been a director in twelve limited companies, which had all
gone bankrupt. The Supreme Court stated in its reasoning that the man had failed to fulfil
his obligations as a company director in each of the limited companies, and that his negli-
gence appeared very serious as he had been the sole director of these companies. The ruling
ought to be significant for the use of board goalkeepers henceforth.
11.4 Permits or registration to engage in business activities
11.4.1 Conduct assessment with registry checks
Although the main principle in Swedish law is free enterprise, there are a number of
business-specific permits (“trade permits”). Consequently, these permits can also be
revoked. The rules regarding permit obligation – and the possibility of revocation and
other interventions – constitute clear examples, perhaps themost obvious, of administrative
measures against economic and organised crime in Swedish legislation.
For industries where tax evasion and other forms of economic crime are a problem, it
would seem logical with some formof examination of the applicant’s conduct and suitability.
Section 5 deals with a number of industries and professions where conduct assessment
takes place. In the absence of an accepted definition of the term conduct assessment, the
definition found in the bill Ökad tillsyn av den yrkesmässiga trafiken58 is used, and which
53 SOU 2012:84, p. 75.
54 Swedish Economic Crime Authority 2004:2.
55 Karlsson-Tuula 2005, p. 54.
56 Goalkeepers are people who do not intend to seriously participate in the company’s business, but merely
lend their name to it in order to comply with the formal requirements of the Companies Act. Bulvanutred-
ningen proposed the introduction of a provision with a specific competence requirement for boardmembers
andCEOs in limited companies, in order to curb the use of goalkeepers on company boards. See SOU1998:47
p. 70 ff. The Government, however, felt that the proposed provision was too vague and imprecise in design,
and therefore rejected the inclusion of such a provision. See Bill 2000/01:150 p. 77 f.
57 Ö 2549:03.
58 Bill 1993/94:168,SOU 1999:60.
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has later been expressed in Section 5 of theAct concerning taxi traffic.59 Conduct assessment
means an examination of the person applying for a specific trade permit (in this case a taxi
permit), which means that a permit/license ‘may only be given to a person who, with
respect to professional skills, economic conditions and good reputation, is deemed suitable
to conduct the business.’60
In the case of thorough conduct assessments, the licensing authorities perform a registry
check in the Police’s Criminal Records and Records of Suspected Persons in order to get
a picture of whether the applicant has any criminal record. The importance of this registry
data when considering permit applications depends on the type of crime, when it took
place and the industry-specific legislation’s protective purpose. The Swedish National
Police Board is responsible for both registries, which have partially overlapping purposes.
The Criminal Records Registry contains information such as judgments and summary
impositions of fines (Section 3 of the Act on criminal records61). The Criminal Records
Registry are maintained primarily for the criminal justice system (for example, for use at
sentencing), but also for other agencies’ diverse needs. As regards administrativemeasures,
one purpose of these records is of particular interest, namely that they are kept for such
‘suitability assessment, permit consideration or other examination as are prescribed by
statute’ (Section 2).
The Records of Suspected Persons, however, contain information on those who are
suspected of a crime on good grounds (Section 1 of the Suspicion Registers Act62). Part of
the objective with this registry is to be able to use the information for conduct assessment.
Information contained in Police records is covered by professional secrecy legislation.
In the case of the Criminal Records Registry, informationmay only be accessed by agencies
that have a statute-regulated right to do so. The Criminal Records Registry has a division
between authorities that are entitled to receive full information from the registry, and
authorities that have the right to obtain information about certain offences (Sections 10-
17 of the Criminal Records Registry Ordinance63). A similar division is found for the
Records of Suspected Persons between authorities that have the right to access full infor-
mation and authorities that have the right to information on crimes for which charges
have been filed (Sections 3 and 4 of the Records of Suspected Persons RegistryOrdinance64).
Authorities such as the Police and the Swedish Tax Agency have direct access to data from
both the Swedish Criminal Records and Records of Suspected Persons.
59 2012:211.
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Apart from the Swedish Criminal Records and Records of Suspected Persons, there
are other registries of interest from an administrative standpoint, which also contain open
data. Registry information at the Swedish Enforcement Authority regarding certain debts,
and information from the Tax Agency on paid taxes and fees, may be requested without
specific legal support as they are public documents.
Where a legal person applies for a permit, a conduct assessment is performed of the
people who have influence over the business, such as the CEO and board members.
11.4.2 Conduct assessment without registry checks as well as duty to report
There is also permit obligationwith conduct assessmentwithout any possibility of checking
the Swedish Criminal Records and Records of Suspected Persons.
One form of conduct assessment that is not connected to permits is when there is a
requirement for banks and other financial operations to, within the context of their business
relations, attain risk-based customer due diligence in accordancewith theMoney Launder-
ing Directive and its transposition into Swedish law through the Act on Measures against
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing.65 Since it is the financial operations that have
contact with their customers, it is also they who have the best ability to identify suspicious
transactions. However, in this context, it is the customers’ conduct (as viewed from a
monetary transaction perspective) that is assessed, which is why only the failure to meet
the requirement of risk-based customer due diligence may result in possible sanctions
against the banks and financial activities covered by the regulation. The reporting obligation
is perceived by many representatives of these operations as unclear, while placing a lot of
responsibility on the individual officers at banks and companies that make qualified legal
assessments.66 Furthermore, suspicious transactions are reported to a very small extent,
with only 1 per cent of the total number of operators having reported a suspicious transac-
tion in 2010.67
Finally, the legislature has considered that, for some activities, it is sufficient with a
reporting requirement (for example in carrying out foreign exchange operations), which
means that a proprietor reports that a business activity is being initiated. Through the duty
to report, the authorities’ control and supervision is facilitated, as they thus become aware
of the business proprietors that are active within a particular industry.
65 2009:62.
66 Brå 2008.
67 Brå 2011b, p. 37 f.
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11.4.3 Industries and professions with permit and reporting requirements
The following section presents a number of industries that are subject to administrative
measures in the form of permit or reporting requirements (or similar measures). Section
11.5 then describes respective legislation. The Criminal Records Registry Ordinance68 and
the Records of Suspected Persons Ordinance69 are referred to below as ‘Criminal Records
Registry’ and ‘Records of Suspected Persons’.
Trade in certain types of goods
– Permit for commercial trade in arms (Chapter 2, Section 10 of the Weapons Act).
Conduct assessment with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal Records and Records
of Suspected Persons.
– Supply/export of defence/military equipment (Sections 1a, 4-6 of theMilitary Equipment
Act).
– Permit for serving alcohol (Chapter 8, Sections 1, 11, and 12 of the Alcohol Act).
Conduct assessment with registry check in the Criminal Records Registry.
– Wholesale trade of spirits, wine, strong beer and other fermented alcoholic beverages
(Chapter 4, Section 1 of the Alcohol Act70). Conduct assessment with registry checks in
the Swedish Criminal Records and Records of Suspected Persons.
– Trade of industrial alcohol and alcoholic preparations (Chapter 6, Section 1 of the
Alcohol Act). Conduct assessment with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal Records
and Records of Suspected Persons.
– Sale of medium-strong beer (Chapter 5, Section 5 of the Alcohol Act). Requirement of
notification before the commencement of business.
– Serving of medium-strong beer (Chapter 8, Section 8 of the Alcohol Act). Requirement
of notification before the commencement of business.
– Trade in tobacco products (Section 12 c of the Tobacco Act71). Requirement of notifica-
tion before the commencement of business.
– Retail trade of pharmaceuticals (Chapter 2, Section 2 of the Act on the trade in medical
products72). Conduct assessment with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal Records
and Records of Suspected Persons.
– Requirement of registration during trade with (certain) used goods (Act on Trade in
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– Permit for commercial sale of locksmith tools (Section 2 of the Act on the Sale of
Locksmith tools74). Conduct assessment without registry checks.
Manufacture of certain types of goods
– Permit to produce spirits, wine, medium-strong beer, strong beer and other fermented
alcoholic beverages (Chapter 2, Sections 1-4 of the Alcohol Act75 and Section 9 of the
Excise Duty on Alcohol Act76). Conduct assessment with registry check in the Criminal
Records Registry.
– Manufacture of defence/military equipment (Sections 1a and 3 of the Military Equip-
ment Act77).
Handling of certain hazardous goods
– Permit to handle, transfer or import explosives, or professionally or in a greater quantity
handle flammables (Section 16 of the Act on flammable goods78). Conduct assessment
with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal Records and Records of Suspected Persons.
Approval of the product for sale
– Approval of drugs for sale (Section 5 of the Medicinal Products Act79) Sale without
authorisation carries penal sanctions.
Sale of certain services (public as well as private sector)
– Requirement of the provision of acceptable collateral during the sale of package tours
(Section 1 of the Act on Package Travel80). Requirement of the provision of financial
security.
– Permit to conduct certain business activities according to Section 23 of the Act con-
cerning Support and Service for Persons with Certain Functional Impairments.81
Conduct assessment with registry check in the Criminal Records Registry.
– Permit to conduct certain business activities according to Chapter 7, Section 1 of the
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– Permit to carry out certain services according to Chapter 7, Section 1 of the Swedish
Social Services Act,83 including residential care for children and youth, HVB. Conduct
assessment with registry check in the Criminal Records Registry. Act regarding registry
checks of staff at care facilities or accommodation that take in children.84
– A Government inquiry proposes that conduct assessment is introduced for the home-
help services.85
– A Government inquiry proposes that conduct assessment is introduced in connection
to the outsourcing to private contractors of the management of specially adapted
housing, round-the-clock residential care, and non-institutional needs-tested care.86
– A Government inquiry proposes the introduction of certain requirements to be met
by providers in terms of prudence, experience, and suitability, in accordance with the
Swedish Social Services Act.87 There are also requirements on the financial ability of
providers to sustain operations in the long-term.
Commercial traffic
– Taxi traffic permit (Chapter 3, Sections 5-12 of theAct concerning taxi traffic88). Conduct
assessment with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal Records and Records of Suspected
Persons.
– Permit to operate commercial traffic (Chapter 2, Sections 1-6 of the Professional
Transport Act89). Conduct assessment with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal
Records and Records of Suspected Persons.
Security operations
– Permit to, as a security company, take on some of the security tasks specified in the
law on behalf of others (Section 2 of the Security Company Act90). Conduct assessment
with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal Records and Records of Suspected Persons.
– Eligibility and appointment requirements for security officers (Sections 4 and 5 of the
SecurityOfficers Act91). Conduct assessment with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal
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– Permit to operate an alarm installation business (Section 2 of the Act with certain
provisions relating to alarm systems etc.92). Conduct assessment with registry checks in
the Swedish Criminal Records and Records of Suspected Persons.
Rental operations
– Permit to engage in the professional rental of cars and off-road motor vehicles without
a driver for periods of less than one year (Sections 3 and 6 of the Car Rental Act93).
Conduct assessment with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal Records and Records
of Suspected Persons.
– Permit to engage in professional activities for the purpose of providing temporary
furnished accommodation (Section 2 of theHotel ProprietorsAct94). Conduct assessment
with (the possibility of) registry checks in the Swedish Criminal Records and Records of
Suspected Persons.
Gambling activities
– Permit to arrange gambling on automatic gaming machines, token gaming machines
and slot machines (Sections 25-27 of the Lotteries Act95). Permit obligation. Indirect
conduct assessment when there is a requirement for the alcohol permit criteria being met
in organised use of token gaming machines.
– Permit to organise roulette, dice and card games (Sections 32-34 of the Lotteries Act96).
Conduct assessment with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal Records and Records
of Suspected Persons.
– Permit in accordance with the Act concerning the Arrangement of Certain Forms of
Gaming Machines.97 Conduct assessment with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal
Records and Records of Suspected Persons.
Lawyer, mediation, auditing and process serving activities
– Admission requirements for becoming accepted as a member of the Swedish Bar
Association (and thus being given the right to call oneself a “lawyer”, Chapter 8, Section
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– Registration and suitability requirements to act as a real estate agent (Sections 5 and 6
of the Estate Agents Act98). Conduct assessment with registry check in the Criminal
Records Registry.
– Authorisation and approval of auditors (Auditors Act99 and Sections 2-6 of theAuditors
Ordinance100). Conduct assessment with registry check in the Criminal Records Registry.
– Authorisation of process serving companies (Section 2 of the Act on the authorisation
of process serving companies101). Conduct assessment with registry checks in the Swedish
Criminal Records and Records of Suspected Persons.
– Professional accountancy or auditing services, where the provider is not an approved
or authorized auditor (Chapter 1, Section 2, point 11 Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing (Prevention) Act102). Requirement of notification before the commencement
of business and conduct assessment with registry check in the Criminal Records Registry
(but without permit requirement).
– Professional tax accountancy services (Chapter 1, Section 2, point 12Money Laundering
and Terrorist Financing (Prevention) Act103). Requirement of notification before the
commencement of business and conduct assessment with registry check in the Criminal
Records Registry (but without permit requirement).
– Professional independent legal professional services (offering certain services), except
if employed by a law firm (Chapter 1, Section 2, point 14 Money Laundering and Ter-
rorist Financing (Prevention) Act104). Requirement of notification before the commence-
ment of business and conduct assessment with registry check in the Criminal Records
Registry (but without permit requirement).
– Professional services, including establishing juridical persons and providing companies
with office space, addresses, or similar services to companies (Chapter 1, Section 2,
point 15Money Laundering andTerrorist Financing (Prevention) Act105). Requirement
of notification before the commencement of business and conduct assessment with registry
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Financial operations and borrowing and lending operations
– Permit to conduct banking (so-called charter) or financing operations (Chapters 2-5
of the Swedish Banking and Financing BusinessAct106). Conduct assessment with registry
checks in the Swedish Criminal Records and Records of Suspected Persons.
– Permit to conduct insurance business (Chapter 2, Insurance Business Act107). Conduct
assessment with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal Records and Records of Suspected
Persons.
– Permit to conduct investment fund operations (Chapter 2, Investment Funds Act108).
Conduct assessment with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal Records and Records
of Suspected Persons.
– Permit to conduct securities trade business (Chapter 2, Securities Market Act109).
Conduct assessment with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal Records and Records
of Suspected Persons.
– Permit to conduct certain consumer credit trade (Certain Consumer Credit-related
Operations Act110). Conduct assessment with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal
Records and Records of Suspected Persons.
– Permit to operate payment institution (Chapter 2, Act on Payment Services111). Conduct
assessment with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal Records and Records of Suspected
Persons.
– Permit to issue electronic money (Chapter 2, Electronic Money Act112). Conduct
assessment with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal Records and Records of Suspected
Persons.
– Reporting requirements as well as requirement to perform customer due diligence, in
order to prevent exploitation financial services for the purpose of money-laundering
and financing of terrorism (Chapters 2 and 3, Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing (Prevention) Act113). Requirement to report.
– Notification requirement for providers of currency exchange services (alongwith certain
other financial services. (Section 2, Act on the Obligation to Give Notice of Certain
Financial Operations). Notification requirement and conduct assessment with registry
checks in the Swedish Criminal Records.
– Requirement for businesses conducting deposit operations to register with Financial
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6 and 7,Deposits Business Act114). Conduct assessment with registry checks in the Swedish
Criminal Records and requirement to register
Financial advisory services, distance sales, and pawn brokering
– The obligation (to the consumer) of providers of financial advisory services (Sections
4 and 5, Financial Advisory Services to Consumers Act115). Obligation to notify. Should
traders fail to observe this obligation, the SwedishConsumerAgencymay impose fines
and even order them to cease providing financial advisory services.
– The obligation to notify for traders making distance sales, when goods and non-
financial services respectively are offered (Chapters 2 and 3, Distance and Doorstep
Sales Act116). Should traders submit inadequate notices, sanctions may be levied in the
form of fines for disruptive marketing practices.
– Permit to operate as a pawnbroker (Sections 1 and 3-5, Pawnbrokers Act117). Conduct
assessment with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal Records
Debt recovery and credit-rating services
– Permit to operate as a pawnbroker (Sections 1 and 3-5, Pawnbrokers Act118). Conduct
assessment with registry checks in the Swedish Criminal Records
– Permit to operate debt recovery activity (Sections 2 and 3, Debt Recovery Act119).
Conduct assessment without registry checks in the Swedish Criminal Records.
– Permit to offer credit-rating services (Sections 3 and 4, Credit Information Act120).
Conduct assessment without registry checks in the Swedish Criminal Records.
Environmentally hazardous operations
– Permit to engage in professional activities which aim to recycle, reuse or dispose of
scrap cars (car breaker) (Chapter 15, Section 24 of the Environmental Code121 and
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– Permit and reporting obligation for environmentally hazardous operations in accord-
ance with Chapter 9, Section 6 of the Environmental Code.123 Permit or reporting obli-
gation without conduct assessment.
11.5 Further information on permit and reporting obligation
The following is a detailed description of the regulations that exist for permits to engage
in certain business activities, with or without a conduct assessment, and reporting obliga-
tion.
11.5.1 Requirement of a permit with conduct assessment
a) Vital societal commissions of trust – requirements of authorisation or registration
To be able to call oneself a lawyer, auditor or work as an estate agent – and the right to use
a protected title – there are, in all cases, requirements of authorisation or registration. A
lawyer requires the authorisation that they are accepted into the Swedish Bar Association
(Chapter 8, Section 2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure), an estate agent must register with
the Swedish Estate Agents Inspectorate (Section 5 of the Estate Agents Act124) and an
auditor – authorised or approved – must register with the Supervisory Board of Public
Accountants (Sections 4-6 of the Auditors Act125). For all these professions, a conduct
assessment is carried out.
Lawyer
A lawyer must ‘[have] become known for integrity and in general also be [deemed] fit to
practice law’ (Chapter 8, Section 2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure). In terms of integrity,
the aspiring lawyer must, according to the legislative history, have a sound and good
judgment.126 Legal practice states that it is incumbent upon the applicant to prove their
suitability, and that any ambiguity concerning important facts can burden the applicant
when assessing their suitability.127 The fact that the applicant has had a limited number of




126 NJA, [New Legal Archives] II 1943 p. 82.
127 See for example NJA 1990 C 125, NJA 1994 C 42 and NJA 1998 C 54.
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the suitability being considered unproven.128 Former crime, even if it occurred far back in
time, affects the suitability assessment.129 Even large debts can disqualify an applicant.130
As the Swedish Bar Association has no legal right to request excerpts from the Criminal
Records Registry, it is up to the applicants themselves to request any excerpts if deemed
necessary for consideration of their application for admission into the Association.
Estate Agent
Estate agents are required, in connection with applying for registration, to have “integrity
and in general be suitable as estate agents” (Section 6, point 5 of the Estate Agents Act).
The Swedish Estate Agents Inspectorate, which processes applications for registration as
a real estate agent, also performs regular inspections of registered real estate agents in the
Criminal Records Registry and the Enforcement Authority’s records.
The general suitability assessment – assessment of honesty, reliability and integrity –
will, according to the legislative history, address the requirements that should be imposed
given the responsible position that a broker occupies in relation to both the client and
their counterparty.131 An estate agent who does not conduct their activities in accordance
with good estate agent practice may be subject to disciplinary action in the form of a
warning, reminder or, at worst, revocation of their registration. The Swedish Estate Agents
Inspectorate verifies that registered estate agents continue to meet the suitability criteria
at least once every five years, but can also initiate an inspection following reports, or for
any other reason, on its own initiative.
Auditor
The wording of the requirement for an aspiring auditor’s conduct is identical with that of
estate agents; the applicant must “have integrity and in general be suitable to engage in
audit activities” (Section 4 of the Auditors Act). Just as in the examination of prospective
real estate agents, the integrity requirement addresses the prospective auditor’s general
honesty, reliability and integrity.132 Particular attention is given to failure tomake payments
or other mishandling of financial obligations.133 The Supervisory Board of Public
Accountants processes applications for approval and authorisation, and manages the
supervision of auditors.
128 However, see NJA 2007 N 14, where the Supreme Court amended the Bar Association’s decision to deny
the applicant admission in favour of the applicant, despite limited reference documentation.
129 NJA 2000, p. 129.
130 NJA 2007 N 14.
131 Bill 1994/95:14, p. 35 and p. 66.
132 Bill 1994/95:152 p. 72.
133 See for example RÅ 2001 ref. 13.
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Authorisation of process serving companies
Professional service under the Service of ProcessAct134 requires authorisation.Authorisation
may be granted only if it can be assumed, in respect of organisation, management and
ownership, that the company’s business will be conducted in accordance with the law and
in an expert and judicious manner. The Swedish National Police Board should be given
an opportunity to comment before authorisation is granted (Section 2 of the Act on the
authorisation of process serving companies135). Both staff andmanagement at an authorised
process serving company must be approved with respect to law abidance and general
suitability for being employed in such an enterprise (Section 3 of the Act on the authorisa-
tion of process serving companies136). The county administrative boards are responsible
for processing applications for authorisation.
b) Manufacture and sale of certain goods
In the case of commercial trade in certain types of goods, it seems more natural to set
particularly high demands on the trader’s professional skills and suitability, as viewed from
a law-abidance perspective.
Weapons
One type of product that can easily be misused if they fall into the wrong hands is firearms.
A permit is therefore needed to conduct trade in firearms, for professionally receiving
weapons for repair and overhaul, and for bringing inweapons and ammunition to Sweden,
or for possessing firearms and ammunition (Chapter 2, Section 1 of the Weapons Act137).
For an individual to be issued a weapon’s permit requires an approved purpose and an
absence of reasonable grounds for believing that the weapon will be misused (Chapter 2,
Sections 4 and 5). The same requirements are placed on any individual borrowing aweapon
(Chapter 3, Section 9). Possession of ammunition also requires a permit (Chapter 2, Section
8). Chapter 2, Section 3 of the Weapons Ordinance138 states that weapons experience is
additionally required for a weapon ownership permit to be issued. In the case of possession
for hunting purposes, the applicant must have obtained a so-called hunting license, and
sharpshooting weapons require that the applicant is an active member of a shooting-club
and has demonstrated marksmanship ability. Issuing a permit for the possession of fully
automatic weapons requires extraordinary reasons, and should as a rule be a time-limited
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The police examine applications for the commercial sale of weapons. Permits to engage
in the commercial trade of firearms may only be “issued to parties who, with respect to
knowledge, law abidance and other circumstances, can be considered suitable to engage
in such activities” (Chapter 2, Section 10). A thorough conduct assessment is therefore
carried out before any permit is issued: “Permits to engage in the trade of firearms may
only be issued to parties who, with respect to knowledge, law abidance and other circum-
stances, are suitable to engage in such activities. Permits may only be granted for trade
conducted in a professionalmanner” (Chapter 2, Section 10). According to the regulations
and general advice of the Swedish National Police Board on weapons legislation, the pro-
vision should be interpreted as follows:139
Great importance should be attached to the applicant’s general law abidance.
[…] Those convicted of, for example, violent crime, property crime, receiving
stolen goods offences and accountancy crime, unless the crimes are considered
to be insignificant, should not be issued a permit until a considerable length
of time has passed, usually three to five years from the date when the criminal
offence was committed. The period of time should relate to the severity of the
offence. The same applies to parties known in the context of misuse. During
permit consideration, the applicant’s taxation history should be taken into
account. An applicant’s integrity and suitability may be questioned if, for
example, VAT regulations were disregarded in prior business activities. Such
breaches may constitute an indication that bookkeeping and other memoran-
dums will not be maintained correctly. […]
The police also has a responsibility for this supervision. If a crime is committed, the permit
can be revoked. The same applies if the permit holder has disregarded a regulation, provi-
sion or condition that has been conferred under the Weapons Act.
The administrative regulations that concern the sale of weapons are complemented by
the criminal provisions relating to weapons crime (Chapter 9, Section 1). An interim report
on stricter penalties for weapons crimewas presented in the report Utredningen om skärpta
straff för organiserad brottslighet.140 The report proposes a nuanced, expanded and stricter
scale of penalties for weapons crime. In addition to the existing offence categories of
weapons crime and serious weapons crime, it is proposed that the penal provision partic-
ularly serious weapons crime also be introduced. The penalty scale’s maximum sentence
is therefore proposed to be extended from four to six years in prison. The proposed penalty
139 Chapter 13, Section 2 of FAP 551-3, RPSFS 2009:13, p. 35.
140 SOU 2014:7.
445
11 The administrative approach in Sweden
increase is partly in response to an increased number of shootings, mainly in Gothenburg,
which have occurred in recent years.
Manufacture, export and supply of military equipment
In Sweden there is a long-standing ban on the export of military equipment without the
necessary authorisation. The manufacture and supply of military equipment (defence
equipment) constitute licensable activities (Sections 1a, 2-4 of the Military Equipment
Act141). The Swedish Agency for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls (ISP) is the
administrative authority that (inter alia) has been commissioned to work with the control
and supervision of defence equipment. Matters of principle importance or particular sig-
nificance are handled by the Government (Section 1a of the Military Equipment Act142).
What constitutes military equipment is determined by a technical classification procedure,
for which the ISP is responsible.
Permits under the Military Equipment Act may only be granted if there are security
or defence policy reasons for doing so and it does not conflict with Sweden’s foreign policy
(Section 1). The Parliament has adopted guidelines that will assist the Government and
ISP when deciding on the export of military equipment.143 Exports should, according to
the guidelines, not be approved to states engaged in armed conflict with another state,
states involved in international conflict that may lead to an armed conflict, states that have
domestic armed troubles, or states where there is widespread and serious violations of
human rights. In addition to these guidelines, the EU has adopted a common position on
weapons exports, which is binding for Member States.
The military industry is a highly capital-intensive industry with high demands on
technical knowledge, and is directly or indirectly subject to review by the Government via
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It is therefore unlikely that it would be the subject, to any
great extent, of exploitation for economic crime purposes. As the weapons industry has a
significant turnover, which generates both jobs and tax revenue for the Swedish state, it
is also often in the Government’s interest, from an economic perspective, that the export
of military equipment (in accordance with parliamentary guidelines for export) actually
occurs.
Production and sale of alcoholic beverages
Permits are required for both producing and for selling and serving alcohol. The point of
departure, according toChapter 2, Section 1 of theAlcoholAct, is that only a party approved
141 1992:1300.
142 1992:1300.
143 Bill 1991/92:174, Report 1992/93:UU1, Written Communication from the Parliament to the Government
1992/93:61.
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as a warehouse keeper under Section 9 of the Excise Duty on Alcohol Act144 has the right
to engage in the wholesale trade, producing and selling of spirits (liquor). A warehouse
keeper is a person approved by the Tax Agency to, as part of their business, produce, pro-
cess, store, receive (both nationally and within the EU) and dispatch alcohol products
without alcohol taxes falling due. The same requirement is imposed with regard to the
production of wine, medium-strong beer and strong beer; except in the home for personal
use (as opposed to liquor and spirits, for which personal production is not allowed).
The permit process and control of liquor production is coordinated with fiscal control.
The Swedish Tax Agency issues indirect production permits by approving a warehouse
keeper, while the Public Health Agency of Sweden is responsible for national oversight.
According to Section 5 of the Excise Duty on Alcohol Ordinance,145 the Tax Agency
examines applications to be approved as a warehouse keeper. Approval requires that the
person “is suitable as a warehouse keeper with regard to their financial circumstances and
circumstances in general.”
The warehouse keeper can send and receive goods from other EU countries tax-free.
If an authorised warehouse no longer meets the requirements for suitability, approval shall
be revoked.146 During permit consideration, it is of great importance that the applicant’s
financial reserves are deemed satisfactorily large.147 Negligence with tax returns and tax
payment constitutes a very strong reason for revocation, unless it is the case of a single
offence.148 When considering applications for approval as a warehouse keeper, the Tax
Agency has the opportunity to request a restricted (for certain law-specified crimes) excerpt
from the Criminal Records Registry. On suspicion of a crime or in the case of commenced
preliminary investigations, the Swedish Economic Crime Authority can in certain cases
provide information to the department in the Tax Agency that processes and issues tax
warehouse permits.149
The requirements imposed by the SwedishTaxAgency on a potential warehouse keeper
are thorough.150 If the goods in a storing place are moved from the warehouse for storage
at another location, they are considered released for consumption. Tax deferral is thus
linked to the goods “physical separation” from the open market. This means that the
warehouse keeper, when moving the goods, immediately becomes accountable for the
144 1994:1564.
145 2010:173.
146 Bill 1994/95:56, p. 86.
147 See, for example, the Administrative Court of Appeal in Sundsvall’s judgment in case no. 3511-1999, pro-
nounced on 27/09/2000.
148 TheAdministrative Court of Appeal in Sundsvall’s judgment in case no. 1766-03, pronounced on 19/09/2003,
and the Administrative Court of Appeal in Sundsvall’s judgment in case no. 2163-2002, pronounced on
03/01/2003.
149 National Intelligence Service 2012, p. 4.
150 SKVFS 2013:12.
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alcohol tax attributable to the goods. Repeated inability to pay alcohol tax at the time of
reporting may in other words be a sign that the sale of alcoholic beverages is taking place
in contravention of the law, which in turn may constitute grounds for revocation of
authorisation as warehouse keeper.
Wholesale trade of tobacco products
Tobacco products for which excise duty has not been paid (“untaxed goods”) are subject
to a tax deferral procedure similar to that of the wholesale trade of alcoholic beverages. It
is only when the tobacco product has been released for consumption that the excise duty
falls due for payment. Anyone who trades in untaxed tobacco products must therefore
also apply to become approved as a warehouse keeper (Section 10 of the Act on Excise
Duty on Tobacco151).
Just as in the consideration ofwarehouse keepers regarding alcoholic beverages, approval
requires that the applicant is deemed appropriate in view of their financial circumstances
and circumstances in general, and utilises a space located in Sweden that can be authorised
as a tax warehouse (Section 10). The same requirements are imposed on the warehouse
design as are imposed for the storage of alcohol.152
Serving of certain alcoholic beverages
According to Chapter 8, Section 1 of the Alcohol Act, “a permit (to serve alcoholic bever-
ages) is required from the municipality where the serving locale is located”. A comprehen-
sive assessment of the applicant’s conduct is performed, as the permit “may only be issued
to a party who shows that he or she, with respect to their personal and financial circum-
stances and circumstances in general, is suitable to conduct the business activities, and
that the business will be operated in accordance with the requirements imposed by this
Act” (Chapter 8, Section 12 of the Alcohol Act). The applicant may be required to present
excerpts from the Enforcement Authority, a certificate from the Tax Agency regarding
VAT registration etc., a bankruptcy certificate from the District Court, certificates of
education and employment history, a lease contract, purchase agreement and financing
plan.153 A statement from the police authority is obtained in matters of alcohol permits.
In their statement the Police shall “report all circumstances that form the basis for the
Authority’s assessment of the individual case and particularly comment on the applicant’s
general suitability for the business” (Chapter 8, Section 11 of the Alcohol Act), or as it is
expressed in the legislative history:154
151 1994:1563.
152 SKVFS 2013:12.
153 Bill 1994/95:89 p. 64.
154 Bill 2009/10:125 p. 97.
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Through the police authority statement, themunicipality receives information
about conditions in the area where the applicant wishes to establish licensed
activities, and the Police assessment of the manner in which these conditions
are likely to be affected by the pending establishment or extension of the same.
Furthermore, the Police provides information about the applicant based on
the SwedishCriminal Records andRecords of Suspected Persons, the data from
which, along with other information, constitutes the basis for the municipal
assessment of whether the applicant is fit to be entrustedwith serving alcoholic
beverages to the public.
It is thus not only the individual proprietor’s suitability and professional skills that are
relevant in considering an application for a permit to serve alcohol, but also the conditions
in the areas in which the applicant wishes to establish licensed activities. Areas with known
drug abuse problems, nearby schools or youth centres are examples of areas where the
municipalitymaywish to prevent the establishment of a business licensed to serve alcohol.
The potential risk of disruption to local residents may constitute circumstances that lead
to rejection of the application for a permit to serve alcoholic beverages (Chapter 8, Section
17).
Applicantsmust undergo a special knowledge test to show that they “have the knowledge
of this law and associated regulations necessary to statutorily conduct business involving
the serving of alcohol” (Chapter 8, Section 12).
Retail trade of pharmaceuticals to consumers
The monopoly on the retail trade of pharmaceuticals that has been in play since the 1950s
is now abolished, which means that anyone who fulfils the requirements of the Act on the
trade in medical products155 has the right to a permit to conduct such activities. A permit
can only be issued to a party that, with respect to their personal and financial circumstances
and circumstances in general, is suitable to conduct the business activities, and is capable
of fulfilling a range of business-specific requirements (Chapter 2, Section 4). Examination
of the application is performed by the Medical Products Agency.
The examination relates to the applicant’s personal and financial circumstances in a
broad sense. If the application relates to a legal person, the suitability requirements in the
first instance apply to the company’s management, that is, those natural persons who have
a significant influence in the business. Drug offences and drug-related crime are examples
of personal unsuitability that can lead to a permit being denied.156
155 2009:366.
156 Bill 2008/09:145 p. 105.
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Approval or registration of pharmaceuticals for sale to consumers
According to the general rule in Section 5 of the Medical Products Act,157 a drug may only
be sold after being approved or registered in accordance with Section 2b or 2c of the
Medical Products Act, or is covered by a recognition of an approval or a registration that
has been issued in another state in the European EconomicArea. Approval and registration
is issued in Sweden by the Medical Products Agency.
Locksmith tools
The manufacture and sale of locksmith tools has a special category, as the regulation is
more thorough and detailed than that which applies to the trade and manufacture of most
other types of goods. According to Section 2 of the Act on the Sale of Locksmith tools,158
there are not only permit requirements but also requirements on the prospective trader’s
customer selection. The sale of locksmith tools may “only be made to parties who in their
profession or otherwise have a noteworthy need of locksmith tools and can reasonably be
assumed not to be misusing them.” Furthermore, it states that “a permit shall be given to
a partywho is known for their orderliness and trustworthiness.”Examination of applications
is performed by the local police authority.
This legislation has the sole purpose of crime prevention.159 The regulations and general
advice of the Swedish National Police Board for applying the Act on the Sale of Locksmith
tools state that the trader’s consideration of a customer’s professional need for locksmith
tools is rigorous:160
Anyone who has a permit to engage in the professional sale of locksmith tools shall record
the following data in a sales ledger for each sale:
1. date of the sale,
2. the buyer’s full name, personal identity number, occupation, postal address and tele-
phone number and, if applicable, name of company,
3. type of identification produced; buyers should be able to prove their identity by
showing identification documentation[…],
4. number and nature of locksmith tools, and
5. the buyer’s justification for needing locksmith tools.
The permit holder shall also keep a stock book. The stock book shall show inventories of





160 Section 4 FAP 579-1, RPSFS 2000:27, p. 2.
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The sales journal and stock book, along with associated documents, shall be kept for
ten years from the date on which the last entry was made. If the business shuts down, the
aforementioned documents are to be turned over to the police authority. Permit holders
are obligated to provide product samples from the sales range as well as the sales journals
and stock books on the request of the police authority.
c) Permit for sale of certain welfare services
The gradual deregulation within the public sector has opened up a number of markets for
private market actors. One important market, which has become the subject of increased
control and regulation, is social services. Those recipients of an approved work initiative
under the Social Services Act,161 or the Act concerning Support and Service for Persons
with Certain Functional Impairments (LSS),162 have a statute-regulated possibility of
choosing a private provider for this approved work initiative.
Permit-required work in accordance with the LSS
The professional workwhich, according to Section 23 of the LSS requires a permit includes,
personal assistance, short stays away fromhome, short-term supervision for school children,
accommodation in a family home or residential care facility for children or young people,
residential care facilities for adults or other specially adapted housing and day care for
people with developmental disabilities.163 The permit requirement for engaging in personal
assistance operations was added in 2011.164 Applications for permits are handled by IVO
(TheHealth and Social Care Inspectorate), which is also responsible for supervision (Section
25 of the LSS). Since 1 July 2013, it is stated in Section 23, second paragraph of the LSS
that a permitmay only be issued to a party that, with respect to their financial circumstances
and circumstances in general, is suitable to conduct such operations. TheCriminal Records
Registry is checked in conjunction with applications being considered.
There is also a special law on registry checks for staff involved in certain operations
directed at children with disabilities.165
Permit-required work in accordance with the Social Services Act
According to Chapter 1 of the Social Services Act, a permit is required for residential care
homes for children and young persons (HVB), residential care facilities in general, short-
term accommodation with 24-hour care, and non-institutional care facilities. Applications
161 2001:453.
162 1993:387
163 Municipalities and county councils instead have notification obligation, aside from operations involving
personal assistance.
164 SOU 2005:100; Bill 2009/10:176.
165 SFS 2010:479; Bill 2009/10:176.
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for permits are handled by IVO (The Health and Social Care Inspectorate), which is also
responsible for supervision (monitoring of work initiatives is the responsibility of the rel-
evant municipality under the Social Services Act))166. Permits to conduct such activities
may only be granted if the operation meets the requirements of good quality and safety
(Chapter 7, Section 2 of the Social Services Act). The quality requirement stipulates, among
other things, that the person in charge of the operation must have adequate training, pre-
vious experience and documented personal suitability. Registry checks are carried out
pursuant to Section 16B, first paragraph, a), of the Criminal Records RegistryOrdinance.167
There is also a special law regarding registry checks of staff at care facilities or accom-
modation that take in children.168
d) Permits to conduct commercial traffic
Taxi traffic
Anyone wishing to engage in taxi business is subject to the permit requirement in Chapter
2, Section 1 of the Act concerning taxi traffic.169 A taxi driver license is also required. The
SwedishTransportAgency decides on taxi driver licenses and permits to run taxi operations,
and is also the supervisory authority.
For those applying for taxi permits, there are requirements imposed onboth professional
skills, adequate finances and reputation and suitability (Chapter 2, Section 5). The applicant
must pass a test in professional skills. The applicant for a taxi permit must also prove that
he or she has sufficient resources to start and run the company appropriately (Chapter 2,
Section 9). This requirement must be demonstrated continuously, even after the permit
has been issued).
The requirement of good reputation means that the applicant must be willing and able
to fulfil their obligations towards the general public (Chapter 2, Section 11). The require-
ment is not considered met if a person has been convicted of a serious crime, one or more
serious or repeated breaches of the Act concerning taxi traffic170 or regulations stipulated
in connection with the Act, road traffic and transport regulations, or regulations on salary
and employment conditions in the industry. An insufficient law abidance focuses mainly
on tax crime, drug offences, crimes against creditors and property crime.171 When the
application applies to passenger transportation, violent crime is also taken into account.
According to Section 10 of the Criminal Records Registry Ordinance and Section 3 of the
166 Municipalities and county councils are instead subject to notification obligation.
167 1999:1134.
168 2007:71; Bill 2006/07:37, p. 12.
169 2012:211.
170 2012:211.
171 Bill 1997/98:63, p. 68.
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Records of Suspected Persons Ordinance, the Swedish Transport Agency is entitled to
access full information from these registries relating to those applying for a taxi permit or
taxi driver license.
Both taxi permits and taxi driver licenses can be revoked (Chapter 4, Sections 1 and
6). In the case of minor discretions, a warning may instead be issued. If the revocation
occurs on account of a crime being committed or other offences, a waiting period
(unsuitability period) of not less than three years and a maximum of five is imposed. This
is especially applicable in the case of serious or repeated crime.172
Commercial goods and passenger transportation
Commercial goods and passenger transportation requires a permit very similar to that of
taxi operations. In examining whether the applicant meets the requirements of good rep-
utation, consideration is given to their willingness and ability to fulfil their obligations to
the general public, general law abidance, and other circumstances of importance. (Chapter
2, Section 4 of the Professional Transport Act).
e) Permits for certain financial operations
The regulation of the financial sector is very extensive, so only a selection of the provisions
deemed to be of particular relevance to economic and organised crime will be dealt with
below.
Measures against money laundering and terrorist financing
The Third Money Laundering Directive (2005/60/EC) has been implemented in Swedish
law.173 According to the Act174 on Measures against Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing, an operator is to take measures to ensure customer due diligence. This might
involve verification of the customer’s identity, and the requesting of information on the
purpose and nature of business relations (Chapter 2, Section 3). Customer due diligence
must be established before establishing business relations or before an individual transaction
is carried out (Chapter 2, Section 9). If customer due diligence has not been achieved,
neither business relations nor an individual transaction may be conducted (Chapter 2,
Section 11).
The operator is also obligated to continually review transactions in order to detect
suspicious transactions and report them to the Finance Police (Chapter 3, Section 1).
172 Bill 2011/12:80, p. 122.
173 Bill 2008/09:70, p. 2.
174 2009:62.
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Banking activities (banking and financing operations)
Banking and financing operations are subject to permit obligation in accordance with
chapter 2, Section 1 of the Swedish Banking and Financing Business Act.175 The Swedish
Financial SupervisoryAuthority is the authorising and supervisory authority. The following
requirements must be met for a permit to be issued (Chapter 3, Section 2):
1. there is reason to believe that the proposed activity will be conducted in accordance
with the provisions of this Act […];
2. those who have or may be expected to have a qualifying holding in the company are
deemed fit to exercise a significant influence over themanagement of a credit institution,
and
3. those who hold a position as boardmember or CEO in the company, or as replacement
for said positions, have sufficient insight and experience to participate in the manage-
ment of a credit institution and are otherwise suitable for such a task.
The applicable suitability requirements are of particular interest. The suitability assessment
of shareholders is viewed in light of the acquisition, involving a qualifying holding for the
shareholder, being in itself subject to permit obligation (Chapter 14, Section 1). Among
other things, the assessment will consider the reputation and financial strength of the
acquirer:176
No criterion directly corresponding to “reputation” is found in the current regulation.
However, within the framework for assessing the acquirer’s reputation, factors identified
as directly disqualifying under existing regulations can be factored in, i.e., that the acquirer
has significantly disregarded their obligations in business or in other financial matters or
is guilty of serious crimes. Examples of this could be that the owner has been convicted of
economic crimes or has been subject to bankruptcy proceedings. It should however be
possible to interpret concept of “reputation” further and also relate to an assessment of
the acquirer’s law abidance, experience, and judgment in general.
The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority also acts as the supervisory authority for
banking and financing operations. The Authority can order a business without a permit
to cease operations, and, if the order is not complied with, can apply to the Court for
compulsory liquidation (Chapter 15, Sections 18 and 19).
Debt collection activities
According to Section 2 of the Debt Recovery Act,177 debt collection activities – debt
recovery on behalf of others or claims that have been taken over for recovery – may only
175 2004:297.
176 Bill 2008/09:155, p. 87.
177 1974:182.
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be conducted with a permit from the Data Inspection Board. Permits are granted only if
‘the activities are likely to be undertaken in an expert and judicious manner’ (Section 3).
The applicant for a permit must provide proof of their conduct and competence.
In the preamble to theDebt RecoveryAct, two regulatory options have been considered
against each other; notification and permit obligation respectively.178 The Official Report
argued that while ‘the notification option does not [allow for] any preliminary examination
of the practitioner’s suitability’, ‘the concession option has undeniable advantages over a
notification system […] [as] the main advantage is that a permit requirement allows for a
preliminary examination of the practitioner’s suitability.’TheGovernment went along the
lines of the Official Report.
The Data Inspection Board also has supervisory responsibility regarding compliance
with the Debt Recovery Act (Section 13) and may revoke any issued permit if the permit
holder breaches a regulation of this Act, or any provision issued pursuant to the Act, and
corrective measures are not taken, or if the conditions for the permit otherwise no longer
exists (Section 15).
Credit-reporting activities
A permit is required to engage in credit-reporting activities in accordance with Section 3
of the Credit Information Act.179 However, credit institutions and credit-reporting opera-
tions run through the publication of credit information in accordance with the Freedom
of the Press Ordinance and the Freedom of Expression Act are exempt from the permit
requirement (Section 3). Permits are granted by the Data Inspection Board and are only
issued if the activities are likely to be undertaken in an expert and judiciousmanner (Section
4). The requirement of expertise has been interpreted by the Data Inspection Board as
referring to experience in the credit information industry and knowledge of the law.
The Data Inspection Board may impose conditions on how a company’s credit-
reporting operations are to be conducted and on the obligation of a company to report
changes in circumstances that are legally relevant to the business’s operation (Section 4).
The Data Inspection Board supervises compliance with the law (Section 15) and has
the right to inspect a business operation (Section 16). If a permit holder is in breach of a
regulation in theCredit InformationAct, theData Inspection Boardmay revoke the permit,
if rectification cannot be otherwise achieved (Section 17).
178 Bill 1974/42, p. 87.
179 1973:1173.
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f) Permits for rental operations
Car rental operations
The commercial rental of cars and off-road vehicles for less than one year (not leasing)
may only be conducted by persons with a permit to conduct such business (Sections 1 and
3 of the Car Rental Act180). The Swedish Transport Agency processes permit applications.
Permits are only issued to individuals deemed fit to run the business, with respect to pro-
fessional skills, financial circumstances, the willingness and ability to fulfil their obligations
to the public, abidance to the law in general and other circumstances of significance (Section
6). Those requirements imposed on personal suitability and conduct are similar to those
imposed on the holder of a commercial transport permit.181
The Swedish Transport Agency oversees compliance with the law. If serious abuses
occur within the rental business or any other business which the permit holder operates,
or if the conditions for the permit are no longer met, the permit shall be revoked. A
warning can also be issued.
The Transport Agency has, however, stated that the permit obligation for car rental
will be abolished.182 The industry is small, and since it is unusual to find serious crimes or
tax debts among rental companies, only a few permits have been revoked. The assessment
is that the industry is working fine and will probably continue to do so in the event of a
possible permit abolishment. The proposal is currently being prepared by the Ministry of
Enterprise, Energy and Communications.
g) Permits for arranging certain gambling activities
Permits for arranging restaurant casinos and certain gaming machines
As a rule, the Swedish state has a statutory monopoly on gaming for money or money’s
value. This means that in some cases it is completely forbidden to offer gaming for money
(e.g., slot machines, which can only be found on ships in international waters or state
casinos), while in some cases it is only illegal for anyone without a permit (i.e., the market
is open to those who meet certain criteria, such as when applying to operate a restaurant
casino). In the Swedish gaming market, Swedish gaming companies and organisations
that have received permits endeavour to arrange this type of gaming.
The Swedish Gambling Authority is the governmental agency that has overall respon-
sibility for controlling (supervising) gaming and lottery operations, issuing permits for
180 1998:492.
181 Bill 1997/98:63, p. 106.
182 Swedish Transport Agency 2012.
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national lotteries, gaming machines, restaurant casinos and certain bingo permits, as well
as special permits for lottery tickets along with equipment for verification and drawing.
Certain types of licensable gaming activities have historically been found in industries
that are particularly vulnerable to economic crime, such as the restaurant industry. The
types of games that typically apply are gaming machines and token gaming machines, and
the conducting of restaurant casinos. Common to the requirements for those who wish
to arrange these types of games is that the game organiser is deemed suitable to provide
such gaming activities, and that money bets and potential winnings are vigilantly limited.
Setting up automatic gaming machines, slot machines and token gaming machines
Permits to arrange gaming on slot machines and token gaming machines may be issued
if the gaming takes place on a ship in international waters (Section 26 of the Lotteries Act).
Permits to arrange gaming on token gaming machines may also be issued if the gaming
is organised in conjunction with hotel and restaurant operations that have (or at least fulfil
the criteria to be granted) a permit to serve alcoholic beverages in accordance with the
Alcohol Act. Thus, according to the provision, there is a link between the permit to serve
alcohol and the permit to arrange gaming on token gaming machines. If a conduct
assessment has already been performed during a suitability assessment in connection with
an alcohol permit application, it can therefore also constitute grounds for a permit to
arrange token gaming machines. As a result, conduct assessment is this case is not per-
formed by the Swedish Gambling Authority. As gaming on token gaming machines may
only be run by state gaming companies, it is AB Svenska Spel that organises the gaming
machines. The SwedishGamblingAuthority can then issue an operating permit to individ-
ual business proprietors that fulfil the criteria. An automatic gaming machine permit may
be granted if the game is arranged in connection with a public amusement activity, in the
form of an amusement park, etc. (Section 25). No conduct assessment is necessary in this
case.
Arrangement of roulette, dice and card games
Roulette, dice and card games are also counted as “lottery activities”. Permits are granted
if the applicant is deemed suitable to run the business. The consideration involves taking
into account the applicant’s experience in the area, financial circumstances, willingness
and ability to fulfil their obligations to the public, abidance to the law in general and other
circumstances of significance (Sections 32 and 33). It therefore involves a rather thorough
suitability assessment. The Swedish Gambling Authority has the right to request excerpts
from the Swedish Criminal Records and Records of Suspected Persons.
If a lottery organiser who has been granted a permit does not adhere to the provisions
of the Lotteries Act, the authority that granted the permit may issue a warning or revoke
the permit (Section 51).
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Arrangement of gaming machines
According to Sections 1 and 3 of the Act concerning the Arrangement of Certain Forms
of Gaming Machines,183 permits are required for such games on mechanical or electronic
gaming machines arranged for the general public, or otherwise provided for the purpose
of making money, and which do not does provide winnings or only provide winnings in
the form of free games on the machine. The organiser of these gaming machines is
responsible for the machine not being used for a purpose other than its intended purpose,
that good order prevails within the premises or at the location where the game is used and
that children and young people are not unduly attracted to participate in the game (Section
2).
When considering a permit, the Swedish Gambling Authority shall assess the risk of
a gaming machine being used for purposes other than that covered by the application, or
the possibility of the business activity being run in violation of the law or conducted in an
environment that is unsuitable for children or young people. The examination shall par-
ticularly consider the applicant’s suitability, the number of gaming machines, the nature
of the games, and the premises’ or site’s suitability and location (Section 4).
The legislative history shows that “amusement machines” have come to represent a
major problem due to illegal gambling and gaming in unsuitable environments.184 It is
therefore important that the game organiser has the will and ability to prevent the occur-
rence of alcohol abuse, drug abuse, crime or antisocial behaviour. The Swedish Gambling
Authority can revoke a permit (Section 6).
h) Permits to engage in hotel rental activities
According to Section 2 of the Hotel Proprietors Act,185 a permit from the local police
authority is required to run a hotel or guesthouse business. A permit may be issued if there
are no reasons to assume that the applicant’s running of the business will pose a danger
to public order and safety. The Police are required to keep a registry of hotel and guesthouse
businesses that have been granted a permit (Section 9).
If a permit holder is not fit to run the business due to being a repeat offender against
this Act or in breach of other provisions that apply to the business, and despite requests
has failed to take corrective action within a reasonable time or otherwise, the police
authority will revoke the permit (Section 19). If it is necessary in order to maintain public
order and safety, the police authoritymay also prohibit the business activities under penalty
(Section 20).
183 1982:636.
184 Bill 2004/05:3, p. 12.
185 1966:742.
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i) Permits to engage in alarm installation and security activities, and qualification require-
ments for security activities’ staff
Permit to engage in security activities
A person who is professionally engaged in security activities must have a permit in the
form of authorisation pursuant to Section 2 of the Security Company Act186.
Authorisation may only be granted if it can be assumed that the business will be con-
ducted in an expert and judicious manner, will not be inappropriately oriented from a
public viewpoint, andwill fulfil the requirements imposed on such activities as the company
aims to conduct (Section 3). All staff of an authorised security company must be approved
following evaluation with regard to abidance to the law, civic reliability and suitability in
general for employment in such a company. Requirements also apply to the company’s
directors andmanagement (Section 4). Evaluation (approval) of said persons is performed
by the county administrative board (Section 6).
According to the legislative history, the requirements regarding registry checks for
persons to be employed in a security company are very strict. A person who is to be
approved for employment in a security company undergoes by and large the same registry
checks (Section 10 of the Ordinance on Security Companies etc.187) as persons to be
employed as police officers.188 Requests for authorisation are examined by the county
administrative board, whereby the board obtains a statement from the Swedish National
Police Board before authorisation is granted (Section 5).
Supervision of security companies is the responsibility of the county administrative
board (Section 8). As part of the supervision, the county administrative board closely
inspects that the conditions for authorisation are still fulfilled. The county administrative
board may order an authorised security or training company to take the corrective actions
and other measures brought about by the supervision (Section 12), but it can also revoke
the authorisationwhen there are no longer conditions for such, orwhere there are otherwise
specific reasons for a revocation (Section 13).
Qualification requirements for security staff (security guards and security officers)
Both security officers, who are appointed by the local police authority (or the Swedish
National Police Board if the position covers several districts), and security guards are
subject to qualification requirements. The security officer’s mission is to contribute to
maintaining public order (Section 1 of the Security Officers Act189). Security officers have
an obligation to follow instructions and to report to the Police. In practice, the appointment
186 1974:191.
187 1989:149.
188 Bill 2005/06:136, p. 18.
189 1980:578.
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means that security officers have powers normally only belonging to a police officer. Only
those considered suitable with respect to law abidance and other circumstances, and those
between the age of 20 and 65, are appointed as security officers (Section 4). If the qualifi-
cation requirements are no longer fulfilled, the appointment may be revoked (Section 9).
For security officers, there is a statutory requirement that they must undergo a training
programme developed by the National Police Board and conducted under the direction
of the local police authority (Section 4). The training requirements for security guards are
not as strict. Although the security industry requires (and organises) training for security
guards, there is not the same statutory training requirement involving state provided
training. This ismainly due to security guards not having the police powers that the security
officers have (the right to take intoxicated persons into custody or those disrupting public
order, etc.).
Permit to operate an alarm installation business
An alarm installation business may not be run without a permit. A permit requires that
an applicant can be expected to run the business with precision and care, and that the
applicant (ormanagement in the company) is known for their law abidance and orderliness
(Section 2 of the Act with certain provisions relating to alarm systems etc.190). The
requirement of law abidance and orderliness aims, according to the legislative history, to
prevent persons with a criminal record from getting involved in the alarm installation
business.191 Registry excerpts from the central police registry are acquired during consid-
eration of applications for a permit to operate an alarm installation business. The permit
requirement itself is intended to ensure that alarm systems are handled with proper care
and caution, so that the Police’s problems with false alarms are reduced.192
j) Permit to handle flammables of explosives
To handle, transfer or import explosives, or professionally or in a greater quantity handle
flammables, requires a permit in accordance with Section 16 of the Act on flammable
goods193. The Act outlines a number of specific operational and competence requirements
for obtaining a permit (Sections 6-16). Registry checks are performed in the Criminal
Records and Records of Suspected Persons.
190 1983:1097.
191 Bill 1982/83:163, p. 41.
192 Bill 1982/83:163, p. 41.
193 2010:1101.
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11.5.2 Requirement of a permit without conduct assessment
a) Environmentally hazardous operations
Permit obligation (or in certain cases –depending on the type of environmentally hazardous
substance involved – notification obligation) is necessary to establish or run an environ-
mentally hazardous businesswhere hazardous substances, which necessitate environmental
hazard management, are part of or expected to be part of the business activities (Chapter
9, Section 6 of the Environmental Code194). The environmentally hazardous substances
referred to here are presented in Section 4 of the Appendix to the Ordinance195 concerning
Environmentally Hazardous Activities and the Protection of Public Health (Section 5 of
the aforementioned Ordinance). The storage, transportation and interim storage of waste
or hazardous waste, for example, require (depending on the type of waste) a permit or
notification. Applications and notifications are as a rule made to the county administrative
board, which is generally also responsible for supervision.
b) Authorisation requirement for car breakers
The operator of a scrapyard must be authorised. It is the county administrative board that
considers the authorisation of car breakers (Section 6 of theOrdinance onCar Scrapping196).
The preamble states that ‘an authorisation requirement for all car breakers leads to better
conditions for the control of operations, and that the same conditions will apply to all
actors in the industry. This benefits, among others, the more ambitious car dismantling
facilities that meet higher environmental standards.’197 The requirements for authorisation
also focus mainly on fulfilling a series of environmental requirements, which can be said
to indirectly involve an examination of the applicant’s suitability and to some extent con-
duct. However, no registry checks are performed in the Swedish Criminal Records and
Records of Suspected Persons.
11.5.3 Other requirements for running certain businesses, with or without
conduct assessment
a) Duty to report/notify or duty to register
Even if a certain business is not subject to permit obligation, it may be required for the




197 Bill 2000/01:47, p. 22.
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Monetary exchange activities (and certain other financial activities)
Monetary exchange activities are subject to notification obligation according to the general
rule in Section 2 of the Certain Financial Operations (ReportingDuty) Act198. The Swedish
Financial Supervisory Authority keep a registry of persons who have submitted reports.
There are requirements on an exchange company’s owner and management, but no
examination of the owner is performed as it is only the business activity which is subject
to the reporting duty.
Parties who have significantly breached obligations in their business activities or who
have committed serious crimes may not engage in business involving a duty to report
(Section 3).
Deposit-taking activities
Limited liability companies or economic associations that intend to engage in deposit-
taking activities, but which are not covered by the Deposit Insurance Act199, are required
to apply for registration of their business to the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority,
in accordance with Section 7 of the Deposit-taking Activities Act200. Companies engaged
in deposit-taking activities may not have people in management positions or holders of
qualified shares that have “significantly breached obligations in business or in other
financialmatters or who have committed serious crimes” (Section 6). Examples of deficient
character include accountancy crime or tax crime, failure to pay taxes or improper pro-
ceedings in conjunctionwith bankruptcy.201 The Financial SupervisoryAuthority conducts
annual inspections to ensure the character requirement is continuously met. The Financial
SupervisoryAuthoritymay, under penalty, order an unregistered deposit-taking operation
to cease activity (Section 15 of the Deposit Insurance Act).
Sale of used goods
According to Sections 2 and 3 of the Act on Trade in Used Goods202, parties intending to
engage in the commercial trade of certain types of used goods have to report the trade for
registration with the local police authority. The law aims to prevent the receiving of stolen
goods: “to hinder the provision of stolen or otherwise unlawfully acquired goods and to
facilitate the Police’s tracking of such goods” (Section 1). The trader is obligated to keep
an account of acquired and received goods (Section 5). The trader may not receive used
goods from parties that fail to supply adequate proof of identity or are known to the trader




201 Bill 2002/03:139, p. 567.
202 1999:271.
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that fall under the scope of this Act. No form of registry checks are carried out during
applications for registration.
The sale and serving of medium-strong beer
The sale, production and serving of different types of alcoholic beverages constitute almost
exclusively licensed operations. An exception, however, is the serving of medium-strong
beer, which may be conducted following notification to the municipality in accordance
with Chapter 8, Section 8 of the Alcohol Act. Medium-strong beer can only be sold to
persons over 18 (Chapter 3, Section 7). The party with the notification obligation shall
“exercise special control (personal control) over the serving. The personal control should
involve the development and application of a suitable programme for the business”
(Chapter 8, Section 8).
The sale of tobacco products
Retail sale of tobacco products requires notification to themunicipality according to Section
12c of the Tobacco Act203. Tobacco products may not be sold, or otherwise supplied in the
course of business, to anyone under the age of 18, which is why parties supplying tobacco
products must make sure that the recipient has reached that age (Section 12). The tobacco
vendor, as with the vendor ofmedium-strong beer, is required to exercise personal control
over the sale (Section 12c). Supervision is exercised by the municipality and the local police
authority, and they can issue orders and bans in cases of violation of applicable laws in the
area.
b) Requirement of the provision of security
The Act on Travel Guarantees204 stipulates that a person who “is the organiser or retailer
of package tours is required, according to theAct on Package Travel205, and beforemarket-
ing a package tour or transportation that takes place togetherwith a package tour, to provide
financial security to Kammarkollegiet [Legal, Financial and Administrative Services
Agency].”
c) Duty to inform
Obligations of the operator regarding financial advice
According to Sections 1 and 4 of the Financial Advisory Services to Consumers Act206, an
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the person providing the actual advice has sufficient expertise, documents what has tran-
spired during the advisory meeting and submits the documentation to the consumer.
The Swedish Consumer Agency supervises compliance with the law and can, under
penalty, order an operator that provides financial advice in violation of the requirements
stipulated in the Act or in the provisions issued pursuant to the Act, to cease their business
activity (Section 9).
11.5.4 Schematic summary of the described industries
In conclusion, the manner in which the above-mentioned industries are regulated can be
































































207 The Bar Association is strictly speaking not an authority but a subject of civil law. However, the Association
has legally been assigned the right to designate who is allowed use the protected title of “lawyer” as well as
supervise these individuals.
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11.6 Security classification and registry excerpts for work with
children
11.6.1 Specific, conduct-assessed employment types
Alongside the conduct assessment that applies for certain industries and occupations,
there are also one such control measure for security-protected professions (‘national
security’), and professions that concerns children.
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11.6.2 Security-classified positions under the Security Protection Act
Certain types of positions fall under the scope of the Security Protection Act208, which
means that a particular conduct assessment with extensive registry checks is conducted
before employment. Security-classified positions exist within both the public and private
sector (e.g., within vital societal sectors such as electricity provision, radio and television
and telecommunications). Prior to employment, a security assessment is performed in
order to prevent “persons who are unreliable from a security standpoint fromparticipating
in activities of importance to national security” (Section 7). Security classification of
employment occurs in three classes, where the level of information covered by professional
secrecy and of extreme importance to national security that the employee may have access
to is crucial (Section 17).
If a position is security-classified, registry checks are performed that includes searches
in the Criminal Records Registry, Records of Suspected Persons and the Police’s general
investigations registry (Section 12).Under the Security ProtectionAct, the SwedishNational
Police Board and the Swedish Security Service are provided a general power to seek out
information on the person being examined which is stored within police databases (i.e.,
to not only perform searches in the registries referred to in the laws specified in the regu-
lation.) For jobs in security class 1 and 2, registry checks can (in some cases) also include
the spouse or partner of the potential employee. A special personal investigation involving
an examination of the subject’s economic conditions is also carried out for jobs in class 1
or 2 (Section 18 of the Security Protection Act).
11.6.3 Expanded requirements for registry excerpts with regard to work within
activities concerning children
Recently, the requirements of being able to produce excerpts from the Criminal Records
Registry when working with children have been stressed in order to prevent the sexual
exploitation of children (mainly due to the requirements of the UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child and the EU Directive on combating the sexual abuse and sexual
exploitation of children and child pornography). To this end, obligatory registry checks
of staff are set out in the Act209 regarding registry checks of staff within pre-school activities,
schools and child care, and in the Act210 regarding registry checks of staff at care facilities
or accommodation that take in children. Furthermore, since personal assistance became
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under the scope of the Act211 on registry checks for staff involved in certain operations
directed at children with disabilities. Since September 18, 2013, registry excerpts are also
required for persons working with children, according to the Act212 on registry checks for
staff who work with children, as part of the implementation of the EU Directive on com-
bating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography.213
In all cases, those seeking employment within these activities must personally request
an excerpt from the Criminal Records Registry to prove their suitability.
11.7 Subsidies, grants and subventions
11.7.1 The Swedish welfare systems’ economic benefits
11.7.1.1 Administrative authorities
The Swedish welfare systems provide a variety of benefits, which are administered and
disbursed by a number of organisations and agencies. The most important include the
Swedish Social Insurance Agency, the Swedish Pensions Agency, the Swedish Board for
Study Support (CSN), theMigrationBoard, the Employment Service, the 29 unemployment
insurance funds (SO, Swedish Federation of Unemployment Insurance Funds) and 290
municipalities.214 Benefits are paid out in the amount of around SEK 520 billion per year
from social security systems.215 Of this total, it is estimated that around 4 per cent is
incorrectly disbursed, i.e., about SEK 18-20 billion annually.216
About 80 per cent of payment transfers from these social security systems can be
attributed to the social insurance fund, which is administered by the Social Insurance
Agency and Pensions Agency.217 Efforts to curb benefit fraud represent one of the areas
in Swedish law characterised by a number of administrativemeasures, such as reclamation
rules, thorough income inspections with information-sharing, and exclusion from unem-




213 Bill 2012/13:194; European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/93/EU.
214 Swedish National Financial Management Authority 2011:11.
215 SOU 2007:45, p. 20.
216 SOU 2008:74, p. 13. These figures represent only a rough estimate, which is why the margin of error is high.
217 Report 7, FUT Delegation, p. 19.
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11.7.1.2 Legislation designed to prevent erroneous payments
Undue payments of financial benefits from the welfare systems carry penal sanctions. The
Benefit Crime Act218 which entered into force in 2007 contains penalty provisions that are
adapted to the specific conditions that exist for payments of allowances and other financial
benefits.However, benefit fraud linked to business activity is covered by the fraud provisions
of Chapter 9, Sections 1-3 of the Penal Code.
11.7.2 Tools and features
In terms of undue payments from these social security systems, there are some key tools
and features with respect to crime. Some tools and features are only employed during
certain types of social benefit fiddles, and are therefore described in the report for each
benefit below.219
11.7.2.1 Tools
Some of the tools used in crime are different forms of certificates such asmedical certificates,
employer certificates, income statements and payslips.
Medical certificate
Benefits which may be payable in case of illness, such as sickness benefit and sickness
allowance, require a medical certificate stating the disease. These certificates can be issued
consciously or unconsciously – partly by doctors deceived by patients simulating aliments,
partly by doctors whose workload and stress means that they are unable to detect that the
patient is exaggerating their symptoms, and partly by those doctors who actively assist in
crime by deliberately issuing false certificates.220
False employer’s certificates, income statements or payslips
In order to obtain an incorrect sickness pay-based income, sometimes false employer’s
certificates are used certifying that a person has a job with a good income. In cases where
such a certificate is not enough to convince the Swedish Social Insurance Agency that a
job exists, false income statements are sometimes also submitted to the Tax Agency. An
income statement contains information on paid salary.221 For this to be possible requires
access to a business that can send out the income statements. Anyone who unduly tries to
raise their sickness pay-based income can thus pay a business proprietor to obtain income
218 2007:612.
219 Brå 2011b, p. 25.
220 Brå 2011b, p. 30.
221 Brå 2011b, p. 26.
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statements, which for the entrepreneur represents the cost of the tax that, according to the
income statement, is based on the salary that the beneficiary (wrongly) claims to have
received. If the Social Insurance Agency asks additional questions, a false payslip can also
be issued to give the impression that salaries have actually been paid to the “employee”.222
11.7.2.2 Features
The organiser has the lead role in the large-scale tax or social benefit crimes, but often
hides from the authorities. The recipient is the one who receives the incorrectly disbursed
benefits, but need not necessarily be aware of the crime in the arrangement. The assistants
(personal assistants) are central to the erroneous payments of attendance allowance, as
the attendance allowance is channelled through their salary. Aside from the central role
of the doctor, there are also goalkeepers who undertake personal payment liability against
payment in bankruptcy, and walkers who assist in the process of turning “white” (reported)
money in an account into off the books money in the form of cash.223
11.7.3 Economic benefits utilised in the context of economic and organised
crime
11.7.3.1 Benefit fraud and administrative measures
The below-described economic benefits are examples of benefits that, to a greater or lesser
extent, tend to be abused in the context of economic or organised crime. The purely
administrative measures that can be taken to penalise undue payments include, for
example, rules for reclamation,224 suspension and exclusion (fromunemployment insurance
funds). In the case of suspected social benefit crime or fraud, possible criminal liability
may also be found to exist.
11.7.3.2 Unemployment-related benefits for individuals
Unemployment benefits
Unemployment insurance is a readjustment insurance that provides compensation during
unemployment. The insurance is regulated in the Unemployment Insurance Act (ALF)225
and handled by the social insurance funds in accordance with the Unemployment Funds
Act (LAK)226. In order to be entitled to unemployment benefits, the employeemust submit
222 Brå 2011b, p. 26.
223 Brå 2011b, p. 29ff.
224 Rules for reclamation for an established undue payment are in place for the majority of the social insurance
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an employer’s certificate, a certificate of the worker’s unemployment. There are several
possible causes of undue payments, in particular that the unemployed person is in reality
working and receiving a salary, reported or off the books.227
There are certain statutory opportunities for the unemployment insurance funds to
prevent erroneous payments. The regulations of the unemployment insurance system
contain three groups of measures for conduct that is not consistent with the conditions of
the insurance. It involves situations when the applicant extends the period of unemploy-
ment, or when the applicant causes unemployment, or when the applicant mishandles
their job-seeking activities. Each group of measures contains a ladder to show how serious
it is to repeat actions that do not comply with the conditions of the insurance (Sections
43-43b of the ALF). The initial measures to be considered for one of the steps is a warning,
and for the other two, suspension. Repeated negligence within each action ladder leads to
a longer suspension period until at a certain time it means that the applicant must one
more fulfil the employment condition. In addition to these measures, an applicant may,
under certain circumstances, be excluded frommembership of an unemployment insurance
fund or be denied the right to compensation, see Sections 46-46b of the ALF and Sections
37-37b of the LAK. These measures, however, concern situations where an applicant has
committed gross violations by submitting false ormisleading information to an unemploy-
ment insurance fund.
As the unemployment insurance funds are member organisations, sharper sanction
tools (exclusion) can be used in the event of undue payments than in the case of benefits
in social security systems for which the state or municipality are responsible.
Wage guarantee
Government salary guarantee refers to government payment of a worker’s outstanding
wage claims against an employer in bankruptcy. The compensation is regulated in the
Wage Guarantee Act228. Causes of undue payments from the government wage guarantee
include the fact that the stress level in the actual processing has increased as the number
of reconstructions have increased. Furthermore, the lack of personal identity numbers or
coordination numbers also constitute risks with regard to erroneous payments.229
Activity grant and development allowance
Activity grants and development allowances support livelihoods in the context of labour
market programmes, and are regulated by the Activity Support Ordinance230. The size of
the activity grant is income-related and based on past income in the same manner as the
227 Swedish National Financial Management Authority 2011:11.
228 1992:797.
229 Report 7, FUT Delegation, p. 106.
230 1996:1100.
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unemployment benefit. Common causes of erroneous payments are that the insured
individual submits incorrect information about their income to the unemployment
insurance fund, fails to inform the Employment Service and/or the unemployment insur-
ance fund that he/she receives severance pay or pension, or submits otherwise incomplete
information about their economy. According to Chapter 23 of the Activity Support Ordi-
nance, a recipient of activity support can, if he or she has given rise to an undue payment
through providing misinformation or otherwise, be obliged to repay the amount unduly
paid.
11.7.3.3 Social security benefits
General information on administrative measures in the event of suspected or actual
erroneous payments of social security benefits
Reclamation
The Social Insurance Agency (or the Swedish Pensions Agency) shall order repayment of
the social security benefits listed in the Social Insurance Code if the insured party, through
providing misinformation or by failing to fulfil an obligation to notify or inform, has
caused the benefit to be incorrectly paid out or paid in too high an amount (Chapter 108,
Section 2 of the Social Insurance Code). In the case of maintenance support, the Social
InsuranceAgency decides on reclamation of the amount unduly paid, even if the conditions
under Section 2 are not met.
The possibility of making a house call and requesting certain information within the context
of a case’s processing
The authority processing a social insurance case is obligated to ensure that the case is
investigated to the extent that its nature requires (Chapter 110, Section 13 of the Social
Insurance Code). In view of this and as part of the investigation, the legislature has given
the processing authority the right to;make inquiries at the insured party’s employer, doctor,
provider of personal assistance or other party likely to be able to provide the necessary
information; to visit the insured party; to request a special medical report or request that
the insured party undergoes an examination; conduct other investigation as needed for
the assessment of the compensation issue or in general for the application of the Social
Insurance Code (Chapter 110, Section 14 of the Social Insurance Code). The general rule
is that the insured party should be informed of the visits in advance, but unannounced
visits can also be made in some cases.
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Relevant types of benefits
Sickness benefit
Sickness benefit is part of the social insurance, and is a work-based benefit under Chapter
6 of the Social Insurance Code.231 Sickness benefit is paid to gainfully employed persons
due to illness. Everyone who is on sick leave for more than seven days must present a
special medical certificate and employer’s certificate. Among the causes of erroneous
payments are false or inaccurate employer’s certificates, false information about the scope
of the work, and that the person on sick leave is in reality working (in practice, often
unreported).
Sickness or activity allowance
Individuals whose work ability is permanently reduced by at least one quarter during at
least one year are entitled on medical grounds to activity or sickness allowance. Sickness
or activity allowance is regulated inChapter 32-38 of the Social InsuranceCode. Entitlement
to compensation requires a medical certificate stating the inability to work. Possible causes
of erroneously disbursed sickness and activity allowance may include; that a person works
too much in relation to the partial compensation, false medical documentation or an
inaccurate work ability assessment.232
Attendance allowance
Persons belonging to any of the three recipient categories in Section 1 of the LSS and
requiring more than 20 hours of assistance per week in order to meet their basic needs
(such as assistance with laundry, dressing, eating and communication), may be granted
attendance allowance. The right to attendance allowance is regulated in Chapter 51 of the
Social Insurance Code. To be eligible for attendance allowance requires documented
medical evidence of disability. Attendance allowance is a relatively large itemof expenditure
in the welfare system.233
In cooperation with the police, prosecutors, Tax Agency and other agencies, the Social
Insurance Agency has discovered massive fraud connected with attendance allowance.234
Among the identified cases of undue disbursements, they found exaggerated or faked
disabilities and exaggerated assistance claims, fraudulent time reports, and also cases of
assistants not actually performing the certified work.235 When it comes to attendance
allowance, cheating often involves relatively large sums of money where salary costs are
231 2010:110.
232 Swedish National Financial Management Authority 2011:11.
233 Social Insurance Agency, 2013.
234 SOU 2012:6, p. 160.
235 Brå 2011b, p. 55.
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subsidised or fully compensated; costs which rapidly grow in scale with the number of
employees. The introduction of permit-requirements for assistance activities aimed at
tackling fraud and other causes of erroneous payments of attendance allowance.236
Parental benefit
Parental leave benefit is a financial support that parents may request in connection with
a child’s birth or adoption. Parental leave benefit makes it possible for parents to be home
with their children during long continuous periods by covering part of the income loss.
The right to parental leave benefit is regulated in Chapters 11-12 of the Social Insurance
Code. The possible causes of irregular payments are primarily income-related, such as
misstated annual income or incorrect information regarding sickness pay-based income.237
Temporary parental benefit
The compensation that a parent is entitled to when staying home from work or refraining
from seeking employment in order to care for a sick child is known as temporary parental
benefit. The provisions on temporary parental benefit are found in Chapter 13 of the Social
Insurance Code. Entitlement to the benefit, as a general rule, applies when the child is
between 8 months and 12 years old. As requirements for medical certificates are only
imposed after 8 days of continuous illness, the risk of the temporary parental benefit being
misused is substantial. Common causes of erroneous payments of temporary parental
benefit include that the child has actually been in pre-school/school/related recreational
activities, that the parent has not been caring for the child, or that the parent has been
home with a healthy child.
Maintenance support
If a parent liable to pay maintenance does not pay it, the party living with the child can
apply for maintenance support from the Swedish Social Insurance Agency. The liable
parent is then required to repay all or part of the disbursed maintenance support.
The right tomaintenance support is regulated inChapters 17-19 of the Social Insurance
Code. For maintenance to be payable, the parents must be registered at different addresses.
Among the most common causes of undue payments is false separation.
11.7.3.4 Financial aid for studies
Student financial aid is regulated by the Study Support Act238 and managed by the Swedish
Board for Study Support (CSN). The student aid, which is the most common form of
236 SOU 2012:6, p. 19.
237 Report 7, FUT Delegation, p. 76.
238 1999:1395.
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subsistence during higher studies, consists of a student grant (the grant component need
not be paid back) and a student loans (to be repaid). Student aid may only be provided to
those who actively study, and for a maximum of 240 weeks for third level studies. To
continue to receive student financial aid, the student must present approved academic
results from the previous term (Chapter 3, Section 6 of the Study Support Act). If a student
has unduly received student aid or in an excessive amount, the erroneous amount must
be paid back (Chapter 5, Section 1 of the Study Support Act). At the same time, the student
aid is coordinated with other social security systems benefits, in that a student receiving
student aid may not receive an activity grant or development allowance for participating
in a labour market programme, sickness benefit, activity allowance or rehabilitation
allowance under the Social Insurance Code (Chapter 3, Section 25 of the Study Support
Act).
Students who receive student aid have an obligation to report changes in circumstances
to CSN, which does not often happen. There can be several causes of this failure to fulfil
the notification requirement. Errors resulting from non-adherence to the notification
requirement, or notification being made too late in relation to the change having occurred,
are commonplace.
11.7.3.5 Subsidised employment – individual recruitment incentives and special
support mechanisms
The general recruitment incentives are intended to encourage employers to hire people
with difficulties getting a job or who have been out of work for a long period of time. These
are regulated by the Ordinance respecting employment subsidies239. The various forms of
support are called Entry Recruitment Incentive, Special Recruitment Incentive, new start
jobs and special new start jobs. The reason for the division into various forms of support
is that they are aimed at groups that, for different reasons, have been out of the labour
market for a long time (e.g., newcomers to Sweden, people who have been unemployed
for a long time or on long-term sick leave). At the same time, the specific forms of assistance
(wage subsidies, public sheltered public employment, security employment, development
employment) endeavour to compensate for the reduction in work ability among persons
with disabilities, and to enhance these people’s capacity to obtain or keep a job. Questions
about eligibility for such benefits are processed by the Employment Service, which also
disburses approved benefits. Decisions regarding new start jobs are made by the Employ-
ment Service. A recipient of recruitment incentives is obliged to repay the amount unduly
paid if he or she has given rise to an undue or excessive disbursement through providing
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It happens that individuals and businesses misappropriate funds from the public in an
unauthorised manner in the area of labour market policy. Individuals who are in need of
assistance risk not receiving the support they need due to the Employment Service’s
resources being limited, while at the same time abuses can undermine confidence in the
social security systems and lead to a distortion of competition in the labour market240. In
terms of employer support, it relates in one respect to the situation with attendance
allowance, insofar as salary costs are subsidised or fully compensated, which for a company
with a larger number of employees immediately leads to significant (unduly disbursed)
amounts. This in turn is one of the reasons for economic criminals’ growing interest in
these compensation schemes.
Against this background, the Government commissioned an official report in order
to identify the extent to which abuses, overexploitation and other errors occur in relation
to subsidised jobs, as well as to submit proposals on how such abuses can be prevented.
This report will be presented no later than 31 March 2014.
11.7.3.6 Income support
Anyone who cannot provide for their own needs, or cannot have them provided for in
anotherway, has the right to the assistance from themunicipality in terms of their livelihood
(income support) and for their way of life in general (Chapter 4, Section 1 of the Social
Services Act). In order to be granted aid, the individual must provide information that
proves they lack the ability to meet their own needs (such as account statements and bank
statements, employment contracts, information on benefits granted by the Social Insurance
Agency and Board for Study Support, information on fixed assets and personal property,
etc.). If, through false information or failure to disclose information or otherwise, someone
has caused financial support under Chapter 4, Section 1 to be unduly or overly disbursed,
the Social Welfare Committee may reclaim what has been overpaid (Chapter 9, Section 1
of the Social Services Act). Erroneous payments can occur if the individual is working,
conducting unregistered business or fails to report revenue in the business.
11.7.3.7 Misuse of EU subsidies
Within the EU there are a large number of grant and benefit schemes. About SEK 12 billion
is annually paid out in Sweden as EU grants. Persons who, in violation of regulations or
conditions, use such a grant or utilise such a benefit for a purpose other than that for which
the grant or benefit has been granted will be convicted of subsidy abuse resulting in a fine
240 An example of the potential for abuse is the compensation the employer can obtain in the case of new start
jobs. Because this compensation is unlimited (no ceiling), it becomes possible for the employer to freely set
the salary for those employed with wage subsidies. The worker and the employer can create a bank account
specifically for this purpose, after which the employer can pay a small compensation to the employee and
keep the remainder himself.
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or imprisonment of up to two years (Chapter 9, Section 1 of the Penal Code). Control and
payment of EU grants takes place at the local level (county administrative board in each
county), which increases the potential for fraud through a reduced risk of detection. The
number of reports of suspected EU fraud is low, although the number of reports has
increased slightly in recent years. The Swedish Economic Crime Authority handles these
types of cases and is also responsible for the coordination of national measures against
fraud, abuse and other impropriety, and the inefficientmanagement and utilisation of EU-
related funds in the country.
11.8 Exclusion of suppliers in public procurement
Swedish municipalities annually procure goods and services worth billions of Swedish
kronor (SEK), but other administrative agencies are also subject to the legislation on
public procurement. In total, the procurements of over one thousand agencies are covered
by the legislation in this area, for which the Swedish Competition Authority is the central
regulatory and procurement support authority. There is therefore a significant risk that
companies, using offences against the law as competitive means, also adopt the position
of tenderer in public procurements.
There is a national collaboration with the purpose of preventing public funds being
used to pay unreported wages or being misused in other ways. Some municipalities have
expanded their background checks on tenderers in order to promote fair competition and
discourage unreported labour. Strict requirements are often imposed on tenderers within,
for example, the construction industry, wherein they must be able to provide a report on
who is working on a certain construction site.
Chapter 10 of the Public ProcurementAct (LOU)241 contains provisions for the exclusion
of suppliers. A contracting authority shall exclude a supplier from participating in a pro-
curement procedure if it is aware that the supplier has been convicted of a crime involving,
for example, bribery and fraud.
There is also an optional exclusion rule which states that a supplier may be excluded
from participation in a procurement if the supplier is in liquidation or has applied for
bankruptcy / is bankrupt, has been put under receivership, is guilty of serious misconduct
or convicted of an offence concerning professional misconduct, has not fulfilled their
obligations with regard to social security contributions and taxes, or has failed to fulfil
their duty of disclosure (Chapter 10, Section 2 of the LOU). It is the responsibility of the
individual supplier to personally provide the contracting authority with the necessary
excerpts from public registries in order to prove that there are no grounds for exclusion
241 2007:1091.
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(Chapter 10, Section 3 of the LOU). However, it is not possible for contracting authorities
to perform searches on tenderers in the Criminal Records Registry.
Chapter 11 of the LOU presents additional examples of sorting and exclusion tools,
but these provisions are more about requirements for the supplier’s financial standing and
technical and professional capacity, and less about the supplier’s law abidance.
The Swedish CompetitionAuthority states in its report on unfair competition in public
procurement that contracting authorities should work with supervisory authorities to
verify suppliers’ compliance with rules, both at contract signing and regularly during the
termof the agreement, and rely on these supervisory authorities’ assessments of individual
rule violations.242 The Swedish Competition Authority also believes that the contracting
authorities should reserve the right in their contractual terms to take legal action if the
rules that apply for the performance of the contract in question are violated. The Govern-
ment should also clarify that information and measures against unfair tendering should
be a priority for the contracting authorities.
11.9 Legal protection and right of review
All administrative authorities are subject to the Administrative Procedure Act243, which
imposes certain requirements on the processing of cases and grants certain rights to each
individual who is a party to a case. An administrative authority shall process cases involving
an individual as straightforwardly, quickly and fairly as possible, without security being
neglected (Section 7). The party to whom the action is directed in the case may hire
counsel (Section 9).
An applicant, plaintiff or other party has the right to access material added in the case,
if this relates to the exercising of official authority against an individual (Section 16). The
party is thus entitled to insight into the processing of the case, including information that
formed the basis for a particular decision. The processing authority also has a communi-
cating obligation, which means that the general rule is that a case cannot be settled without
the person who is the applicant, plaintiff or other party being notified of information that
has been added to the case by someone else, and being given the opportunity to comment
on said information, if the case relates to the exercising of official authority against an
individual (Section 17). Furthermore, as a rule the processing authority has a duty to provide
justification, which means that a decision must include the reasons which determined the
outcome, if the case relates to the exercising of official authority against an individual
(Section 20). The authority is also responsible for informing the applicant of the decision
(Section 21).
242 Swedish Competition Authority, 2013, p. 89.
243 1986:223.
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Adecisionmay be appealed by the person it affects, if this person objects to the decision
and is granted leave to appeal (Section 22). The decision must be appealed to an Adminis-
trative Court (Section 22a). If an authority finds that a decision it has issued as the first
instance is obviously incorrect, due to new circumstances or for any other reason, the
authority shall amend its decision (review) if it can be done quickly and without detriment
to any individual party (Section 27). If the decision cannot be reviewed on appeal, this
authority shall submit the letter and other documents to the authority that will examine
the case (Section 25 of the Administrative Procedure Act).
Foundwithin the framework of the Swedish administrative process areAdministrative
Courts, which process and rule on appealed authority decisions. TheAdministrative Courts
represent the first instance, the Administrative Courts of Appeal represent the appeal
instance, and the Supreme Administrative Court represents the highest instance. The dis-
pensation of justice in the Administrative Courts is regulated by the Administrative Court
Procedure Act244. As a general rule, the administrative process is conducted in writing,
unlike the general courts where the process ismainly verbal (Section 9). TheAdministrative
Courts in general have a more extensive material process management obligation than the
general courts, in which the court ensures that the case is as well investigated as its nature
requires (Section 8). This is partly due to the Administrative Courts mainly reviewing
authority decisions, thus constituting a guarantee that individuals’ statutory rights are
ensured andmaintained in the relations between individuals and the public (in connection
with the exercise of official authority). The expanded investigatory responsibility means
that the individual in cases inAdministrative Courts often lack the need for legal represen-
tation, which means that the space for the granting of legal aid or having expenses reim-
bursed in connection with litigation in Administrative Court is clearly more limited than
in the general courts.
That one of the Administrative Courts’ central purposes is ensuring citizens’ rights in
connection with the exercise of authority also speaks to the fact that a party, unlike in a
civil litigation process, is not at risk of having to cover their own and the counter-party’s
court costs (or any legal fees of the counter-party), as the State has committed to fully
covering the costs of a process undertaken in an Administrative Court.
244 1971:291.
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11.10 Security measures
11.10.1 Civil procedure security measures
General information on civil procedure measures
In the context of a civil dispute, there are certain civil procedure security measures in order
to prevent the risk that the defendant will sabotage a forthcoming enforcement (execution).
For example, it is conceivable that the defendant will contest the claim solely to sabotage
the enforcement.245 These measures are aimed at maintaining the object of enforcement
(or the applicant’s claim under Chapter 15, Section 3 of the Code of Judicial Procedure)
in an unaltered state, so that a future ruling, which involves the plaintiff’s action being
approved, may later be enforced.246 The plaintiff is thus allowed plenty of time to develop
their action without running the risk that the disputed object somehow gets lost. The mere
risk of being subject to security measures discourages any thoughts the defendant might
have of disposing of (or in some other way getting rid of) the object of enforcement before
its dispute is settled. However, common to security measures under Chapter 15, Sections
1-3 of the Code of Judicial Procedure is the requirement that the applicant submits security
to the court for any damages thatmay be inflicted on the counter-party (Chapter 15, Section
6 of the Code of Judicial Procedure).
Sequestration at contentious claims
The institution of sequestration is available both within the framework of criminal proce-
dure (Chapter 26 of the Code of Judicial Procedure) and civil procedure (Chapter 15 of
the Code of Judicial Procedure), but only the civil procedure part will be addressed below.
Sequestration within the framework of civil procedure is regulated in two separate provi-
sions. The first provision is aimed at cases where the subject of the dispute consists of a
claim. In accordance with Chapter 15, Section 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, the
plaintiff may request sequestration when probable cause is established to believe that he
“has a claim that is or is likely to become the object of a trial or examination of another
similar order, and there is reason to fear that the counter-party, through absconding,
removing property or acting in some other way, will evade payment of the debt”. Under
these circumstances, the “court can issue a sequestration order to seize enough of the
counter-party’s property that the claim is likely to be covered in the event of enforcement.”
If the creditor wins the case, the judgment can be enforced through seizure of the
property for which the sequestration has been ordered.
245 Ekelöf, Edelstam & Bylund 2006, p. 11.
246 Ekelöf, Edelstam & Bylund 2006, p. 12.
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Sequestration in the case of alleged superior right to property
Sequestration may also be used when the matter in dispute does not relate to a monetary
claim, but instead relates to superior right to certain property. In accordance with Chapter
15, Section 2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, “if someone shows probable cause to believe
that he has superior right to certain property, that is or is likely to become the object of
trial or examination of another similar order, and there is reason to fear that the counter-
party will remove, substantially damage or in some other way dispose of the property to
the detriment of the applicant, the court may order sequestration of the property.” For
this form of sequestration to become a reality, the action must be based on the plaintiff
claiming “superior right” to some of the counter-party’s property.
Ordering of appropriate action to secure the applicant’s rights
According to Chapter 15, Section 3 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, when the applicant
shows probable cause to believe he has a claim against another party, the court can also
order appropriate action to secure the applicant’s rights. Such an action could entail the
court, under penalty, issuing a ban that would prevent the counter-party performing a
certain act or conducting certain business activities.247 Alternatively, the court may appoint
a trustee or issue a regulationwhich is in some other way likely to prevent any infringement
of the applicant’s rights. In the numerous alternative measures that the court may order
to secure the applicant’s rights, it can be considered an obligation on the side of the court
to, in each case, choose the mildest procedure for the counter-party.248
11.10.2 Other security measures
Lien – a public-law coercive measure
According to Chapter 46, Section 2 of the Tax Procedure Act, the Swedish Tax Agency
may requisition the property of a person liable for payment in order to secure the payment
of tax, charges, special charges or interest. Decisions on lien aremade by theAdministrative
Court, on application by the Swedish Tax Agency. Decisions on lien may be taken if there
is a real risk that the person liable for payment will not pay and the payment obligation
relates to a significant amount (Chapter 46, Section 6). Although the payment obligation
does not need to be established or charged, the lien is determined only when it is probable
that the obligation will be established (Chapter 46, Section 7 of the Tax Procedure Act).
Lien is very similar to sequestration within civil and criminal procedure, but can be
used by government agencies for certain types of claims (certain taxes, duties and charges).
In the jurisprudential doctrine, it has been suggested that lien has longer-reaching legal
247 Ekelöf, Edelstam & Bylund 2006, p. 13.
248 Fitger, Comments to Chapter 15, Section 3 of the Code of Judicial Procedure.
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effects than sequestration.249 The reason is that, through variousmeasures, a taxable person
has a greater chance remove his property before this tax payment is due than the counter-
party in a civil dispute.
Seizure of evidential matter – a coercive measure to ensure the preservation of evidence
in cases of tax audit
According to Chapter 45, Section 2 of the Tax Procedure Act, seizure of evidential matter
refers to the following coercive measures; audit of the auditee’s business premises,
requesting and taking into custody of documents, as well as the sealing of premises, storage
facilities or other spaces. If the auditee does not fulfil their obligations under Chapter 41,
Sections 8-11 of the Tax Procedure Act (essentially, giving access to business premises and
providing the required documents, as is deemednecessary during the audit), or a substantial
risk of sabotage exists, an audit may be conducted in the auditee’s business premises
(Chapter 45, Section 3 of the Tax Procedure Act). In connection with the audit in the
business premises, the requesting and taking into custody of documents may also be per-
formed under certain circumstances, as specified in Chapter 45, Sections 4-11 of the Tax
Procedure Act. Under certain circumstances, premises, storage facilities or other spaces
may be sealed to protect documents to be examined or taken into custody for review
(Chapter 45, Section 12 of the Tax Procedure Act).
11.11 Evacuation measures in order to maintain public order
In Swedish law, there are limited possibilities to, through administrative measures, vacate
or expropriate property, premises and areas in order to prevent the disturbance of public
order. Preventing the disruption of public order does not constitute a valid reason to allow
expropriation of property under the Expropriation Act250.
If an apartment is used for criminal activities or as a brothel, the right to use the
apartment is forfeited (Chapter 7, Section 18 of the Tenant-Ownership Act251 and Chapter
12, Section 42 of the Land Code). The housing cooperative or landlord is thus entitled to
respectively evict the apartment owner or terminate the lease agreement early. However,
these rights are only held by the cooperative or landlord. No authority can refer to these
provisions as a basis to vacate a property. Until 1 March 2010, there was a special Acquisi-
tion of Rental Properties Act252, which in practice meant that a party intending to acquire
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a rental property needed a special acquisition permit. The law was aimed at preventing
rental property acquisition by rogue traders.
However, a person who leases an apartment in the knowledge that it is being used as
a brothel or for gaming activities can be convicted of pimping or illicit gambling (Chapter
6, Section 12, and Chapter 16, Section 14 of the Penal Code).
Deployable statutory evacuation measures of a more administrative nature are found
in the Police Act253, hence they can only be used by the Police. If for special reasons, it is
deemed there is a risk of a crime involving grave threat to life or health or extensive
destruction of property being perpetrated in a certain location, a police officer may vacate
or prohibit access to a building, room or other location connected to this place in order
to avert the crime or protect against it (Section 23).
In the case of serious disturbances of public order or safety, and if it is necessary to
maintain order or safety, the Police can ban access to a certain area or space (Section 24).
The legislative history shows that cordoning off areas has been a common and effective
measure in preventing serious disorder and crime.254
An important explanation for the limited evacuation powers is that a large proportion
of those potentially order-disrupting business operations that take place in premises (e.g.
drug sales, brothels and gambling activities) are prohibited under Swedish law. The purchase
of sexual services (Chapter 6, Section 11 of the Penal Code), pimping (Chapter 16, Section
14 of the Penal Code), illicit gambling (Chapter 16, Section 14 of the Penal Code), and all
forms of manufacture, sale, possession and use of narcotic drugs (Section 1 of the Narcotic
Drugs Punishments Act255, are criminal acts. These also represent crimes prioritised by
both the Police and other authorities.
11.12 Conclusions
11.12.1 Levels of industry regulation
Figure 11.1 represents an attempt to schematically illustrate the differences in the level of
regulation between the previously described business activities in terms of permits to
conduct the business.
253 1984:387.
254 Bill 1996/97:175 p. 28.
255 1968:64.
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difference in level of business regulationsFigure 11.1
The regulatory pyramid indirectly reflects the legislature’s view of which business activities
are most at risk of being abused. The scope of the administrative measures is therefore
primarily dependent on the existence of economic crime within the industry in question,
or whether the business activity otherwise poses a risk of crime or irresponsible enterprise.
At the top is the ban on business activity, which admittedly is not an administrativemeasure
but a special legal consequence of crime. The trading ban represents themost severe penalty
to which a trader may be subjected. At the bottom of the pyramid are the business activities
involving a notification obligation. In these cases, the legislature has held that a permit
procedure has not been necessary for control purposes, but has judged that satisfactory
control can be achievedwith supervision, combinedwith certain personal controlmeasures
(e.g. during notification of the sale ofmedium-strong beer or tobacco, the trader is required
to establish a personal control programme for the purpose of ensuring compliance with
legislation in the area).
Under the trading ban, we find businesses where abuses can result in widespread
damaging effects on society. Examples of well-established views include that the sale of
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weapons and alcohol should be vigilantly controlled, and that it is important to maintain
confidence in businesses of systematic important such as banking and financing operations.
It is thus no coincidence that they are high up in the regulatory pyramid.
From an approval perspective, it is possible to see to what extent a certain regulation
is exclusionary. Notification obligation allows for the possibility of market access for all,
while the permit requirement constitutes an examination of the applicant’s suitability and
previous good character.
On the other hand, the trading ban involves an absolute prohibition of business activity,
regardless of industry. The permit obligation within a particular industry may however
result in similar consequences for those who do not meet the requirements or who, during
supervision, lose a previously granted permit due to negligence. The right to do business
is lost and freedom of trade is curtailed. On a principle level, it is however possible to
observe that the regulations are parallel-placed. Trading prohibition is based on the indi-
vidual trader’s lack of suitability to engage in business, while the permit requirement is
based on a specific business activity. While there are conditions within a licensable industry
that control who will get the opportunity to establish themselves within it, it is society’s
interest in a person refraining from business activity that is crucial to a trading ban being
issued in an individual case.
11.12.2 Patterns of development
It is difficult in Swedish law to see a coherent and consistent pattern of development in
terms of administrative measures against economic and organised crime. This is mainly
due to the lack of an explicit, coherent political line on administrative measures for crime
prevention, which has never existed in the Swedish political debate. The administrative
measures that have been introduced have primarily (sometimes exclusively) focused on
the prevention of economic crime, while thework on organised crime seems to have largely
remained a matter for the criminal justice system. There are however two exceptions.
Asset-oriented law enforcement focusing on the re-appropriation of criminal gains, and
the efforts against social benefit crime and benefit fraud, are both clearly aimed at organised
crime, even though in practice they have a significantly wider spectrum.
All in all, however, the administrative measures palette has become more nuanced in
recent decades. This is partly due to the consequences of economic crime for serious traders
having increasingly become a topic of discussion, but also due to the fact that the changes
which the Swedish business sector has undergone – such as the deregulation of public
monopolies and the financial market, and EU accession – have had an impact on the rele-
vant legislation. Below is an attempt to illustrate the parallel patterns of development that
can be observed within the area of administrative measures against economic crime.
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1. Increased use of conduct assessment for the operation of certain types of business
activity
Despite the fact that free enterprise still forms the backbone of Swedish commercial policy,
the trend has been towards increased administrative measures, not least through conduct
assessment, both with and without registry checks. Although the Commission against
EconomicCrime’s trade permit systemwas never implemented, the 1980s saw an expanded
conduct assessment introduced in commercial traffic and the restaurant industry. The
design of the conduct assessment set the trend for the current alcohol legislation. Conduct
assessment has also been introduced when applying for the arrangement of certain gaming
activities under the Lotteries Act (e.g., roulette, dice and card games), which indirectly
relates to theAlcoholAct’s provisions on permits to serve alcohol. Furthermore, the conduct
assessment has become gradually stricter for professions where great demands are placed
on trust, such as estate agents (who have gone from voluntary authorisation to registration
with suitability assessment) and to some extent auditors (supervision has been bolstered
with the introduction of the Supervisory Board of Public Accountants). In previously non-
competitive areas, conduct assessment has also come to be established, for instance when
applying for the retail sale of pharmaceuticals, as well as in carrying out activities under
the LSS (Act concerning Support and Service for Persons with Certain Functional
Impairments).
There are several signs that the assessment of principals, owners and management of
businesses in the welfare sector is, in general, moving in an inculcated direction. In a recent
report the National Free School Committee proposed an extended assessment of school
institutors’ suitability in terms of conduct and financial conscientiousness.256 At the same
time, the investigator in the Ownership Assessment Commission has been commissioned
to examine whether, within the welfare sector, just as in the financial sector, there is a need
to ensure that owners and managements are responsible and competent and are engaged
in long-term and high-quality business.257 Among other things, a stance will be taken on
whether requirements are to be imposed on aBoard’s or executivemanagement’s suitability,
skills and composition.258 A proposal was also presented recently for the introduction of
mandatory registry checks for prospective family homes.259
2. Increased use of conduct assessment outside the business sector
Another sign of increased conduct assessment with a view to crime prevention (primarily
aimed at preventing sexual offences against children) are the laws on registry checkswhich
have been added in recent years. This development has partly stemming from international
256 SOU 2013:56, p. 1.
257 Dir. 2012:131, p. 1.
258 Dir. 2012:131, p. 11.
259 SOU 2014:3, p. 180.
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conventions (e.g. the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child) and EU legal acts. On
18 December 2013, the Act260 concerning registry checks entered into effect, which entails
the right for employers to request that the individual provides an excerpt from theCriminal
Records Registry if they want to be employed or perform tasks involving regular contact
with children (the Act thusly also extends to volunteer assignments, such as sports leaders).
Another example of conduct assessment aimed at protecting customers is the conduct
assessment of taxi drivers, where a subsidiary aim of the examination is to prevent passen-
gers from being exposed to violent crime. A discussion is currently being held at the
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in order to see whether an excerpt from the Criminal
Records Registry should also be required of people working in elderly care and with the
disabled.
An increased number of positions currently require the staff to be security-classified.
A gradual extension of these positions has occurred with an emphasis on vital societal
operations within the private sector, which consequently have been perceived as essential
for ensuring national security.
Another sign of a general increase in the examination of the individual worker’s conduct
is that employers nowadays, even within industries without the statutory requirement of
a registry excerpt for potential employees, also require the job seeker to request and produce
a registry excerpt before a position can be considered. According to the Swedish National
Police Board, a total of 222,940 requests weremade for excerpts from the Criminal Records
Registry in 2013, which represents just over five times the amount of excerpts during a
ten-year period. On a principle level, it can be discussed whether this is a desirable devel-
opment. If there is an implied requirement that a job seeker must bring a newly issued
registry excerpt to every interview – and the person in question is registered in the Criminal
Records Registry – this will mean an undermining of the principle that those who served
a court sentence have atoned for their crime.
3. Stricter control of erroneous payments of grants and subsidies
The fact that the prevention of erroneous payments from the welfare systems over the past
decade has been a political priority is clear in the range of collaborative, investigative and
legislative initiatives. These includes the Delegation on erroneous payments, the new
Benefit Crime Act, the added official investigative reports on benefit blocking and
administrative sanctions for observed benefit fraud and, in connection to this, a harmonised
concept instrument regarding transfers from the welfare systems. The increased informa-
tion-sharing between the welfare systems’ administrating authorities and expanded recla-
mation rules are examples of administrative measures. Thus it appears that the status of
administrative measures as crime prevention instruments in the subsidies area is strong,
260 2013:852.
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at least in relation to their position in other areas, where only a minor proportion of the
legislative measures are of a criminal nature (for example, the Benefit Crime Act).
To a large degree, the legislation against benefit fraud impacts individual benefit
recipients, but inmany areas the administrativemeasures work to prevent economic crime
in companies, such as the abuse of subsidised forms of employment or unreported work
in combination with sickness benefit, unemployment benefit or sickness allowance. As
just mentioned, measures against benefit fraud have also become part of the fight against
organised crime.
4. Consequences of EU accession
EU membership also came to imply adapting certain trade permit regulations in order for
them to harmonise with the EU law-decreed four freedoms (e.g., within the banking and
financial sector, the auditing and commercial traffic industries).Within the banking sector,
for example, previous legislation dictated that the Government only authorise banking
business if the purpose could be considered beneficial to the public. For foreigners who
were not Nordic citizens or who did not have permanent residence permits, permits were
required to conduct any business in Sweden.
The requirements of risk-based customer due diligence to prevent money laundering
and terrorism have also tightened requirements on the financial sector’s transaction con-
trols. The alignment with EU law should therefore not have had any significant impact on
the Swedish trade legislation’s crime prevention elements.
5. Stricter regulations for public procurement
Legislation, procedures and collaboration aiming to exclude rogue contractors frompublic
procurement have been strengthened and intensified during the 2000s. Somemunicipalities
have begun performing careful background checks on tenderers on their own initiative,
while at the same time a lot of responsibility is placed on the tenderers to avoid undeclared
work and uphold fair competition. In addition, the municipality imposes higher require-
ments on the tenderers, for example, that the same right to freedom of speech enjoyed by
public sector workers must be granted to the tenderer’s employees.
However, no background checks on the tenderers are performed in the Criminal
Records Registry, which makes the exclusion of rogue bidders very difficult. In its report
on unfair competition in public procurement, the Swedish Competition Authority states
that there is a need for improved cooperation between different authorities to discourage
companies from using offences against the law as competitive means.261 The large number
of actors in the procurement area places high demands on effective collaboration in order
for public procurement regulations to be maintained. Actors include the following; the
261 Swedish Competition Authority 2013, p. 39.
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Swedish Competition Authority, which provides support in the procurement process and
acts as the central supervisory authority; the SwedishTaxAgency, whichworks preventively
against undeclared work in public procurement; the Swedish National Audit Office and
the Swedish National Financial Management Authority, which in different ways examine
agencies’ use of tax revenue, as well as over one thousand contracting authorities.
6. Increased powers of fiscal control
The Swedish Tax Agency’s powers of fiscal control have gradually been extended and, in
relation to trade authorisation and related supervisory control, represent an important
complementary component in the palette of administrative measures. The Tax Agency’s
controls, and the data that emerges in connection to these, can be used by the supervisory
authorities in order to make it easier to revoke a previously issued permit in connection
with the on-going regulatory work. The Agency’s on-going fiscal control of all business
activities thus becomes a form of indirect supervision of all licensable operations. As a
widespread occurrence of tax fraud (within a given industry) risks driving legitimate
business operations out of the market, it is necessary to have an effective fiscal control in
order to maintain competitive neutrality, which promotes serious business.
Examples of the expanded powers of fiscal control include the regulations regarding
staff ledgers in hairdressing and restaurant businesses, which have recently been extended
to include the laundry industry. In conjunction with this extension, the Government was
instructed to submit a detailed proposal enabling the extension of the staff ledger system
to later include the construction industry. Another example is that, from 1 January 2014,
the requirement of cash registers also applies to market trading.
However, the report’s proposal regarding monthly data on staff salaries, withheld pre-
liminary tax and employer’s contributions, has ended up far down on the priority list,
despite the fact that its implementation would have a crime prevention effect.
7. Regulatory relief for limited liability companies
Abolition of the requirement of auditors in smaller limited companies and the lowering
of the capital requirement for limited liability companies is amove in the opposite direction
to what has, at least to some extent, previously been perceived as crime prevention. The
development of general requirements for companies therefore appears to move in slightly
different directions.
8. Development of the trading ban – a key component of the administrative sanction
battery
An important crime prevention instrument in terms of Swedish law is the trading ban,
which has been strengthened and expanded several times since the Trading Prohibition
Committee Directive. The Directive emphasised that the extension of the rules on trading
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prohibition is one of the methods that deserve to be considered for combating economic
crime.262 The perceptionwas that the discussion on trading prohibition should be extended
to include such crimes as systematic violations of tax and tax collection legislation or the
legislation relating to industrial welfare, monetary exchange, environmental protection or
unfair competition.263 In the subsequent guidelines bill, trading prohibition was identified
as a way to attack the rogue traders without making things more difficult for legitimate
business owners (thus inhibiting the establishment of new businesses) through a compre-
hensive trade permit system. It was therefore argued in the bill that any increased demands
on industry in order to prevent economic crime should be dealt in tandem with an
expansion of the trading ban.
In this bill, which dealt with the Trading Prohibition Committee’s proposal, it was
recommended (in accordance with the report’s proposal) that an independent law on
trading prohibition would be introduced. Previously, the provisions on trading bans had
formed part of the Bankruptcy Act, where a trading ban could only be issuedwhen a trader
failed to fulfil their obligation in connection with bankruptcy.264 The same bill dealt with
the trade permit system in critical industries as proposed by the Commission against
Economic Crime which, as mentioned earlier, came to be implemented on a limited scale
for a trial period in the restaurant industry and in commercial traffic.
What is important to note is that the bill emphasised that the proposals for an expanded
conduct assessment and an expanded trading ban constituted part of the fight against
economic crime.265 The reasons for these (additional) proposals was thus explicitly to prevent
economic crime. Furthermore, it should be emphasised that the trading ban – as a legal
sanction – is something of a hybrid product in the legislative context. It is certainly a special
legal consequence of crime, but the prosecutor can now, in some cases, request a trading
ban outside criminal proceedings.266 In addition, there is now a presumption that a trading
ban will be issued when a trader has failed to fulfil payment obligations, committed an
offence forwhich theminimum sentence is sixmonths in prison, has been guilty of repeated
significant crimes, or on several occasions over a ten year period has been involved in
bankruptcies. The number of issued trading bans in relation to the number of active traders
(registered companies) is still relatively low.
262 SOU 1984:8, p. 64.
263 SOU 1984:8, p. 64.
264 Bill 1985/86:126, p. 1.
265 Bill 1985/86:126, p. 1.
266 For example, the prosecutor has a greater responsibility not to await a criminal investigation before he
requests a trading ban in the case of repeated bankruptcies.
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9. Is there a need in Sweden for administrative measures to prevent organised crime?
A problem in some countries is that organised crime infiltrates legal business activities. It
happens in cases of potential criminal violence providing a controlled company with a
monopoly on, for example, transportation, waste disposal or sales.267 In this way, high
prices can be maintained externally. A company controlled by organised crime may also,
through the corruption of politicians and officials, usurp big contracts with the public
sector. Through a lack of delivery of the contracted services and goods, the tax revenue,
in reality, goes straight into the pockets of the criminal syndicates.
Administrative measures usually form part of the law enforcement when faced with
these problems. Even in countries where the business world is not as mafia-infiltrated,
administrative measures can be viable. In those cases it is often about discouraging prosti-
tution and drug trade as well as related crimes such as illegal gambling and receiving stolen
goods. What is characteristic of the administrative measures is that they target businesses
and premises linked to the crime.
According to Swedish law, all dealings with narcotic drugs in any form is a criminal
offence. This also applies to the use of narcotics. The Swedish drug policy is very strict and
the penalties are therefore severe. Furthermore, the purchase of sexual services is a crime,
as is pimping. The party who provides the premises for prostitution also risks being con-
victed of pimping. Alcohol legislation is also rigorous, rooted in the First World War
rationing. Even games with money are carefully regulated. The need for administrative
measures aimed at premises where prostitution, drug sales, alcohol sales and gambling
takes place – for example, in the form of extensive evacuation powers – therefore seems
to be limited in the Swedish context.
Put another way, the need for administrative measures is limited in Sweden, meaning
measures designed to prevent organised crime having access to the legal infrastructure
that running a business entails, as well as access to certainmarkets. The fight against serious
organised crime constitutes a priority area, and is largely undertaken in collaboration with
other agencies.268 To the extent that administrative authorities are involved, it is for the
purpose of mapping the assets of criminals.269 To the extent that non-criminal (adminis-
trative) measures are used against organised crime, it appears to increasingly take place
within the framework of on-going criminal investigations, and to a more limited extent,
to deny organised crime access to the business sector’s legal infrastructure. It then involves
sequestration, lien and other asset-oriented measures. Besides forfeiture, the authorities
are currently attempting to increase their grip on organised crime by re-appropriating
criminal gains with the help of administrative measures. Associated administrative and
267 Jacobs 1994.
268 Brå 2011b, p. 7.
269 cf. Brå 2011a, p. 84; ISF 2011:12, p. 82.
493
11 The administrative approach in Sweden
asset-oriented measures include the review of grant decisions and the reclamation of
erroneously disbursed subsidies.
In a Swedish context, however, there is a greater need for administrative measures to
combat economic crime. One way to look at the situation is to try to answer the question
of what it is that makes a particular industry attractive for economic and organised crime
respectively. To simplify, from an economic crime perspective, critical industries that
combine relatively low access requirements (in terms of education, professional skills and
capital) with opportunities to make money through running a rogue business, particularly
by failing to pay taxes and charges, and which do not follow others burdensome rules for
business activity. Critical industries for organised crime are the individual companies
particularly suited to being exploited as a criminal instrument for accessing direct payments,
preferably by running a business to a limited extent. If offenders specialising in economic
crime primarily circumvent regulations, actors within organised crime are more focused
on appropriating money through fraudulent practices.
Expanded administrativemeasures can constitute an increased risk of detection, which
in turnmakes these industries less attractive for both economic crime and organised crime.
Administrative measures against economic crime have the clear purpose of supporting
legitimate business, while administrativemeasures with the express purpose of combatting
organised crime are purely preventative in nature. In practice, however, such a theoretical
division of motives is difficult to do. Additionally, the two types of crime tend to coincide
– companies in critical industries (e.g. the construction industry) are often seen as well
suited to being used as crime instruments by organised crime.
In its report on methods for administrative measures that impede serious organised
crime, the National Intelligence Service (NUC)270 bases its work on a more comprehensive
definition of the term “administrativemeasure”. The definition also includes “suchmeasures
thatmay disrupt serious organised crime on a broader front and not only focus on individ-
uals”.271 Such a definition implies that the administrative measures flora becomes richer
in its diversity, with the inclusion of measures other than those that focus on denial of
access to business activity. Among other things, the report mentions the following; the
Swedish Prison and Probation Service’s ability to limit an inmate’s authorised telephone
and visitation time or to enforce his sentence in probation form; the Enforcement
Authority’s ability to apply for conversion of a penalty to a prison sentence in the case of
repeated non-payment; a police authority’s ability to deny a criminal suspect’s application
for passport renewal and its work with aliens cases (refusal of entry or expulsion at external
and internal border controls); and the Swedish Migration Board’s ability to revoke a resi-
270 A national body composed of agency heads from several collaborating agencies that develops supporting
data and situational overviews for effective inter-agency cooperation against organised crime.
271 National Intelligence Service 2012, p. 14.
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dence permit when it has been based on deliberately submitted false information. It is
somewhat doubtful whether these measures are contained within this report’s definition
of the “measure” concept, but with the NUC report’s broader definition, one can well
consider them administrative measures that can be applied in order to prevent and limit
the harmful effects of organised crime.
If the narrower definition of administrative measures mentioned in Section 1.1 above
is applied, the existing battery of measures seems to be primarily focused on the prevention
of economic crime (which to some extent seems natural, as it is companies that have the
widest interfaces to administrative regulations and authorities). There aremany indications
that, as far as Sweden is concerned, it will essentially remain this way.
11.12.3 The future of administrative measures for economic crime prevention
purposes
For a long time, the premise of the work to prevent economic crime in Sweden has been
that it should act as support for serious traders (i.e., it should ensure that sound and fair
competition on equal terms ismaintained).Whilst the legislature has gradually intensified
its work to prevent economic crime, it has been careful not to impose unnecessary demands
or taxes on serious traders. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that rules blocking rogue
entrepreneurswithout creating extrawork for the serious proprietors – such as the extended
trading prohibition – gain public support. Nor should there be any objection from serious
entrepreneurs to conduct assessment since it is directed at individuals who have committed
crimes.
However, it would be of value, in light of the scope and structure of economic crime,
to examine the degree to which various administrative regulations and controls address
this criminality. This should create the conditions to establish an holistic approach in order
to use administrative measures that make it possible, if necessary, to fill the gaps. For
example, there is an apparent lack of existing measures targeting the construction and
cleaning industries. Both industries are known for major problems with economic crime.
The construction industry is also, in terms of size, one of the single most important
industries in the country. Furthermore, control operations should be synchronised, where
one single agency could also carry out control measures for other authorities’ needs. The
control measures could also be made more effective. If the requirement of monthly data
for salaries, tax at source and employer’s contributions is introduced, the staff ledger system
in the restaurant, hairdressing and laundry industries can be abolished, and the TaxAgency
can be given the general authority to, through field checks, reconcile the monthly data
against those working at the individual workplace.
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An overall review should make it possible to develop a coherent strategy for using
administrative measures, particularly against economic crime.
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– Bill 2011/12:80. Nya lagar för yrkestrafik och taxi, [New legislation for commercial
traffic and taxi services].
– Bill 2012/13:34. Personalliggare för tvätteribranschen, [Staff ledgers in the laundry
industry].
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– Bill 2012/13:129. Förbättrad konkurrens på lika villkor i kontantbranschen, [Improved




– Brå’s comments to proposal, ref. D1.1-0157/2008, 2008.
– Swedish Economic Crime Authority, EBM A-2008/0123, 2008.
– Swedish Tax Agency’s comments to proposal, ref. 1 31 222668-08:112. 2008.
Government Communications
– Govt. Com. 1994/95:217. Regeringens skrivelse till riksdagen. Samlade åtgärder mot den
ekonomiska brottsligheten, [Official letter to Parliament –Coordinatedmeasures against
economic crime].
– Govt. Com. 2009/10:79 – En tydlig, rättsäker och effektiv tillsyn, [A clear, legally secure
and effective supervision] SwedishTransportAgency, 2012, Framställan om upphävande
av lagen (1998:492) och förordningen (1998:780) om biluthyrning, [Request to revoke
the act [1998:492] and ordinance [1998:780] on car rentals], TSTRYT 2011/23242.
Case law – Administrative Court of Appeal
– Administrative Court of Appeal in Sundsvall’s judgment in case no. 3511-1999,
27/09/2000.
– AdministrativeCourt ofAppeal in Sundsvall’s judgment in case no. 84-2002, 22/11/2002.
– AdministrativeCourt ofAppeal in Sundsvall’s judgment in case no. 1766-03, 19/09/2003.
– Administrative Court of Appeal in Sundsvall’s judgment in case no. 2163-2002,
03/01/2003.
– AdministrativeCourt ofAppeal in Sundsvall’s judgment in case no. 3351-03, 01/11/2004.
Case law – Supreme Administrative Court
– RÅ 2001 ref. 13.
– RÅ 2004 note. 24.
501
11 The administrative approach in Sweden
Case law – Court of Appeal
– RH 1999:56.
Case law – Supreme Court
– NJA 2000 p. 129.
– NJA 2007 N 14.
– NJA 1990 C 125.
– NJA 1994 C 42.
– NJA 1998 C 54.
– NJA 2007 N 14.
Other
– Ds 2009:43. Närvaroliggare och kontrollbesök, [Attendance ledgers and checkups].
– CSN, Statistics on financial aid for studies in 2012, 2012 (dnr 2013-522-3199).
– Fitger, Elektronisk kommentar till 15 kap. 3 § RB, [Electronic commentary to Chapter
15, Section 3 of the Swedish Penal Code], Zeteo, (131120).
– National Intelligence Service, Metoder för administrativa åtgärder som försvårar den
grova organiserade brottsligheten, [Methods for administrative measures to impede
gross organised crime], NUC report 26/04/2012, 2012.
– Statskontoret, Utvärdering av kontrollfunktionen i staten, [Evaluation of the state
supervisory function], Stockholm: Swedish Agency for Public Management], 2012:15.
– Swedish Competition Authority, Osund konkurrensi offentlig upphandling – om
lagöverträdelser som konkurrensmedel [Unhealthy competition in public procurement
– on legal violations as a means of competition], Report 2013:6, 2013.
– Swedish Economic CrimeAuthority, Rapport om näringsförbudets efterlevnad, [Report
on the adherence to the trade ban], Report 2004:2, 2004.
– The Swedish Tax Agency’s provisions for approval of tax warehouses under the Act
on Excise Duty on Tobacco (1994:1563), the Excise Duty on Alcohol Act (1994:1564)
and the Act on the Taxation of Energy (1994:1776), SKVFS 2013:12.
– Tillsynen av yrkestrafiken på väg – en förstudie, [Supervision of commercial traffic – a
preliminary study], ref. no.169-2937-2009/10, Parliamentary Committee on Traffic,
Evaluation and research function.
– The Swedish National Police Board’s provisions and general advice for application of
the Act on the Sale of Locksmith tools (1979:357), RPSFS 2000:27.
502
L. Korsell & M. Norlin
– The Swedish National Police Board’s provisions and general advice on weapons legis-
lation, RPSFS 2009:13.
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12.1 Introduction
There are numerous ways that the administrative authorities in the selectedMember States
can combat crime using tools other than traditional criminal law enforcement instruments.
Intensive use of such instruments in the respectiveMember States could lead to a displace-
ment effect across national borders, however.1 During the empirical phase of this study,
we indeed found indications of this displacement effect to Belgium owing to the use of
administrative instruments in theDutch border areas. This will be explored further in Part
III of this report.
The existence of the displacement effect presumes cross-border cooperation between
administrative authorities and/or other authorities. Insight into the varying national
powers of administrative authorities is also necessary to facilitate cross-border cooperation
in an administrative approach to crime.2 Previous research has compared the neighbouring
Member States of the Netherlands and Belgium,3 but a detailed comparison of other EU
Member States is still lacking. This chapter seeks to provide such a comparison. The main
question is:
What role do administrative authorities in EU Member States play in tackling
serious and organized crime?
One of the key underlying principles of an administrative approach to organized crime is
‘that the local authorities must play a major role in preventing and combating this type of
crime.’4 The administrative approach is complementary to and co-dependent on criminal
law enforcement and thus relies on information exchange between criminal law enforcement
1 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 437.
2 Obviously, more elements are necessary to facilitate cross-border cooperation, such as an international
institutional framework; see Chapter 14 for a detailed study.
3 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 437ff.
4 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 461.
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authorities and government administrators.5 It is important to note that an administrative
approach to organized crime is not necessarily solely preventive in nature, nor is a criminal
law approach necessarily repressive. For instance, administrative bodies can impose
administrative sanctions or refuse permits based on previous offences. Additionally,
investigativemeasures can be used before there is a formal suspicion, and criminal sanctions
can be aimed at preventing crime.6
The purpose of this chapter is to contrast the key elements of the country reports from
a comparative law perspective. The main sources for the comparison are the explorative
country reports on the selected Member States. The country visits during the empirical
phase of the study also deepened our understanding of local legislation. The comparison
will result in a horizontal overview of the policies and tools employed in the selected
Member States to combat crime bymeans other than traditional criminal law enforcement
instruments.
The authors of the country reports were responsible for the content of their report.
Several benchmarks were put in place before they began, with a view to creating some
cohesion. These benchmarks included a definition of the administrative approach and
subsequent sector-specific working definitions. We refer to the general introduction to
this study. The authors were also encouraged to review the national peculiarities of their
legal system, resulting in an overview of country-specific measures. During the empirical
phase of the research, however, it became clear that the various authors differed in their
interpretation of the term ‘administrative approach’. For instance, some countries included
money laundering and reporting suspicious activity in the administrative approach,whereas
others did not. This uncertainty as to what ‘the’ administrative approach entails conse-
quently filters through in the separate country reports, making it difficult to compare them,
since they do not all cover the same instruments. Where possible and necessary, we con-
ducted additional research to further substantiate the country reports for purposes of
comparison.Where this was the case, the additional sources have been referenced. In some
instances, the lack of information on a particular topic in a country report resulted in the
exclusion of a Member State from that part of the comparison. Any mistakes or misinter-
pretations are in this comparison our own.
We begin by considering the general framework and policies underlying the adminis-
trative approach in the selectedMember States (Section 12.2).We then discuss some general
principles of administrative law (Section 12.3) and compare the various substantive
instruments in-depth. This includes screening and monitoring when administrative
authorities take a decision that influences a natural or legal person. It also encompasses
the power tomaintain public order.We further discuss the possibility of forfeiting criminal
5 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 461-462.
6 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 461-462.
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gains outside the scope of criminal proceedings and review country-specific measures
where comparison is possible (Section 12.4). Third, we compare the legal protection of
natural and legal persons confronted with these types of measures (Section 12.5). Finally,
the legal framework assigns the responsibility for wielding the administrative instruments
to various authorities. We therefore compare institutional frameworks and examine the
current potential for cooperation between administrative and other authorities (Section
12.6). The final section (Section 12.7) presents our conclusions.
12.2 The policies in the selected Member States
Before comparing the detailed instruments that were the focus of the country reports, first,
a general impression of the general policies, if there are any, on the role of administrative
authorities in the approach against crime will be discussed.
The administrative approach to crimewas first applied inNewYork in the 1980s, when
Mayor Rudy Giuliani started to complement traditional law enforcement tools, such as
wiretapping, infiltration and witness protection, with administrative tools to tackle the
influence of ‘La Cosa Nostra’ in several economic sectors in the city.7 Jacobs and Gouldin
evaluated this approach and concluded that the application of traditional law enforcement
instruments alone is insufficient to tackle crime.8 The authors commented that the com-
plementary application of regulatory powers and oversight of business sectors was ‘a great
innovation in crime control’.9 This ‘double strategy’ to fight organized crime10 gained a
foothold in the Netherlands in the 1990s and was thus introduced in Europe.
One of the starting points of this study was the following hypothesis: ‘There might not
be a coherent or official policy supporting the use of administrative tools to tackle crime in
the selected EU Member States. However, the actual tools, for example screening the criminal
history of persons who are requesting an administrative decision from administrative
authorities, do exist.’
The country reports confirm this hypothesis. After all, a complete absence of such tools
would have resulted in the absence of a country report. Without going into detail here,
each of the selected countries has administrative instruments that could be used to prevent
criminals from infiltrating the legal infrastructure. However, the question is whether there
is a specific policy in the respective countries directed at using administrative tools to
prevent serious and organized crime and, if such policies exist, what the underlying central
concepts are.
7 Van Daele et al. 2010 and Jacobs & Gouldin 1999.
8 Jacobs & Gouldin 1999.
9 Jacobs & Gouldin 1999.
10 Fijnaut 2010.
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When it comes to having an expressly formulated policy or strategy on an administrative
approach to crime, the Member States break down into three different camps. First, there
areMember States that have established policies on using administrative instruments with
the specific goal of combatting crime by administrative means. Most notably, this group
includes the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Italy and England and Wales. Second,
Belgium and the Czech Republic do implement initiatives suggesting an administrative
approach to organized crime, but have developed less elaborate strategies. Third, several
of the selected Member States have no discernibly coherent policy establishing an admin-
istrative approach to crime.
To elaborate on the latter, the absence of a common policy does not imply the absence
of administrative instruments that could be used in any future administrative approach
to crime. For instance, Sweden has around 230 laws regulating administrative supervision,
involving 90 central governmental agencies and 290 municipalities that derive regulatory
powers from these laws. Yet there is no common policy promoting the utilization of these
administrative instruments against crime in Sweden.11 Such a smorgasbord of different
instruments and responsible authorities is also present in Poland, Spain, Germany and
France, even though a common policy or strategy of using administrative instruments is
absent in these countries. The institutional framework will be discussed hereafter. Never-
theless, the absence of a policy supporting an administrative approach to crime does not
imply the lack of an overall strategy against serious and organized crime; such a strategy
is upheld by all the selected Member States.12
Additionally, several Member States have policy-driven administrative approaches to
crime. This includes the Netherlands, Italy, and England and Wales. These policies have
in common that they are part of a broader national organized crime policy or strategy.
They therefore offermore options for tackling crime than administrative instruments only.
The instruments described in these policies are intended to complement traditional law
enforcement, not serve as an alternative to it. The policies also have in common that they
– among other things – aim to protect public bodies from infiltration ormisuse by organized
crime. Finally, these policies support cooperation and information-sharing among govern-
ment bodies, as a practical measure and at different speeds. To elaborate and point out
differences, the separate policies will be discussed below, moving from the least-imple-
mented policy to the most-implemented one.
In England andWales, themain policy instrument as developed by theNational Crime
Agency (NCA) focuses on serious and organized crime. The main goal of the current
strategy is to reduce both the threat of crime and vulnerability to crime. The latter objective
11 In the 1980s, legislators proposed introducing a trade permit scheme to protect industries vulnerable to
economic crime, such as restaurants, transport companies and building firms. However, the proposal was
never implemented.
12 Fijnaut & Paoli 2004.
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includes reducing the vulnerability of the national and local government by protecting
them from fraud, misuse of public procurement and bribery. The strategy emphasizes the
‘whole government approach’ to organized crime. As a consequence, it encompasses tra-
ditional law enforcement measures, fiscal measures, penal measures and administrative
measures. Another consequence is the involvement of all sorts of government authorities
and agencies, as well as the focus on information-sharing between those bodies. This policy
is mainly meant to tackle organized crime, however, and it mentions each available
instrument – or so it seems – that could help the authorities reduce crime. There is no
tailor-made policy covering administrative instruments specifically, in otherwords; instead,
those instruments are part of a pool of all sorts of different tools that can be deployed to
disrupt organized crime activities in general.
Italy recently introduced the Anti-mafia Code, the corpus iuris for addressing mafia-
type associations. The Code combines all legislative actions that have been undertaken
since the 1960s into one legislative instrument. The Italian instruments are specifically
aimed at organized crime. Historically, the main goal of this legislation was to prevent
dangerous phenomena from infiltrating the public system. Nowadays, the focus is on
banning persons suspected or convicted of organized crime from entering into contracts
with public administrators. Contracting should be understood broadly as including tenders,
licences, authorizations, subsidies and other administrative deeds supporting the economy.
Apart from administrative tools, the corpus includes traditional law enforcementmeasures,
criminalization of mafia-type organizations, preventive and repressive confiscation, and
penitentiary sanctions. From a comparative point of view, the Italian policy ismore focused
than the policy in England and Wales because its aim is to prevent organized crime from
infiltrating the public system, whereas the English policy aims to disrupt organized crime
in general.
The Netherlands has the most developed and systematic policy concerning an admin-
istrative approach to crime. That policy is situated within the broader context of an inte-
grated approach to organized crime. The integrated approach involves using law enforce-
ment measures alongside fiscal and administrative ones. In short, it means that law
enforcement, fiscal and administrative authorities apply the measures for which they have
competence and when appropriate. It is a policy that assumes cooperation as well as
information exchange between those authorities. The primary goal of the Dutch adminis-
trative approach, as part of the integrated approach, is to bolster and protect the integrity
of government frommisuse by organized criminals.More specifically, it ismeant to prevent
public bodies from unknowingly and/or unintentionally facilitating criminal activities.
Historically speaking, the aforementioned New York double strategy gained a foothold in
theNetherlands in the 1990s. A scandal involving police investigative tactics, the subsequent
parliamentary enquiry and a study into the scope and forms of organized crime spurred
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the development of the Dutch administrative approach.13 The study by the Van Traa
Committee revealed that criminal groups had infiltrated the illegal and legal economy of
the City of Amsterdam.14 This prompted the city to tackle crime systematically using both
traditional law enforcement instruments and available administrative tools. These initial
policies emphasized the range of options open to local administrative authorities to take
action against crime and nuisance, such as screening of natural and legal persons applying
for permits, subsidies or tenders. In the early 2000s the administrative approach became
more and more embedded in national policy. The current national policy programme,
Nederland Veiliger [Making the Netherlands Safer], prioritizes several organized crime
categories, including human trafficking, drugs trafficking, money laundering, cybercrime
and child pornography. Unlike the other selected countries (with the exception of Italy),
the Netherlands has developed a complex legislative framework for screening and moni-
toring: the Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act (2002) (hereafter: BIBOB legis-
lation).15
The third group of countries consists of the Czech Republic and Belgium. Here, an
administrative approach to crime as such has been recommended at the national level but
there has been no systematic implementation of any such policy.
Influenced by developments in the Netherlands, Belgium has considered the role of
the administrative authorities in the battle against organized crime. In 1998, the Belgian
Senate’s Parliamentary Investigation Committee on Organized Crime recommended
combating organized crime by looking beyond a criminal law enforcement perspective,
in line with the Organized Crime Action Plan by the Belgian government and given that
local, regional and federal administrators had their own set of responsibilities. However,
almost twenty years later, little has come of these recommendations, although there are
some notable local exceptions, for instance local initiatives in the city of Liège, which uses
administrative measures to tackle motorcycle gangs,16 as well as initiatives in Antwerp and
Turnhout.17 The practical implementation will be discussed in Part III.
The Czech Republic’s national policy on organized crime references the need to use
means other than traditional law enforcement measures, i.e. administrative measures.
However, it merely refers to future possibilities and focuses mainly on administrative
authorities sharing information with criminal law enforcement authorities. This is a
starting point for a policy, but one that has not (yet) been implemented.
13 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 26.
14 Huisman et al. 2005, p. 1-2; Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 25.
15 Wet van 20 juni 2002, houdende regels inzake de bevordering van integriteitsbeoordelingen door het
openbaar bestuur met betrekking tot beschikkingen of overheidsopdrachten (Wetbevordering integriteits-
beoordelingen door het openbaar bestuur), Staatsblad 2002, nr. 347.
16 Lecture by the politiecommissaris of the local police department of Midlim (Belgium) on 24 October 2014,
attended in another capacity by M. Peters.
17 Interviews with the local police of Turnhout and the City of Antwerp.
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Our conclusion is that policy in the EU on an administrative approach is being devel-
oped at different speeds. Some Member States have no policy at all on an administrative
approach, others hint at the possibility, and still others have complex policies in place. The
result is a range of different institutional and legal frameworks. With no strategy or policy
to be seen, there is also no systematic implementation of legal and institutional frameworks.
The implications of this will be discussed in the following sections.
12.3 The legislative framework
12.3.1 The fragmented nature of the legislative framework
The absence of policies discussed in Section 12.2 – i.e. policies meant to support an
administrative approach to crime – has consequences for the legislative framework gov-
erning such an approach. Based on the country reports, we can divide our Member States
into two categories according to their legislative framework: (1) a policy-driven legislative
framework and (2) a non-policy-driven legislative framework.
The first category includes those countries that, acting on the above-mentioned policies,
have enacted administrative legislation for the primary aim of tackling crime. These
countries are theNetherlandswith its complex BIBOB legislation, Italy with its Anti-mafia
Code, and the UK, where administrative measures are part of the NCA strategy for com-
bating crime.
Other countries have a legal framework that allows for the use of administrative
measures to combat crime but do not see this as their primary aim. This is an important
finding. The fact that there aremeasures, but that they are not primarily aimed at preventing
criminals from infiltrating the legal infrastructure, makes sense within a context that lacks
any systematic, coherent and implemented national policy. Countries that exemplify a
non-policy-driven legal framework are Poland, Sweden, Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Germany, France and Spain.
In general, a common feature of the legal frameworks in all the selected Member States
is their subject-specific and therefore fragmented nature. Although the policy-driven
frameworks are less fragmented than the non-policy-driven ones, they still consist of a
patchwork of provisions. This is particularly true for England and Wales, which have no
overarching legislation to support the above-mentioned policy. Instead, the main policy
documents dictate a wide array of measures from which the authorities can ‘pick and
choose’ in order to combat crime. Italy’s anti-mafia legislation provides the least fragmented
body of legislation; the 2011 Anti-mafia Code is a corpus iuris that combines and updates
all previous legislation. Nevertheless, other measures, such as the dissolution of a city
council, are not regulated in the anti-mafia legislation. In the Netherlands, even though
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the BIBOB Act was introduced as a general screening instrument for administrative
authorities, the body of national legislation is still composed of several topical national,
local and regional regulations and powers. There are separate laws pertaining to the
supervision of legal persons, the screening of applicants for certain professions (such as
taxi drivers), and the revocation of permits based on spatial plans. Licences can be revoked
under the BIBOB Act.18 Apart from BIBOB screening and monitoring, administrative
authorities are also empowered to refuse or revoke a licence if it is clear that the applicant
or licensee will misuse it for criminal activities.
The BIBOB screening procedure is therefore only used if and when it is unclear what
an applicant intendswith an administrative decision. Furthermore, the BIBOB’s aforemen-
tioned complexity is partly due to its combining the screening andmonitoring of applicants
for several administrative decisions (on licences, subsidies and tenders) with the respective
subject-specific administrative laws. These laws range from the Licensing and Catering
Act and the Opium Act to the Environmental Permitting (General Provisions) Act,
resulting in more than 15 different substantive administrative laws named in the BIBOB
Act.19 Finally, the Netherlands has separate legislation concerning public order. It is not
idiosyncratic in this regard, as both Italy and England and Wales assign similar, separate
powers to local administrative authorities, regardless of any overarching policies. In other
words, the presence of overarching policies does not preclude the presence of a complex
and fragmented body of law. The foregoing can be linked to the mainly subject-specific
nature of substantive administrative law in general.20
In the country reports, this finding resulted in an overview of all sorts of subject-specific
legislation that needed to be discussed. This was even more so for the non-policy-driven
legislative frameworks because there was no general framework or policy that could be
used as a structure on which to base the country reports. A fragmented legal framework
is most common in the field of business regulation, such as the granting, revocation or
refusal of licences, permits and subsidies. We can best explain this by giving an example.
In Poland, economic activities are divided into three categories of regulation: activities
requiring a concession, regulated activities, and activities requiring a permit. Specific
economic activities are then assigned to these three types of regulation. For example,
trading in explosives and weapons falls under activities requiring a concession, whereas
the production of alcohol and tobacco products falls under regulated activities. Distribution
and retail of alcohol however fall under activities requiring a permit. These economic
activities each have their own specific law, dictating the conditions under which they are
regulated, the responsible issuing authority and the responsible monitoring authority.
18 Article 1 BIBOB however refers to other administrative legislation.
19 This is further expanded by the ‘Besluit BIBOB’, for instance regulating public events.
20 Backaveckas 2014. See also Chapter 1 of this report.
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Typically, they are economic activities that carry a risk of criminal involvement, such as
the restaurant sector, the transport sector, the production of prescription drugs, prostitution,
and so on.
Such a subject-specific legal framework for the regulation of economic activities can
also be found in Sweden, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, France, Spain and Bel-
gium. Moreover, the fragmented nature of this framework is not limited to business regu-
lation but also extends to certain professions, such as auditors, notary publics, lawyers,
etc. Additionally, local authorities in someMember States are allowed to create local decrees
or by-laws to regulate public order in their territory. That is the case in all our selected
Member States.21 The decrees cover a wide range of possible measures that can be imple-
mented at the local level. Important for the purpose of this research is that the local decrees
or by-laws can implement specific licences thatmust be obtained to exploit certain economic
activities.Moreover, the local decrees can also encompass provisions penalizing (adminis-
tratively or criminally) public order disturbances. They can also regulate specific phenomena
for that territory, such as prostitution or gambling. The local decrees must be in concor-
dance with higher regulations. Examples of such local decrees are the General Binding
Decrees (GBDs) in the Czech Republic, the municipal police decrees in Belgium, police
regulations in France, the Allgemeinverfugungen or Ordnungsbehordliche Verordnungen
in Germany, and the Algemeen Plaatselijke Verordeningen in the Netherlands. These local
decrees are used extensively in practice.
In conclusion, due to the nature of substantive administrative law, the instruments in
the country reports are presented as a fragmented body of legislation, both subject-specific
and territorial. A policy-driven framework does not necessarily prevent such a fragmented
legal framework, although it assists in coordinating actions and identifying possible
administrative measures.
12.3.2 General applicable principles of administrative law
In general, all selected Member States share certain principles of administrative procedure.
These general procedural principlesmay be encompassed in a commonnational legislative
framework, applicable to the substantive administrative laws, such as in Germany, the
21 This possibility was explicitly mentioned in all the country reports, with the exception of Poland. After we
contacted the Polish authors, they clarified that this is also a possibility in their country.
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Czech Republic, theNetherlands, Sweden,22 Spain,23 Poland and Italy.24 In other countries,
such general principles are dictated by case law. This is true for Belgium, where the Raad
van State stipulates general principles of administrative procedural law,25 France, where
the Conseil d’Etat has formulated such general principles,26 and the United Kingdom.27
General procedural principles include the right to be heard during administrative
proceedings, the right to information, the right to be notified of an administrative decision
in the proceedings, the right to counsel, and the right to a timely procedure. The common
framework usually also regulates the right to appeal. Unsurprisingly, most of these general
principles can be traced back to Article 6 of the ECHR. The implications of these principles
will be discussed in Section 12.5.
Apart from general administrative procedural regulations, most countries can issue
administrative law sanctions in the event of an infringement of local administrative law.
The most iconic example is the German Ordnungswirdrigkeitengesetz, which allows fines
if administrative law is violated. There is a detailed comparative study edited by Oswald
Jansen (2013) on sanctions in the EuropeanUnion, including a comprehensive comparison
and country reports on eight of the selected research countries in this study.28,29 We must
also mention the report by Metselaar & Adriaanse (2014), which comprises a quick scan
of the cross-border recovery of administrative fines in Belgium, Germany and the United
Kingdom.30
Finally, each selectedMember State basically adheres to the principle of a free economic
market. In the reports, some countries explicitly mention this as a leading principle for
economic activities (Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Spain, France and Sweden).31
In some countries, that principle is constitutionally embedded (Sweden, Germany, France).
It encompasses the concepts of equality (Poland, Spain), proportionality and necessity
(Spain) in relation to measures that curb economic activity.
Due to the economic crisis, bureaucratic restrictions on the economic market have
been lifted in some Member States, simplifying access to business activities (Spain),
22 See: Blanc-Gonnet Jonason 2013, p. 565ff. Interestingly, Paliero (2013) classifies Sweden as a country lacking
a general legal framework, even though Blanc-Gonnet Jonason (2013) identifies a general administrative
procedural law. This might be a consequence of Paliero’s decision to only include the framework on
administrative sanctions.
23 See also: Paliero 2013, p. 23-24.
24 Bernardi, Grandi & Zoda 2013, p. 291-292.
25 See also: Paliero 2013, p. 25-26 and Put & Andries 2013, p. 104ff.
26 See also: Breen 2013, p. 209-210.
27 See also: Paliero 2013, p. 25-26 and McEldowney 2013.
28 Excluding Poland and the Czech Republic.
29 Jansen 2013; for a critical review of the research, see: Bröring 2013.
30 Metselaar & Adriaanse 2014.
31 Even though other reports do not explicitly mention the principle, this does not imply that a free market
does not exist. As the selected countries are all members of the EU, the existence of (and adherence to) this
principle may be assumed.
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introducing new legislation – for instance concerning ‘whitelists’ for companies – or
relaxing the supervision of access to the free market (Italy).32 Some countries have experi-
enced a rise in organized crime stemming from the transition from a communist regime
to an openmarket, in connectionwith the open borders introduced by the Schengen Aqcuis
(Czech Republic).
The principle of a free market is important in the administrative approach to crime.
Economic activity can only be restricted when explicitly provided for by law (Poland,
Germany, Spain) and when doing so entails the protection of essential public interests,
such as human life, health and safety (Poland, Sweden, Germany, Spain). Thus, as long as
the law does not impose limitations, business activities can be performed freely. This does
notmean that there are no general requirements for conducting business, such as corporate
taxes and capital requirements (Sweden). The risk of criminal activity can also trump the
principle of the free market (Sweden again).
12.3.3 Economic sectors
All of our selected Member States regulate certain economic activities or business sectors,
be it by licences, tenders or subsidies. These sectors are – as explicitly indicated in the
country reports – regulated for several reasons. Certain sectors are, for example, important
to the national economy (Poland); it is important tomaintain certain professional or other
quality standards in a sector (Poland, Sweden); and certain sectors are vulnerable to
criminal influences (the Netherlands, Poland).
It is important to note that the country reports differ in the way they have listed regu-
lated sectors. Some reports discuss the most relevant sectors (e.g. Sweden, Spain, Poland)
while others reviewed the overarching system and gave examples from certain sectors (e.g.
the Czech Republic, Italy, Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands). The overview
below is therefore not comprehensive. Nevertheless, it does indicate which sectors are seen
as ‘risky’ in the selected Member States. The overview only lists sectors that are regulated
by more than one Member State. For the full overview, please see the country reports.
The following economic sectors were listed in all the country reports.
– the hotel, restaurant and bar sector
– the gambling sector
Moreover, some country reports discussed the following economic sectors, which are
regulated in some way by the selected Member States. This includes sectors in industry,
32 Interview at the Prefecture of Milan, 25 September 2014.
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but also sectors which provide services to the public, sectors authorized to trade in haz-
ardous products, as well as public and private professions:
– production of alcohol products (Poland, Sweden)
– production of prescription drugs (Poland, England & Wales33)
– waste collection and processing (Poland, Sweden, Italy)
– the building sector (Germany, Italy, Sweden34)
– distribution of alcohol products (Poland, Belgium, Sweden, the Czech Republic)35
– currency exchange offices (Poland, Sweden, Spain)
– the banking sector (Poland, Sweden, Spain, the Czech Republic, France, England &
Wales)
– credit reporting operations (Sweden, Germany, the Czech Republic)
– the prostitution sector36 (the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, France, the Czech Republic)
– the real property sector (Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands)
– persons working with children (Poland, Sweden, Spain, England & Wales)37
– the (private) security sector (Poland, Sweden,38 Germany,39 Spain, England & Wales)
– lawyers (Sweden, Spain, the Czech Republic,40 England & Wales)
– police personnel (Spain, England & Wales)
– auditors (Sweden, Spain, the Czech Republic)
– penitentiary staff (Spain, England & Wales)
– notaries (Spain, the Czech Republic)
– taxi services (Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, England & Wales)
– commercial (goods and passengers) transportation (Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain)
– trade in explosives, firearms and ammunition (Poland, Sweden, the Czech Republic,
England & Wales, Italy)
– trade in used goods (Sweden, Germany)
– public events (the Netherlands, the Czech Republic).
Last, peculiar to the Netherlands are the Dutch coffeeshops. Contrary to what their name
suggests, these shops sell marihuana and hemp products. The Netherlands condones the
selling of small amounts of soft drugs,41 but the coffeeshop sector is also regulated by
33 Implementations of Regulations 2004/273/EC and 2005/111/EC.
34 TheNacka project, including the inspection and supervision of building sites, was discussed in the interviews.
35 This is linked to the hotel, restaurant and bar sector. In the countries listed, it was a specific licence.
36 If legal and/or regulated.
37 Based on Directive 2011/92/EU.
38 Also includes alarm installation companies and locksmith tools.
39 Including lock and key services.
40 Defined as ‘bar members’.
41 A common misconception is that drugs are legal in the Netherlands. This is untrue; soft and hard drugs are
illegal under the Dutch Opiumwet. However, Dutch public prosecutors condone, i.e. do not prosecute, under
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administrative procedures. The sector is a hot topic of discussion in the Netherlands and
elsewhere due to its vulnerability to organized and other crime.42 Moreover, it attracts
considerable (and unwanted) drug tourism from other EU Member States and beyond.43
Obviously, the procedures and the scope of screening differ. In the following sections,
we compare the manner in which the Member States regulate these sectors.
12.4 Substantive instruments in the administrative approach to crime
This section discusses the substantive instruments described in the country reports on the
selectedMember States. The purpose is to compare the different applicable provisions and
identify common characteristics and exceptions. It was not our intention to rehash the
country reports. Readers who are interested in the specific situation in one or more
Member States should refer to the reports in Chapters 2 to 11. Before continuing our dis-
cussion, we must mention that we made no distinction between regulations pertaining to
natural persons and regulations pertaining to legal persons, unless necessary due to distinc-
tive applicable law.
12.4.1 Screening and monitoring instruments
Say I am the wife of a known Hell’s Angel member, and I want to open a restaurant and
apply for a licence. Is there any way for you to screen me and the people I am involved with
to ensure that my licence is not misused for criminal purposes, for instance money launder-
ing?44
In the scope of business and economic activities, government authorities can be allowed
by law to screen natural and legal persons before permitting them to engaged in said
activity, for instance by granting a licence, concession, permit or issuing some other positive
decision. One of the main goals of this research focused on whether such preventive
instruments for screening and monitoring natural and legal persons exist in the selected
Member States in the context of administrative decisions. In this section we will answer
this question from a legal point of view. Part III of this study discusses the practical appli-
cation of these measures.
strict policy regulation, the sale and use of small amounts of soft drugs, which has led to the rise of coffeeshops.
See for instance Bouchard, Decorte & Potter 2013.
42 Bouchard, Decorte & Potter 2013.
43 Van Ooyen-Houben, Bieleman & Korf 2014.
44 This hypothetical situation was presented to almost all of the persons interviewed in the scope of this study.
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Our first and foremost finding is that the selected Member States all have instruments
that allow the administrative authorities to screen persons before they enter regulated
sectors. The power to screen ormonitor and subsequently refuse or revoke an administrative
decision puts serious restrictions on the freedom of economic activity. That is why in all
the countries reviewed, national law regulates these powers in order to protect significant
public interests. In Poland and the Czech Republic, they are even regulated by the relevant
Constitutions. However, these screening instruments differ in their purpose, scope, sector,
object, subject, procedure and the information sources that can be accessed.
One important detail is that not all screening instruments are tailor-made for an
administrative approach. This is linked to our earlier findings, discussed in Section 12.2,
concerning the absence of a policy-driven approach inmost of the selectedMember States.
Consequently, we can make a sharp distinction between screening instruments aimed at
regulating economic sectors in general and screening instruments aimed at preventing
misuse of sectors by criminals.
All the Member States have instruments meant to regulate sectors. These licensing,
subsidy and tender procedures are not aimed at preventing crime directly. Instead, they
are intended to regulate a specific sector or sectors by creating hurdles for persons who
are notwanted in the sector because of their professional or personal background.However,
in doing so, these instruments have the indirect effect of excluding persons with a criminal
background and thus indirectly preventing criminals frommisusing the sector. An example
of this is the certificate of good conduct. Persons may be required to obtain this certificate
before entering a professional field or applying for a licence. As aptly worded with respect
to theDBS checks in England andWales, such instruments aremeant to ‘help governments
make safer decisions’. Thus, certificates of good conduct are meant to regulate economic
sectors, but in doing so can exclude criminals from entering those sectors.
On the other hand, there are also instruments created specifically to prevent criminals
from misusing the legal infrastructure. In the selected Member States, only two real
examples of such legislation exist, found in the most policy-driven countries. First of all,
the Anti-mafia Code in Italy aims to prevent natural and legal persons from contracting
with or benefitting from the public administration system in any way if they have been
convicted of certain offences or if mafia infiltration can actually be established. Second, in
the Netherlands the BIBOB Act aims to prevent public authorities from unintentionally
facilitating criminal offences by granting permits, licences, tenders or subsidies in certain
sectors. These types of legislation are specificallymeant to prevent criminals frommisusing
the relevant economic sectors.
Instruments that regulate sectors and instruments that aim to prevent criminals from
misusing the legal infrastructure exist alongside each other, even in the policy-driven
Member States. For instance, in the Netherlands licences can be refused on the basis of
sector-specific laws, such as the Environmental Licensing (General Provisions) Act, aimed
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at regulating spatial planning. Also, a refusal to issue a Dutch certificate of good conduct
(VOG) can prevent persons with a certain criminal background from entering a certain
professional field.
However, the BIBOB Act also applies to several sectors and administrative decisions.
The foregoing reveals the complex reality of the selected Member States, with different
types of screening instruments for different aims co-existing in a single legal system. This
complexity is heightened by the following observations. Some screening instruments limit
themselves to only one sector and one administrative decision, for instance the licensing
procedure for casinos in Poland or Belgium. However, other instruments are applicable
to multiple sectors and involve different administrative decisions, such as the certificates
of good conduct in the Member States, the Anti-mafia Code in Italy, and the BIBOB legis-
lation in the Netherlands. Moreover, in actual screening practice, these instruments can
be used consecutively.
It is worth mentioning that this exploratory study’s definition of preventive screening
and monitoring instruments posed something of a challenge when it came to our compar-
ison. As a starting point, we divided the screening instruments into administrative decisions
concerning licences, subsidies or tenders, based in part on the Dutch BIBOB Act. Since
we had almost no knowledge of the instruments used in other Member States and how
they are applied, it was logical to use the BIBOB Act as a starting point. As we began
writing this chapter, however, it soon became clear that we needed to deviate from this
division. Thismade the comparison somewhat challenging, but at the same time highlights
the beauty of exploratory research.
Below, we discuss the instruments used in an administrative approach to crime. These
instruments are categorized by scope, ranging from broad to limited. We therefore begin
by discussing instruments that overarch economic sectors and/or administrative decisions
(Section 12.4.1.1).We then turn to the screening of persons in the scope of licences (Section
12.4.1.2), subsidies (Section 12.4.1.3) and public procurement (Section 12.4.1.4). Last, we
look at the options for prohibiting trade (Section 12.4.1.5).
12.4.1.1 Overarching screening instruments
In this section, we look at those screening instruments that can be applied to more than
one sector or administrative decision in the selected Member States. The latter includes
the option of screening in the context of licences, tenders and subsidies. We will start with
the broadest but least invasive instruments, i.e. certificates of good conduct, and end with
overarching instruments that aim to prevent criminals from infiltrating the legal infras-
tructure, i.e. the Anti-mafia Code and the BIBOB Act.
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12.4.1.1.1 Certificates of good conduct
Many administrative decisions, e.g. a business licence or permission to enter a certain
profession, require the applicant to submit a ‘certificate of good conduct’. This usually
involves screening the applicant’s criminal background by requesting the relevant register
for a certificate. In this manner, public authorities indirectly access information on an
applicant’s criminal history. Such a certificate can be part of a larger screening procedure,
for example for licences, or it can be a stand-alone requirement. Some of the selected
Member States allowed certificates of good conduct to be requested in the scope of an
administrative decision.45
Most selectedMember States provide for a ‘certificate of good conduct’ (theNetherlands,
Spain, Germany, the Czech Republic, England and Wales and to some extent Sweden and
Poland). The other reports did not mention a standardized certificate of good conduct.
A certificate must be requested for specified activities. Some countries, such as the
Netherlands, Spain, theCzechRepublic and England andWales, allow for such certificates
in a broad range of areas, including professions, licences, business activity and tenders.
The relevant country reports provide a more complete list of all such areas; suffice to say
here that the aforementioned countries all require personsworkingwith children to submit
an excerpt from their criminal recordwith their job application. This requirement is based
(albeit implicitly) on Directive 2011/93/EU on combating the sexual abuse and sexual
exploitation of children and child pornography. Other countries, in this case Sweden and
Poland, only require an applicant to provide an authority with an excerpt of their criminal
records in specified situations, mainly employment. In other situations where the law
requires the person to be of ‘good conduct’, criminal records are assessed as part of the
licensing procedure, allowing the authority to check the records directly. In all countries,
the persons checked can be either natural or legal persons.
A certificate of good conduct is usually issued after a background check (i.e. a check
of the person’s criminal record). In the Netherlands and England and Wales, this includes
access to police information and police investigations where necessary. Other countries,
such as Spain, only allow for a check of the Criminal Registers, which contains only judicial
information. Separate checks do exist in the Czech Republic and England and Wales,
ranging from basic to more extensive screening, based on the applicable law and the
information that can be accessed in thatMember State. For instance, in England andWales
it is possible to check local police information and lists banning certain persons from
engaging in certain professions when the individual concerned is applying for a taxi or
private hire vehicle licence, which requires a certificate.
45 While other reports do not mention such certificates, this does not necessarily mean that they do not exist
in these Member States. Here, we discuss only the certificates that were explicitly mentioned in the reports.
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Whether it is the applicant in question who has to provide the certificate or whether
the authority requesting the certificate can access the relevant information itself differs
from one country to the next. In the Netherlands and Spain, the applicant provides the
certificate at the authority’s request. In the Czech Republic, a transition to ‘e-government’
has made it possible for the authority to request a certificate from the Penal Register. The
content of the certificates sent to the administrative authorities ranges from a ‘blank’ cer-
tificate if no impediments have been found in a person’s criminal history (the Netherlands
and Spain) to excerpts from the criminal records (the CzechRepublic, England andWales,
Sweden and Poland).
The authority requesting the certificate decides whether to exclude the applicant from
a certain activity. In Spain and the Netherlands, the decision is based on the activity for
which the application was submitted and whether the person’s criminal record provides
cause to prevent his or its engagement in such activity, i.e. because he/it would represent
a risk to society if allowed to perform that activity. For instance, a conviction for drink
driving may prevent a person from obtaining authorization to drive a taxi. This would not
necessarily be the case if that person had been convicted of fraud.
Peculiar to England and Wales is that the authority providing the certificates, the Dis-
closure and Barring Service (DBS), is in fact a semi-private company.
Finally, the relevant legislation in someMember States explicitly allows for the submis-
sion of certificates from foreign countries. This is the case for England and Wales and the
Netherlands. During our country visits, it became clear that this would also be allowed in
Italy and Sweden. In our opinion, certificates of good conduct, either as a ‘blank’ form or
an excerpt from the criminal records, offer a good starting point for screening foreign
persons and companies, especially if the natural or legal person’s domestic legislation
allows him to obtain the document himself. Another optionwould be to use the provisions
in ECRIS allowing for the exchange of information on criminal records for administrative
purposes.46
12.4.1.1.2 Invasive overarching screening instruments
It is no coincidence that the Member States that are most policy-driven also have overar-
ching instruments for screening. These instruments are Italy’s Anti-mafia Code and the
Netherlands’ BIBOB Act. We compare these two instruments in detail, separately from
the other screening and monitoring instruments, for the following reasons. First, they are
the only real policy-driven instruments, focused on preventing criminals from misusing
the legal infrastructure. Second, they apply tomultiple economic sectors and administrative
46 We refer to Section 12.4.4 of the report on the potential for information exchange in Europe for administrative
purposes. This section describes the potential for information exchange for administrative purposes via the
ECRIS channels, if provided for under the national law of the relevant Member States.
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decisions,making themdifficult to comparewith instruments that focus only on one sector
or one type of administrative decision.47 Our detailed review in this section will support
our comparison in the following sections, which focus on the types of administrative
decisions, i.e. licences, subsidies and tenders.
Pursuant to the Anti-mafia Code, legal and natural persons subject to a preventive
measure or convicted of participation in amafia-type organization, kidnapping for ransom
or drug trafficking cannot obtain any kind of subsidy, concession, licence, tender, police
authorization or other financial contribution from Italy’s public administration. In practice,
however, the instrument mostly concerns contracting with local government.48 The
instrument is divided into three tiers. The first tier consists of low-value contracts, which
are exempt from screening. Contracts under EUR 150,000 are not screened. The second
tier requires the screening of contracts above EUR 150,000 but below the EU threshold
for tenders by means of the anti-mafia communication. Contracts above the EU threshold
must be screened by means of anti-mafia information, which involves a more detailed
check.
In theNetherlands, natural and legal persons applying for subsidies, tenders and licences
as well as contracting for real property transactions can be screened under the BIBOB Act.
This focus on specific administrative decisions makes the Act narrower than the Italian
Anti-mafia Code. Moreover, the BIBOB Act is limited to certain economic sectors, such
as the bar and restaurant sector, the transport sector and the coffeeshop sector, which is
againmore limited than the Italian system.A personmay be excluded from an administra-
tive decision if there is a serious risk that the decision will serve (in part) to allow him/it
(a) to make use of proceeds obtained or yet to be obtained from criminal offences that
have been committed or (b) to commit criminal offences. Criminal offences also include
administrative infringements.
Both screening instruments apply in the case of a relationship with the local adminis-
trative authorities. As we have seen, the Dutch screening instrument is more limited in
terms of both the types of administrative decision and the economic sectors for which
screening can be conducted. The Italian instrument on the other hand is narrower when
it comes to the reasons for exclusion (offences involving mafia-type associations) and the
financial threshold (exclusion of low-value contracts). In Milan, however, low-value con-
tracts are now being screened in connection with the coming EXPO 2015. The screening
procedure has revealed many irregularities and the involvement of criminals in low-value
contracts, rousing suspicion of criminal contra-strategies.49
47 This would lead to unnecessary double explanations of the overarching instruments.
48 Interviews in Milan and Rome in the week of 22 September 2014.
49 Interview at the Prefecture of Milan, 25 September 2014.
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The procedures for the two instruments differ greatly. The Italian local administrators
must ask the authority at the provincial level, the prefect, to screen the legal or natural
person by means of the anti-mafia documentation instrument. This includes a check in
the national anti-mafia database and, in the case of the anti-mafia information instrument,
the possibility of performing on-site checks. If impediments are found, the prefect will
send a prohibitive communication to the local authorities. The prefect’s opinion is binding.
Italian local authorities thus have no access to the relevant information on the legal or
natural person. Dutch local authorities are initially allowed to screen the person themselves,
based on the information they can access.50 If, after detailed screening, the local authority
is in doubt as to the risk that a person poses, the Landelijk Bureau BIBOB (Bureau BIBOB)
can be asked to advise. Bureau BIBOB is allowed to request even more information from
several authorities51 and, after careful consideration, issues its advice to the original
administrative authority. This advice is not binding, but in practice it is often followed.
Compared to the Italian system, where the prefect conducts the screening, screening by
Bureau BIBOB is more limited, in the following ways. First, Bureau BIBOB can request
information from closed sources, but the owners of the databases determine whether to
provide the information (in full). Moreover, the public prosecutor can request that some
information regarding criminal investigations is not included in Bureau BIBOB’s recom-
mendation if there are significant interests involved in connection with criminal prosecu-
tions. Other information suppliers can also request for the omission of certain information.
In Italy, on the other hand, the prefect is allowed direct access to the information in the
national anti-mafia database. Second, Bureau BIBOB cannot actively gather information.
The Italian systemgoes a step further and allows on-site checks under certain circumstances.
According to the prefects, these on-site checks are invaluable in ascertaining the presence
of mafia infiltration.52
Both instruments allow for far-reaching screening with regard to the subjects. In Italy,
not only is the person applying for the administrative decision screened, but (in the case
of the anti-mafia information instrument) also his family members. In the Netherlands,
BIBOB screening can be extended to the following persons. First, persons can be seen as
posing a serious risk if they have been involved in criminal offences, either because they
have committed the offence themselves or because they are or were in charge of, control
or controlled, or provide or provided capital to a legal person that has committed criminal
offences within the meaning of Article 51 of the Dutch Criminal Code.53 Moreover, it can
also be extended to another person who has committed these criminal offences or is or was
directly or indirectly in charge of, controls or controlled, or provides or provided capital
50 This includes several open and semi-closed sources as well as information provided by the applicant.
51 Including several closed sources, such as on-going police investigations.
52 Interviews in Rome and Milan in the week of 22 September 2014.
53 This concerns the criminal liability of legal persons.
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to the person concerned or is orwas in a joint business venturewith him. The ‘joint business
venture’ was included to prevent deceptive constructions to circumvent screening, such
as ‘strawmen’.54 Dutch screening under the BIBOBAct therefore includes amuch broader
circle of persons, as well as past relations, than the Italian screening procedure.
Last, the Netherlands has a specific provision allowing the public prosecutor to inform
the administrative authority that it may ask Bureau BIBOB to advise on a legal or natural
person. This is because information flowing from the police and judicial authorities to the
administrative authorities is pivotal in properly implementing an administrative approach
to crime. The prosecutor should only use this provision if he is then willing to share the
information he possesses on the person in questionwith BureauBIBOB. There is currently
no such provision under Italian law.
Below we discuss the screening instruments in the scope of licences, subsidies and
public procurement. Where necessary and appropriate, reference will be made to the
foregoing comparison between the Anti-mafia Code and the BIBOB Act.
12.4.1.2 Screening instruments in the scope of licences
Administrative authorities are enabled by law to assess the conduct of an applicant before
making an administrative decision. Such an administrative decisionmay involve granting,
refusing or revoking a licence. For the purposes of this section, we also include permits
and concessions for economic activities.
As mentioned above, licences can be screened under sector-specific laws, or based on
overarching laws generally governing screening in the context of government decisions.
Two of these overarching lawsmay be applicable to licences, namely the ItalianAnti-mafia
Code and the Dutch BIBOB Act.
Assessments of conduct can be found in the sector-specific laws regulating administra-
tive matters. In the Czech Republic, applicants must be of ‘unimpeachable character’ to
be granted a licence. In Sweden, an assessment of conduct and suitability is required in
the context of several regulated industries. Such assessments are also conducted in Poland,
Belgium, England and Wales, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy and focus on the char-
acter, reliability or suitability of an applicant for a particular economic activity.
The exception to this rule is Spain. Most business activities do not require a licence
that includes a conduct assessment, except in very specific cases.55 In contrast, certain
professions are screened, and that includes an assessment of the applicant’s conduct in a
Certificado de Antecedentes Penales (see Section 12.4.1.1.1). In most other cases, the
54 A ‘straw man’ is someone who has no criminal record and is put forward to lead or manage a company while
in reality a person with a criminal history actually controls the company.
55 These encompass Lottery and Gambling licenses, licenses for taxi drivers, licenses for private school owners
and licenses for private security company owners.
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applicant’s personal background is not screened; instead, if licences are required,56 the
screening involves the technical requirements of buildings and whether the business
activity would cause nuisance in the direct environment.57 Recent developments in Spain
intended to stimulate the economy and curb bureaucracy, i.e. the Licensia Express, have
changed the procedures for obtaining licences. Rather than applying for a licence before
starting up a business, applicants notify the administrative authorities by submitting a
declaration, which is screened later. This ex post screening only covers the aforementioned
technical requirements, however. For these reasons, we will not discuss Spain any further
in this section.
The subject of the screening can either be a natural person or a legal person in all
selected Member States. There are no separate instruments for screening legal persons in
the scope of licences. However, information that applies to a legal person, e.g. registration
with the national Chamber of Commerce, cannot be vetted for natural persons. Moreover,
all selectedMember States screen the natural persons behind the legal person. For instance,
in Italy, the anti-mafia documentation instrument can be used to subject all sorts of natural
persons who represent companies to screening, e.g. company owners and technical man-
agers, legal representatives of associations, all local company representatives as well as the
legal representatives of foreign companies.
Although most Member States screen only the person applying for the licence, some
screen persons other than the applicant as well. First of all, in Belgium a hard liquor licence
requires screening not only of the applicant but also any persons living with the applicant
and any persons living in the building in which the licence will be exploited, if they are
involved in that exploitation. Second, as we mentioned earlier, the anti-mafia information
instrument in Italy also allows for the applicant’s family members to be screened. In the
Netherlands, screening in scope of licences goes furthest under the BIBOB Act.
The manner in which an assessment of conduct is initiated differs per Member State.
In general, such assessments can be divided into a) conduct assessments initiated by the
notification of a legal or natural person wanting to be registered in a relevant trade register
and b) conduct assessments initiated when a natural or legal person wanting to pursue
business activities applies for a licence, concession or a permit.
a. Conduct assessment initiated by notification
A conduct assessment that is initiatedwhen a competent administrative authority receives
notification is the most straightforward way to supervise a certain economic sector. In
general, the notifying person furnishes certain information to the competent authority to
56 Licences are not required for ‘regular activity’. The local authorities distinguish between licensable and reg-
ular activities.
57 Further clarified by the interviews in Madrid in the week of 15 September 2014.
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allow him/it to start up a business. The authority performs an ex post check. Notification
leads to registration in a general or sector-specific register. Persons can be refused registra-
tion under certain conditions, for instance a criminal record or a ban on performing that
type of activity (see Section 12.4.1.5). Being admitted to the register allows the supervisory
authorities tomonitor and supervise the persons registered. The country reports on Poland,
theCzechRepublic, France,Germany and Swedenmention the duty to notify the competent
authorities of general or specific business activities. The following examples can be given.
In Poland, all natural and legal persons that wish to start a business must be registered
as entrepreneurs, regardless of sector-specific obligations to apply for licences or conces-
sions. Two separate registers exist, one for natural persons and one for legal persons. There
is no general requirement regarding the applicant’s criminal antecedents, but natural
persons are subject to a background check depending on the type of business activity.
Natural persons acting as legal persons are screened for certain types of criminal offences
if they are members of the management or supervisory board of a legal person. If someone
is already a member of such a board and is convicted of such a crime, he is expelled from
his position. Apart from this general obligation to register, Polish law distinguishes between
activities requiring a concession, activities requiring a permit, or regulated activities. A
regulated activity requires the entrepreneur to enrol in the relevant register. Currently,
there are twenty different regulated activities in Poland, e.g. driving schools, biofuel pro-
duction, alcohol production, currency exchange offices and operating a nursery or
kindergarten. These activities have their own registers. To be admitted to a register, the
applicant must produce a certificate from the National Criminal Register. Registration
makes it possible for the competent authority to exercise monitoring and supervision.
Under French law an example of a notifying obligation consists out of the following.
Anyone looking to open a pub, bar or public house, submits a written statement to the
relevant administrative authority.58 This statement includes the person’s particulars,
information on the establishment and a permis d’explotation.59 The competent authority
provides the applicant with a receipt, which also contains a tax licence. Nonetheless, the
authority will send the initial statement of the applicant to the public prosecutor and the
prefect of the department. This can lead to criminal investigations.
In Germany, the Trade Regulation Act obliges a legal or natural person who starts a
business at a fixed location to notify the competent administrative authority. The authority
will proceed to register the person in the Trade Register. This register is managed by the
municipal authorities. Certain economic sectors, such as the trade in second-hand goods
and detective agencies, are subject to special inspections based on the Trade Regulation
58 In most cases this is the mayor of the municipality, however in Paris the relevant authority is the prefect of
the police.
59 This is a certificate obtained after completing a compulsory training on the rights and obligations of a
restaurateur.
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Act. In such cases, the reliability of the notifying person will be checked. This includes a
review of the person’s certificate of good conduct and an excerpt from the Central Trade
Register. The excerpt can contain prohibitions against engaging in certain trades (see
Section 12.4.1.5), as is the case in Poland. This information is provided either by the noti-
fying person or by the authority ex officio. The notifying person is obliged to provide this
information, as well as other information required by the authority.
Sweden also imposes the duty to notify the authorities of a business activity. Notification
enables the relevant authority to monitor and supervise the business activity. Sectors for
which this is applicable includemoney exchange activities, certain deposit-taking activities,
the sale of used goods and the sale of certain alcohol and tobacco products. In some sectors,
but not in all, the notifications are entered into the relevant sector register. If such a register
exists, persons who have committed serious crimes or seriously breached business obliga-
tions are not allowed to engage in the relevant business activities.
b. Conduct assessment initiated by the application for a licence, permit or concession
One step beyond simply notifying the local government of a business activity is the obliga-
tion to ask the government for permission to conduct that activity, which it then issues in
the form of a licence, permit, concession or other sort of permission.
In the relevant Member States, such permission is connected to sector-specific laws or
local regulations. These dictate the conditions under which the economic activity may be
undertaken, including the requirement of a licence, permit or concession. Moreover, leg-
islation regulates which authority is competent to grant the licence andwhich information
sources can be used to perform assessments of conduct in the scope of the licensing proce-
dure.
The subject-specific and fragmented nature of administrative law is particularly obvious
when it comes to licensing. The competent administrative authorities are appointed under
the sector-specific laws, resulting in a wide range of supervisory and licensing authorities
in each Member State for various matters. Whether these authorities are centrally, locally
or regionally embedded depends on the specific legislation. This institutional framework
will be discussed further in Section 12.6.
Based on the country reports, all the licensing authorities are generally allowed to check
an applicant’s criminal background in the context of conduct assessments, with the minor
exception of conduct assessments under specific legislation in Sweden.60 The sector-specific
laws do not necessarily require a person to have no previous convictions whatsoever. For
example, older convictions may be regarded as spent61 (England and Wales, the Czech
60 These are conduct assessments concerning environmentally hazardous activity, without a check into the
applicant’s criminal background.
61 I.e. the convictions are out of date.
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Republic), certain prior convictions can be excluded by the applicable sector-specific law
(Belgium), or the authorities can use discretionary power – if applicable – to assess and if
possible disregard these convictions (Sweden, the Netherlands). For instance, in Belgium
applicants for a casino licence are screened for convictions that resulted in an incarceration
of sixmonths ormorewithin a timeframe of three years prior to the application.Moreover,
depending on the type of activity, only criminal conduct relating to that activity is taken
into account in all the selected Member States. Again, in Belgium the same casino licence
applicant cannot have been convicted of crimes relating to games of chance. The more
risk an activity poses, the stricter the screening becomes. For example, concessions in the
weapons industry in Poland are only awarded to those with a spotless record, i.e. persons
who have not committed or have been suspected of committing intentional and fiscal
crimes. The same is true for the Polish private security industry.
The question that remains is what we should understand by an assessment of conduct,
and what kind of information contributes to this assessment. To begin with, the terms
used for conduct assessments – such as ‘unimpeachable character’ (the Czech Republic),
‘assessment of conduct and suitability’ (Sweden), ‘good conduct’ (Poland), ‘absence of
impediments’ (Italy) and other terms – imply more than just the absence of criminal
activity. The assessmentsmay also include a check into an applicant’s financial background
(the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden), his professional background, for instance whether he
has a degree or experience in a certain branch (Sweden, the Czech Republic, Poland,
France), or other factors, e.g. whether someone is an alcoholic when applying for licence
to run a bar or restaurant (Germany), whether certain patrimonial measures have been
imposed (Italy) or whether he has violated administrative law, resulting in administrative
offences (the Czech Republic, the Netherlands). Other exclusionary reasons may be viola-
tions of health, labour and food laws (Germany, Belgium). One specific example of a
conduct assessment that applies in all theMember States is the following. The ThirdMoney
Laundering Directive62 requires all EU Member States to register casinos, money service
businesses and trust and company service providers. These types of businesses are registered
after they have passed a ‘fit and proper test’, essentially introducing or maintaining a
licensing scheme for these sectors. The test not only assesses the company or person’s
criminal background but also their financial fitness. The country reports for England and
Wales, France, Poland and Belgium report a licensing test of this kind.
The French situation is a good example of the closelymonitored casino branch. Histor-
ically, gambling has been a strictly monitored activity in France, caused by the potential
vulnerability of the sector to criminal activity. Casinos can only operate in municipalities63
62 Directive 2005/60/EC.
63 Also, the municipalities able to conclude such an agreement is restricted to large municipalities or those
with certain specific tourist features.
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with which they have concluded an agreement. This agreement allows the municipalities
to impose taxes and social obligations on the casinos, such as the investment in centres
treating personswith gambling addictions. The temporary licence is granted by theMinistry
of the Interior based on information of the applicant’s agreement with the municipality,
his capital and the (proposed) management. Pending the licence, the Ministry consults
with the Commission consultative des jeux de cercles et de casinos [The consulting Commis-
sion on horseracing and casinos], who reviews advice from the municipal council, the
prefect of the department and the Services Central des Courses et Jeux [The Central Service
on Horseracing and Casinos]. The Services screens the applicant’s background, financial
integrity and the source of his capital. The Ministry is not obliged to follow the advice of
the Commission, but has discretionary power in the matter. Once the licence is granted,
the Ministry is the competent authority to monitor the casino and can repeal the licence
if infringements occur.
Second, information that can be used to establish whether an application should be
refused or a licencewithdrawn consistsmainly of the applicant’s criminal history (Belgium,
Germany,64 England and Wales, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Poland, Sweden
and Italy). A certificate of good conduct or excerpt from the relevant database in the specific
Member State (the Czech Republic, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands) can offer
insight into a person’s criminal history. Under certain circumstances, provided for in
national legislation, the administrative authorities can also check the person’s criminal
history themselves (the Netherlands, Sweden, Poland) or can ask a higher authority to
check the criminal records, as happens in Italy. When an Italian local authority, acting
under the circumstances provided for by law, needs to assesswhether there are impediments
to granting a person a licence, they send a request for anti-mafia documentation to the
prefect, including the applicant’s registration with the Italian Chamber of Commerce. The
prefect is an administrative authority at the provincial level. He will check the national
anti-mafia database, after which he will send his interdittiva, i.e. the anti-mafia communi-
cation or information, to the local authority. The administrative authority is bound by the
interdittiva.
The administrative authority can also request additional information directly from the
applicant (the Netherlands, Germany). Some authorities are allowed to receive a copy of
the conviction and the underlying case files (theCzechRepublic) or can request information
and opinions from other authorities on the applicant, including police opinions (Poland),
police information (the Netherlands), open sources (Sweden, the Netherlands) and tax
information (theNetherlands). Other authorities are allowed, under certain circumstances,
64 The report however phrases this implicitly: ‘The licence has to be denied if facts justify the assumption that
the applicant will encourage alcohol abuse, illegal gambling, handling of stolen goods or immorality.’
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to do on-site checks before granting the licence.65 In Italy, the prefect, in the scope of the
anti-mafia information instrument, can perform on-site checks to review whether the
applicant – usually a legal person – has been infiltrated by the mafia.
After the information is received, the licence is either granted or refused, or, if it has
already been granted, withdrawn or suspended. In most of the selected Member States,
this decision is up to the administrative authority, with the exception of Italy and Poland.
These two countries put differing limits on such discretionary powers. In Italy, the local
authority asks the prefect at the provincial level to provide an anti-mafia communication
or information on an applicant.Whether the communication (less invasive) or information
(more invasive) is required depends on the value of the project for which a licence is being
sought. After performing the necessary checks in the relevant databases and (if necessary)
on the ground, the prefect issues a prohibitive communication or information to the local
authority if he finds impediments in the applicant’s records. The local authority is obliged
to follow this binding opinion. In Poland, the administrative authority is obliged to issue
the permit in certain sectors if all the necessary conditions have been fulfilled. The necessary
conditions are specified in sector-specific laws, for instance concerning waste collection
and processing and the retail and wholesale distribution of alcohol.
The consequences of screening applicants or holders of licences
The consequences of screening can be either reactive or preventive in all the Member
States. If the administrative authority refuses a licence based on previous criminal convic-
tions, the refusal is motivated by the idea that the licence will not be used properly. To
prevent improper utilization, the administrative authority takes preventive action by
refusing permission to perform the economic activity.
Moreover, in all the Member States, supervision and monitoring can lead to the revo-
cation, suspension or withdrawal of a licence if screening confirms that criminal activity
is taking place or that the licence holder is not adhering to the licensing conditions. Such
action is reactive, since the administrative authority reacts to infringements of the law.
Whether revocation, suspension or withdrawal is seen as an administrative sanction
depends on national law. This will be discussed in Section 12.4.2.
An administrative decision involving the refusal or revocation of a licence, concession
or permit needs to be properly motivated and the person involved can turn to certain
remedies against the administrative decision. Section 12.5 of this chapter will compare the
systems of due process in the selected Member States.
65 Which differs from other inspection powers; this will be discussed in Section 12.4.2.
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12.4.1.3 Screening instruments in the scope of subsidies
On the topic of screening in relation to subsidies, we can be relatively brief. Public aid (and
competition) is a heavily regulated and complex area in European law.66 It is sufficient to
mention here that state aid under the relevant EU provisions consists of government
support, except for support granted to individuals or general measures open to all enter-
prises.67 The EU provisions prohibit state aid for the most part, unless justified for reasons
of general economic development.68 It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss this
complex area of the law at length. This sectionwill focus on subsidy-related screeningwith
a view to the risk an applicant with a criminal background may pose.
Not all of the country reports discuss screening in relation to subsidies or public aid.
We focus here on the country reports that do (the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, Spain, the
Czech Republic and Sweden).
What do the selected Member States understand by a subsidy? We did not define the
term beforehand to ensure that our respective authors would not feel constrained in their
discussion of their legal systems. As a result, they report on a diverse range of legislation
relating to subsidies.
Several reports start by defining what a subsidy is, either explicitly or implicitly. Under
Dutch law, subsidies are: ‘a claim to financial means, provided by an administrative
authority for certain activities of the applicant, other than payment for goods and services.’
Commercial activities involving public and private institutions therefore fall outside this
framework.69 Social security benefits, such as student aid and social housing allowances,
also fall outside the scope of this definition. In the Czech Republic, the definition of a
subsidy is based on EU legislation, namely Article 107 TFEU: ‘any aid granted by a state
or through state resources in any form whatsoever that distorts of threatens to distort
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods.’ This
is also true for Poland; its country report discusses subsidies in the context of state aid,
with reference to the relevant European legislation. In Sweden, subsidies include EU grants
as well as social security benefits. Spanish subsidies entail the granting of money by certain
administrative authorities for the benefit of public or private persons. Excluded from this
definition are inter-administrative contributions, contributions from central to local gov-
ernments, and a range of social benefits. Thus, in some of the selected Member States social
security benefits are not considered subsidies (the Netherlands, Spain) whereas in others
such benefits represent a major share of subsidies (Sweden). Other countries simply leave
us in the dark about the position of benefits (Italy, Poland and the Czech Republic).
66 See for instance: Schoenmaekers, Devroe & Philipsen 2014.
67 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html.
68 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html.
69 However, see Section 12.4.1.4 on public procurement.
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With regard to the screening of applicants, two groups can be discerned. Italy and the
Netherlands apply overarching legislation concerning the screening of applicants for
subsidies, i.e. the Anti-mafia Code and the BIBOB Act (see Section 12.4.1.1.2). The
screening procedures for subsidies are (almost)70 the same as for the other administrative
decisions for which these instruments apply. Other countries have specific legislation on
subsidies, including the screening of applicants (Sweden, Spain, Poland, the Czech
Republic). However, the applicable procedures are usually only meant to ensure that the
applicant fulfils the conditions set by EU legislation (the Czech Republic, Poland, Spain).
Nevertheless, the applicant’s criminal history can be screened indirectly because the subsidy
will allow him to become active in a certain economic field, and screening will then take
place as part of the licensing procedure for that field (the Czech Republic).
Finally, Sweden is a special case. The Swedish welfare state is unique in the world,
offering all sorts of government benefits in support of various activities. According to the
country report, these benefits are all considered subsidies.71 To combat social benefit fraud,
Sweden has introduced a number of administrativemeasures, such as inspections, exclusion
from benefits, denial of benefits, and the reclaiming of benefits. The government, mainly
the Social Security Agency, has taken action in cooperation with other authorities, for
example the police, the tax authorities and the public prosecutions office. Such cooperation
focuses on information-sharing between the authorities to uncover the fraudulent use of
the welfare system.
Following on from this, we can say that the matter of subsidies, their scope and the
relevant screening procedures vary greatly between Member States. In general, the
screening procedures mainly involve checking compliance with EU rules. Screening
therefore focuses less on the person of the applicant than it does for licences (with the
exception of Italy and the Netherlands, which have overarching legislation, and Sweden,
with its focus on social security benefit fraud).
12.4.1.4 Screening in the scope of public procurement
This section compares the selected countries in terms of screening andmonitoring natural
and legal persons in public procurement procedures. Since EU directives72 apply to tenders
for works, deliveries and services above a certain threshold sum, we will assess their
implementation in the different countries and provide a brief overview of EU legislation
in the process. Our comparison also considers whether national legislation goes above and
70 Concerning the BIBOB Act, there are two exceptions. First, subsidy-related screening basically applies in
all economic sectors. This differs from screening for licences, which only applies in a few economic sectors.
Second, the subsidy must include BIBOB screening as one of its conditions. The Dutch legislator assumes
that this condition will apply for all public subsidies in line with legislation or government decrees.
71 Although they would not fall under the EU definition of state aid.
72 Directive 2004/18/EC and Directive 2004/17/EC; De Moor-van Vught 2012 p. 65-76.
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beyond the EU legislation. We also compare the Member States’ quality assessments of
natural and legal persons tendering below the EU threshold (where applicable).
Quality assessment of legal and natural persons under Directive 2004/18/EC73
In assessing tenders, we must distinguish between a qualitative assessment of the tenderer,
the selection of providers, and the allotment criteria.74 For the purposes of this study, the
qualitative assessment of the tenderer is of primary importance.
Article 45 of Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts,
public supply contracts and public service contracts sets out compulsory exclusion grounds
(paragraph 1) and facultative exclusion grounds (paragraph 2) for this quality assessment.75
The compulsory reasons for exclusion by the tendering authority include previous
convictions for participation in a criminal organization, corruption, fraud and money
laundering. The facultative exclusion grounds comprise bankruptcy or similar situations,
offences concerning professional conduct, failure to fulfil obligations to pay social security
and other taxes, or the misrepresentation or failure to provide information as required
under Section 2 of the Directive, according to Article 45 paragraph 2g of the Directive.
Whenever an authority looks to tender and assess whether an applicant should be excluded
and for which period, it needs to take into account the proportionality principle and the
principle of non-discrimination.76 As a rule, all public authoritiesmust take the compulsory
and facultative exclusion grounds into account before each tendering.77
Additionally, threshold sums apply. These differ per tender topic (works, supply or
service) and can be found on the European Union website.78
In general, all the selected Member States have implemented the EU directives on
tender procedures, including the compulsory and facultative exclusion grounds. Some
reports mentioned this implicitly, but the facultative and compulsory exclusion criteria
imposed under the Directive can be found in each countries’ procurement procedure. The
same is true for the derogation grounds. Moreover, all Member States request information
on the economic and financial quality of the tenderer during the tendering procedure.
Some countries also maintain certain lists of persons banned from contracting with the
73 This regime is applicable until 17 April 2016. The EU public procurement regime will be reformed under
Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement
and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC. This new regime must be enforced by the Member States by 18 April
2016 and the old regime must be repealed. The new regime will bring about changes to the compulsory and
facultative exclusion grounds, for instance adding terrorist and human trafficking offences to the compulsory
exclusion grounds. Facultative grounds include bankruptcy or insolvency of the economic operator.
74 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 137ff.
75 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 137-140.
76 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 140. See also ’t Hart 2006, p. 616ff.
77 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 140. See also ’t Hart 2006, p. 616ff.
78 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/rules/current/index_en.htm.
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public sector. Such registers exist in Poland, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom,
Italy and Spain. In Poland and the Czech Republic, these lists are open sources and pub-
lished online. The contracting authority is allowed to check the applicant against the list
of banned persons.
The Member States differ in the way they conduct their procurement screening proce-
dure. One important difference is whether the applicant supplies information about the
exclusion criteria to the contracting authority, or whether the contracting authority can
access the information itself.
In theCzechRepublic, Poland, Sweden, England andWales, France and theNetherlands,
the primary burden of proof regarding the absence of exclusion criteria, i.e. the absence
of convictions for certain crimes, lies with the applicant at the time of application. The
Dutch Public Procurement Act 2012 requires a statement or declaration concerning the
absence of exclusion criteria. The applicant must substantiate the statement by submitting
relevant documents, such as an excerpt from the national criminal records registry.
Moreover, the contracting authority is allowed to ask for additional information regarding
the applicant’s economic and financial fitness. The aforementioned Member States differ
with regard to this additional information. In Sweden, Poland and the Czech Republic,
the contracting authority is not allowed to access this information. For example, if it
requires a declaration by the national tax authority concerning the applicant’s tax debt,
then the applicantmust submit this information; the contracting authoritymay not petition
the tax authority for this information.On the other hand, in theNetherlands the contracting
authorities are allowed to follow up information from the criminal registers, i.e. the certifi-
cate of good conduct, and search in open and closed or semi-closed information sources
themselves, as well as ask Bureau BIBOB for advice.
An example of screening in relation to public procurement is the (now concluded) Nacka
project in Sweden, which was operational in 2009 and 2010. Nacka is a fast-growing
municipality in the Stockholm area. The municipality decided to focus on the building
industry to ensure the quality of the contractors. This meant excluding persons convicted of
being part of criminal organizations, bribery, fraud, etc. Screening of applicants (whether
natural or legal persons) took place during the procurement qualification phase and when
the contract was awarded. Information supplied to the municipality included information
on the applicant’s financial soundness, including checks with the Swedish Tax Authority for
outstanding tax debt and other government debts, checks with the social security registers,
etc. Problems could lead to exclusion. Once a contract had been granted, there were follow-
up checks every four months. The contractor was obliged to supply the municipality and the
Tax Authority with information on its financial soundness as well as the involvement of any
subcontractors. Moreover, the municipality conducted on-site checks to ensure compliance.
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This method has now been implemented for all service contracts concluded by the Munici-
pality of Nacka.79
The option of conducting on-site checks is comparable to the on-site checks performed
by the Italian prefects under the Anti-mafia Code.
In conclusion, the contracting authorities in the aforementioned countries decide to
grant a contract or refuse a tender based on information that they have accessed themselves
or that has been given to them by the applicant. An exception to this rule is Italy. When
an Italian procurement procedure commences, neither the contracting authority nor the
applicant provides the necessary information on the latter’s quality. Instead, the prefect,
in line with the Anti-mafia Code, screens the applicant. The opinion issued by the prefect
is binding.
Additional rules concerning tenders not (or not fully) subject to the EU directives
Although the EU Public Procurement Directives do not cover tenders under the EU
thresholds, the European Commission provides an interpretative communication on this
particular topic in which it suggests best practices.80 In the communication, a distinction
is made between: cases for which the EU framework does not apply at all, i.e. low-value
contracts (when there is a sufficient connection with the Internal Market)81 and; cases for
which the EU framework does not fully apply, i.e. contracts mentioned in Annex II B to
Directive 2004/18/EC and in Annex XVII B to Directive 2004/17/EC that exceed the
thresholds for application of these Directives.82
The interpretative communication summarizes the existing case law of the ECJ in
stating that for the above types of contracts, the rules of the Internal Market still apply and
the contracting authorities are bound by the fundamental rules of the Treaty.83 The basic
standards as developed by the ECJ include an obligation of transparency. This implies the
obligation to sufficiently advertise the tender as well as an impartial application procedure
and the possibility for review of these procedures.84
The country reports on public tendering in the scope of this study showno contradiction
of the above. Some country reports mention specific rules pertaining to tenders below the
79 Interview, Municipality of Nacka, 5 March 2014.
80 Commission interpretative communication on the Community law applicable to contract awards not or not
fully subject to the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives, Official Journal 2006/179/2, p. 2-7.
Hereafter: ‘Commission interpretative communication’.
81 This ‘sufficient connection’ is not established in individual cases when a very modest economic interest is
at stake and the contract is of no interest to economic operators in other Member States. Commission
interpretative communication, p. 3; Coname case, paragraph 20.
82 In practice, these contracts exceed the threshold of € 193,000 and involve legal or health services.
83 Commission interpretative communication, p. 3; Bent Mousten Vestergaard case, paragraph 20.
84 Commission interpretative communication, p. 3-7.
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EU threshold, such as in the Netherlands and the Czech Republic. These rules are usually
applied at the local level. Moreover, in Italy the Anti-mafia Code also applies to tenders
and contracts below the EU threshold. However, the Anti-mafia Code also has a financial
threshold. Contracts falling below that threshold (€150,000) are not generally screened.
In Milan, however, the upcoming EXPO 2015 gave the authorities the opportunity to
screen contracts below the Anti-mafia Code threshold, leading to the discovery of many
irregularities and criminal involvement in contracting parties.
12.4.1.5 Prohibitions to trade
The final (and indirect) screeningmeasure that wewill discuss are the prohibitions against
trade. Some Member States allow persons to be barred from performing certain economic
activities. The foregoing sections mentioned such lists as part of the screening procedures.
Prohibitions against trade are not screening instruments themselves, but screening a person
for such prohibitions can be a decisive factor in their pursuit of an administrative decision.
We discuss these measures briefly here.
Trading bans, i.e. prohibitions against or exclusions from trading, can be found in
Germany, Sweden, Poland, Italy, Spain, France and the Czech Republic. In general, the
measure can be applied to all sorts of business activity. For instance, in Italy, it can be
imposed as a preventive measure, with the relevant person subsequently being screened
as part of the anti-mafia documentation instrument. In Poland, it is specifically intended
for economic activities that do not require a permit, authorization or licence of any kind,
i.e. the ‘regulated activities’. The same is true for Germany. After all, infringement of
licensing, permit or authorization conditions can result in revocation, withdrawal or sus-
pension, making prohibition unnecessary. In France, two separate types of prohibition to
trade exist, namely the additional measure imposed by a criminal court on a convicted
person and the personal disqualification prohibiting natural persons from engaging in
business activities or management.
InmostMember States, it is an administrative authority that prohibits the person from
engaging in economic activities (Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic). In Italy, the
exclusion from trading is a preventive measure applied by a court. In Sweden, however,
this ban on trading is an additional measure requested by the public prosecutor when
prosecuting for criminal offences as a ‘special legal consequence’. The measure itself
therefore cannot be qualified as penal or administrative.
A prohibition against trading may be imposed owing to the unreliability of the person,
which may include criminal convictions (Germany), as a special legal consequence after
criminal conviction (Sweden), or due to false statements or a breach of the trading condi-
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tions (Poland). Specific to Sweden is the fact that known straw men85 can also be subject
to a trading prohibition.
The main consequence of the prohibition against trade is that it is documented in a
central register (Germany, Sweden, Italy, Czech Republic). The administrative authorities
can be informed about entries in such registers by requiring certificates of good conduct
(Germany, theCzechRepublic, Italy). Yet, in Poland themeasure imposed by the competent
registry authority leads to a (automatic) removal of an entrepreneur from the applicable
registry.
Trading bans and registers can be useful in an administrative approach to crime with
cross-border dimensions. The registers can provide useful information for administrative
authorities in otherMember States, without the need to access penal information. Caution
is advised, however, because the registers only provide some information, namely the
economic activity from which a person has been banned, and not the complete picture
that includes their criminal history. Moreover, not all of the selected Member States have
such registers, limiting the potential for a coherent approach.
12.4.2 Public order powers
Local administrative authorities bear primary responsibility for keeping public order in
their territory. They can be empowered to do so by higher (i.e. national) legislation, but
they can also regulate certain key aspects in their territory by issuing by-laws, decrees or
other local regulations. Local regulations can also impose sanctions for administrative
infringements and bestow powers of inspection. Apart from local authorities, other
administrative authorities specifically assigned to regulate a certain sector, such as the
health and food sector, the environment, etc., can use public order competences based on
specific legislation. These competences can also be used to prevent criminals frommisusing
the legal infrastructure.
One important notion is that public order competences are intended to maintain
public order in a certain territory or to regulate a certain sector. In most of the selected
Member States they are not part of a policy to combat serious and organized crime, with
the exception of the Netherlands. This does not imply that these measures cannot help
prevent crime and the misuse of legal infrastructures. Readers should bear this in mind
while reading the following sections.
For the purposes of this comparison, the powers tomaintain public order can be divided
into (1) powers of inspection, and (2) the power to intervenewhen public order is disturbed.
The latter category can be divided into several subcategories. We discuss these below.
85 In the Swedish country report, the term used is ‘goal keepers’.
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12.4.2.1 Powers of inspection
All the selectedMember States have bestowed powers of inspection on local administrative
authorities,86 following on from national, local or sector-specific regulations. Most of the
country reports only discussed these powers incidentally. Our comparison is therefore
necessarily brief.
In all of the Member States, the focus is mainly on the powers of either local authorities
or inspectorates or agencies established especially to deal with specific issues. These
inspectorates or agencies can only exercise their powers of inspection and monitoring in
the sector in which they have competence. When a licence has been issued, the licensing
authority is the same authority empowered to check that the licensee is adhering to the
licence conditions. The administrative authorities have been assigned several powers that
can be exercised during checks or inspections. As discussed in the country reports, these
include the power to enter premises, the power to request information, and the power to
inspect documents.
As will become clear in Part III of this report, which considers the practical application
of the administrative approach, the administrative authorities can wield their power to
inspect within a multi-agency cooperation. This happened for instance in Poland during
an ad hoc cooperation of several authorities relating to the ‘Cocomo clubs’. These strip
clubs were suspected of committing fraud and constituted a public nuisance. Several
administrative authorities, including the sanitary inspectorate, the labour inspectorate,
the Polish tax authority and the building inspectorate, began to conduct inspections together
with the local authorities. In some cases, the inspections led to revocation of the licence
to sell alcohol, resulting in the subsequent closure of the club.
12.4.2.2 Intervention by administrative authorities
Administrative authorities may intervene when local, regional or national legislation is
infringed. Such interventions may or may not be punitive, depending on national law.
Since administrative law is subject-specific in nature, as we mentioned earlier, the country
reports usually discussed the administrative authorities’ intervention when confronted
with a certain crime phenomenon, instead of discussing all possible interventions. The
crimes included illegal prostitution, drugs and illegal gambling. Interventions can generally
be divided into the following categories: (1) repeal of an administrative decision, (2)
intervention in or around premises and (3) administrative fines. These three categories of
interventions are reactive in nature, as they respond to an established infringement.
86 Even if not specifically discussed in the country reports, the presence of such powers became clear during
the interviews in the relevant Member States.
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12.4.2.2.1 Repeal of an administrative decision
Based on a known infringement, the administrative authorities can decide to repeal an
administrative decision. Thismeans that the permit, licence or authorized activity covered
by the administrative decision cannot be continued.
Several country reports explicitlymention the possibility of repealing an administrative
decision (Germany, the Czech Republic, Italy, Spain, Belgium, France, Poland, Sweden
and the Netherlands). A distinction can be made between the suspension of an adminis-
trative decision and the revocation orwithdrawal of a decision. Suspension involves placing
a full or partial temporary ban on the activity (Belgium, Italy, the Czech Republic); after
the period of the ban has ended, the activity may be resumed subject to the initial admin-
istrative decision. Some reportsmention that suspension can be followed by the revocation
of the decision (Italy and the Czech Republic) or that revocation may follow a warning by
the supervisory authority (Sweden). In Germany, repeals are divided into two categories:
the withdrawal of an unlawful administrative act and the revocation of a lawful adminis-
trative act. A decision may be withdrawn if it is based on fraudulent information, for
example. This is comparable with the situation of revocation andwithdrawal under French
administrative law.
Another difference is how the repeal of an administrative decision is qualified under
the law. The decision to repeal an administrative decision can be qualified as an adminis-
trative sanction (Germany, and in some instances the Netherlands,87 France88 and Bel-
gium89), but it can also be expressly qualified as not being an administrative sanction, i.e.
concerning a suspension in Belgium.90 Evidently, the qualification of a repeal as adminis-
trative sanction or not is important for the question whether the full rights arranged under
article 6 ECHR are applicable.
Reasons to repeal an administrative decision vary, but the overriding reason is that it
poses a risk or potential risk to the public interest and/or safety (Belgium, Spain, Poland,
Germany, France and Italy). For instance, in Italy if premises are identified as a customary
hangout for criminals or if public disorder and riots erupt, a licencemay first be suspended.
If the situation does not improve, the licence can be revoked by the Quaestor.91 Thismeasure
is commonly used in Italy.92 The example illustrates the reasons for repeal and the notion
that different forms of repeal can succeed one another, in this case suspension and revoca-
tion.
87 Concerning a revocation based on spatial planning.
88 Depending on the intention of the administrative authority granting the decision or administrative authori-
sation.
89 See also: Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 206-209 and 445.
90 The other country reports provided insufficient information on the legal qualification of repeal of adminis-
trative decisions.
91 Provincial head of the state police.
92 Interview at the Prefeturra Rome, 23 September 2014.
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Another important reason to repeal an administrative decision is the infringement or
violation of the conditions underwhich the decisionwas issued (the CzechRepublic, Spain,
Poland, the Netherland, France and Germany). A change in spatial planning can also lead
to the repeal of an administrative decision (Spain and the Netherland), either when the
designated purpose of a certain area or premises changes – which may then include
financial compensation for the person affected (Spain) – or when the designated zoning
of an area or premises has been violated (the Netherlands). Moreover, administrative
decisions can be repealed if the liquidity of the entrepreneur has been affected (Poland)
or if the decisionwas issued erroneously (Spain, Germany). The Polish report alsomentions
that the reasons for revoking administrative decisions are subject to legislative provisions
governing that specific administrative decision. Since there are vast numbers of such laws,
we will not discuss this here.
The foregoing comparison shows that the administrative authorities have numerous
ways to intervene and maintain public order when they have granted permission, e.g. a
licence, for certain activities. In the following section, we will focus on the possibilities of
administrative authorities to intervene in or around premises.
12.4.2.2.2 Intervention in or around premises
Possibilities to intervene by administrative authorities in or around premises include sus-
pension of economic activities, eviction of tenants, building maintenance (by either the
administrative authority or the person responsible for the premises), closure of premises,
barring someone from premises, expropriation of premises and the forced demolishment
of premises. The various options and the extent to which they can be applied differ per
Member State. Here, we discuss private law actions, suspension, closure, and expropriation.
First, the reports on Sweden and England and Wales specifically mentioned the possi-
bility of landlords or housing companies undertaking private law actions. For instance, in
England and Wales, the landlord can ask a court for a possession order or injunctions
against tenants.
Second, the authoritiesmay suspend business activities and thus effectively close down
the premises in which the activities occur. The suspensionmay involve allowing the person
to rectify the situation so that it conforms to local regulations or the administrative decision
on which the activity was based. In the Czech Republic, business activity can be suspended
if the Trade Licensing Act has been violated. If the situation improves, the activity being
carried out in the premises may continue. If not, suspension of licenses can take place, as
discussed in the foregoing section. In Poland, the local authorities can also suspend eco-
nomic activity for a brief period. The authorities must inform the relevant inspectorate
during that period, which decides whether further action is required. Further action may
also mean the prolonged suspension of the activity. For example, if the production of a
prescription drug poses a risk to health, the State Sanitary Inspectorate can suspend its
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production for up to three months as well as seize the products. In France, persons receive
prior notice before the decision of the prefect to close a pub or restaurant, in order to
enable the proprietor to prevent closure bymaking adjustments. Also, these establishments
can be temporarily closed based on the public order powers of the major or prefect of the
department for the maintenance of public order. The closure by the major is limited to
the period necessary to restore public order, or in case of closure by the prefect for a
maximum of two or three months, depending on the nature of the establishment.93 In
Germany, the police are able to close premises based on the Sicherstellung for as long as
required to neutralize the danger that the premises pose, in effect taking the form of a
suspension.
Third, it is possible to close down premises or bar persons from premises in the Czech
Republic, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, England and Wales and the Netherlands. Such
measures can be taken for several reasons relating to public order, health and safety. In
Italy, the authorities are not specifically empowered to close premises, but they can revoke
police authorizations, which amounts to the same thing in practice. In Sweden and the
Czech Republic, the police can vacate or restrict access to buildings for public health and
safety reasons. A similar provision exists in Germany, based on the aforementioned Sich-
erstellung as well as other national regulations that require licences for performing certain
activities in premises, e.g. a bar or a restaurant. If an operator carries out that activity
without administrative authorization, the premises can be shut down. In France, several
types of closure of premises are available for the administrative authorities. First, violation
of licencing conditions of bars and pubs can lead to repeal of licences by the prefect of the
department,94 effectively closing the premises. Moreover, bars and pubs can be ordered to
close by the French Minister of the Interior after conviction for a criminal offence of the
proprietor. This latter possibility is not qualified as a sanction, but as a measure to maintain
public order. Violation of the order to close is punished with a fine. Also, both the mayor
and prefect can temporarily close pubs, restaurants or bars as an administrative police
measure when a violation of public order, health, tranquillity of morality occurs. Lastly,
premises can be (wholly or partially) closed in the scope of criminal investigations concern-
ing prostitution charges. After conviction, the French Criminal Code allows for the addi-
tional penalty ofmandatory closure, even if the person concerned is not prosecuted himself.
In this latter case, when it involves a bar, the licence can also be withdrawn. In Poland,
premises can be closed when the holder of an administrative decision infringes the condi-
tions of that decision. In England and Wales, police can issue temporary closure notices
based on the ASBO Act 2003 if anti-social behaviour has taken place in the premises. In
93 Three months in case of a discotheque, two months in case of a bar or restaurant.
94 Or in Paris the prefect of the police.
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the Czech Republic, the administrative authority is also allowed to demolish the building
or repair it in such a way that it does not form a threat to public safety.
In theNetherlands andBelgium, themayor of amunicipalitymay close downpremises
if public order is disturbed, based on local decrees and national regulations, i.e. the
respective Dutch and Belgian Gemeentewet. Also in Belgium, there are specific regulations
governing the closure of premises to combat human trafficking. This is in fact one of the
competences of the mayor as the head of the municipal police. The Belgian provisions
allow for closure for an indefinite period, as an administrative sanction, unlike in the
Netherlands, where premises may only be closed temporarily.95
Both the Netherlands and Belgium have specific regulations allowing the closure of
premises in connection with drugs. The Dutch Opiumwet and the Belgium Drugswet both
allow for suchmeasures if there are serious indications that drugs are being sold, distributed
or delivered (the Netherlands) or sold, delivered or facilitated (Belgium) on the premises.
In the Netherlands, the local municipal decrees further specify the manner in which the
provisions for that territory are to be implemented. The Dutch mayor of a municipality
is allowed to close the premises for a certain amount of time, even if the activity itself did
not cause a public nuisance. Moreover, the mayor’s competence is not limited to public
premises; purely private premises can also be closed down. In Belgium, closure under the
Drugswet is limited to public premises and private premises accessible to the general public.
Closure is only permitted if there are serious infringements of the applicable law and
serious disruptions of public order and safety. In summary, the Dutch intervention goes
much further because the authorities may intervene without nuisance occurring and
because private homes fall under the scope of the legislation.
Finally, expropriation of premises is a serious measure that can only be imposed under
specific circumstances in the selected Member States. Only a few of the country reports
specifically discuss this measure (the Czech Republic, Spain and the Netherlands). In some
Member States, expropriation is seen as a sensitive issue owing to the communist past (the
Czech Republic). In Spain, the measure can only be applied when dictated by serious
public interests. The Spanish provisions require the affected person to be compensated.
Using such a measure to tackle crime would be taking the relevant provisions in Spanish
law too far. It is only in the Netherlands that premises can be expropriated either because
they are a source of general disturbances of public order, to follow up on their closure in
connection with drug dealing, or for health and safety reasons. However, the measure may
only be applied in exceptional circumstances.
95 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 447.
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12.4.2.2.3 Administrative fines
Administrative authorities can punish infringements of public order by imposing admin-
istrative fines. Section 12.4.2.2.1 reviews when the repeal or closure of premises qualifies
as a sanction.
All the selected Member States allow administrative fines to be imposed in the event
of infringements of administrative regulations or decisions. The relevant measures were
mentioned incidentally throughout the country reports. Examples of administrative fines
are the notableGerman Ordnungswirdrigkeitengesetz (AdministrativeOffencesAct), which
sets out general regulations for all administrative offences. The Ordnungswirdrigkeitengesetz
defines the administrative offence and restricts the sanction to an administrative fine. The
Netherlands has the Algemene wet bestuursrecht, whichmakes it possible to penalize persons
who do not comply with administrative regulations. There are three types of sanctions,
one of which is specifically intended as a fine to be imposed on the violator (bestuurlijke
boete).96 This fine is punitive in nature.97 In Belgium, the municipalities can apply fines in
the form of the gemeentelijke administratieve sancties (GAS) if this option is included in
their local decrees. These fines are also punitive.98 Last, in the Czech Republic, specific
administrative offences against public order were created both in the Misdemeanour Act
and local General Binding Decrees. Administrative authorities are allowed to penalize
such misdemeanours, as long as they are not labelled a criminal offence. The sanctions are
not restricted to fines alone, but can also include warnings, the prohibition against
undertaking a certain activity and the forfeiture of items.
Inmost of the selectedMember States, administrative fines are not included in a person’s
criminal history. This is for example the case in the Czech Republic, where convictions
for administrative offences do notmean that an applicant for a licence is not of ‘unimpeach-
able character’, as discussed in Section 12.4.1.2. In Belgium, GAS are not included in a
person’s criminal history99 and these convictions will consequently not be included in the
screening procedures for administrative decisions.However, in theNetherlands, bestuurlijke
boetes do form part of the BIBOB screening procedure, as ‘a criminal offence is deemed
to include an infringement for which an administrative fine may be imposed’.100
In conclusion, the administrative authorities have several ways to intervene when
public order is disturbed. As we saw, they can repeal an administrative decision but they
96 The other two sanctions can either impose administrative coercion or an administrative financial penalty.
These are restoration sanctions, whereas the fine is a punitive sanction. There are specific regulations con-
cerning the combined imposition of these sanctions Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 447.
97 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 447.
98 Administrative sanctions in Belgium are always punitive. See: Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 202-205 and 447-
448.
99 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 202.
100 Article 3 paragraph 8 of the BIBOB Act. Official translation, Ministry of Security and Justice.
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can act even when no prior decision has been taken. In such cases, they may maintain
public order in and around premises and/or impose administrative fines.
12.4.3 Forfeiting assets outside the scope of criminal law
The authors of the country reports were asked to elaborate on the seizure, confiscation or
forfeiture of assets gained through criminal activity outside the scope of criminal law. In
drafting the format of the various country reports, we deliberately did not limit this category
to administrative measures alone, as previous research had indicated that measures to
seize criminal assets also exist in other areas of the law.101 In comparing the different
reports, we can make several observations.
First, some country reports do not discuss instruments aimed at seizing criminal assets
in any way. This includes Belgium,102 France and Poland. It is unclear whether this is
because their legal systems only provide for such instruments within the scope of criminal
law, explaining the absence of a discussion in the context of this study, or whether such
instruments do not exist at all. Nevertheless, the other reports do discussmeasures directed
at seizing assets gained through criminal activity. We can differentiate between Member
States that regulate such measures mainly through criminal law (the Netherlands, Spain)
and Member States that qualify such measures both under criminal law and civil and/or
administrative law (Sweden, England andWales, the Czech Republic and Italy, Germany).
In the Netherlands and Spain, the seizure of criminal assets is regulated solely under
criminal law. The two countries view these measures differently, however. In the Nether-
lands, the fight against organized crime includes the targeting of criminal assets.103 In
Spain, on the other hand, the seizure of criminal assets is viewed as secondary to prosecu-
tion. Nevertheless, a debate is under way (in academia) regarding the seizure of criminal
assets as an integral part of Spain’s policy on serious and organized crime.
We have identified a number of measures outside the scope of criminal law aimed at
seizing criminal assets in the other aforementioned Member States. These measures range
from seizure under civil law to administrative seizuremeasures. The fact that thesemeasures
exist does not rule out any criminal law measures aimed at seizing criminal assets. In fact,
the options discussed below should be viewed as complementary to the seizure of assets
under criminal law. When necessary, we discuss the criminal law instruments.
101 Also, as discussed in the country report, there is no clear distinction between civil law and public law in
England andWales. In the interests of drawing a concise comparisonwith the otherMember States, however,
we have applied this division whenever possible.
102 Although an interview with the local police in Liège revealed some options for seizing criminal assets in
Belgium.However, the respondents explained that it is extremely difficult to enforce suchmeasures inBelgium.
103 Ministry of Security and Justice, Nederland Veiliger, The Hague: January 2011, p. 4.
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First, civil law measures can be used to seize illegally obtained assets. Sweden has the
civil lawmeasures of sequestration and lien. Sequestration can be applied by private persons
and is aimed at securing the rights of a plaintiff, e.g. a financial claim, rights to property
or other claims, in civil proceedings. The measure of lien is also intended to secure rights,
but it can only be used by government agencies, e.g. the Swedish Tax Authority, to secure
their rights. Thesemeasures are a common feature of civil law and are not intendedmerely
to combat crime or criminals. They are also not included in Sweden’s policy towards
tackling organized crime. They can, however, be used in that manner, according to the
authors of the Swedish report. In England and Wales, the legal system contains specific
civil law measures specifically aimed at seizing criminal assets. Based on the Proceeds of
Crime Act 2002, civil recovery is an instrument that can be used by the NCA and the
Serious FraudOffice. The proceedings take place before theHighCourt and concern assets
that are, or represent, property obtained through unlawful conduct. The proceedings are
filed against the property (in rem) instead of against the person (in personam). The
standard of proof is civil (‘the balance of probability’) rather than criminal (‘beyond a
reasonable doubt’), making it easier to apply themeasure in practice. A criminal conviction
is not necessary. An additional measure is cash forfeiture; criminal law enforcement
authorities are allowed to recover forfeited cash in civil proceedings. A conviction is also
not necessary.
Second, other Member States describe the possibility of applying administrative
measures to seize criminal assets (the Czech Republic, England and Wales, Germany and
Italy). In the Czech Republic, criminal assets are seized mainly under criminal law, but
assets can also be seized within the scope of administrative law. The relevant measures are
not necessarily linked directly with policies on combatting crime. First of all, forfeiture of
items can take place within the scope of the Czech Misdemeanour Act under certain cir-
cumstances, if the item is related in someway to themisdemeanour (see Section 12.4.2.2.3).
Moreover, specific authorities and inspectorates monitoring certain sectors have powers
to seize items if the market, consumers or public health so require. Examples are the
powers of the Czech Trade InspectionAuthority, which can seize and subsequently destroy
or disperse goods that are not in compliance with the applicable regulations. Other
inspectorates, such as the Czech Agriculture and Food Inspection Authority, have similar
powers.
In England and Wales, tax measures can also be used to seize criminal assets on a non-
conviction basis. They are applied when there is little or no proof that assets were gained
illegally. The NCA can also use some idiosyncratic measures to seize the proceeds of crime.
These include financial reporting orders, which oblige a person convicted of certain offences
to report their financial activities for a period of up to twenty years. The public prosecutor
issues the order. There are other, broadly used serious crime prevention orders; they include
545
12 A legal comparisonof theadministrative approachto serious andorganized
crime in the EU
various measures taken against persons convicted of certain types of serious organized
crime, including financial measures.
In Germany, the seizure of assets is possible under one particular type of instrument:
the prohibition against an association. This is a serious measure that is applied when
associations aim to contravene criminal law or the constitutional order. The prohibition
order allows the association’s assets to be seized and confiscated so that its (former)
members are unable to establish a new association using the same financial means. This
instrument has been used to prohibit certain outlaw motorcycle gangs in Germany.104
Italy has several measures under administrative law that allow for the confiscation of
criminal assets. Compared with the other selected Member States, Italy’s system of seizure
and confiscation of criminal assets is much more advanced. This set of preventive and
personal measures was most recently amended by the new Anti-mafia Code. Under this
complex system, both criminal confiscation and confiscation under administrative law
are possible. For the purposes of comparison, we will discuss all categories of measures,
regardless of their legal qualification. First of all, there is criminal confiscation. Criminal
proceedings, including the burden of proof, applies in full. A link between the offences
and the assets must be proven. Second, there is the option of extended confiscation in the
context of criminal proceedings. This can be imposed on persons convicted of certain
types of offences related to organized crime. Here, the burden of proof is reversed: instead
of the prosecutor proving the origin of the assets, the person in question must explain
assets that are disproportionate to his income from legal sources. It is not necessary to
prove a connection between the assets and any criminal activities. Third, there are two
other forms of administrative confiscation: (1) preventive confiscation and (2) equivalent
confiscation.
Preventive confiscation can be applied outside the scope of criminal proceedings,
without a conviction being necessary. However, it is up to law enforcement authorities to
utilize the measure, under the judiciary’s supervision. The measure can be imposed not
only on the person under direct investigation but on also his relatives and other persons
with whom he associates regularly as well legal persons to which he is in some way con-
nected. The assets can be confiscated if they are linkedwith criminal activity or if the person
cannot explain the disparity between his legal income and the value of the assets. Equivalent
confiscation is possible if the original assets can no longer be confiscated but their equivalent
value can be recovered from a person’s other assets.
Based on the foregoing, several observations can bemade regarding the seizure of assets
outside the scope of criminal law, since such measures overarch the legal qualification of
criminal, civil or administrative law.
104 Interview LKA Stuttgart, April 2014.
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Some of thesemeasures are specifically intended to target criminal activity but can also
be employed more broadly. This is especially true of lien and sequestration in Sweden and
to some extent of themeasures used in theCzechRepublic.Moreover, although themeasure
of civil recovery in England andWales is qualified under civil law and themeasures imposed
under the Anti-mafia Code in Italy are categorized under criminal or administrative law,
they have some similarities. First of all, several measures can be applied without demon-
strating a direct link with a conviction (England and Wales: civil recovery and taxation
powers; Italy: extended confiscation, preventive confiscation and equivalent confiscation).
Furthermore, to facilitate the enforcement authority, the burden of proof differs from
that applied in criminal proceedings. This can either be a reversal of the burden of proof
(Italy) or a lower standard of proof (England and Wales). The standard of proof has also
been lowered in some criminal proceedings related to the seizure of assets (the Nether-
lands).105 Compared to the system in England and Wales, the Italian system is distinctive
in that the asset recovery investigation concerns not only the subject but also the persons
and companies with which he is directly linked. This is specifically imposed to combat
straw persons and counsellors.
12.4.4 Other measures
The authors of the country reports were asked to discuss any common measures beyond
the above three categories that the selected Member States included in their national
administrative approach to crime. The exploratory nature of this research demanded an
all-inclusive category of this kind. The authors of the country reports were allowed to
provide an inclusive view of their legal systems.
It is important that these measures should not be seen as less significant than the
measures discussed above, as they may represent important tools in a Member State’s
administrative approach. The category ‘othermeasures’ ismerely amethodological choice,
since screening, public order and asset recovery instruments constituted the starting point
for our research, inspired by the Dutch administrative approach and the Hungary Hand-
book.
The above query resulted in descriptions of some distinctive measures106 that cannot
be compared simply because they apply only in a specific Member State. Important
examples are:
– Italy: dissolution of city councils
– Czech Republic: residence prohibition
105 See Article 36e of the Dutch Criminal Code.
106 Although not all of the reports actually discuss other instruments.
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– the German prohibition of association107
– Poland: blocking of bank accounts
– Germany and France: area prohibition for prostitutes
Some country reports mentioned measures in the ‘other’ category that can be compared
with the measures mentioned under the first three categories, specifically public order
competences, screening, or seizure of assets. For example, the country report on the Czech
Republic mentions certain powers of inspection by the health authorities that could be
included in the section on public order. Where applicable, these measures have been
incorporated into the above sections.
While analysing the country reports in detail, we also identified certain specificmeasures
that are present in more than one selected Member State (and can thus be compared).108
These are instruments that are used in the scope of money laundering.
In essence, instruments that tackle money laundering implement the EU Money
Laundering Directives,109 which in turn are based on the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) recommendations.110 The presence of such instruments in the context of an
administrative approach to crime was discussed in the reports on Spain, England and
Wales and Poland. The implementation of the EU provisions in the national legal systems
is very similar in these countries, consisting of a system of reporting and monitoring.
Certain financial institutions, such as banks, are obliged to report suspicious activities to
a monitoring authority, which is authorized to license and register relevant institutions in
compliance with Directive 2005/60/EC.
Under the Money Laundering Directives, all of the selected Member States have
established FIUs to monitor and share information on money laundering via FIU-NET.111
The possibility of sharing information about suspicious financial transactions in the EU
and the potential of this network to exchange information in support of an administrative
approach will be discussed in Chapter 14.
107 The possibility of seizing assets administratively under this instrument is discussed in Section 12.4.3, however.
108 Although the country reports do not always cover these measures in the ‘Other measures’ section.
109 Directive 2005/60/EC on preventing the use of the financial system for money laundering and financing
terrorism (3rd Anti-Money Laundering Directive); Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 on information on the
payer accompanying transfers of funds and Directive 2006/70/EC. In February 2013, two new proposals
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12.5 Due process
An individual or legal person subject to the instruments discussed above also has recourse
to certain legal safeguards protecting him or it from unjust decisions by government.
Article 6 of the ECHR, fair trial, is applicable in each selected Member State, including in
administrative proceedings. Administrative procedures basically fall within the scope of
‘civil rights and obligations’, making all the safeguards of Article 6 paragraph 1 applicable.112
The various country reports discuss safeguards related to the above-mentioned
administrative instruments either in a separate general section or in the sections on the
separate instruments. We will compare these safeguards below.
All the selected Member States adhere to general principles for safeguarding natural
or legal persons subject to administrative decisions. In someMember States, the safeguards
fall under general administrative (procedural) law (Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands,
Spain), whereas in others, these principles can be derived from the vast array of subject-
specific administrative regulations (the Czech Republic, France) or case law (England and
Wales, Belgium).
Several general principles can be identified in the various phases of administrative
procedure applicable to administrative decisions in the selected Member States. In each
country, the administrative authorities must conduct the procedure in an appropriate and
timely manner. Moreover, the administrative authorities are obliged to inform the person
about the procedure and his rights and duties, and they must also adhere to the principles
of necessity and proportionality.
One key feature in the selected Member States is the right to a fair hearing prior to a
negative administrative decision. The reports on Belgium, France, the Czech Republic,
Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands discuss this explicitly. The relevant party has the
right to communicate his views on the matter to the competent administrative authority.
Under certain circumstances, this may even be an obligation (Germany). There are
exceptions to the right to a fair hearing, for example when the administrative authority is
already familiar with the relevant party’s opinion (Belgium, Germany, France). This right
to be heard allows the person to enter their own arguments regarding the facts and the
intended decision or measure. This may avert what would be a negative decision for that
person. The right to a fair hearing reflects the care with which the administrative authority
should take its decision.
When an administrative authority takes a decision, it has an obligation to state the
reasons underpinning that decision.113 In Sweden, for example, the decision must include
112 Barkhuysen & Van Emmerik 2006, p. 130-131.
113 Not all of the country reports discuss this explicitly. During several interviews in the selectedMember States,
however, it became abundantly clear that this is a common feature of the relevant Member States’ national
administrative law. See: De Moor-van Vught 2013, p. 626-627.
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the reasons leading to the outcome of the decision. In Belgium, this obligation breaks down
into a substantive and a procedural part. This means that the decision must be based on
sound reasons (substantive) and that the motivation must be given in the decision (proce-
dural). In Germany, the administrative authorities must state the reasons for their decision
as well as the sources of information on which they have based that decision. A general
obligation to state reasons is theoretically not present in France. Nevertheless, law regulates
the duty to state reasons formany types of decisions, amongst others (1) decisions deviating
from general rules laid down in law or regulations, (2) when it concerns decisions which
– for instance – restrict civil liberties, constitute a police measure or impose a sanction
and (3)when an individual administrative decision creating rights is withdrawn or revoked.
The obligation to state reasons can be problematic in the quest to introduce a policy-
driven administrative approach to crime in the selectedMember States. As discussed, such
an approach assumes information-sharing between administrative and law enforcement
authorities. This information-sharing is essential to a functional administrative approach
to crime.114 However, law enforcement authorities may be reluctant to share information
because the administrative authorities’ obligation to state the reasons for their decisions
– i.e. to make these known to the person involved – could undermine the case being built
by the police and judicial authorities.
The Netherlands has experience with this issue and it would therefore be useful to
briefly consider the solutions posed by the BIBOB legislation. First, administrative
authorities are allowed to request information from several open and semi-closed sources
themselves, including a person’s criminal history. However, they cannot access sensitive
police and judicial personal data, such as criminal intelligence, directly. If doubts remain
about an applicant,more detailed information is required.As a safeguard, the administrative
authority does not access certain personal data on its own, but instead asks the national
Bureau BIBOB to review the applicant and advise. Several authorities are then obliged to
provide Bureau BIBOB with information, such as the Tax and Customs Administration,
the Social Affairs and Employment Inspectorate and the public prosecutor.115 As an addi-
tional safeguard, however, the law enforcement authorities may refuse to cooperate if:




115 Article 27 paragraph 1 BIBOB Act.
116 Article 27 paragraph 2 under b BIBOB Act.
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in the case of criminal investigation data, their supply would, in the opinion of
the public prosecutor, having consulted with a public prosecutor designated by
the Board of Procurators General, prejudice an important interest in connection
with a criminal prosecution.117
Furthermore, almost every recommendation issued by Bureau BIBOB is checked against
relevant police and judicial information by the Landelijk Parket, i.e. the national public
prosecutor’s office in Rotterdam, before being sent to the administrative authorities. This
check prevents information from being exchanged that could harm a criminal investiga-
tion.118
There are several remedies available to persons who are affected by a negative decision.
In most countries, they have the right to lodge an appeal against the decision with the
administrative authority (the Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom, Germany), an
appellate administrative authority (Czech Republic), or a lower administrative court
(Sweden, Italy). Theymay also appeal against this second decision (Poland, theNetherlands,
United Kingdom, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Germany). Additional specific remedies
are possible in England andWales (judicial review), theCzechRepublic (review and renewal
of proceedings), and Belgium (appeal for nullity and suspension of the decision).
During the procedure, the person has the right to information (Spain, Germany, the
Czech Republic, France, Sweden), both procedural and substantive, and to counsel (the
Netherlands, Sweden, France, Belgium). The right to information and the right to counsel
provide important safeguards in administrative procedures. In the Netherlands, the right
to information and the recommendation of Bureau BIBOB has been the subject of debate.
Until 2013, the counsel of the person in question was only allowed to review the recom-
mendation on site; copies were not issued. There was much criticism of this rule, resulting
in an amendment that allowed counsel to take a copy of the decision with him.
The procedures in the case of public procurement differ from the aforementioned. In
principle, tender procedures come under private law, whichmeans that the decisions taken
by the administrative authority concerning tenders are also civil law decisions. The reports
on the Netherlands and the Czech Republic discuss these matters separately. In the
Netherlands, normal civil proceedings apply, including summary proceedings, unless the
tender decision came under the public competence of the administrative authority. If so,
then administrative law is applicable, invoking the procedures discussed above. In the
Czech Republic, instead of an appeal, parties may lodge objections with the contracting
authority and then petition the administrative authority’s supervisory authority, the Office
for the Protection of Competition.
117 Article 27 paragraph 2 under c BIBOB Act.
118 Interview at the Landelijk Parket.
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In conclusion, various safeguards can be identified in the decision-making process,
the decision itself, and the legal remedies against negative decisions in the selectedMember
States. Usually, these are based on normal administrative procedure as regulated by national
law, with the exception of the Netherlands, which provides for specific legal protection of
the individual by means of the BIBOB Act.
12.6 The institutional framework – the necessary infrastructure
12.6.1 The responsible authorities in the selected Member States
Based on the above sections, we can identify several authorities that are responsible within
the legislative framework for implementing the relevant legislation in the differentMember
States. Even though some Member States have not (yet) implemented a national strategy,
the legislation in each country provides grounds for preventing criminal activities. This
allows us to compare the institutional frameworks in the selected Member States.
First, however, we wish to shed some light on the concept of the ‘administrative
authority’. Although the concept seems relatively simple at first glance, prior research –
particularly concerning international cooperation between administrative authorities –
has shown that the definition of ‘administrative authority’ differs greatly fromoneMember
State to the next.119 For example, it is difficult to determine whether the concept includes
the police force. In some Member States, the police have the power to maintain public
order (‘administrative police’ or ‘municipal police’). However, they also have investigatory
powers.
Nevertheless, the difference between these two roles is not always clear-cut and they
may even be occupied by one and the same person in practice.120 In addition, certain
authorities are only regarded as ‘administrative’ in some Member States when performing
a certain function. This is the case with garage owners in the Netherlands: they are private
legal persons that have the administrative authority to decide whether a car is roadworthy
after performing the annual roadworthiness test for motorized vehicles.121 It would be
going too far to discuss all the different types of administrative authorities, given the
foregoing.However, in consideringwhether administrativemeasures play a role in tackling
crime, it is important to know the kind of institutional framework in which the adminis-
trative authorities operate. Here, we have included administrative authorities in local,
regional and national institutional frameworks that perform the same functions for the
119 Klip & Vervaele 2002, p. 12.
120 Klip & Vervaele 2002, p. 12.
121 Article 83 Wegenverkeerswet 1994 in conjunction with 1:1 Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht.
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purposes of our study, i.e. screening and/or monitoring business activities, maintaining
public order in their territories in the respective Member States, as well as authorities that
may be of specific importance to an administrative approach to crime because they regulate
certain vulnerable sectors.
In general, we found a three-way division into local, regional and national institutional
frameworks in the selected Member States, with the exception of France and Italy where
a four-way division in administrative structure exists.122 However, if we consider what type
of authorities are, or can be, responsible for an administrative approach to crime, we can
distinguish between:
a. countries that have assigned primary responsibility for executing administrative
measures to local authorities and;
b. countries where the primary responsibility for executing administrative measures lies
with other authorities.
Examples of the first category are theNetherlands, Belgium, Spain and the Czech Republic.
Local governments – mostly municipalities headed by a mayor, president or marshal – are
specifically responsible for managing public order. This is, after all, a well-established
responsibility of local authorities in general (see Section 12.4.2). Although that responsi-
bility is not necessarily intended to combat organized crime, it can contribute to this aim.
In some countries, such as Belgium and the Czech Republic, it includes the presence of a
‘municipal police force’ specifically assigned to maintain public order in the territory of
the municipality. Municipalities are also the competent authority for granting, refusing
and revoking licences for business activity in their territory, such as opening a bar and/or
selling liquor. This is the case in the Netherlands, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Spain,
Sweden and Germany.
Atypical in this perspective are Italy and France. Both countries have located the primary
responsibility for executing administrativemeasures at the regional, instead of on the local
level. Italy has assigned the prefect a leading role in screening applicants for licences, sub-
sidies or tenders. Regarding public order in Italy, the competence is divided between the
provincial head of the State Police and the local authorities, but the powers entrusted to
them are largely similar to those of the local authorities in the other Member States. In
France, considerable fragmentation in the administrative infrastructure allows for the
existence of over 36.000 municipalities on French territory. As noted in the French report,
most of these municipalities are too small to operate efficiently. Like Italy, key actor in the
implementation of administrative policy and maintaining public order is the prefect of
122 In France the municipalities, the departments and the regions exists apart from the central state. In Italy,
the municipalities, the provinces and the regions exist apart from the central state.
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the département, located on the regional level, instead of on the local level.123 The prefect
of the département even has exclusive competence in public ordermaintenance.124 In doing
so, he is also the head of the administrative police.
All theMember States have delegated powers to administrative agencies or inspectorates,
which brings us to the second category. These agencies are usually only competent in
certain specific areas, such as the environment or health. In England and Wales, such
agencies, and not the regional or local authorities, bear primary responsibility for an
administrative approach. In particular, the Home Office has established a national opera-
tional non-ministerial governmental department, the National Crime Agency (NCA), to
fight serious and organized crime. Its strategy includes (but is not limited to) the use of
administrativemeasures to combat crime. ComparedwithmainlandEurope, this distinctive
approach can be traced back to the common law system and its interpretation of adminis-
trative law in general, as discussed in the country report. In Poland, several national
agencies have been established to deal with certain issues, such as weapons licences (for
which the competent authority is the Minister of Internal Affairs). Other examples are the
involvement of the Pharmaceutical Inspector and the Financial Supervision Authority.
However, we do not wish to suggest that the primary authority lies solely with these types
of agencies in Poland, since the local authorities are also competent to act in certain desig-
nated areas, such as the regulation of driver training centres, the distribution of alcohol,
and the running of nurseries. Instead, the division of competences appears to be arranged
by subject in Poland. The same is true for Sweden. Obviously, other Member States also
have subject-specific inspectorates or agencies; examples can be found in the Netherlands,
the Czech Republic and Spain. However, the primary responsibility for executing admin-
istrative measures in these countries lies with the local authorities.
An administrative approach can only be successful if it is implemented on a national
level as well. TheMinistries of the Interior are responsible for coordinating local authorities.
In all the selected Member States, the local authorities fall hierarchically under the
respectiveMinistries of the Interior, with the exception of England andWales. There, local
government falls under the Department for Communities and Local Government.125
Since the administrative approach is complementary to traditional law enforcement,
the Ministries of Justice in the selected Member States are important partners of the Min-
istries of the Interior when it comes to coordinating national policy on an administrative
approach, specifically concerning information exchange between law enforcement and
123 Not to be confused with the (current) 22 regions, soon to be 13, which are the largest territorial units in
France.
124 Although the mayor of a municipality does have police powers, they are restricted to the municipal territory.
Once the application of measures supersedes the territory of the municipality, the prefect of the department
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administrative authorities. As mentioned earlier, not every country has such a policy. If a
given country were to develop such a strategy, however, it would need to ensure coordina-
tion and cooperation between the ministry responsible for the administrative authorities
and the ministry responsible for the law enforcement authorities. The institutional context
of the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice is a-typical in this regard. Before 2010, the
Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations was responsible for the policy on
an administrative approach to crime. However, after the responsibilities of the Ministries
were reorganized, the issue of ‘security’, including the administrative approach to crime,
was transferred to the ‘new’ Ministry of Security and Justice, making it responsible for the
integrated approach to crime. This did not eliminate the need for coordination with the
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, however. The responsible department in
England and Wales also has an a-typical institutional context. The Home Office, which is
responsible for security and safety, bears primary responsibility for the approach to orga-
nized crime and determines the national strategy against serious and organized crime.
Since England and Wales rely mainly on agencies to execute administrative measures,
coordination with the Department for Communities and Local Government seems less
pressing than in otherMember States. Instead, coordination between the different agencies
is of vital importance.
12.6.2 Horizontal institutional frameworks for the purposes of collaboration
When governments are considering implementing an administrative approach to crime,
a fundamental concern is having the administrative authorities coordinate actions and
exchange information with other authorities (e.g. law enforcement). After all, as we saw
in the discussion on the legal instruments present in the Member States, police and judicial
information, such as criminal antecedents, is particularly vital to administrative decision-
making. The foregoing implies cooperation with the police and the judicial authorities in
a Member State, as well as with other authorities.
One critical factor is legitimate access to criminal law enforcement information. Apart
from the legal difficulties involved in sharing information horizontally between different
authorities, horizontal institutional frameworks are necessary to facilitate coordination
and cooperation between authorities. Some of the selected Member States have established
such horizontal frameworks. Below, we begin by describing existing horizontal frameworks
in the selected Member States and then analyse the countries that lack such frameworks
but have opportunities to establish them.126
126 We were unable to determine from some of the legal reports whether such bodies exist and whether there
are opportunities to establish them at a certain government level. However, this does not rule out the possi-
bility of informal cooperation in practice, a matter that will be discussed in the empirical report.
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In Sweden, the various authorities have collaborated since the 1970s. In the 1990s, this
resulted in specific collaborative bodies being established at regional/provincial level to
enhance cooperation between several Swedish authorities, including the police, the Swedish
Enforcement Authority, the alcohol-licensing authorities, and so on. These bodies are
primarily meant to inspect local restaurants for infringements. The authorities that make
up these bodies are thus able to set up coordinated actions. Each authority can wield its
own powers during such inspections. Nowadays, there are similar cooperative bodies for
social security benefits, including such authorities as the Swedish Social Insurance Agency,
the Swedish Pensions Agency, and the municipalities.
In England and Wales, the current policy on organized crime stresses inter-agency
collaboration or ‘partnership-working’. On a strategic level, the recently established Gov-
ernment Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN) combines several key players in the fight
against organized and serious crime. Regional Organized Crime Units (ROCUs) have also
been established, which facilitate information-sharing between agencies and government
departments. The ROCUs are supported byGAIN.On a local level, there aremulti-agency
approaches to tackling crime and disorder. These approaches differ in terms of their aims
and the authorities involved per local initiative.
In France, Regional Intervention Groups (RIG) exist which are mainly intended to
seize illegally obtained assets. Currently, 37 RIGs exist at the regional level in France. The
RIGs allow for the exchange of information between amongst others police authorities,
tax officials and customs.127 Cooperation also exists with authorities specifically dealing
with financial crimes, such as Tracfin. Information-exchange is facilitated by access of the
members of the RIGs in the databases of participating authorities.
Last, in the Netherlands, ten Regionale Informatie en Expertise Centra (RIEC) were
established to help the municipalities implement the Dutch administrative approach to
crime, boost their information and knowledge position and facilitate regional cooperation.
In 2011, the RIECs were joined by the Landelijke Informatie en Expertise Centrum (LIEC),
which is the link between the Ministry of Security and Justice’s policies and the RIECs’
operations. The RIECs and the LIEC are based on special covenants concluded between
the cooperative partners, including municipalities, police, the Tax and Customs Adminis-
tration, the Public Prosecution Service, and many more.
Looking at the established horizontal frameworks in the selected Member States, we
can make a couple of remarks at this stage, based on the legal country reports. First of all,
the reports mention the horizontal frameworks but often fail to explain the legal basis for
these collaborations. From the information we have obtained, that basis is often provided
by agreements between the collaborating partners. It is therefore unsurprising that the
127 Presentation by French representatives of RIG in the context of the meeting “working apart together”,
15 October 2014 in The Hague.
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reports do not contain detailed descriptions of these agreements, since this would have
gone beyond the remit of this exploratory study. However, a commonly held notion is that
the collaborative bodies aremeant to: a) facilitate information-sharing between the partners
to the extent that legislation pertaining to the various partners allows and; b) coordinate
actions between the different partners, with the partners acting on the basis of the powers
delegated to them in compliance with their own legislative framework. Last, based on the
limited information provided by the legal country reports, the partners collaborating in
these frameworks are not confined to administrative or law enforcement authorities.
Cooperative bodies established to tackle crime and disorder in general may also include
tax and custom authorities, immigration authorities, welfare authorities, youth services,
emergency services and many others. In such instances, the aims of the collaboration are
often broader than simply tackling crime by administrative means, with the exception of
the RIECs in the Netherlands.
Even though we did not identify a structural horizontal framework for collaborating
authorities in the other selected Member States, this does not imply that the authorities
there do not cooperate at all. If these Member States were willing to implement formal
horizontal frameworks, they would already have the institutional context to do so. At the
very least, the municipality, the police and the public prosecution service in each country
would need to exchange information. In Belgium, for instance, it would be possible to
implement structural collaboration between various authorities at the provincial level
within the context of the provincial deliberations. This would be complementary to the
province’s responsibilities in maintaining public order.128 In Italy, the same role could also
be embedded at the provincial level, within the context of the prefect’s executive responsi-
bilities. TheCzech Republic has a network of different Trade LicensingAuthorities (TLAs).
Other authorities have a legislative duty to informTLAs if trading infringements are found.
However, there is no organized, structured framework. In France, it could be possible to
extend the scope of the RIGs to encompassmore than the seizing of assets. Finally, Germany
has a multi-agency alliance for tax matters. Public prosecutors, customs and financial
administrators cooperate in this structure. Cooperation between the Landeskriminalamt
and the administrative authorities could also be embedded.
In Part III we discuss the administrative approach in practice, including how different
authorities and departments in the selected Member States collaborate on either a formal
or informal basis and what trends we can identify in cooperation.
128 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 442.
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12.6.3 National information databases
The selected Member States have databases containing the criminal history of natural and
legal persons; these aremeant to assist the judicial and police authorities in taking decisions
based on criminal backgrounds. These databases are of vital importance to the administra-
tive authorities when they are taking administrative decisions. Usually, when someone
applies for a licence, contract, job or authorization to conduct business, a background
check is necessary (to some extent) to appraise his or her suitability for that position.
Knowledge of a person’s criminal history is essential in that regard. The flow of information
from judicial and police authorities to administrative authorities is the key to implementing
an administrative approach to crime, and if an EU administrative approach to crime were
to be instituted, this type of information would also need to be shared across borders.
Obviously, privacy and other fundamental rights would need to be safeguarded properly.
For an overview of the potential for cross-border information exchange, we refer to
Chapter 14. Here, we review the available criminal history databases, including police and
judicial information. Our review compares the authorities responsible in each selected
Member State and the contents of the various databases (police, judicial, both or more)
and reveals whether the administrative authorities can access these databases and, if so,
how and to what extent.
Each selected Member State has databases containing criminal records, i.e. judicial
information. The authorities that bear primary responsibility for the national databases
are the respective Ministries of Justice. In Sweden, however, the National Police Board
manages the information. In the United Kingdom,129 the Home Office manages the Police
National Computer, whereas ownership of the information lies with the Association of
Police Officers.130 Finally, in Italy the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the National
Anti-mafia Database.
The contents of the databases differ per country. In some countries, such as Spain
(Registro Central de Penados), the Netherlands (Justitieel documentatiesysteem), Germany
(Bundeszentralregister), Poland (National Criminal Register) and Sweden (Police Criminal
Records), the databases contain judicial information. They may also include information
on decisions by the prosecution (the Netherlands) or wanted notices and detention on
remand (Poland). In these countries, there are often other databases, for example containing
police information on pending investigations or suspects. Examples ofMember States that
have separate police information databases are the Netherlands (HKS), Poland (National
Centre of Criminal Information) and Sweden (Records of Suspected Persons).131
129 The Police National Computer is relevant for the whole territory of the United Kingdom, and not only
England and Wales.
130 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/275136/PNC.pdf.
131 Other country reports did not provide information on such databases.
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In other Member States, information on a person’s final convictions can be found in
the same databasewith other types of information. In Italy (National Anti-mafiaDatabase),
the Czech Republic (Penal Register) and theUnitedKingdom (PoliceNational Computer),
the databases contain more than judicial information alone. For instance, in the United
Kingdom, the Police National Computer holds several other types of information,
including information on pending prosecutions, warnings and vehicle information.132 In
Italy, theNational Anti-mafia Database contains information on on-site checks performed
by the prefect, personal and precautionary measures outside the scope of criminal law,
and financial information on persons.
Access to the information contained in the databases is possible when provided for by
law. The law enforcement authorities naturally have access to the information in the
national criminal databases. However, in some selectedMember States, the administrative
authorities can also access the information in the national databases. A distinction can be
made between (1) administrative authorities having direct access to the substantive infor-
mation contained in the databases, (2) authorities that can access the information at the
request of the national authority, and (3) authorities that can require an applicant to add
proof that he has a clean criminal history to his application before taking an administrative
decision.
Sweden is the only country that allows the administrative authorities direct access to
the Police Criminal Records. However, administrative authorities can only access the
database when that is specifically provided for by law. Permission may be granted if a law
requires an assessment of the applicant’s conduct before a licence may be granted. That
law also determines the type of access – full or limited – to the Police Criminal Records.
Direct access is not possible in the otherMember States, but the authorities are allowed
to request an excerpt of a person’s criminal history from the central database. Again, this
is only possible when provided for by law. That is the case in the Czech Republic and
Poland. In the Czech Republic, the requests and responses are arranged by electronic
means. Access to the information is contingent on the purpose of the request. In theUnited
Kingdom, the relevant authority gains access to the substantive information via the Disclo-
sure and Barring Service (DBS). In Germany, an administrative authority can obtain a
certificate of good conduct on request. The certificate only covers certain types of offences;
juvenile offences, for example, are excluded. In Italy, the prefect accesses the information
and then recommends that the administrative authority take a particular decision; this
means that the administrative authority has no access to the person’s substantive criminal
history.
In the Netherlands, administrative authorities can access information about a person’s
criminal past in two ways. First of all, the authorities can ask the Dienst Justitiele
132 See: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/275136/PNC.pdf.
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Inlichtingen for information.However, they can also ask the applicant for VOG (Certificate
of Good Conduct). The applicant has to request the VOG himself and add this to his
application. The COVOG, part of the Ministry of Security and Justice, then screens the
judicial information, and – if necessary – police information. The COVOG assesses the
applicant’s suitability for the job. If he is deemed suitable, he will receive a VOG. The latter
method is current practice in the Netherlands, placing this country in between the second
and third categories. Spain, on the other hand, falls entirely in the third category. In the
case of applications for certain licences or authorizations, the administrative authority –
where provided for by law – can ask the applicant to add his criminal history to the appli-
cation. This is the case for certain types of employment, public positions, types of licences
and administrative authorizations.
Notably, in Belgium some administrative authorities are excluded from access to
criminal records, most remarkably municipal administrative authorities. Other specific
agencies do have access, such as the tax authorities and immigration services staff.
Some additional features of the databases important for this report are listed here. First
of all, most Member States save the criminal history of legal persons in their national
criminal records. In the Czech Republic, anyone may obtain an extract, but not a copy, of
the criminal records of a legal person, since this is deemed to be public information. Second,
in Italy the recent legislative changes on the anti-mafia front have allowed for the introduc-
tion of a ‘single database’. This database will not only include a person’s criminal history
but will also create whitelists and blacklists of persons who may and may not contract with
the Italian government.133 Third, the introduction of ECRIS into the European legal system
aims to ensure that information on foreign convictions is included in national databases.
The country reports on Poland and the Netherlands specifically mentioned information
obtained via this system. This does not imply that the other countries do not make use of
ECRIS. After all, if ECRIS is implemented correctly, foreign convictions should be added
to a person’s criminal history automatically.134
Finally, the country reports mentioned other databases used by the administrative
authorities in the selected Member States when assessing a person’s suitability in an
administrative decision. First of all, we refer to Section 12.4.1.5 concerning trading bans.
Examples of databases that list trading bans are ROLECE (Spain) and REPPC (the Czech
Republic). Second, still other databases contain useful information for administrative
authorities. In Sweden, information on debts and tax information may be requested from
the Swedish Enforcement Agency at any time for any purpose, as these are public records.
In the Netherlands, the administrative authorities have access to open sources and certain
closed or semi-closed sources, such as the Municipal Personal Records Database (GBA),
133 Interview, Prefeturra Rome, 23 September 2014.
134 With the exception of countries that object to this automatic transfer.
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the Chamber of Commerce and the tax authorities. The Polish country report mentions
that the Central Registry and Information about Economic Activity (CRIAEA) and the
National Court Register are of importance when registering entrepreneurs. All
entrepreneurs, regardless of their specific economic activity, requiring a licence, concession,
permit or other type of permission by an administrative authority are obliged to register
with these databases. The CRIAEA is the register for natural persons and managed by the
Ministry of Economic Affairs, whereas the National Court Register encompasses legal
persons and is maintained by the district courts. Both registers are public and therefore
accessible for administrative authorities. Also, the data that has been entered by the regis-
tering party is compared to the data in the National Criminal Register, bringing sentences
and prohibitions against conducting certain activities to light. If a natural or legal person
is convicted by a court or barred from certain activities, registration can be refused.
12.7 Concluding remarks
This chapter provided a comparison of the administrative approach to crime in the selected
Member States. The overview first looked at the current policy of the Member States, the
general features of the applicable administrative law, the actual instruments that are used
and the institutional framework in which this takes place.
The main question was ‘What role do administrative authorities in EU Member States play
in tackling serious and organized crime?’
First, the above sections show that each selected Member State has instruments at its dis-
posal that could contribute to an administrative approach to crime. It is however important
to understand that those instruments have not necessarily been put in place to actively
prevent criminals frommisusing the legal infrastructure. Instead, they aremeant to prevent
misuse of the legal infrastructure in general. This does not imply that these instruments
cannot be used in this manner in future. What follows from the legal comparison is that
some Member States have made extensive use of the administrative approach, whereas
others are currently in the process of discovering its added value.
This brings us to the second important finding of this study. Most countries do not
have a general policy supporting an administrative approach to crime. We can explain this
by pointing out that administrative measures are not regarded as essential to preventing
crime, or were not seen that way in the past. Combined with the subject-specific and geo-
graphical focus of administrative law, these two factors explain the highly fragmented
nature of the present instruments in the selected Member States. As we have seen, the
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instruments are somewhat less fragmented in Member States that have a policy-driven
approach.
The Member States that do not pursue a policy supporting an administrative approach
consequently also lack the institutional context for such an approach. That is otherwise
in theMember States that are pursuing an administrative approach to crime in their policy.
Here, themeasures encompassed by such an approach are reflected in the national, regional
and local framework as well as in horizontal structures for information exchange and
coordination between law enforcement and administrative authorities. Horizontal coop-
eration between several types of government authorities is common to all the selected
Member States, however. Future efforts to introduce an administrative approach to com-
batting crime could make use of such frameworks.
Nevertheless, there is considerable potential in the selected Member States to prevent
crime by administrative means, usually within economic sectors that are deemed as high-
risk. It is only logical that when deciding to grant licences, subsidies or tenders, local gov-
ernments wouldwant to preventmisuse by criminals or act when public order is disturbed.
Screening someone’s criminal history, for instance, is nothing out of the ordinary. In
addition, the necessary requirements for due process and protection of the individual in
the face of administrative decisions are present and ingrained in the legal systems of all
these countries. The above implies that the introduction of new measures is unnecessary,
and might even frustrate on-going developments. Instead, it would be more sensible to
explore and implement existing measures.
Moreover, coordination and cooperation between administrative and law enforcement
authorities must be encouraged, along with the potential for information exchange. As
highlighted above, information exchange between these types of authorities is vital to the
success of an administrative approach to crime. As we have seen, some countries already
have a horizontal framework that facilitates information exchange between different gov-
ernment authorities, and could serve as an example for other Member States.
In part III, the workings of the legislative framework described will be discussed. It will
focus on the application of economic business regulations in practice. Furthermore, the
way different authorities work (apart) together in order to tackle crime problems in their
area will be discussed. Furthermore, local and regional initiatives that address permanent
bodies and long-term projects aimed at the exchange of information, intelligence and
coordination of efforts to deal with criminal activities is considered.
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Part III
The administrative approach in
practice

13 Practical application of the concept
A.C.M. Spapens & M. Peters
13.1 Introduction
Part III addresses the practical application of the ‘administrative approach’ concept in the
ten selected Member States. As we have seen in the previous parts of this report, the term
‘administrative approach’ covers a broad range of activities and instruments. Generally,
we can distinguish three types of measures and cooperation aimed at preventing and
combating organized crime. These three overlap to a certain extent.
The first is the use of business regulations to prevent persons with a criminal back-
ground, or persons who can be linked to organized crime groups, from entering specific
types of business or economic activity in general. As shown in Part II, all the selected
Member States have legislation in place that excludes from business activities individuals
who are unable to demonstrate their ‘good conduct’, which implies at least the absence of
a criminal record with regard to specific offences and in a given period. Some Member
States, Italy and the Netherlands in particular, screen applicants for government contracts
and specific licencesmore extensively. The BIBOB screening procedure in theNetherlands,
for example, may even include police intelligence on an applicant’s criminal activities or
contacts obtained from undisclosed criminal informers.
Second, the concept covers the fight against organized and other crime problems by
means of administrative measures only, or through the cooperative efforts of law
enforcement agencies and administrative bodies. The latter may for example carry out
sanitary inspections of businesses, impose fines and even revoke licences if local and
business regulations have been infringed. In some countries, the local authorities can close
premises that cause nuisance. A step further is coordinated action between different gov-
ernment agencies against a specific location or a crime problem, which we can define as
‘working apart together’.
Finally, ‘working apart together’ can be organized more systematically within the
context of long-term projects or in permanent/semi-permanent bodies. This may take the
form of a task force or agency to which staff from various public bodies are seconded. One
example is the Italian Anti-mafia Directorate, which encompasses four Italian law
enforcement agencies. Another is the Dutch Regional Information and Expertise Centres,
in which the police, the public prosecution service, the tax authorities and the local
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administrative authorities have representatives. Such cooperative efforts may be organized
at the national, regional or local levels.
Chapter 13 of the report is structured as follows. Section 13.2 addresses the application
of administrative regulations to prevent criminal infiltration in economic sectors. Section
13.3 then focuses on parties ‘working apart together’ to tackle specific problems in the
context of crime or public order. Section 13.4 addresses permanent/semi-permanent
bodies meant to exchange information and intelligence and coordinate efforts to tackle
crime problems. Section 13.5 concludes the chapter.
13.2 Applying administrative regulations to prevent criminal
infiltration
13.2.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the first manner in which administrative regulations are applied
in the context of crime, i.e. to prevent individuals and legal entities that have criminal
records or can be linked to organized or other crime obtain licences to operate a business
or to gain public contracts. Section 13.2.2 briefly addresses the basic application of business
regulations and 13.2.3 focuses on regulations to prevent public order disturbances. Section
13.2.4 analyses examples from Italy and Sweden of the screening of natural and legal persons
in the context of public procurement. Section 13.2.5 addresses BIBOB screening in the
Netherlands, which offers the option of conducting extensive background checks on
individuals and legal entities that wish to obtain government contracts and subsidies, but
also on those who are applying for a permit for selected economic activities.
13.2.2 Use of business regulations to prevent crime
The legal studies (see Part II) showed that all theMember States investigated in this project
have administrative legislation in place that sets requirements for entrepreneurs and for
the running of specific businesses. A customary basic requirement is that anyone who
wishes to start up a businessmust not have a criminal record of offences that could influence
his or her competence to engage safely in the activity. Such restrictions may also apply to
employees, for example staff who work with children and taxi drivers (see below). If the
licence holder is a legal entity, the requirements concern members of the management
and supervisory boards. Background checks are more extensive when the economic
activities present bigger risks, for instance to safety, health or the environment. In addition,
businesses operating in these areas are also regulated more strictly.
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The EU has adopted two specific business regulations that require the absence of a
criminal record. To begin with, there is Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing common rules concerning
the conditions to be complied with to pursue the occupation of road transport operator
and repealing Council Directive 96/26/EC. Under this regulation, transport managers
must not have been convicted of a serious criminal offence or have incurred a penalty for
a serious infringement of Community rules relating to road transport in particular. This
was followed in 2011 by Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 December 2011 on combating sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of chil-
dren, and child pornography, replacing the Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA.
This Directive states that a person convicted of a number of specific offences ‘must be
prevented from exercising employment involving direct and regular contact with children’.
General regulations in most cases are not specifically aimed at ‘keeping out criminals’
but primarily at ensuring the proper functioning of a business. Someone who has been
convicted of document fraudmay be less trustedwith his or her bookkeeping, for example.
Several interviewees explicitly mention the need to maintain a balance between offering
citizens the opportunity to start a business on the one hand and imposing restrictions on
the other. In Spain and Italy for example, interviewees stated that reducing the number of
hurdles for potential entrepreneurs became particularly important after the financial crisis
hit in 2008. Most notably in Poland, the Czech Republic and Spain, severe restrictions on
the free market are a sensitive issue because of these countries’ experiences under commu-
nism and the Franco regime.
Efforts to prevent a business from being misused for criminal activity is official policy
only in the Netherlands and Italy (in procurement procedures) and England & Wales. The
UK Serious and Organised Crime Strategy, for example, states that ‘wherever we can, we
will prosecute those involved in serious and organised crime. But where we cannot, we
will look to deter and disrupt engagement in organised crime with a wide range of inter-
ventions that complement and, where appropriate, offer an effective alternative to criminal
investigations.[…] Licence conditions are an important part of this toolkit: they require
offenders leaving prison following the custodial part of a sentence to follow certain
requirements based on a case by case assessment of risk.’1 This could imply issuing a
‘Director Disqualification Order’ to ban a convicted criminal from operating a business.
Apart frompolicies at the national level, local authoritiesmay also formulate guidelines
for extensive background checks. InGothenburg for example, the licensing unit (Tillstånd-
senheten) performs such checks on natural and legal persons applying for licences to sell
alcohol, non-prescription medicines and tobacco. The screening procedure takes approx-
imately 15 weeks and applies to new applicants and to licence holders if the ownership
1 HM Government 2013, p. 51.
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changes, for example. The applicant must provide all sorts of data, such as a financial and
business plan, a fire prevention plan and his or her qualifications to run the business. The
unit also consults with other agencies and private parties such as banks. The opinion of
the police weighs particularly heavily on the decision to grant the licence. Also important
is the financing of the business, because a lack of transparency in this respect may also
result in the application being rejected. It is, however, difficult to establish whether the
applicant is a straw man, according to members of the unit we interviewed.
In each case, the exchange of information between law enforcement agencies and
administrative bodies is crucial. As explained above, all the Member States studied here
have legislation allowing background checks. However, the police or other government
bodies may also have ‘soft’ information available. One example would be a woman whom
the police know to be the girlfriend of a well-known drug dealer applying for a licence to
operate a bar. While she herself has no criminal record, in most cases the local authorities
would consider it undesirable to issue her a licence if they know of her relationship.
In Germany, local administrative authorities can request information from the police
regarding applicants for certain types of licences. This involves licenses for working with
weapons and explosives, when persons apply for visa and immigration related licences
and persons applying to work in high-risk environment. To standardise these kinds of
checks throughout the police services in Germany a federal project was started two years
ago. A long running discussion in this project concerned the disclosure of ‘soft’ information
by the police. In the end, it was decided that the original owner of the information, i.e. the
(local) police force, has discretionary power to decide whether to disclose the information
to the administrative authority.
If there is no legal framework to exchange such information officially, law enforcement
agencies may ‘informally’ notify the administrative authorities, provided they are aware
that a certain person intends to start a business. This requires regular contact between law
enforcement agencies and administrative bodies. Because the information cannot be dis-
closed officially, an informal notification may not allow the administrative body to refuse
a licence, but they can keep a closer watch on the business. This type of information
exchange depends on personal relationships and mutual trust between the staff of various
agencies, particularly trust in each other’s integrity. If persons change jobs, for example,
the contact persons may not be as willing to provide intelligence to their successors.
As will be explained in Part IV, there is no clear legal framework underpinning the
cross-border exchange of criminal and fiscal information for administrative screening
purposes. In the Dutch-Belgian border area for example, serious and organised crime is
to a large extent ‘integrated’ because members of crime groups operating in the area often
live on both sides of the border and execute parts of their ‘criminal business processes’ in
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both countries.2 In one example, a Belgian police chief was suspicious about a Dutch
national who wanted to open a bar in a border town. He enquired informally with his
Dutch police colleagues and learned that the person who had applied for a licence was
indeed associated with a group of organized criminals. However, the Belgian authorities
could not use this information in the licensing procedure because the Dutch authorities
believe that existing treaties do not allow official exchanges of such information. Italy for
example complains that its extensive antimafia screening of companies tendering for
public contracts is problematic when a company originates from another Member State
(see below). A public prosecutor in the Netherlands for instance refused to check the
background of a Dutch company that applied for a contract relating to the Milan Expo.
Although a less strict interpretation of the existing conventions is possible, as we will
show in Part IV, the lack of clarity hampers the prevention of serious and organized crime
in an international context.
13.2.3 Use of local public order regulations to prevent crime
In most of the Member States studied here, the local authorities can take specific measures
to maintain public order. Municipalities may regulate economic activities in local by-laws,
for example, or use spatial planning for this purpose. Although public order is the main
concern, local regulations can also be used to prevent crime.Here, we present two examples.
The Belgian municipality of Turnhout added a provision to its local by-law requiring
nightshops (small groceries that are open all night) to have a permit. This is because such
shopsmay cause nuisance, with customers coming and going during the night and parking
their cars on the road if they cannot find a spot near the shop. Because nightshops are also
thought to be vulnerable to criminal infiltration, such regulations can help prevent crime
by controlling the number of shops and avoiding concentrations of similar shops in one
street or in a residential area with no parking space, for example.
In an example from the Netherlands, several municipalities set requirements for
growshops. These shops sell all sorts of equipment for cannabis cultivation, such as growing
lamps, electrical equipment, black earth soil, pots, fertilizer and materials to prevent
detection, for example carbon filters to dispel the scent of cannabis. Selling these materials
is legal and the owner does not require a permit to open a growshop. However, such shops
are also known to advise cannabis growers on where to buy cuttings and sell their harvest.3
Furthermore, criminal organizations involved in large-scale cannabis cultivation also run
growshops. In response, several municipalities in the south of the Netherlands forbid such
2 Spapens 2008a.
3 Spapens, Van de Bunt & Rastovac 2007.
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shops in specific areas in order to control their numbers and make it less attractive to open
one.
13.2.4 Screening in the context of public procurement
The foremost aim of regulating public procurement in the selected Member States is to
ensure a transparent process and fair competition. Second, regulation is meant to prevent
corruption, i.e. politicians and civil servants favouring specific entrepreneurs unfairly.
Third, the screening process is supposed to prevent companies that are owned (wholly or
in part) or infiltrated by members of organized crime groups from obtaining government
contracts. This type of measure aims to prevent criminals from generating legitimate
income as well as other offences they might commit during the work, such as labour
exploitation and money laundering. Below, we describe two examples of measures aimed
explicitly at preventing criminals from procuring contracts, as well as at ensuring a trans-
parent and fair process: the Gruppo Interforze Centrale per l’EXPO Milano 2015 (GICEX)
and the Nacka project in Sweden.
The Milan Expo (Italy)
Italy has adopted extensive legislation to prevent companies that are owned or have been
infiltrated bymafia-type criminal organizations (or theirmembers) to gain public contracts
(see the country report on Italy). The Prefecture screens companies that wish to procure
government contracts. Depending on the size and scope of the contract, anti-mafia docu-
mentation or information is required. The anti-mafia communication certifies that there
are no grounds for disqualification, banning or suspension owing to a final preventive
judgment, a preventive measure (with a final decision), or criminal convictions for specific
offences. The anti-mafia information has a wider scope, and refers to any attempt by the
mafia to infiltrate a company.4 The prefect of the regionwhere the company’s headquarters
is located is the competent authority in the screening procedure and issues the certificate.
In Milan, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the State, the City, the Province and
the Chamber of Commerce established the limited public company (società per azioni,
S.p.A) Expo 2015 to govern the organization of the event. Expo 2015 also took extensive
measures to prevent criminally affiliated companies from gaining contracts related to the
Expo. The ‘Committee for the surveillance of major works’ is responsible for monitoring
anti-mafia activities and for ensuring that all themain contractors and their subcontractors,
consultants and other partners are qualified to do the job.
The Gruppo Interforze Centrale per l’EXPO Milano 2015 (GICEX) collects and analyses
all information concerning building sites so as to detect money laundering activities or
4 Calderoni and Di Stefano 2014, Chapter 7 of this volume.
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the involvement of mafia-type criminal organizations in the project. The GICEX may also
perform checks at sites. The group is made up of the Direzione Antimafia, the police, the
Carabinieri, the Guardia di Finanza, the local labour directorate (Direzione Territoriale
del Lavoro), the local health service (Azienda sanitaria locale, ASL), the national institute
of social security (Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale, INPS) and the national institute
for insurance against accidents at work and occupational diseases (Istituto nazionale per
l’assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro e le malattie professionali, INAIL).
The screening and monitoring activities in the context of the Expo go beyond the
normal screening procedure. First, the procedure covers all companies that take part in
the logistics of the work, regardless of the value of their contribution, with the exception
of catering businesses if the value of their activities does not exceed €50,000 in a three-
month period. The underlying rationale is that the mafia has shifted its attention to facili-
tating construction work, for example by leasing trucks and machinery to bona fide con-
struction companies. In addition, companies that are considered to run a higher risk of
mafia infiltration, for example those active in waste disposal, the supply of soil, and the
transport of concrete, bitumen and asphalt, are subject to themafia information procedure,
regardless of the value of their contracts. Second, the Prefecture of Milan is the competent
authority for all companies contracted to work on the Expo, regardless of the regional
location of their headquarters. Third, the GICEX also encompasses national bodies and
can thus acquire the information necessary for screening and monitoring from all of Italy.
Fourth, every contract (and sub-contract) contains a clause providing for immediate
contract termination on the establishment of mafia connections.
The GICEX also monitors the contracted companies during the execution of the work.
Officials perform on-site checks of personnel to ensure that all the workers are employed
properly and the companies are complying with the requirements following from labour
and social security legislation. All information relating to the contracts, ownership structure
andmanagerial accounts of the companies and their employees is registered in the anagrafe
degli Esecutori.
In the past three years, there have been 48 cases in which the Prefecture banned a firm
from working at the Expo. The bans involved 32 different firms and about half of these
appealed against the decision. So far, all of the cases have stood up in court.
Procurement screening in Nacka (Sweden)
Nackamunicipality is a part of the greater city of Stockholm. The community has expanded
rapidly over the past few years and now numbers 94,000 inhabitants. It will continue to
grow in the near future. Its expansion has spurred extensive building activities. The Nacka
project started in 2004 and aims to prevent criminally connected construction companies
from obtaining contracts and to ensure that no illegal activities, for example labour
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exploitation and tax evasion, occur at the building sites. In the future, the project will also
focus on other economic sectors, such as restaurants, cleaning companies and taxi operators.
The Nacka project involves cooperation between the municipality, the Swedish Eco-
nomicCrimeAuthority, the SwedishTaxAuthority, the StockholmAssociation of Building
Contractors and Byggnads Stockholm, a trade union. The aim of the project is to contract
only financially sound operators that have the expertise to provide goods and services of
the desired quality. The contractors and their subcontractorsmust also have a clean record
when it comes to paying taxes and other contributions. The procurement officers check
whether the company is registered with the Swedish Companies Registration Office and
the tax authorities, as well as for social security contributions. They also check whether it
has outstanding debts with the Swedish Tax Authority and the Swedish Economic Crime
Authority. Furthermore, themunicipality checks the background of applicants against the
criminal records held by the police. Operators that have been convicted of corruption,
bribery, fraud or money laundering or are known members of criminal organizations are
excluded from the procurement procedure. If the supplier is a legal person, these require-
ments apply to the representatives of that entity.
The contractors are obliged to comply with the requirements stated under the ID06
General Regulations. This entails that anyone working at the construction site must have
a valid authorization card. The contractormust keep daily records on the persons working
at the site for his own company as well as for subcontractors. These records and a specifi-
cation of the tax returns for each employeemust be sent digitally to the Swedish TaxAgency
once a month. The contractor must also inform the tax authorities about subcontractors’
activities. Subcontracting companies are required to comply with the ID06 General Regu-
lations as well, and must also send a monthly specification of received tax returns to the
Tax Agency for every employee. This allows the tax authorities to check whether a person
who is registered as an employee working at a specific construction site actually works
there. The municipality regularly checks whether the workers who are present at the
building site have valid IDO6 authorization cards. If irregularities are detected, the con-
tractor may be fined but it is also possible to stop the work.
The Nacka project has now concluded and has received a positive evaluation. Contrac-
tors think that the procurement procedure helped ‘level the playing field’ and increased
the expertise ofNackamunicipality. Intervieweeswhowere involved in the project observed
that at least one large construction company refrained from competing for a contract. The
project did not generate extra costs, fewer opportunities for smaller companies or less
competition, although it did reduce the number of subcontractors hired. In practice, the
companies adhered closely to the requirements. Interviewees mention a few cases in which
the tax authorities did not receive information in time, which usually resulted in only a
warning. This in fact shows that the project had its intended preventive effects, in their
opinion. They did observe a problemwith foreign subcontractors, however. Because anyone
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can work in Sweden for a maximum period of three months, it is impossible to check
whether the companies and their employees pay taxes in their home countries. The Swedish
Parliament is now discussing whether the procedures should be included in legislation
and thus become the standard for the entire country.
13.2.5 BIBOB screening in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the Public Administration (Probity Screening) Act (‘BIBOB Act’)
enables the administrative authorities to refuse or revoke permits, as well as tenders and
subsidies funded by the government, if screening reveals a risk that an applicant will use
the permit, contract or subsidy for criminal purposes. The legislation applies to natural
persons as well as legal entities.
As explained in Chapter 8, application of the BIBOB legislation is the responsibility of
the administrative authorities at the municipal or provincial level, depending on the type
of activity. Apart from government contracts and subsidies, the BIBOB legislation only
applies to economic activities that are considered vulnerable to criminal infiltration, such
as bars and restaurants, gambling activities, and prostitution.
The screening procedure consists of two stages. First, the administrative authorities
require the applicant to provide a range of information.He or shemust hand in a ‘certificate
of good conduct’ (i.e. showing the absence of a criminal record), and the business must
have been registered with the Chamber of Commerce. The municipality may also ask for
a business plan for the intended activity, how the applicant acquired the necessary capital,
his or her tax records, as well as annual financial reports if the applicant is already engaged
in economic activities.
This information may be sufficient to grant the permit. However, if the competent
administrative authority suspects irregularities, it may ask the national Bureau BIBOB,
part of the Ministry of Security and Justice, to perform in-depth screening. The district
public prosecutor who is competent for BIBOB cases can ‘tip’ the administrative authorities
if he or she holds information that the applicant may be linked to persons involved in
organized criminal activities. Bureau BIBOB can request further information on the
applicant from the police, the tax authorities and other public bodies, and even intelligence
fromundisclosed criminal informers whom the police classify as trustworthy. The national
bureau then issues a recommendation in which it reviews the information collected and
establishes the level of risk involved, i.e. the risk that the permit, contract or subsidy will
be misused for criminal purposes (no risk, limited risk, high risk). The competent local or
provincial authority then decides on this advice. In practice, if a ‘high’ level of risk is
established, the competent authority will usually decide not to grant the permit, or to
revoke it if it has already been issued.
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Requesting a recommendation fromBureauBIBOB is considered an ultimum remedium.
In 2013, the national bureau issued 268 recommendations.5 Of these, 41 cases concerned
an additional recommendation, issued after lawyers acting on behalf of an applicant con-
tested the original report. Most concerned bars and restaurants (128), Dutch-style cof-
feeshops (54) and sex businesses (15). In 2013, only two cases referred to procurement and
the national bureau did not receive any requests concerning subsidies. Of the 227 new
recommendations issued, in 131 cases Bureau BIBOB judged the risk of misuse to be high
and in a further 37 cases the risk was limited. In another 37 cases, the requesting authority
withdrew its request, usually because the applicant also decided to withdraw from the
licensing procedure after the bureau started asking for additional information.
Although this is difficult to assess, the authorities believe that the instrument does have
the effect of preventing persons who already suspect that they will not pass the screening
from applying. If, however, there is no relevant police information available, it is difficult
to conclude that granting the permit will pose a high risk of misuse.
13.3 Working apart together ad hoc
13.3.1 Introduction
Authorities can use administrative legislation not only to prevent illegal activities but also
to repress them. Administrative authorities can put an end to crimes or public order dis-
turbances by revoking permits and closing premises that criminals use. To begin with,
authorities can apply such competences independently, as a follow-up to inspections
revealing that the licence holder has contravened various regulatory or permit requirements.
Administrative authorities can also cooperate with other public bodies and apply their
respective competences in a concertedway. Finally, private partiesmay be able to contribute
to interventions aimed at reducing crime.
This section starts with some brief examples of the interventions administrative
authorities may impose based on their own competences (Section 13.3.2). Section 13.3.3
focuses on cooperation between administrative authorities and other public partners,
particularly law enforcement. Section 13.3.4 then describes the Joker project, an example
of the combined use of different competences to tackle illegal casinos in the Netherlands.
Section 13.3.5 then presents practical examples of public-private partnerships and in par-
ticular the European Pol-PRIMETT project, aimed at reducing metal theft.
5 Landelijk bureau BIBOB 2014.
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13.3.2 Administrative interventions
Part II of this report gave an extensive overview of legislation in the ten Member States
meant to regulate business activities so as to ensure public safety as well as local and other
regulations aimed at preserving public order. Such regulations allow local authorities not
only to prevent criminal infiltration, but also to take repressive action against businesses
and premises.
To begin with, administrative authorities may receive information that a particular
natural or legal person has been convicted in a criminal case. For example in Poland, if a
person or a legal entity is convicted of a criminal or fiscal offence, this information is
automatically forwarded to the National Crime Register and to other databases relevant
for the issuing of licences, permits and the registration of economic activities. Depending
on existing regulations, such information may enable the administrative authorities to
revoke a licence.
In Germany for example, the authorities apply the Vereinsverbot to prohibit certain
associations. Under this administrative measure, the police was able to prohibit around
15 differentmotorcycle gangs in the last two to three years. In a concrete example in Baden-
Württemberg, two rival gangs caused several problems, leading up to a murder. Although
the club had over 150 members of which only 15 had been involved, the association was
prohibited, the assets were seized and the police closed the clubhouse, based on a decision
of the competent administrative authorities.
In practice, however, signs of organized or other criminal activity will often be less
clear-cut. The neighbours of certain premises may complain about nuisance because its
owner rents it to people who stay there temporarily and may be victims of human traffick-
ing. To begin with, the municipality may try to tackle the problem on its own account and
redress the situation, for example because local regulations do not allow a private home
to be converted into a hotel or to be divided up into separate rooms without a permit. In
such cases, the administrative authorities may undertake inspections to establish whether
the situation complies with various rules, including sanitary and safety regulations.
Depending on the severity of the infringements and the options that specific regulations
offer, the authorities can demand improvements, impose fines or even close the premises
for a certain period.
Administrative enforcement may be time-consuming, however. It is primarily future-
oriented and aims to repair violations rather than punish the perpetrator. Consequently,
the administrative authorities must always offer the perpetrator the opportunity to make
improvements before they can take decisive action. It is therefore only logical for the
administrative authorities to enquire whether other government agencies hold information
that can help them build a stronger case. If the police know that a person is affiliated with
an organized crime group and that the tax authorities question the size of his legal income,
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this informationmay enable the administrative authorities to revoke a licence immediately.
In Italy, for example, the tax authorities may terminate a business when it reports losses
for more than three years running and cannot explain why it accepts them.
Taking this approach a step further involves exploring the possibility of coordinated
interventions by multiple administrative authorities, law enforcement and the tax
authorities, based on their own respective competences. The knowledge that something
may be wrong could trigger all of them to dig deeper into the case and undertake coordi-
nated actions based on their respective competences. This is the concept of ‘working apart
together’ that is typical of an administrative approach.
13.3.3 Cooperating with other public partners
In practice, we can observe two main types of ‘working apart together’ in ad hoc cases.
The first is to launch joint inspections in which relevant government agencies visit a
business or premises at the same time to check compliance with the regulations that fall
under their responsibility. The second is to exchange information that allows a partner
agency to take action.
Joint inspections and combining competences
Interviewees in most of the Member States studied here were able to give examples of joint
inspections. The agencies participating in these inspections differ depending on country-
specific legislation. For example, the local administrative authorities in most countries
check compliance with sanitary regulations, but in Spain this competence is allocated to
the police. Generally, the interviewees see joint inspections as an effective tool. Thorough
inspections almost always reveal shortcomings. Furthermore, if the local press starts writing
about the case, customers will avoid certain businesses.
A good example is a ‘men’s club’ in the old centre of Warsaw where men could buy
womendrinks at exorbitant prices. The administrative authorities could not prove organized
prostitution – ‘if the woman wants to go to a hotel with this man afterwards that is her
own choice’ – and the prices of the drinks were correctly given on the price list. The local
authorities tried another tack by launching sanitary and safety inspections; at the same
time, the immigration authorities checked the status of the Moldavian and Ukrainian
women who frequented the club, while the tax authorities checked whether the alcohol
was legitimate and properly taxed. These inspections generated so much bad publicity for
the club that the owners decided to terminate their business.
Joint inspections may also be cost effective. In Gothenburg, for example, the licensing
unit performs about 1200 inspections of licence holders annually. In some of these cases,
the inspections are conducted together with the police, the tax authorities, customs and
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the fire department. Combining the respective competences can be very fruitful. For
example, the municipality has all sorts of competences to access and check premises,
including sending ‘mystery guests’ who pose as clients, and to seize goods, such as bottles
of alcohol to check the alcohol percentage. Sometimes cooperation is more efficient,
however. The tax authorities also check the goods that are being sold at restaurants. When
they share their findings, it saves the municipality the cost of collecting and analysing its
own samples.
Inmost cases, it is the local authorities that initiate joint inspections. In the city of Brno
in the Czech Republic, interviewees explained how the local authorities had arranged
informal meetings to discuss both preventive and repressive interventions with regard to
metal theft and pawnshops. Such meetings can also be arranged if there is a threat to
public order, for instance if right-wing extremists want to organize a demonstration. The
municipality invites the relevant bodies to participate depending on the nature of the
problem, such as the Trade Inspection, the Environment Inspection Agency, the police,
customs and the sanitary service. Sometimes it also invites private parties, for example
scrap metal yard operators in the case of metal theft.
The local authorities in the city of Antwerp combined competences in their battle
against street prostitution. To begin with, the police can detain a person suspected of
breaking the law administratively for a maximum of 12 hours. The police have used this
regulation to arrest streetwalkers systematically. Prostitutes who had been arrested received
an administrative restraining order banning them from certain streets. As a result, the
police no longer needed to establishwhether awomanwasworking as a prostitute to arrest
her, which saved a lot of time and effort. These measures resulted in a 50 percent drop in
the number of prostitutes. The authorities then targeted the customers. In Belgium, the
local administrative authorities can issue ‘municipal administrative sanctions’ (gemeentelijke
administrative sancties) forminor violations, such as littering. Such sanctionswere imposed
on customers who drove around the area with the intention of picking up a prostitute.
Although it was doubtful whether these sanctions would hold up in court, they did have
an effect, particularly on married men, who could expect questions from their wives about
the fine. Media attention also helped. Finally, hotels that systematically rented out rooms
for short periods were named and shamed as facilitators. A number of hotels stopped
renting rooms to prostitutes and several others were closed. Although these combined
measures did notmake street prostitution disappear completely, they disrupted themarket
to such an extent that the number of women declined from 60 to 80 per night to 2 or 3.
Acting on each other’s information
Joint inspectionsmay provide each of the participating agencies with information onwhich
it can act, but it may also be relevant for other partners. If the police have seized illicit
drugs or illegal firearms while inspecting a bar, informing the licensing agency about this
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will also be highly relevant. If the information is the result of a joint inspection, it will
usually be exchanged officially. However, if the partner organization obtains such informa-
tion in the context of separate enquiries, ‘automatic’ exchange is far from guaranteed.
Problems occur specifically when law enforcement agencies and the tax authorities
respectively hand over information to administrative bodies. The opposite flow of infor-
mation presents fewer problems, as does the exchange of information between administra-
tive authorities, although this may require specific agreements. In the context of criminal
and fiscal investigations, all types of information may be requested from administrative
bodies. Furthermore, all ten countries studied here have legislation requiring civil servants
to proactively inform the appropriate law enforcement agencies if they receive information
in the course of their regular duties that offences are being committed. In Poland, for
example, the health inspectorate informed the public prosecution service that certain types
of new psychoactive substances were dangerous to people’s health. This information was
subsequently used to charge the personswho sold these substances with causing permanent
physical damage to an individual (Art. 156).
In turn, law enforcement information is often crucial in permitting administrative
bodies to take action. In Spain, for example, interviewees explained how the local police
– in Spain the police check compliance with safety, sanitary and other regulations as well
as with the requirements of local licences – received information from the National Police
that a particular restaurant was linked to an organized crime group under investigation.
The check revealed the presence of illegal firearms. The police passed on the information
to the local authorities responsible for licensing so that they could impose administrative
sanctions.
In Germany, the police can also disclose information to the competent administrative
authorities that allows them to take repressive action. For example, an organizedmotorcycle
gang had permits for firearms.When one of the Landeskriminalämter (LKA)was informed
about this, police officers drew up a report for the competent licensing authority to inform
them that the persons involved should not be allowed to carry a gun because they could
not be considered ‘reliable’. Many licencing laws allow to withhold a licence when there
are ‘good reasons that allow to question a person’s reliability.’ As many as 248 members
of organized motorcycle gangs under the competence of this LKA had a firearm license.
In each of these cases, the relevant authority was requested to check the background of
the person involved. So far however, only eight licenses have been withdrawn. The inter-
viewees state that particularly the local authorities are not yet sensitive enough to crime
problems and thus do not refuse licences to persons with a questionable background or
withdraw these.
In other examples, however, law enforcement agencies were unaware that their intelli-
gence was of importance to the administrative authorities. In the municipality of Nacka
in Sweden, for example, the local authorities experienced problems with an outlaw
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motorcycle gang that had acquired premises there. As it transpired, the police had infor-
mation that would have enabled the local authorities to block the gang from opening a
clubhouse but failed to share it. The only course of action open to the municipality was to
buy the property. To discuss the case, the municipality arranged a meeting with the police
and the Ministry of Justice, which made the law enforcement agencies more aware of the
administrative powers of the municipality.
In theUnitedKingdom theNational CrimeAgency put together a ‘DisruptionManual’
intended to raise awareness within the police force of the competences of a wide range of
partners and giving examples of how they could be used to disrupt criminal activities.
According to the NCA Newsletter of January 2014, the ‘Disruption Manual is a guide to
a wide range of capabilities and specialist knowledge and is a living document to be shared
and continuously developed in collaboration with our wider law enforcement partners.’6
Whether law enforcement agencies will share relevant informationwith administrative
authorities depends not only on whether that is legally possible. Particularly in ongoing
criminal investigations, the police and the public prosecution service may decide to wait
until a suspect is convicted so as not to jeopardize their case before the court.
They may also refuse to share information because they do not trust the integrity of
the public authorities, particularly those who are politically responsible. An example is an
investigation several years ago into a case of environmental crime in the Netherlands in
which law enforcement agencies refused to hand over information to the competent
administrative body because they concluded from telephone intercepts that a representative
of the provincewas leaking information to the director of the company under investigation.
However, subsequent investigation did not render proof of corruption and in terms of
efficiency, the decision not to share information was not a good one. Had the information
been shared immediately, the administrative body would have been able to use it to close
the entire facility; instead, almost four years later the criminal case is still pending in court
and will probably result in only a relatively small financial penalty.
Apart from sharing information on individual persons or legal entities, law enforcement
agencies may draw up general reports to inform administrative bodies and private parties
of crime risks. In theNetherlands, for example, the police sometimes compile ‘administra-
tive reports’ (bestuurlijke rapportages). Such a reportmaymap a ‘criminal business process’
with the aim of raising awareness among partners of vulnerabilities so that they can take
preventive measures. An example from the mid-1990s concerns a case in which a group
of bank robbers used sledgehammers to break the protective glass between the bank
employees and the customers. Banks used this information to install heavier glass that
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Finally, we must mention information exchange between the tax authorities and
administrative bodies. The tax authorities may possess information that can be highly
relevant for administrative bodies. The next section gives an example of how the Dutch
tax authorities worked with local administrative authorities to close illegal casinos.
13.3.4 Combining competences creatively: the Joker project
In the Joker project in the Netherlands, the tax authorities effectively combined their
competence to collect debts with the competence of the mayor to close premises that vio-
lated local regulations on illegal casinos.8 The project started in 1999 when about 75 illegal
casinoswere operational across the country. By 2005, the Joker project had led to the closure
of all existing gambling houses. The intervention method was so successful that no new
comparable casinos have appeared since then, and it was subsequently used to tackle illegal
poker and bingo tournaments.
Illegal casinos in the Netherlands generally offered a type of observation roulette, for
example ‘Golden Ten’ or varieties of this game. The customers could also play card games,
for example poker or blackjack. In 2001, the estimated number of visits to illegal casinos
was 1.5 million compared to 5 million visits to official casinos.9 Although the illegal casinos
were ‘brick andmortar’ gaming houses whose locationwas known to every local taxi driver,
and also to the police of course, it proved difficult to close them down; even when closure
was successful, a new casino would quickly appear, often in the same location. There were
two reasons for their quick reappearance. First, these casinos claimed to offer games of
skill, which did not require a licence, instead of games of chance, which did. Second, the
Dutch Gambling Act stated that only publicly offered games of chance required a licence.
Illegal casinos thus set themselves up as private clubs, although in reality every customer
could become a ‘member’ on the spot. Proving that the casino was not a members-only
club and offered games of chance was a time-consuming task for the police; for one thing,
police experts had to observe the game on several occasions to establish whether it involved
skill or chance.
Because the casino operators also committed tax offences – they were unable to pay
gambling taxes voluntarily because doing so would be admitting that they offered games
of chance, which was illegal without a licence – the tax authority could also reclaim some
or all of the tax debt by seizing objects of value from the casino, such as the roulette and
card tables. Logically, this had the same outcome as closing the casino down for violating
gambling legislation. However, holding the ‘club’ liable for the remaining tax debt proved
difficult, as the legal person was dissolved immediately and the ‘board members’ were
8 This section is based on Spapens 2008b.
9 Regioplan 2001, p. 44.
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penniless straw men. The real operators stayed behind the scenes and could easily establish
a new ‘club’ to continue the gambling activities. It usually took several months before the
police or the tax authorities were able to halt the operation. This period allowed the oper-
ators to make good on their investment and to gain substantial profits. Under these cir-
cumstances, it will hardly come as a surprise that the eagerness of the public prosecution
service, the police, and the tax office to close the illegal gambling houses gradually waned.
Moreover, the local authorities generally did not regard illegal casinos as a serious issue
as long as there were no public order problems or visible criminal activities related to them.
Hence, in many cases the authorities tolerated the situation. However, in 1996 the Ministry
of Finance decided that massive tax evasion by illegal casinos needed to stop and launched
a special project. After several years of preparation, the Joker project began in earnest in
1999.
As its most important feat, the Joker project found an effective method to prevent the
illegal casinos from re-establishing themselves time and again, based on the administrative
municipal by-law (Algemene Plaatselijke Verordening, APV). Among other things, local
regulations specify the conditions under which the authorities will issue permits under
the Alcohol and Catering Act. Such a licence is required for any place that serves food and
drink, either alcoholic or non-alcoholic. This requirement also pertains to members-only
clubs, even if they serve free food and drink. Illegal casinos were therefore unable to
operate without such a licence. The APV also states the conditions under which the local
authorities can revoke this permit. The Joker project asked the authorities of the towns
with illegal casinos to add an extra paragraph to the by-law explicitly stating that any vio-
lation of the Gambling Act could result in administrative penalties, including closure of
the premises and, ultimately, revocation of the licence. In theNetherlands, the administra-
tive closure of premises, a decision taken by the mayor, is effective immediately.
The new paragraph added to the APV had a profound effect on the illegal casinos. As
the burden of proof is less severe in an administrative case, a single observation and
interviews with casino staff and players sufficed to close a casino down. It was no longer
necessary to wait until the operators had built up a substantial tax debt. After the munici-
pality amended its by-law, the existing casinos were closed. When a new one appeared,
the Joker project team would immediately start coordinated inspections, often within a
few days of the gambling house opening. During these visits, the tax authority’s gambling
experts established whether games of chance were offered and interviewed the players and
personnel. Statements by the players were used to demonstrate that they made no effort
to use skill in their games. The municipality checked whether the operators complied with
safety and sanitary regulations. The police were present to protect the other civil servants
and also checked for the presence of illegal arms and narcotic drugs. The public prosecutor
was then able to hand over relevant information collected by one public body to another.
Based on all the information, the Joker project team drew up a report that enabled the
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mayor to close the casino. As a result, it was no longer profitable to open an illegal casino.
By 2005, the authorities had closed all illegal casinos, and the situation has not changed
since then. Most of the customers have moved on to gambling arcades and the internet.
Criminals, who specifically wanted to avoid identity checks at the official casinos, have
reverted to private homes and the concealed back rooms of shady bars.
13.3.5 Cooperating with private parties
Apart from public bodies, private parties may also be able to help combat illegal activities
and public order problems. Private parties may have relevant information and be able to
take action on their own behalf. Although public-private partnerships were not the focus
of this study, this section presents some examples of such cooperation.
Denial of access to property
To begin with, private parties can play a role in denying access to property that criminals
use to facilitate illegal activities. An example from the Netherlands is cannabis cultivation
in social housing. Non-profit private housing foundations or associations own the houses.
If the police discover a cannabis nursery in social housing, the contract with the tenant
allows the housing association to evict him or her from the property and to deny access
to another of their houses for a certain period. This is justified by the fact that a cannabis
plantation causes severe damage to the property, for example because of damp.
In Gothenburg, a property owner also terminated a lease when the tenant started to
use a storage facility as a clubhouse for an outlaw motorcycle gang. It is of course essential
that the provisions in such contracts should be clearly formulated to allow such measures;
in addition, the private party must have a legitimate interest in taking action against his
contract partner.
Cooperating with private parties to reduce telecom fraud
A specific example fromAntwerp concerns ‘phone shops’, which allow customers tomake
overseas phone calls at reduced rates. The customers are usually poor immigrants. Phone
shops are also vulnerable to criminal infiltration and known as locations for illegal activities,
such as the trade in stolen smartphones. A specific problem in Antwerp was that phone
shops regularly went bankrupt intentionally after only a few months, leaving the telecom
operators with unpaid bills. The local authorities urged the telecom operators to be more
restrictive in contracting shady phone shops. Combined with the requirement that such
shops had to apply for a permit in order to prevent nuisance, this measure reduced the
number of phone shops by 90 percent.
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Cooperating with private parties to reduce metal theft
The Pol-PRIMETT project is funded by the European Commission and offers an example
of multi-agency cooperation involving public and private parties. The project is running
in a number of EU Member States and aims to reduce metal theft. Pol-PRIMETT-1 ran
from October 2010 to September 2013 and has been followed up by Pol-PRIMETT-2. The
aims are to improve (transnational) collaboration between law enforcement agencies and
the private sector in the fight against metal theft and to promote good practice across the
EU, enabling the exchange of knowledge, skills and intelligence. The UK National Crime
Agency heads Pol-PRIMETT-2, which involves partners from eight Member States. The
project aims to disseminate information on offender profiles, crime locations, target
materials, the stolen metal supply chain, prevention countermeasures, public-private
security strategies, legislation and voluntary codes of practice.10 The parties that cooperate
in Pol-PRIMETT differ per Member State because each country is at a different stage of
tackling metal theft and faces different challenges. Due to variations in legislation, culture,
society and public/private structures, there can never be one solution to this problem.11
In the UK, for example, the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and the British
Transport Police (BTP) are involved, but also the private, faith and heritage sectors. The
latter are involved because theft of copper roofs causes severe damage to historical churches.
The BTP launched the Fusion Intelligence Unit in 2011, which brings together infor-
mation from different government agencies, Crimestoppers and private parties such as
railway companies and forwards it to the relevant police departments, such as the Regional
Organised Crime Units (ROCU, see 4.3.2).12 Another initiative was to have scrap metal
dealers take photographic proof of the identity of anyone offeringmetal for sale (Operation
Tornado). A final example are ‘days of action’ during which the police, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Vehicle and Operator Services Agency, the Department of Work
and Pensions and the local authorities performed inspections of scrap metal dealers and
set up road blocks to check the vehicles of persons wanting to sell metal.
13.4 Working apart together in permanent/semi-permanent structures
13.4.1 Introduction
The examples of administrative approaches presented in Section 13.3 refer to case-based
cooperation. Another option is to apply the concept in permanent or semi-permanent
10 See: http://pol-primett2.org/.
11 Pol-PRIMETT, Findings of Pol-PRIMETT research activities, via: http://pol-primett2.org/.
12 Pol-PRIMETT, Findings of Pol-PRIMETT research activities, via: http://pol-primett2.org/.
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bodies. Such bodies can focus on information exchange only, but they can also act as
platforms to coordinate disruptive or repressive actions. The basic principle of an admin-
istrative approach in which agencies ‘work apart together’ but apply their own respective
competences remains intact even if their seconded staff members share the same office.
The range of permanent and semi-permanent structures in place in the ten Member
States varies greatly. Theymay include administrative bodies, customs, tax authorities and
law enforcement agencies, or different combinations of partners. Theymay be territorially
organized to address all serious and organized crime problems in a given place, but may
also focus on a specific type of crime, such as VAT-related crime. Finally, some structures
may be more or less permanent in nature, whereas others have been established for a set
period. Below, we distinguish between structures at the national (Section 13.4.2), regional
(Section 13.4.3) and local levels (Section 13.4.4).
13.4.2 Integrated cooperation at the national level
Anti-mafia Directorate in Italy
The Italian Anti-Mafia Investigations Directorate (Dia) was established in 1991 as an
interagency investigative organization in which the State Police, the General Officers of
the Carabinieri, the Corpo Forestale dello Stato, the Polizia Penitenziaria and the Guardia
di Finanza cooperate to coordinate investigative activities as well as to carry out judicial
police investigations into mafia-type criminal offences. The Dia comprises three depart-
ments tasked with preventive investigations, judicial investigations and international
relations for investigative purposes, respectively.
The first type of investigation aims to gather information on criminal phenomena and
the activities of persons who belong to mafia-type organizations. The intelligence gathered
is used as a starting point for criminal investigations. This includes the composition of
criminal groups, their domestic and international relations and their modi operandi. The
emphasis is also on financial information, money laundering and public contracts. The
latter topic is the responsibility of the Procurement Central Monitoring Authority
(L’Osservatorio Centrale sugli Appalti, OCAp). The role of OCAp is to assist in preventing
mafia-affiliated companies from obtaining public tenders. It cooperates with the multi-
agency groups (Gruppo Interforze) set up with the Prefectures (see 13.2.4). The OCAp
maintains a nationwide database of legal and natural persons involved in building contracts,
for example.
The second department is tasked with criminal investigations. These investigations
are intelligence-led and aimed at strategically selected targets. During such investigations,
the Dia cooperates closely with the aforementioned police forces. Its main task is to coor-
dinate and manage the operations.
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The third department is responsible for international relations for investigative purposes.
It promotes and builds cooperation with law enforcement agencies abroad in the field of
organized crime. Such cooperation focuses on both the prevention and repression of
organized crime.
The Unit Synthetic Drugs in the Netherlands (1997-2004)13
In the second half of the 1990s, theDutch authorities came under increasing pressure from
abroad to tackle the problem of drug smuggling in general, and of ecstasy in particular. In
1995, the German police concluded that the Netherlands was the source of almost all of
the ecstasy pills it had intercepted. The French authorities made similar observations and
Senator Paul Masson even qualified the Netherlands as a narco état. The criticism worried
Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok, particularly because the Netherlands was scheduled to
assume the presidency of the European Union in January 1997. Kok argued that failing to
tackle ecstasy production would seriously damage the country’s international reputation.14
In July 1996, the Dutch police produced an analysis report that made clear that the
Netherlands had indeed developed into a major production country. Furthermore, it
concluded that all sorts of government agencies bore some of the responsibility for the
manufacture and trafficking of ecstasy, but had failed to share information and to cooperate
effectively.15 One of the main recommendations of the report was to establish a special
unit inwhich different agenciesworked together to address the ecstasy problem. In response
to the Prime Minister’s concerns, the Minister of Justice quickly adopted the idea and
informed Parliament in September 1996 that this ‘Unit Synthetic Drugs’ (USD) would be
set up as soon as possible.
The USD brought together personnel from the police, the public prosecution service,
the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service (FIOD), the Central Agency for Import
and Export (CDIU), the Economic Investigation Service (ECD), Customs, and the Gen-
darmerie (Royal NetherlandsMarechaussee). This enabled the integration of criminal and
fiscal investigation, themonitoring of flows of non-controlled precursor chemicals required
for the manufacture of synthetic drugs, and border controls.16 The unit would comprise
46 personnel, operate for four years, and then be evaluated.
Its first task was to bring together information from different agencies for analysis and
operational purposes, collect additional data in the Netherlands and abroad, and promote
13 This section is based on Spapens 2013.
14 Spapens 2006.
15 IRT Zuid-Nederland 1996.
16 The CDIU and ECD have since been merged with the FIOD. The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is a
military police organization, but it also performs a number of civilian tasks, such as policing the international
airports.
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information exchange. The fact that a third of the USD’s staff was dedicated to this task
underlines its importance.
Second, the USD would function as a national contact point for foreign authorities
seeking information from the Netherlands, and it would also coordinate responses to
requests formutual legal assistance on synthetic drugs.Members of theUSDalso performed
public relations tasks and travelled the world giving presentations on the Dutch approach
to tackling ecstasy production and trafficking.
Third, the unit itself was to investigate criminal groups, usually in cooperation with
regular serious and organized crime squads.17 The USD established two investigation
teams. The first focused on facilitators who traded in precursor chemicals and provided
specific hardware to ecstasy producers. The second team performed ‘quick interventions’,
usually short-term criminal investigations (six weeks), partly in response to requests for
mutual legal assistance from abroad.
The Dutch authorities stepped up their efforts after the turn of the millennium. The
main reason was fierce criticism by the United States regarding the rising number of pills
from the Netherlands flowing into the country since the second half of the 1990s. President
Bill Clinton personally lectured Prime Minister Kok during his visit to the White House
in September 2000. Immediately upon his return, Kok angrily summoned the chiefs of
police and the heads of the public prosecution service and demanded that they take bolder
action against ecstasy production and trafficking. Furthermore, following its evaluation,
the USD was allowed to continue for another four-year term.
The USD contributed to these efforts by providing information on the ‘XTC network’.
By combining information sources, the authorities had been able to identify the major
producers and traffickers of ecstasy. The police chose the ‘top ten’ key players as the targets
of large-scale criminal investigations which could take a year or more to complete. These
operations employed the usual range of special investigative methods, such as wiretapping,
surveillance, pseudo-purchase, and infiltration. Over a period of five years, different serious
and organized crime squads were able to apprehend most of the key players. Prison sen-
tences for the kingpins also rose from between six and eight years on average to twelve to
fourteen years in several cases. There was also the risk of extradition to the United States
in cases of trafficking ecstasy to that country, something that Dutch criminals particularly
feared because of the conditions in American prisons.18
In search of integrated and innovative approaches, theUSD itself focused on ‘facilitators’
providing key services to criminal groups manufacturing ecstasy. The USD succeeded in
apprehending a person who adapted vessels originally designed as equipment for milking
17 At that time, theDutch police force was divided into 25 independent regions, each of which had a department
for the investigation of organized crime. There were also six supra-regional organized crime investigation
squads. The latter merged into the National Criminal Investigation Department in 2004.
18 Husken & Vuijst 2002.
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cows into reaction vessels for synthesizing MDMA. The police had discovered the fruits
of his labour in over twenty ecstasy laboratories. Criminal groups importing PMK from
China were another important target of investigation. PMK is a controlled chemical and
although other raw materials may also be used, the synthesizing process for PMK is much
simpler. The arrest of several major importers in 2004-2006 resulted in a noticeable drop
in production. In addition, another initiative proved to be essential for reducing the flow
of PMK. The Dutch undertook successful diplomatic action to persuade the Chinese
authorities to prevent chemical companies from covertly manufacturing PMK. This in
particular resulted in PMK becoming a scarce product. The above illustrates that a combi-
nation of traditional investigation methods and integrated approaches toward facilitators
may be powerful tools in the fight against organized crime.
Czech joint cooperation centre
In the Czech Republic, cooperation and information exchange between law enforcement
agencies, administrative authorities and private parties is common.One example is human
trafficking, where the police cooperate with a non-government organization to help the
victims (La Strada International). Another is the trade in counterfeit alcohol containing
industrial alcohols such as methanol, which can cause health problems and even death.
Here, a combination of criminal, fiscal (fines for tax evasion) and administrative measures
(issuing of special stamps) was applied to address the problem.
Such cooperation was encouraged in the national Strategy to fight organised crime for
the years 2011-2014. According to this strategy, ‘cooperation between law enforcement
authorities with administrative authorities is a key tool for detecting organised crime.’19
The strategy promotes launching joint teams to detect and investigate economic crime,
money laundering and laundering of the proceeds of crime (in collaboration with the
Financial Analysis Unit and tax offices), smuggling and illegal production and trade (in
collaboration with the Customs Administration and the Czech Trade Inspectorate), envi-
ronmental damage (in collaboration with the Environmental Inspectorate), and possibly
in other areas.20 It also aims to enhance cooperation between the police and the tax
authorities (including a joint team to detect tax crimes) and the intelligence services,
respectively.
Czech legislation already allows for this type of cooperation, but the government con-
sidered it a problem that it was ad hoc and incident-driven and depended on individual
staff to establish contacts with other public or private partners.21 The aim of the strategy
is therefore to achievemore systemic cooperation between different government agencies.
19 Ministry of the Interior 2011.
20 Ministry of the Interior 2011, p. 37.
21 Interview, Czech Ministry of the Interior, 31 March 2014.
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In March 2014, the Ministry of the Interior was in the process of establishing a joint centre
at the national level inwhich the police, theCustomsAdministration and the tax authorities
would cooperate. The centre will be responsible for investigating organized crime and
comprise about 60 staff, who will be able to access the databases of their respective agencies
and exchange information directly. Furthermore, local and regional agencies may contact
the centre if they require information from or contacts within one of its partner organiza-
tions.
VAT Task Force in Poland
At the national level, Poland has established several integrated task forces to counteract
specific crime problems. Examples are VAT-related crimes, metal theft (in the context of
the Pol-PRIMETTproject, see 3.5.2) and the trade in new psychoactive substances. A Task
Force was also launched for asset recovery.
On 30 January 2014, the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Finance and the
ProsecutorGeneral concluded the Agreement on cooperation in developing systemic solutions
aimed at preventing and combating economic crime. Based upon this agreement, two
working groups were established.
The first working group, led by the Ministry of Internal Affairs has been tasked to
develop proposals for instruments for the efficient recovery, accounting and management
of secured property derived from crime. This working group prepared so far:
– a concept of inter-institutional trainings in financial investigations;
– a draft Law on the Central Data Base for accounts – aimed as a tool for fast acquisition
of complete and reliable information about accounts and other investment products
enabling storage of financial assets;
– still ongoing is the elaboration of a methodology for the management of secured
property derived from crime.
The second working group, led by the Ministry of Finance, was tasked to deal with VAT
and excise fraud. This working group deploys activities in three areas:
– development of joint legislative and organizational initiatives aimed at improving the
inter-institutional activities in preventing and combating VAT and excise fraud. This
included, inter alia, a survey among law enforcement officers to identify the main
problems in counteractingVAT and excise fraud. Based on the survey results, proposals
for concrete solutions, contributing to systemic changes, will be prepared;
– inter-institutional cooperation in training. This concerned joint training on counter-
actingVATand excise fraud for the police, the fiscal control authorities and prosecutors.
This training was offered to all the Appellate Prosecutor’s Offices in Poland.
– implementation of integrated pilot actions to counteract the most important areas of
economic crime. Implemented measures for example concerned irregularities in the
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turnover of fuel and electronic products. Theworking group initiated and implemented
joint inter-agency operations aimed at counteracting such irregularities.
The latest systemic result of the agreement is the elaboration of a draft Programme for
preventing and combating economic crime, for the years 2015-2020, which aims at identifying
and coordinating the implementation of a national policy to strengthen the mechanisms
for preventing and combating economic crime. The main objective of this programme is
to reduce economic crime by strengthening the system for preventing economic crime,
increasing the effectiveness of the combat against economic crime and enhancing the
efficiency of with which proceeds of crime are recovered. The programme will be give the
status of a governmental programme. Currently, the legislative process is ongoing and will
be finalized when the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland has adopted the
programme.
Already in 2011, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Health developed a
coordinated response to new psychoactive substances (NPS). These substances are not
included in the legislation on illicit drugs but can be dangerous to a person’s health. Fur-
thermore, to circumvent regulations on food and drug quality, shops sold these substances
as ‘collector’s items’ that were not to be consumed or otherwise used by the buyers. The
Polish authorities adopted legislation enabling the chief sanitary inspector and the regional
offices to halt the sale of these substances by administrative decision temporarily so as to
determine whether they are harmful to health and so as to secure all stocks of the drugs.
In addition, different authorities carried out site inspections to establish whether the shops
involved complied with all sorts of regulations, closing the ones that did not comply. Sales
of NPS dropped off considerably as a result.
13.4.3 Integrated cooperation at the regional level
Regional Intelligence Centres in Sweden
In the mid-2000s, Sweden saw a rising number of violent crimes committed by members
of organized crime groups and outlaw motorcycle gangs. In November 2007, for example,
there was a bomb attack on the house of a public prosecutor in Trollhättan. At the time
of the attack, she was preparing a trial concerning a criminal group.22 In response, Minister
of Justice Beatrice Ask initiated a programme to combat organized crime. One of its out-
comes was a national operative council for the police and three Regional Intelligence
Centres (RICs). The police also intend to establish regional task forces specifically to
combat organized crime that will employ 200 staff in total.
22 Korsell, Skinnari & Vesterhav 2011.
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The RICs facilitate information-sharing between the police, customs (Tullverket), the
SwedishEconomicCrimeAuthority (Ekobrottsmyndigheten), bailiffs (Åklagarmyndigheten),
the CrimeUnits of the Swedish TaxAuthority (Skatteverket) and other agencies. A Steering
Group decides at the strategic level which projects the RICs should work on. At the oper-
ational level, the Operative Council meets every four weeks to discuss specific cases and
phenomena that require interventions. If a partner organization is of the opinion that a
particular criminal group or phenomenon should be tackled, it presents its case before the
Council. In early 2014, there were 46 key criminals under investigation.
There are currently three RICs (in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö), but the
intention is to open another five in order to cover all of Sweden. An RIC can be visualized
as an office where intelligence staff from the various partner organizations can access their
respective information systems and integrate their findings. The RICs cooperate closely
with the task forces and provide these with information and intelligence relevant for their
investigation. Cases are discussed in informal, usually weekly meetings. Depending on the
nature and scope of the case, and the state of the investigation, all or some of the agencies
participate. One operation may lead to a number of different court cases, with different
public prosecutors, because the intention is not just to apprehend perpetrators but also to
remove the infrastructure they use to commit crimes and launder money, for example.
The importance of the RICs and the task forces is that the partner organizations now have
immediate access to relevant information, whereas before they usually received it only as
a leftover when the other agency had completed its investigation. “The difference with
some years ago is that we look at a problem in a different way. We not only look at the
crime or the suspect, but also at his businesses, his property, his finances and so on, and
ask ourselves what we can do together” explained a police officer whom we interviewed.
The cases addressed by the task forces are the most serious organized crime cases involving
violent criminal groups that have infiltrated in legitimate businesses and are attempting
to exert unlawful influence on civil servants. The local police handle ‘normal’ cases of
narcotic drug dealing, for example.
GAIN network in England and Wales
TheGovernmentAgencies IntelligenceNetwork (GAIN) in England andWales is amulti-
agency group that brings together intelligence and investigation staff from public sector
enforcement agencies to lawfully share information and intelligence. The exchange of
information may of course also prelude joint investigations or other coordinated interven-
tions.
GAINwas established at the end of 2013 and is specifically aimed at reducing the threat,
harm and risk associated with serious and organized crime. The origin of GAIN lies with
theRegionalOrganisedCrimeUnits (ROCUs), of which there are currently nine in England
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and Wales. The ROCUs provide capability to investigate serious and organized crime
across police force boundaries.23
Each ROCU has a GAIN coordinator at both a strategic and tactical level who acts as
a gateway through which the different partners can share information. At the regional
level, the partner organizations generally meet once every three months to discuss ongoing
and emerging issues and cases. The aim of these meetings is to decide on actions and
resources. A Deputy Chief Constable chairs a meeting of the GAIN Executive group at the
national level, facilitating the implementation of theGAINprogramme.GAIN is supported
by the Home Office.
Twenty different government bodies were participating in the network in May 2014,
including the police, HM Revenue and Customs, the National Health Service – Protect,
Trading Standards, the Gambling Commission, the Driver & Vehicle Standards Agency,
and the Environment Agency. The legal basis for information-sharing is regional agree-
ments. This document allows for full sharing of information and intelligence between the
different partners, although individual agencies can ‘opt out’ with regard to specific types
of information.
Information between the partner organizations is shared through a secure online system
comparable to an e-mail network. It uses a standard form for posing a request for informa-
tion and data-sharing. If a colleague requests information, a GAIN authorized employee
fills in the form, signs it, and forwards it to the regional GAIN coordinator. From there,
the form is distributed to all the other partners, or a selection depending on the wishes of
the requesting agency. The partners establish whether they have relevant information and
report this as either a ‘hit’ or a ‘no-hit.’ The requesting party is informed about both out-
comes. The system itself therefore does not store intelligence. In the event of a hit, further
information is exchanged bilaterally. The outcome may also be that two or more partner
organizations continue working on the case together, and approaching it from all possible
angles.
Regional Intervention Groups (France)
The French Regional Intervention Groups (RIG) were set up in 2002 and have grown to
37 RIGs throughout the country. Their primary task is to identify and seize illegal assets.
The RIGs employ six to 25 staff who represent the National Police, the Gendarmerie, the
Tax Authorities and Customs.
The RIGs act on indications that a person’s assets are potentially illicit or in cases when
a person has an unusually luxurious lifestyle andwealth. In such cases, the RIGmay perform
a financial analysis to establish whether a person’s legitimate income is consistent with his
or her lifestyle. This is evaluated based on data available to each of the partner organizations
23 HM Government 2013.
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in the RIG. Tips about suspicious financial behaviour come from various public services,
databases such as the unusual and suspicious transactions database (TRACFIN, Traitement
du Renseignement et Action Contre Les Circuits Financiers Clandestins) and the intelligence
services. From 2009 to 2013, the RIGs seized approximately €443 million, confiscating
€138 million in 2013 alone.
Regional Information and Expertise Centres in the Netherlands
In 2008, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior launched the Administrative Approach to
Organized Crime programme. The main aim of this programme was to improve imple-
mentation of the instruments available to disrupt criminal activities and promote their
coordinated application.One outcome of this policywas the establishment of ten Regional
Information and Expertise Centres (RIECs).24 The RIECs were greatly inspired by the
Emergo project discussed below, and operate as platforms for the exchange of information
between municipalities, provinces, the public prosecution service, the tax authorities, the
special investigative services and other public and semi-public bodies.
The RIECs became operational in 2010 and were given two main tasks. The first is to
facilitate information exchange. The main aim here is to bring together information held
by the different partners, either to detect criminal activities in the geographical area for
which the RIEC is competent or to decide on interventions to disrupt these activities.
Analysts from different disciplines working at the RIEC bring together the available
information in a report and advise onwhich instrumentsmay be used to tackle the problem.
The second task of the RIECs is to facilitate interventions aimed at disrupting criminal
activities. Depending on the nature of the illegal activities, one partner can be asked to
intervene. In complex situations, effective disruption may require a coordinated effort
involving two ormore partners and hence ongoing information exchange and fine-tuning.
Depending on the nature of the activities, interventions may be based on criminal law,
administrative law, fiscal law or combinations of these instruments. To this end, illegal
activities are often analysed in terms of ‘criminal business processes.’ First, the chain of
logistics is determined. Based on this, the RIEC establishes which partner is best able to
intervene in a particular part of the business process. This analysis tool is known as the
‘barrier model’. Such models have been drawn up for assorted types of crime, for example
human trafficking, illegal immigration, cannabis cultivation, synthetic drugs production
and specific environmental crimes.
The following example briefly describes how one of the RIECs proceeded to tackle a
network of individuals involved in cannabis cultivation in one of the major cities in the
south of the Netherlands. Its approach focused specifically on persons who facilitated this
24 There is also the LIEC (Landelijk Informatie- en Expertisecentrum), which operates at the national level. The
LIEC is policy-oriented and facilitates the RIECs but it does not handle operational cases.
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criminal activity, such as real property agents who provided houses and commercial
property for cannabis nurseries to criminal groups, electricians who installed the wiring
in the plantations, rental companies that provided cars and vans for the transport of
growing equipment, cannabis and waste from the plantations, and lawyers who advised
the criminals on how to launder money.
The starting point for this particular operation was a witness who had played an
important role in a criminal group and who knew most of the others in the local network
of large-scale cultivators. He decided to quit when other key members in his group started
to threaten him.25 One day in 2012, he walked into a police station and began to give
detailed statements on the functioning and composition of the local cannabis network.
This allowed the police to take action against several suspects andmount extensive searches
of their houses, where they found 1.4 million euros in cash buried in plastic containers in
the gardens, for instance. Next, the information from the witness’s statements was passed
on to the RIEC. Here, the aim was to disrupt the infrastructure of the network, both the
legal and the illegal parts of it.
The RIEC first identified and listed all individuals and locations mentioned by the
witness. It next installed a situation room for representatives of the police, the public
prosecution service, the tax authority and the municipality. In this room, nicknamed the
‘pressure cooker’, they had direct access to their own information databases. They were
tasked to discuss all possible interventions against the identified subjects from a criminal,
fiscal and administrative law perspective and come up with recommendations and plans.
Depending on the subject, the recommended intervention might involve a single agency
or require a coordinated approach. Next, the interventions were rated in terms of effects,
efficiency and their contribution to the disruption of the local cannabis network. Based
on the list of priorities, six subjects were selected for integrated repressive interventions.
The interventions were not necessarily aimed at key persons within criminal groups, but
at individuals who worked for different groups and were thus more crucial to the network
as such. These included electricians, who had the expertise to install the wiring in large
plantations in a way that reduced the risk of detection by the power company, for example
by means of a setup that prevented suspicious peaks in electricity use. Although such
experts performed crucial roles, theywere usually not hardened criminals and this increased
the chance that they would provide further information and evidence.
In addition, the RIEC initiated general preventive activities. For example, it became
clear that criminal groups carefully prepared covers for persons who posed as tenants of
25 Of course, the witness could have been treated as a criminal informer, which would have meant keeping his
identity secret. However, the information he provided was so specific that the authorities would then have
been unable to use it without disclosing the source to his fellow criminals. Hence, the police asked him to
deliver the statements as a normal witness, to which he agreed. He and his family have been taken into a
witness protection programme.
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private or commercial property in which they installed cannabis plantations. ‘You do not
send a youngster in a tracksuit to rent a villa in an affluent neighbourhood, but a well-
groomed man in his fifties with a credible financial background,’ explained the witness.
This of course is rather obvious, but he also gave other details that were used to inform
bona fide real property agents and thus enable them to detect whether a prospective tenant
was actually a front for a criminal group.
The ‘pressure cooker’ method differs from the usual approach in the sense that all rel-
evant partners exchange information and intelligence and discuss interventions from the
beginning. In most other cases, one party starts to address the problem on its own and is
inclined to involve other partners only after they have successfully completed their own
activities or, conversely, run into problems.
Of course, this type of multi-agency cooperation is not without its problems and fric-
tions. Although the exchange of information and intelligence in the context of the RIECs
is based on a specific legal framework agreement, there will always be self-declared ‘experts’
on data protection laws within the various agencies who will contest whether particular
information can be shared legally in specific situations. Most notably, the police and the
public prosecution service have a culture of secrecy, even within their own organizations,
and many of their personnel tend to be uncomfortable with the idea of opening up to
‘outsiders’. Another problem, mentioned below in the context of the Emergo project, is
that the different agencies participate voluntarily in the RIEC. That means that none of
the partners can overrule the other. When conflicts arise at the operational or middle
management levels, a ‘steering group’ consisting of the regional heads of the relevant
agenciesmust convene and find a solution, which causes delays. Not surprisingly, effective
multi-agency cooperation often requires substantial diplomatic skills.
13.4.4 Integrated cooperation at the local level
Emergo project in Amsterdam (The Netherlands)
In 2007, Amsterdam launched the Emergo project as a multi-agency approach to serious
and organized crime (e.g. exploitation, narcotic drugs, money laundering) in the Red Light
District.26 In Emergo, the police, the public prosecution service, local government, and the
tax authorities worked together, with academics also joining the team. The project involved
both information analysis and an operational part. The Emergo project did not have
investigative personnel attached directly to it, and the members of the team did not work
together in a single office but they did meet very frequently.
26 Projectgroep Emergo 2011.
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The Emergo project broke down into two main parts. The first was operational and
consisted of two groups: the Enforcement Group, which was concerned with surveillance
and control, and the Serious CrimeGroup, whichwas taskedwith criminal investigation.27
The joint objective for both groups was to intervene where possible in crime-related
problems. Staff in the groups overlapped to some extent. The EnforcementGroup consisted
of civil servants from the Central Borough of the City of Amsterdam tasked with licensing,
Tax Administration staff tasked with controlling the businesses in the district, and uni-
formed police officers working on the streets. The Serious Crime Group comprised per-
sonnel from the Central Borough but also from the Van Traa team. Police representatives
were from the Serious and Organized Crime Department of the Amsterdam-Amstelland
police region and from the Tax and Customs Administration’s Serious Cases Team. The
latter handles fiscal cases involving key members of organized criminal groups.
Information-gathering and analysis constituted the second part of the Emergo project.
Here, the primary goal was to identify hidden crime problems in the district by bringing
together information from the databases of the Emergo partners and from open sources
such as the Chamber of Commerce register. The exchange and use of information required
the development of a specific legal framework agreement, which the Emergo partners
signed in 2008.
The information and analysis part of Emergo also consisted of two subprojects. The
first involved human analysts from the police, local government and the tax authorities,
who collected and compared information in five separate projects. These concerned a
thorough analysis of two particular streets in the Red Light District, a selection of one-star
and two-star hotels, a selection of coffeeshops situated in the district, a selection of key
players and facilitators known to the Emergo partners, and a study of the problem of
human trafficking in the district. In all these projects, the analysts collected and evaluated
every piece of information available on persons, businesses and premises. They then passed
on indications of crime, fiscal irregularities or non-compliance with administrative regu-
lations to the operational groups and documented these in analysis reports.
The analysis of one street, for example, revealed that about 30 percent of the addresses
had no registered inhabitants. The Enforcement Group thus set up an operation to check
these premises. It became clear that all sorts of persons lived there who preferred not to
make their presence known to the authorities, such as Eastern European prostitutes and
pimps. Several houses also turned out to be in use as an illegal hotel. These findings were
followed up by administrative and fiscal measures, for instance because the operators of
such hotels had usually ‘forgotten’ to report their income to the Tax Administration. The
hotel project led to the identification of a hotel owner known to the police for possible
involvement in drugs trafficking, whereas the tax authorities had serious questions about
27 Projectgroep Emergo 2011, p. 284.
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the financing and operation of the hotel. Based on these findings, the Serious Crime Group
initiated an investigation, whichwas successfully completed. These are just a few examples.
Generally speaking, creating an open atmosphere in information exchange contributed
greatly to building trust among the partners. Before, secrecy fed the idea that the other
party was sitting on a mountain of data that it was unwilling to share. It soon became clear
that the opposite was true. One interesting but not unexpected discovery was that the
available information on particular persons or problems usually pointed in the same
direction. Whenever the police had its doubts about a person or a business, the tax
authorities and local government also had information on irregularities, and vice versa.
Although manual analysis of various databases produced a great deal of useful infor-
mation towhich the different partners could respond, it also proved to be time-consuming.
Even though the Red Light District comprises no more than a few square kilometres, it
was impossible to have analysts screen it manually. A second subproject was therefore
launched aimed at developing data mining techniques to identify persons, legal entities,
and premises with non-standard profiles. Human analysts could then further analyse the
‘red flags’. This subproject ran into many difficulties, however. To begin with, it took
considerable effort to obtain databases from the different partners and to format them for
analysis purposes. Merging of databases proved to be problematic because the police, the
city, and the tax authorities had registered the same person under a slightly different name,
for instance if the name concerned was Arabic, Chinese or Spanish. It took a team of ICT
specialists and academics almost three years to come up with the first results. One was the
identification of a group of persons whose profiles were similar to those of known serious
criminals. Of course, establishing whether these individuals were indeed engaged in
organized crime would require further manual analysis. Unfortunately, this proved to be
impossible because a municipal data protection committee, tasked with supervising the
use of the population register database, decided that the results could not be shared with
the operational pillar of the Emergo project. This revealed a flaw in the legal framework
underlying the project: although theMinistries of Justice, the Interior, and Finance, as well
as the Emergo partners had all signed the framework agreement, that agreement did not
override the decisions of privacy committees operating at lower levels.
Beyond this, however, Emergo profoundly changed operational cooperation in actual
criminal investigations. In earlier cases of human trafficking, the police performed their
investigation independently and focused only on the pimpswho actually exploitedwomen.
Afterwards, the police advised local and fiscal authorities on specific measures in an
‘administrative report’. The reports only addressed general issues, however, and offered
the other government agencies little news. Of course, the public prosecution service also
transferred information from police files to the local authorities, but because the police
were not experts on administrative law, the files often lacked the precise information local
authorities needed to take action.
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In the Emergo project, the targets were not only the pimpswhowere actually exploiting
women but also the companies renting out the windows, the owners of the premises, and
the facilitators. In other words: the purpose of the investigation was not just to prove
human trafficking but also to gather the precise details required for administrative and
fiscal proceedings. During the first investigation, the team of detectives, Central Borough
staff, the Van Traa team, and tax administrators met every month to discuss results and
tactics.28 On the one hand, the meetings allowed the partners to make clear which informa-
tion they needed; on the other, the local authorities and the Tax and Customs Administra-
tion could act immediately on specific information. For instance, when the police found
out where the prostitutes and pimps stayed, it shared this information with local govern-
ment. The local authorities then traced who had rented these houses or apartments in
order to assess compliance with local regulations.29
The criminal investigation and the administrative proceedings were also intertwined
in other ways. For example, during the investigation the operator of the company that
rented the pimps the windows transferred ownership to his brother. However, the local
authorities issue licences to a person and not to a company. The new owner should
therefore have applied for a licence, which he ‘forgot to do’. Consequently, the company
was ordered to stop renting windows to prostitutes. The investigation team and local
government staff carefully orchestrated delivery of this notice, allowing the police to use
wiretapping and surveillance to observe which persons the ‘owner’ – who was suspected
of being a mere front – would contact in response.30 This is but one example of how the
Emergo partners aligned interventions and tactics to tackle the whole of the infrastructure
used in the exploitation of women.
The Emergo project made clear that professionals from different government agencies
usually have little trouble cooperating closely. However, three important problems remain.
The first is information-sharing. Dutch legislation on data protection is very complex, and
although legal advisers from the Ministry of Justice had reviewed the Emergo framework
agreement in detail, there were always other ‘specialists’, particularly within the police,
who had their own opinions and sometimes succeeded in convincingmanagers that certain
types of information could not be shared.
The second problem is a shortage of available personnel for conducting investigations,
especially in the police force and, to a lesser extent, the Tax and Customs Administration.
TheDutch police force is notoriously understaffedwhen it comes to planned investigations,
28 Verhoeven, Van Gestel & Jong 2011.
29 The housing shortage is a significant problem in Amsterdam, but rents are kept low for tenants of premises
owned by the city or a housing association. Some of those tenants then sublet their house or apartment –
including to criminals – at market rates, which is of course not allowed.
30 Verhoeven, Van Gestel & Jong 2011.
601
13 Practical application of the concept
and the teams that decide which cases should be pursued regularly refused to commit
resources to Emergo investigations.
The third problem is that in a cooperative effort such as Emergo, no single partner is
leading.When specific problems arose, for instance regarding data protection and resources,
no one had the power to take a final decision. This regularly called for ‘massaging’ and
persuasion.
Centre of Knowledge against Organized Crime in Gothenburg (Sweden)
In Gothenburg, the Centre of Knowledge against Organized Crime fights gang crime,
organized crime and unlawful influence. Its mission is to sponsor, support and lead net-
working activities and projects aimed at concrete measures. The Centre was launched in
June 2008 specifically to tackle serious problems with organized crime in the city. In 2006,
a car owned by a doorman at a nightclub was blown up in the city centre. There was also
a spectacular robbery at the Post Office, with seven burning cars in the city centre.31 During
this period, shootings and other violent crimes also became an increasing problem that
persists to this day; in 2013, there were 58 shooting incidents involving eight deaths.
The Centre works as a coordinator and supports municipal and state agencies as well
as private parties in Gothenburg. It is part of the City Council of Gothenburg and works
with eleven government agencies: the County Administrative Board, the Tax Agency, the
County Police, the public prosecution service, the Economic CrimeAuthority, the Security
Service, the Enforcement Authority, the Prison and Probation Service, the Social Insurance
Agency, the Employment Agency and Customs. The regional heads of these agencies
participate in a steering group that discusses strategic policies and priorities. At the oper-
ational level, the contact group meets six to eight times per year. Apart from this, there is
also close cooperation with private parties, such as real property owners, non-profit orga-
nizations and businesses.
The Centre itself is a small unit of six persons, including civil servants and one police
officer. On the strategic level, it aims to implement long-term structural measures that
disrupt the preconditions for organized crime and unlawful influence. To this purpose,
the Centre collects and distributes information, supports learning and participates in
debates on legislation, urban planning, procurement, the social insurance system and
licensing. An example from2010 is how it contacted politicians and the JusticeDepartment
in Stockholm to inform themof problemswith legislation regarding the unlawful possession
of firearms. At the operational level the Centre initiates, supports and leads networking
activities and projects aimed at concrete measures against gang criminality, organized
crime andunlawful influence. TheCentre also offers advice and supports local organizations
and citizens.
31 Korsell, Skinnari & Vesterhav 2011, p. 34.
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The Centre of Knowledge has four main areas of activity. The first is employment,
where it aims to prevent unlawful influence by supporting and assisting officials in carrying
out their tasks. The second is the economy, where it works to prevent organized criminals
from accessing procurement procedures, financial assistance, licensing and premises.
Third, the Centre supports both the victims of organized criminal activity, for instance
those who have been threatened or extorted, and perpetrators who want to give up their
criminal activities. The fourth main area of interest is to guarantee the integrity of demo-
cratic institutions. This includes preventing criminals from exercising unlawful influence
over politicians, civil servants and journalists.
The Centre of Knowledge facilitates cooperation between the partner organizations,
for example by promoting the establishment of operational teams that can address long-
term and ad-hoc problems. Much of the work of the Centre is based on informal network-
ing, bringing together people from different agencies and building trust between them.
The Centre is also involved in screening applicants in the context of procurement and
licensing, and it has access to police intelligence. Sweden does not have legislation on
sharing law enforcement information with municipalities, but there is a general clause
(Art. 14) in the Secrecy Act that allows this when the public interest prevails over the
interest of the individual. Invoking this provision, however, is a continuous balancing act.
One of the concerns in Gothenburg are the clubhouses of outlaw motorcycle gangs.
These are used to recruit new members, strengthen the networks and help to create a
feeling of ‘us against society’. They stir up feelings of unsafety in the community. Preventing
the gangs from acquiring clubhouses is an ongoing concern. In one case, an outlaw
motorcycle gang the Red Devils MC had subleased property from a tenant who had sup-
posedly rented it as Mandroms MC an regular motorcycle club. With the help of the City,
the property owner initiated a civil case to terminate the contract because the subleasing
had been unlawful. The outlaw motorcycle gang did not wait for the outcome of the case,
but moved voluntarily. They next bought an old ship lying in Gothenburg harbour with
the aim of converting it into a new clubhouse. However, they forgot that the City owns
the port. Moreover, the ship could only remain moored there permanently if the owners
joined the Fartygsföreningen Gullbergskajen, an association for ship restoration. With the
help of the City, the association succeeded in refusing the Red Devils MC as members and
in the end, they gave up and sold the ship. This example underlines that all sorts of unex-
pected regulations may be applied in the context of an administrative approach.
Recently, the efforts of the Centre of Knowledge have resulted in criminals moving to
other parts of the Gothenburg agglomeration to acquire property. These communities
have less experience with organized crime and administrative prevention. The Centre has
therefore started to advise the local authorities in the suburbs, and there is also discussion
about expanding its activities to 12 villages around Gothenburg. This will require extra
offices and personnel, however.
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‘Administrative approach to organized crime’ project in Genk (Belgium)
Genk is a Belgian city located in the Meuse-Rhine Euroregion. This particular region is
one of the most densely populated border regions in the EU and faces various types of
serious and organized cross-border crime.32 One example is the emergence of ‘integrated
crime groups’ that operate parts of their criminal business processes, such as synthetic
drugs production and cannabis cultivation, across the entire border area. For instance in
ecstasy production, chemicals may be stored in Germany, the laboratory where MDMA
is synthesized may be located in Belgium, and the final product, the pills, may be manufac-
tured in the Netherlands. The members of such groups may also live in different countries
in the region.33 Not surprisingly, they may also try to infiltrate the legitimate economy
throughout the border area.
When theDutch part of the region introduced an administrative approach to organized
crime in 2005,modelled after theVanTraa team inAmsterdam, the authorities immediately
foresaw the risk of a waterbed effect to other parts of the region, particularly from the
Netherlands to Belgium. In 2010, a comparative study was published on administrative
measures to prevent and repress crime and to cooperate across borders.34 In 2013, the city
of Genk set up a two-year pilot project entitled ‘Administrative approach to organized
crime’whichwas funded by the EuropeanCommission. The project was specificallymeant
as an experiment with an administrative approach in Belgium and to explore the option
of cross-border cooperation with the Netherlands in this field.
The Genk project adopted the structure of the Dutch RIEC located in Maastricht.35
The project is run by a steering group involving the City of Genk, the Belgian Province of
Limburg, the district public prosecution service in Tongeren36, the local and federal police,
the Ministry of the Interior, and the Association of Belgian Cities and Municipalities
(Vereniging van Vlaamse Steden en Gemeenten).
At the operational level, the local consultative group discusses the cases. The group
consists of representatives of the City of Genk, the local police and public prosecution
service, inspectors from the Federal Public Social Security Service (FOD Sociale Zekerheid)
and the Federal Public Economic Service, (FOD Economie) as well as representatives of
the Public Centres for Social Welfare (Openbare Centra voor Maatschappelijk Welzijn).
Of course, staff from the various municipal service departments also attend meetings if
the cases require this. The Tax Authorities have also been invited to join the group, but as
32 Spapens & Fijnaut 2005.
33 Spapens 2006.
34 Van Daele et al. 2010.
35 Although their purpose is the same, the Dutch RIECs may differ slightly in organizational structure.
36 The district of Tongeren has since merged with the district of Hasselt and now constitutes the district of
Limburg.
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explained above, the possibility of information-sharing between the tax service and other
public bodies is limited, although the VAT control group cooperates as an observer.
The project decided to focus on nightshops and human trafficking as targets for coor-
dinated interventions. With regard to the nightshops, the project initiated joint inspections
to check whether these shops complied with business regulations and specific local rules.
The inspections revealed all sorts of shortcomings; for example, some of the persons
employed at the shops also received unemployment benefits, and quite a number of these
businesses had not been properly registered with the Chamber of Commerce. In the latter
cases, the Federal Public Economic Service followed up on these infringements.
Inspections of houses that served as temporary residences for migrant workers led to
indications of human trafficking. In one case, the building inspector for the City of Genk
conducted a quality inspection of a house after receiving information that the owner was
renting it to illegal migrant workers. He discovered 17 Bulgarians and Romanians,
including some children, living there and sleeping on mattresses on the floor. The property
owner tried to intimidate the inspector when he announced that hewould be taking further
steps. Consequently, the local consultative group discussed the case and decided to gather
more information. As it transpired, the owner possessed other houses as well and already
had a record of violating the building codes. He also operated a grocery that caused parking
and waste disposal problems in the surrounding neighbourhood. In addition, the annual
turnover of this shop was largely cash-based and much higher than one would expect.
Based on the information collected, the authorities assumed that the property owner
acquired most of his income by renting temporary housing to foreigners at exorbitant
prices and laundered the money through his grocery. The property owner was already the
subject of a court case for building code violations.
These experiments revealed two main problems. The first was the absence of local
regulations pertaining to nightshops. For example, there was no by-law to regulate the
number of shops and their locations in order to prevent their concentration in one area.
Furthermore, the City of Genk could not screen the operators because there were no
requirements concerning criminal background or good conduct. As a result, the City ini-
tiated the adoption of additional local regulations.
Second, it proved difficult for the police and the tax authorities to share information
directly with the administrative authorities. The City of Genk, for example, could hand
over all its relevant information to the law enforcement agencies and the tax authorities,
but it took a very long time before they made their intelligence available to their adminis-
trative partners. The lack of criminal and fiscal information is particularly problematic.
Only after a person has been convicted does the information become available to the
administrative authorities. This is not always satisfactory, however, because the adminis-
trative authorities might have been able to act at an earlier stage if they had received the
relevant information. The Genk project sparked off a discussion with the police and the
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public prosecution service as to when the public interest, for example to prevent straw
men from obtaining a licence, should prevail over the efforts of law enforcement agencies
to obtain a conviction and in which cases both objectives could be reached.
13.5 Conclusion
We began Part I by presenting the following working definition of an administrative
approach: ‘preventing the facilitation of illegal activities by denying criminals the use of the
legal administrative infrastructure.’ Part III has shown that this definition is too narrow
because the selectedMember States also apply an administrative approach to actively disrupt
and repress serious and organized crime. One crucial aspect is ‘working apart together’,
in which different government bodies exchange information and develop concerted
responses to crime and public order problems. ‘Apart’ refers to the fact that every agency
uses its own competence. The added value of the approach is coordination on the one
hand and the more effective use of the information available with different partners on
the other.
Given the practical experiences described here, the definition should be amended as
follows: ‘preventing the facilitation of illegal activities by denying criminals the use of the
legal administrative infrastructure as well as applying coordinated actions to disrupt and
repress serious and organized crime and public order problems.’
In practice, the options available to prevent criminals infiltrating legitimate business
activities are often limited, as most business regulations only require the absence of a rele-
vant criminal record.Of course, background checks aremore extensivewhen the economic
activity is considered crucial to a nation’s economy, such as banking, or when it presents
a greater risk to the safety of consumers or the environment, such as operating a gambling
venue or selling firearms.However, only Italy and theNetherlands have adopted legislation
specifically designed to protect activities considered vulnerable to misuse by organized
criminals.
Administrative authorities may base repressive action taken against illegal activities,
or the disturbance of public order, on a wide range of regulations, such as business regula-
tions and local rules to guarantee public order. Applicable regulations are in place in all
of the Member States studied here. These allow for inspections and sanctions, which the
competent administrative authorities can execute independently. Administrative authorities
may also use information from law enforcement agencies and the tax authorities. However,
the exchange of such information outside the scope of a criminal investigation or before
a person (or legal entity) has been convicted is less far developed in most countries. In
England & Wales and Sweden, a variety of agencies can share information at the regional
level in theGAINnetwork and the Regional Intelligence Centres respectively, but the local
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administrative authorities are not included in these structures. In the Netherlands, Sweden
and Belgium, the local administrative authorities are included in the Regional Intelligence
and Expertise Centres, the local Centres of Knowledge Against Organized Crime in
Gothenburg, Malmö and Stockholm, and the Administrative Approach to Organized
Crimeproject inGenk, respectively. In Italy, theDirezioneAntimaffia can share information
with the prefects with regard to anti-mafia legislation. If information cannot be shared
officially, law enforcement agencies and the tax authorities may still be able to exchange
informationwith administrative bodies informally. Although administrative bodies cannot
use that information directly to impose sanctions or revoke licences, the knowledge that
something is wrong sends up a red flag. In addition, informal information exchange may
still enable different public bodies to ‘work apart together’. In that case, the intelligence is
used to agree on coordinated actions, such as joint inspections, but in executing such
actions, every agency acts in accordance with its own competences. Such cooperation may
be initiated ad hoc in all of the Member States studied here, for particular problems that
are regarded as considered serious.
Taking the idea of ‘working apart together’ a step further involves installing permanent
or semi-permanent structures in which different agencies exchange information and
develop coordinated actions. Such structures may be organized at the national, regional
or local levels. They may be problem-oriented, such as the Unit Synthetic Drugs in the
Netherlands or theVATTask Force in Poland, or territorially oriented, such as the projects
in Amsterdam (Emergo), Gothenburg and Genk, the Regional Organised Crime Units in
England & Wales, and the Joint Cooperation Centre in the Czech Republic.
Information exchange is an essential cornerstone for an administrative approach to
work. Particularly the flow of information from law enforcement agencies and the Tax
authorities to administrative bodies is sometimes problematic, and may require specific
agreements also to ensure proper data protection.
Our study shows that, although they vary widely, coordinated responses to crime
problems that involve different government agencies are far from a new or revolutionary
concept. All of the Member States studied here have applied the idea of ‘working apart
together’ to address crime problems and public order disturbances. Long-term cooperation,
however, only seems to occur when a problem is perceived as extraordinarily serious.
Examples are themafia in Italy, extreme violence caused by organized criminals in Sweden,
ecstasy production in the Netherlands, VAT-related fraud in Poland, and organized crime
in general in England & Wales. The fact that multi-agency cooperation requires a severe
problem also puts the continuity of such initiatives at risk. As soon as the sense of urgency
wanes, particularly at the higher management and political levels, cooperation initiatives
tend to fade away, slowly but surely. One can therefore conclude that cooperation, although
much more effective than uncoordinated efforts, is far from being the ‘natural’ approach
to complex crime problems. There is still a lot of work to be done.
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Finally, some remarks are appropriate with regard to the cross-border exchange of
information from law enforcement agencies and the tax authorities to administrative
bodies (see part IV for a legal analysis of this topic). Generally, our empirical research
revealed that such requests are not yet common, as in most countries included in our
research an administrative approach to serious and organised crime is still developing.
However, forerunners such as Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium do mention serious
difficulties in exchanging relevant ‘soft’ police information with other Member States
because the current legal framework only applies to ‘hard’ convictions. The problem con-
cerns exchange of ‘soft’ information for official use in particular: law enforcement agencies
and the tax authorities may exchange such information obtained from abroad informally
with the competent administrative bodies, but then it cannot be used to base administrative
decisions on. In such cases, the lack of a clear legal framework for information exchange
is highly frustrating for authorities that want to apply an administrative approach and
enables criminals to circumvent screening and avoid repressive interventions.
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14 The potential for information exchange
in Europe for the purpose of an
administrative approach to crime
M. Peters & A.C.M. Spapens
14.1 Introduction
In scope of the administrative approach to crime, it is essential to report on the potential
for information exchange within the European Union, since criminals make use of the
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) to conduct their business. When applying
administrative measures to prevent criminals from misusing legal infrastructures, the
authorities deem information from across the borders necessary due to the continuing
integration of the EU. For instance, displacement effects are found from the Netherlands
to Belgium due to application of an administrative approach in the Netherlands.
The underlying report first provides a discussion on whether the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the EU (TFEU) provides a foundation for drafting EU regulations concerning
information exchange supporting an EU-wide administrative approach and, if this is
insufficient, which other regulatory forms can be used to integrate information exchange
in support of an administrative approach (Section 14.2).
Second, we look at current instruments in the AFSJ that may provide a basis for
information exchange in support of an administrative approach. We distinguish between
legislative instruments (Section 14.3.1) and organizational structures supporting the
exchange of information in the EuropeanUnion (Section 14.3.2).We discuss each relevant
instrument and, if applicable, provide the name, implementation date and implementing
Member States and describe the type of information that can be shared, under which
conditions and by which authorities. We analyse whether the instruments discussed can
currently provide a basis for exchanging information in support of an administrative
approach. We also look at the possible applicable data protection regime (Section 14.3.3).
As this chapter focuses on the potential for information exchange, the instruments as
discussed above will be researched. This means that the report only indirectly deals with
issues of privacy and data protection, i.e. in the framework of the discussed instruments.
Questions of privacy and data protection however are of significant importance and should
not be overlooked when using or developing instruments for information exchange.
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14.2 The possibility of the EU regulating a European Administrative
Approach
In this section, we discuss the following question.
Is the EU legislator competent to create a legal instrument that allows adminis-
trative authorities to exchange information internationally with direct counter-
parts and with other relevant authorities such as the police, judicial authorities,
tax authorities, etc., in support of an administrative approach to crime?
To apply the methods as described in the definition, administrative authorities need
information about the persons involved. Currently, there is no instrument at EU level
specifically addressing the need of administrative authorities to exchange information in
order to prevent criminals from using legal infrastructures.1 Below, we discuss the options
offered by Title V of the TFEU (Section 14.2.1), and address the possibilities presented by
the integration of the Prüm Convention into the EU legal framework (Section 14.2.2).
14.2.1 Potential for regulating information exchange in support an
administrative approach under the Area of Security, Freedom and
Justice
Because the administrative approach to crime addresses crime prevention through means
other than criminal law, the legal basis for legislative instruments at the EU level must be
sought in theArea of Security, Freedom and Justice (ASFJ).2 Title V of the TFEU addresses
this area, which combines part of the former first and third pillars. According to Article
4 paragraph 2 under j TFEU, the Member States and the Union have shared competence
concerning the area. This implies that both the Member States and the European Union
can legislate and adopt legally binding acts on topics assigned to this area. The Member
1 This does not mean however that under certain existing instruments in the AFSJ, information designed for
police and judicial cooperation could not be exchanged to support an administrative approach. This will be
addressed under Section 14.3.
2 Title XXIV of the TFEU addresses administrative cooperation. Article 197 TFEU, the sole article in Title
XXIV, regulates the implementation of Union law by the Member States, which is regarded as essential for
the proper functioning of the EU. In this context, the Member States should improve their administrative
capacity to implement Union Law. The wording of this article makes clear that this provision is not intended
to cover cooperation and information exchange between administrative authorities to combat crime, but
rather to facilitate the implementation of EU law, regardless of the topic. A discussion of Article 197 TFEU
thus falls outside the scope of this report.
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States may exercise their competence in so far as that the Union has not exercised or ceased
the exercise of its competence.3
Several topics fall within the scope of the AFSJ. First of all, the AFSJ ensures absence
of internal borders for persons; it furthermore encompasses a common policy on asylum,
immigration and external border controls (former first pillar)4 and ensures a high level of
security by means of measures to combat crime, racism and xenophobia and to facilitate
coordination and cooperation between the police, judicial authorities and other competent
authorities, and through the mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters and the
approximation of criminal laws if necessary.5 Last, access to justice is provided for under
the AFSJ.6
Although several articles mention ‘administrative cooperation’7 or ‘administrative
measures’,8 they do not touch on the subject of this report. For instance, Article 74 TFEU
specifies that the Council will adopt measures for administrative cooperation between the
relevant departments of the Member States and between those departments and the
Commission concerning the topics referred to in the whole of Title V. However, this does
not refer to cooperation between administrative authorities, but to administrative cooper-
ation between judicial and police departments in the Member States. Article 75 refers to
a framework of administrativemeasures aiming to include capitalmovement and payments
for counter-terrorism purposes. These topics fall outside the scope of this report.
For the purposes of this report, the focus will lie on Chapter 2, 4 and 5 of Title V, which
concern Policies on Border Checks, Asylum and Immigration, Judicial Cooperation in
Criminal Matters and Police Cooperation, respectively. Chapter 3 is irrelevant for this
report, since it concerns judicial cooperation in civil matters. We discuss these chapters
in order to study whether the TFEU provides a legal basis for the EU to produce legislation
on information exchange in support of an administrative approach.
Policies on Border Checks, Asylum and Immigration
The policies that can be developed under Chapter 2 of Title V of the TFEU concern the
absence of internal border controls and the monitoring and checking of persons crossing
the external borders.9 For these purposes, the Parliament and the Council can adopt several
measures in accordance with the policies stated above.10 Chapter 2 does not comprise
explicit policies on information exchange betweenMember States or other relevant bodies.
3 Article 2 paragraph 2 TFEU.
4 Article 67 paragraph 2 TFEU and Chapter 2 of Title V TFEU.
5 Article 67 paragraph 3 TFEU.
6 Article 67 paragraph 4 TFEU.
7 Article 74 TFEU.
8 Article 75 TFEU.
9 Article 77 paragraph 1 TFEU.
10 Article 77 paragraph 2 TFEU.
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Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters
Article 82 paragraph 1 TFEU permits the European Parliament and Council to adopt
measures for judicial cooperation in criminal matters in accordance with the ordinary
legislative procedure. These include the possibility of adopting measures for cross-border
recognition of judgments and judicial decisions throughout the EU (sub a), preventing
and settling jurisdiction conflicts (sub b), supporting the training of the judiciary and
judicial staff (sub c) and facilitating cooperation between judicial or equivalent authorities
in relation to proceedings in criminal matters and the enforcement of decisions (sub d).
Directives under the ordinary legislative procedure may be adopted to establish minimum
rules in criminal procedure for the purpose of facilitating the mutual recognition of judg-
ments and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminalmatters having
a cross-border dimension.11 If a draft directive conflicts with their national legal system,
Council Members may refer the draft to the Council and suspend the ordinary legislative
procedure in the process. At the same time, other Member States may establish enhanced
cooperation if they so wish and there are at least nine that wish to do so.12
Since the scope ofArticle 82 specifically concerns criminal procedure, this article cannot
form the legal basis for an administrative approach to crime as defined in the introductory
section of this report.
Article 83 continues by providing a legal basis for establishingminimum rules concern-
ing the definition of criminal offences and sanctions for specifically defined serious crimes
with a cross-border dimension.13 Since this article defines criminal offences and sanctions
and provides relevant minimum rules, it cannot provide a legal basis for establishing a
new regulatory instrument for the administrative approach to crime; after all, it offers no
room for preventive or other measures based on national administrative law. Article 85
concerns Eurojust and Article 86 the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s
Office within the scope of Eurojust. Hence, both articles do not provide a basis for infor-
mation exchange in support of an administrative approach.
A provision offering a legal basis for the Council and Parliament to initiate legal actions
for an administrative approach to crime would be Article 84 TFEU:
The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the
ordinary legislative procedure,may establishmeasures to promote and support
the action of member states in the field of crime prevention, excluding any
harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States.
11 Article 82 paragraph 2 TFEU.
12 Article 82 paragraph 3 TFEU.
13 Article 83 paragraph 1 TFEU.
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This article deals directly with crime prevention. The article is somewhat overlooked and
moreover quite ambiguous in its formulation.14 Nonetheless, it creates competence for the
EU to act in the scope of an administrative approach to crime.
First, the provision formulated in article 84 TFEU does not condone proposals aiming
to harmonise laws and regulation of theMember States. Limitations also apply considering
the objectives set by the provision itself, which is however relatively general, i.e. crime
prevention.15 The definition of ‘crime prevention’ is based on the broad definition posed
in Council Decision 2001/427/JHA,16 which encompasses an administrative approach to
crime as defined in this study. Moreover, the article is not limited to certain criminal or
cross-border offences, and thus constitutes a significant potential for European influence
on crime prevention.17 In the scope of the article, the Council and Parliament can take
measures to ‘promote and support’ the actions of Member States under the ordinary leg-
islative procedure. More concrete, they can promote and support the Member States by
coordinating exchanges of best practices, monitoring and evaluating actions in the field.
Furthermore, the Council and Parliament can pass laws to establish ‘incentive measures’
as long as this does not involve harmonisation of law or regulations of the Member States.
This means that the EU can intervene by ‘persuasive soft law’. Based on article 76 TFEU
the Commission can submit proposals for measures as well as a quarter of the Member
States. Save from the exact terminology, these measures do constitute legally binding acts.18
Hence, the legislative power that can be derived from this article is more broad than the
provision initially suggests.19
Considering the above, initiatives by the Council and Parliament in the field of an
administrative approach to crime can be based on article 84 TFEU, as the foregoing defi-
nition of crime prevention allows for administrative measures to be included. One such
action would be to agree to include a multilateral convention in the EU legal sphere, as
has occurred for the Prüm Treaty, discussed in Section 14.2.2.
14 Craig 2010, p. 367.
15 Craig 2010, p. 175.
16 Lenz & Borchardt 2010, p. 1101. This very broad definition is regulated by article 1 under 3 of the Council
Decision 2001/427/JHA: Crime prevention covers all measures that are intended to reduce or otherwise con-
tribute to reducing crime and citizens’ feeling of insecurity, both quantitatively and qualitatively, either through
directly deterring criminal activities or through policies and interventions designed to reduce the potential for
crime and the causes of crime. It includes work by government, competent authorities, criminal justice agencies,
local authorities, and the specialist associations they have set up in Europe, the private and voluntary sectors,
researchers and the public, supported by the media.
17 Sieber et al. 2011, p. 124.
18 Craig 2010, p. 175.
19 Craig 2010, p. 176.
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Police cooperation
Chapter 5 of Title V TFEU provides for the establishment of measures concerning police
cooperation. Although this chapter does provide a legal basis for information exchange,
Articles 87 to 89 TFEU refer to either the police or other law enforcement authorities. Since
the scope of an administrative approach involves administrative authorities, no legal basis
can be found in this section. One solutionwould however be to amend the treaty to include
administrative authorities.
Conclusion
As shown above, the only possible basis in the TFEU for legislation concerning information
exchange in support of an administrative approach to crime would be Article 84 TFEU.
Having said that, Article 84 TFEUdemands action on the part of theMember States, which
the EU can support or promote. The initiative to exchange information in support of an
administrative approach to crime therefore lies with the Member States.
Another possible, but very ambitious option is to adjust the provisions on information
exchange for police cooperation purposes. This can be done by adding ‘administrative
authorities’ to ‘police authorities’ and ‘other law enforcement authorities’ as provided in
Articles 87 to 89 TFEU.
14.2.2 Possibility of including multilateral treaties under the framework of
the EU as offered by the integration of the Prüm Decision
In 2005, seven EU Member States decided to promote mutual recognition in the area of
police cooperation, with the Prüm Treaty serving as their pilot project.20 In 2008, the EU
adopted a FrameworkDecision that incorporated crucial parts of the treaty into theUnion’s
legislative framework. The substantive provisions of the Prüm arsenal and their usefulness
for an administrative approach will be discussed in Section 14.3 of this report. Here, we
reflect on how the Prüm Treaty became part of the EU’s legal framework, i.e. by its trans-
position from Prüm Treaty into Prüm Council Decision.21 We analyse whether such a
process might also be beneficial for developing regulations governing an administrative
approach to crime.
The Prüm Process had two distinct phases. The first involved multilateral agreement
on the PrümTreaty. Germany organized ameetingwith the Benelux countries andAustria
in 2003. On 28 May 2004, these countries undertook to cooperate more closely on
20 Guild&Geyer 2008, p. 11. These countries include theNetherlands, France, Luxembourg, Belgium,Germany,
Austria and Spain.
21 Council Decision 2008/615/JHAof 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly
in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, O.J. L 210, 6 August 2008, p. 1–11.
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exchanging information on organized crime, among other matters.22 The multilateral
treaty agreed at Prümon 27May 2005 between these countries, France and Spain expressed
the same intentions as the earlier declaration.23 Like all international treaties, the Prüm
Treaty was subject to the international and national laws of the contracting parties.24 This
meant that after the Treaty was negotiated by the national governments and subsequently
signed, the national parliaments of the Contracting Parties had to ratify the international
instrument.25 The national parliaments can only decide whether to ratify the treaty or to
stop the ratification procedure. They have no formal say about the negotiations conducted
previously by their governments.26 The role of the European Parliament and European
Commission is limited in this phase. The only measure open to them is to challenge the
Treaty before the European Court of Justice, based on an infringement of the principle of
loyalty.27 Such proceedings played no role in the Prüm Process, however.
The preamble to the Prüm Convention had foreseen that the Prüm Treaty could be
integrated into the EU legal framework:
“Seeking to have the provisions of this Convention brought within the legal
framework of the European Union, in order to improve exchange of information
within the European Union[…]”
Germany initiated the second phase of the Prüm process in March 2006.28 Before the
decision to integrate the Prüm Treaty into EU legislation as a Council Decision, two other
options were also considered, namely integration via enhanced cooperation or the acquis
via the ratification of the Treaty by all EU Member States.29 Eventually, a decision was
taken to integrate the essential provisions of the Prüm Treaty via a Council Decision.30
The legislative process regarding the formation of Council Decisions is based on former
Title VI of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). Since the implementation of the
Lisbon Treaty, the legal basis on which the Prüm Treaty was incorporated into the EU
legal system has been changed. Below, we describe the Prüm process as it took place under
the old legislation. We then discuss which legal basis could now be used to implement a
multilateral or bilateral Treaty or Convention into the EU legal order.
22 Kamerstukken II 2006/07 30 881, nr. 3, p. 1.
23 Kamerstukken II 2006/07 30 881, nr. 3, p. 1.
24 Bellanova 2007, p. 204.
25 Bellanova 2007, p. 204.
26 Bellanova 2007, p. 204.
27 Bellanova 2007, p. 204.
28 Bellanova 2007, p. 205-206.
29 Bellanova 2007, p. 206.
30 Bellanova 2007, p. 206.
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In the process leading to the Prüm Decision, Article 34 (2) TEU (old) determined that
the Council could adopt decisions concerning police and judicial cooperation in judicial
matters. TheMember States and theCommission had the power to propose such a decision.
For the adoption of a Council Decision, unanimity is required. Limitations imposed by
Article 34(2) TEU (old) are the exclusion of approximation of the laws and regulations of
the Member States and the fact that the Decision shall not entail direct effect. The Council
was able to adopt measures to implement such decisions by qualified majority.31 The
European Parliament played a consultative role and needed to be informed regularly
according to Article 39 paragraph 2 TEU (old). In the Prüm Process, the European Parlia-
ment proposed seventy amendments to the Prüm Decision, mostly concerning data pro-
tection and the applicability of the principles of necessity and proportionality on informa-
tion exchange.32 However, these amendments were never negotiated in the Council.33 The
role of the national parliaments as well as the national data protection authorities and the
European Data Protection Supervisor was limited in the process of transposing the Prüm
Treaty into the Prüm Decision.34
With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, the provisions of Title VI of the former
TEU concerning police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters were repealed and
replaced by Title V of the TFEU.35 Article 34 as such has not been transposed, but – as
discussed earlier – Article 84 TFEU could form a viable basis for transposing a treaty,
convention or agreement between EU Member States into EU law. After all, this article
determines that the European Parliament andCouncilmay establish ‘measures to promote
and support the action of Member States in the field of crime prevention, excluding any
harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States.’ The latter limitation is
a reflection in Article 84 TFEU of former Article 34 TEU (old).
14.3 Applicability of existing instruments on information exchange
in the EU Member States – the legislative framework
In 1985, five European countries agreed to abolish their common borders. The Schengen
Convention of 1990, which executed the 1985 agreement, included provisions on informa-
tion exchange. Since then, many other instruments, such as the Swedish Initiative and the
Prüm Decision, contain provisions on information exchange between the Member States
31 Bellanova 2007, p. 206.
32 Bellanova 2007, p. 207-208.
33 Bellanova 2007, p. 207-208.
34 Bellanova 2007, p. 207-208.
35 Council of the European Union, Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Unions and the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
6655/7/08 REV 7, Brussels, 12 November 2012, p. 460.
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of the European Union, spurred by 9/11 and the Madrid and London bombings. We can
distinguish two types of instruments: those that regulate information exchange concerning
the internal borders, and those that are meant to regulate the external frontiers of the
European Union, such as the exchange of Passenger Name Records (PNR) with third
countries. The latter instruments fall outside the scope of this report.
Below, we discuss instruments containing provisions relevant to the exchange of
information related to an administrative approach to crime. We distinguish between (1)
legislative instruments regulating information exchange that may be used to support an
administrative approach (Section 14.2.1), (2) the legislative instruments regulating the
protection of personal and other data and the associated EU legislative process (Section
14.2.2) and (3) the organizational structures used for information exchange (Section 14.2.3).
14.3.1 The Schengen Convention36
The Schengen Convention allows for the exchange of personal data between the police
authorities of the Contracting Parties. The goal of the Schengen Convention is to abolish
the internal borders between the Contracting Parties. Although the United Kingdom is
not a part of the Schengen Convention, it does participate in police cooperation aspects
and in the Schengen Information Systems (SIS I and II).37
Title III of the Schengen Convention concerns police cooperation between the Con-
tracting Parties. Article 39 paragraph 1 Schengen Convention states:
The Contracting Parties undertake to ensure that their police authorities shall,
in compliance with national law and within the scope of their powers, assist
each other for the purposes of preventing and detecting criminal offences, in
so far as national law does not stipulate that the request has to be made and
channelled via the judicial authorities […].
The obligation to assist each other includes the exchange of personal data.38 Paragraph 2
continues by saying that written information exchanged via the principle of paragraph 1
can only be utilized as evidence for a charged offence when the judicial authorities of the
requested Contracting Party give the requesting police authorities permission to do so.
The ‘written information’ under paragraph 2 therefore only includes information intended
36 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States
of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual
abolition of checks at their common borders, Schengen 19 June 1990 O.J. L239, 22/09/2000 P. 0019 – 0062.
37 Brussels 7 December 2012, COM (2012) 735, p. 5. With the exception of alerts relating to third-country
nationals on the entry ban list.
38 Kamerstukken II 2006-2007, 23 490, nr. 444, p. 2; Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 401.
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for criminal procedures.39 Further agreements can be made between the competent Min-
isters of the Contracting Parties concerning cooperation in border regions, according to
paragraph 4 of Article 39.
In individual cases and according to Article 46, the Contracting Parties may send each
other information spontaneously, such as police data meant to help the other Contracting
Party to combat future crime and prevent offences against or threats to public policy and
public security. The information exchange can take place between central authorities, but
also directly between the police authorities involved.40
The types of information that can be shared between the Contracting Parties via the
Schengen Information System are mentioned in Articles 94 to 101 of the Schengen Con-
vention. They comprise personal data (Articles 94-99), data vehicles (Article 99) and objects
(including vehicles) for seizure or for use as evidence in criminal cases (Article 100). The
exchange of personal data under Article 94 paragraph 3 is limited to specific types of per-
sonal data.41 Any exchange of information other than those types is not authorized, espe-
cially information identified in the first sentence of Article 6 of the Council of Europe
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data of 28 January 1981.42
Title VI of the SchengenConvention provides for the protection of personal data,more
specifically in Article 126 paragraph 1. The protection of personal data must be arranged
via national legislation, and such protection needs to be as strict or stricter than the obli-
gations imposed under the Council of EuropeConvention for the Protection of Individuals
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 28 January 1981. According to
Article 126 paragraph 3, the requirements for the exchange of personal data are as follows.
1. The personal data cannot be used for goals other than those for which the Schengen
Convention provides (sub a), unless prior consent has been given by the requested Con-
tracting Party and in accordance with the national law of the requested Contracting
Party;43
2. The personal data can only be used by judicial authorities and the departments and
authorities carrying out tasks or performing duties in connection with the purposes
referred to in Article 126 paragraph 3 sub a (sub b);
39 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 401.
40 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 401.
41 Article 94 paragraph 3 sub a to j specifies the types of information: surname, forenames, aliases, specific
objective personal characteristics not subject to change, first letter of second forename, date and place of
birth, sex, nationality, whether the persons concerned are armed and/or violent, reasons for the alert and
actions to be taken.
42 Which means racial origin, political opinions or religious or other beliefs, as well as personal data concerning
health or sexual life.
43 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 402.
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3. Article 126 is limited in its use, however. It does not apply to Chapter 7 of Title II and
Title IV. The requirements of Article 126 paragraph 3 also do not apply to Title III
Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5.44
Regarding the exchange of personal data for police cooperation, Article 39 and further,
separate requirements are laid down in Article 129 of the Schengen Convention. First, the
level of data protection, irrespective of the provisions set out in Articles 126 and 127, must
comply with the principles of Recommendation No R (87) 15 of 17 September 1987 of the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe regulating the use of personal data in
the police sector.45
Additional requirements have been formulated for the application of Article 46 of the
Schengen Convention regarding ‘spontaneous information exchange’:
– the principle of purpose. The receiving Contracting Party may only use the personal
data for the purposes determined by the distributing Contracting Party, bearing in
mind the requirements as been established by the distributing Contracting State
(Article 129 sub a);
– the prohibition against continuous distribution to authorities other than police and
judicial authorities without prior consent (Article 129 sub b);
– at the request of the distributing Contracting Party, the receiving Contracting Party
must provide information about the how the exchanged information has been used,
as well as the results stemming from the exchange (Article 129 sub c).
The foregoing implies that the Schengen Convention does provide a basis for information
exchange in support of an administrative approach, namely when such information is
exchanged on request (Article 39 in conjunction with Article 126 paragraph 3 sub a of the
Schengen Convention). Prior consent from the requested Contracting Party as well as
compliance with the laws of the requested Contracting Party is necessary, since application
within an administrative setting means abandoning the purposes defined by the Schengen
Convention. Spontaneous information exchange is also possible for an administrative
approach according to Article 46 in conjunction with Article 129 sub a and b. Use of such
information in the context of the administrative approach to crime requires prior double
consent. First, the distributing Contracting Party must consent to the use of police and
personal data in the context of an administrative approach (sub a). Second, since the
information can only be distributed to police authorities, consent is needed to distribute
the information to administrative authorities (sub b).
44 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 402.
45 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 403.
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14.3.2 The EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters46
Article 1 of the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters specifies the
goal of the Convention: to supplement and facilitate mutual legal assistance in criminal
matters. The EU Convention superseded Articles 49 sub a, 52, 53 and 73 of the Schengen
Convention, which previously regulated mutual legal assistance in criminal matters.47
With regard to information exchange in support of an administrative approach, the
name of the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters suggests that the
scope of application is limited to assistance in criminal matters. Article 3 states:
Mutual assistance shall also be afforded in proceedings brought by the adminis-
trative authorities in respect of acts which are punishable under the national law
of the requesting or the requested Member State, or both, by virtue of being
infringements of the rules of law, and where the decision may give rise to proceed-
ings before a court having jurisdiction in particular in criminal matters.
Under this provision, information exchange in support of an administrative approach
would seem impossible. Although the administrative authorities are authorized to exchange
information, the condition that the infringements must be punishable under national law
and that a decision regarding these infringements may give rise proceedings before a
criminal court hinders exchanges on a broader administrative scale.48 National legislation
that fits within the limited scope of Article 3 includes the Dutch Traffic Regulations
(Administrative Enforcement) Act.49
Second, Article 7 allows for spontaneous information exchange:
Within the limits of their national law, the competent authorities of the Member
States may exchange information, without a request to that effect, relating to
criminal offences and the infringements of rules of law referred to in Article 3(1),
the punishment or handling of which falls within the competence of the receiving
authority at the time the information is provided.
46 Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union
the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European
Union, 29 May 2000, O.J., C197/1.
47 Article 2 paragraph 2 of the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters; Van Daele et al.
2010, p. 405.
48 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 406.
49 Wet administratiefrechtelijke handhaving verkeersvoorschriften (WAHV).
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This provision is a reflection of Article 46 of the Schengen Convention,50 which regulates
spontaneous information exchange between police authorities. Article 7 of the EU Con-
vention mirrors this for the judicial authorities,51 for which such a provision did not pre-
viously exist.52 Since this article refers to the provisions as laid down by Article 3, informa-
tion exchange for administrative purposes on a broad scale is impossible.
Article 23 of the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters regulates
the protection of personal data. It should be noted that this article regulates only the pro-
tection of personal data and no other types of information.53 When personal data is
exchanged under the provisions of the Convention, the goals for which the data can be
used are:
a. for the purpose of proceedings to which this Convention applies;
b. for other judicial and administrative proceedings directly related to the proceedings
referred to under (a);
c. for preventing an immediate and serious threat to public security;
d. for any other purpose, but only with the prior consent of the communicating Member
State, unless the Member State concerned has obtained the consent of the data subject.
This article suggests that when the personal data has already been exchanged in support
of criminal proceedings, the receiving Member State could ask for permission to use the
information for other purposes under points c and d. Again, this is mirrored by the
Schengen Convention, which allows for uses other than the initial purpose of the informa-
tion exchange when the distributing Member State has given its prior consent. For the
purposes of an administrative approach, a sharp distinction must be made between:
– the goals on which the requests for the exchange of personal data or spontaneous
exchange of personal data can be based (Articles 3 and 7) and;
– the use of the personal data received after exchange for goals other than the initial goal,
with the prior consent of the distributing Member State.54
In conclusion, the personal data exchanged under the EUConvention onMutualAssistance
in Criminal Matters can be used for administrative purposes, but the prior consent of the
distributing Member State is necessary. Since Article 23 only concerns personal data,
Articles 3 and 7 regulate the exchange of other types of information. This means that the
Convention does not regulate the use of non-personal data for purposes other than those
identified under Articles 3 and 7.
50 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 406.
51 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 406.
52 Kamerstukken II 2001-2002, 28 350, nr. 3, p. 12-13.
53 Kamerstukken II 2001-2002, 28 350, nr. 3, p. 31.
54 See also Kamerstukken II 2001-2002, 28 350, nr. 3, p. 30.
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14.3.3 The Swedish Initiative55
The Swedish Initiative is a framework decision, whichmeans that the results to be achieved
are binding on the Member States, but that the means for achieving those results are up
to them.56 Framework decisions lack direct effect.57 The goal of the Swedish Initiative is
explained in Article 1 paragraph 1:
The purpose of this Framework Decision is to establish the rules under which
Member States’ law enforcement authoritiesmay exchange existing information
and intelligence effectively and expeditiously for the purpose of conducting
criminal investigations or criminal intelligence operations.
The principle of ‘equivalent access’ is applicable to the Swedish Initiative, which means
that the requesting Member State’s access to information is regulated as strictly as for a
national authority.58
Article 2 identifies which authorities are ‘competent law enforcement authorities’ for
the purposes of this framework decision:
[…] a national police, customs or other authority that is authorised by national
law to detect, prevent and investigate offences or criminal activities and to
exercise authority and take coercive measures in the context of such activities.
Agencies or units dealing especially with national security issues are not covered
by the concept of competent law enforcement authority […].
TheMember States file a declaration substantiatingwhich national authorities are indicated
as competent law enforcement authorities for the purposes of this framework decision.
Article 2 also defines ‘criminal investigation’ (sub b), ‘criminal intelligence operation’
(sub c), ‘information and/or intelligence’ (sub d) and ‘offences referred to in Article 2(2)
of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant’ (sub e). The
definition of ‘criminal investigation’ offers no room for an administrative approach, but
the definition of ‘criminal intelligence operation’ does:
a procedural stage, not yet having reached the stage of a criminal investigation,
within which a competent law enforcement authority is entitled by national
55 Council FrameworkDecision 2006/960/JHAof 18December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information
and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union, O.J. L
386/89.
56 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 425-426.
57 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 425-426.
58 COM (2012) 735, p. 3; COM (2010) 385, p. 10.
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law to collect, process and analyse information about crime or criminal activities
with a view to establishingwhether concrete criminal acts have been committed
or may be committed in the future.
An administrative approach to crimemight fall under this definition, especially if it concerns
investigations screening the criminal backgrounds of applicants for subsidies, tenders and
permits, such as the Dutch BIBOB legislation.59
According to the Swedish Initiative, information and/or intelligence can be exchanged
upon request (Article 3 paragraph 2) or spontaneously (Article 7). Information and/or
intelligence for the purposes of the Swedish initiative means:
– any type of information or data which is held by law enforcement authorities, and;
– any type of information or data which is held by public authorities or by private entities
and which is available to law enforcement authorities without the taking of coercive
measures, in accordance with Article 1(5).
Spontaneous information exchange is only possible when there are reasons to believe that
this could assist in investigations relating to the offences referred to in Article 2(2) of
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA.60
Article 6 of the Initiative explains that the information exchange takes place via the
existing channels for international law enforcement cooperation, which means that –
depending on the type of information and the purpose of information exchange – all the
channels and structures discussed below, with their limitations, can be used.61
Article 8 provides the data protection applicable to information exchange as regulated
by the Swedish Initiative. Paragraph 2 declares the national data protection laws and the
Council of Europe Convention of 28 January 1981 for the Protection of Individuals with
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data applicable, along with the Additional
Protocol of 8 November 2001 of that Convention where ratified by the relevant Member
States. Also, Recommendation No. R(87) 15 of the Council of Europe Regulating the Use
of Personal Data in the Police Sector is declared relevant when handling personal data for
the purposes of the Swedish Initiative. Article 8 paragraph 3 furthermore determines:
Information and intelligence provided under this Framework Decision may
be used by the competent law enforcement authorities of the Member State to
59 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 427.
60 Such as participation in criminal investigations, illicit drug trade, money laundering, etc.; Van Daele et al.
2010, p. 427.
61 Article 6 Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of
information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European
Union, O.J. L 386/89.
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which it has been provided solely for the purposes forwhich it has been supplied
in accordance with this Framework Decision or for preventing an immediate
and serious threat to public security; processing for other purposes shall be
permitted solely with the prior authorization of the communicating Member
State and subject to the national law of the receiving Member State. The
authorization may be granted insofar as the national law of the communicating
Member State permits.
This implies that information exchange can take place outside the initial purpose of the
Swedish Initiative, but that prior consent is necessary. Also, the requested Member State
is not obliged to exchange said information. Article 10 provides reasons for withholding
information or intelligence: jeopardizing national security, a criminal investigation, an
intelligence operation, and the safety of individuals, and disproportionate or irrelevant
requests.
In conclusion, information exchange can take place as part of a ‘criminal intelligence
operation’, both on request or spontaneously, as long as there is prior authorization by
the distributing Member State and compliance with the national law of the distributing
Member State.
14.3.4 The Prüm Convention and Prüm Decision
The Prüm Convention62 builds on the Schengen Convention (amongst others). In order
to integrate the Prüm Convention into the legal framework of the European Union, the
Council decided to enact the Prüm Decision.63 According to Articles 1 of the Prüm Con-
vention and the PrümDecision, themain goal of the instrument is to intensify cross-border
cooperation.64 Hereafter, we will take the Prüm Decision as the principle lead in our dis-
cussion, unless otherwise indicated. Article 2-7 of the Decision regulate the exchange of
DNA analysis files and profiles, Article 8-11 fingerprinting data and Article 12 vehicle
registration data. Article 13 of the Prüm Decision regulates the exchange of non-personal
data:
62 Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Spain,
the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic
of Austria on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border
crime and illegal migration, Prüm 27 May 2005.
63 Council Decision 2008/615/JHAof 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly
in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, O.J. 2008 L210/1.
64 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 412.
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For the prevention of criminal offences and in maintaining public order and
security for major events with a cross-border dimension, in particular for
sporting events or EuropeanCouncilmeetings,Member States shall, both upon
request and of their own accord, in compliance with the supplying Member
State’s national law, supply one another with any non-personal data required
for those purposes.
Article 14 of the Prüm Decision regulates the exchange of personal data:
For the prevention of criminal offences and in maintaining public order and
security for major events with a cross-border dimension, in particular for
sporting events or European Council meetings, the Contracting Parties shall,
both upon request and of their own accord, in compliance with the supplying
Contracting Party’s national law, supply one another with personal data if any
final convictions or other circumstances give reason to believe that the data
subjects will commit criminal offences at the event or pose a threat to public
order and security, in so far as the supply of such data is permitted under the
supplying Contracting Party’s national law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 14 furthermore states that the data exchanged may be used only for
the goals determined under paragraph 1 of Article 14 and only for the particular event for
which the data was exchanged.
At first glance, Articles 13 and 14 seem to be too limited in scope for the administrative
approach, since they mainly concern major cross-border events.65 Depending on how one
interprets ‘major events’, an administrative approachwould fall within the scope of Articles
13 and 14.66
Article 27 of the Prüm Convention provides a non-exhaustive list concerning the
exchange of personal data.67 Thismeans thatArticle 27 could be used to cover other requests
65 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 413.
66 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 413.
67 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 414.The Contracting Parties specifically assist one another with: (1) identifying
owners and operators of vehicles and providing information on drivers, masters and captains of vehicles,
vessels and aircraft; (2) supplying information on driving licences, navigation licences and similar permits;
(3) ascertaining individuals’ whereabouts and place of residence; (4) checking on residence permits; (5)
ascertaining the identity of telephone subscribers and subscribers to other telecommunications services,
where publicly accessible; (6) establishing the identity of individuals; (7) investigating the origin of items
such as arms, motor vehicles and vessels (enquiries via trade channels); (8) supplying data from police
databases and police records and supplying information from official records accessible to the public; (9)
issuing urgent alerts concerning arms and explosives and alerts concerning currency counterfeiting and
securities fraud; (10) supplying information on practical implementation of cross-border surveillance, cross-
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for information.68 Article 27 does not designate a competent authority; national law regulates
this.69 The Prüm Decision does not lay down any provision mirroring that of Article 27.
Both thePrümConvention and thePrümDecision arrange for the protection of personal
data. Article 33 paragraph 1 sub 1 of the Convention and Article 24 paragraph 1 sub a of
the Decision define the ‘processing of personal data’, which includes:
[…]any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data,
whether or not by automaticmeans, such as collection, recording, organisation,
storage, adaptation or alteration, sorting, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure
by supply, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment, combina-
tion, blocking, erasure or destruction of data. Processing within the meaning
of this Convention shall also include communicatingwhether or not a hit exists.
Article 35 paragraph 1 of the Prüm Convention and Article 26 paragraph 1 of the Prüm
Decision allow for the dissemination of personal data within the goals of the Convention.
According to these articles, when a receiving Contracting Party wants to process the data
received for other purposes, it must request prior authorization from the administering
Contracting Party.
For the purposes of an administrative approach, when the exchange of personal data
is requested, three criteria must be fulfilled under Article 35 paragraph 1 of the Prüm
Convention and Article 26 paragraph 1 of the Prüm Decision: (1) the administering
Contracting Party needs to give prior authorization; (2) the national law of the receiving
Contracting Party has to allow the personal data to be used for the purpose of an adminis-
trative approach, and (3) utilization of the personal data is allowed by the national laws of
the administering Contracting Party.70 Possible problems can be foreseen with regard to
Contracting Parties who are not permitted under national law to use such information to
support an administrative approach.
Article 36 of the Prüm Convention and Article 27 of the Prüm Decision furthermore
stress that only authorities competent to process the personal datamay do such processing,
such as furtherance data, and only for the purposes specified byArticle 35 PrümConvention
and Article 26 Prüm Decision.71
In conclusion, the Prüm Convention and Prüm Decision could form a basis for infor-
mation exchange relating to an administrative approach. Nevertheless, the three criteria
border hot pursuit and controlled deliveries, and (11) ascertaining an individual’s willingness to make a
statement.
68 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 414.
69 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 414.
70 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 415.
71 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 415-416.
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of Article 35 Prüm Convention and Article 26 Prüm Decision must be fulfilled in order
to make the information exchange possible.
14.3.5 Naples II Convention72
Article 1 paragraph 1 of the Naples II Convention regulates mutual assistance between
customs administrations in the European Union to prevent, investigate and prosecute
infringements of national and Community customs provisions.
There are two separate ways to exchange information under the Naples II Convention.
First, exchange requests can be made under Article 10 to support the prevention, investi-
gation and prosecution of infringements.73 Second, Article 17 provides for spontaneous
information exchange. This refers to the immediate exchange of information on planned
or committed infringements as well as information regarding the goods involved and new
methods for committing infringements.74
Both articlesmention that basically all relevant information can be exchanged.However,
for the protection of personal data, a special regime has been installed under Article 25 of
the Naples II Convention. Article 4 paragraph 8 defines ‘personal data’ as follows.
[…]all information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person; a
person is considered to be identifiable if he or she can be directly or indirectly
identified, inter alia by means of an identification number or of one or more
specific elements which are characteristic of his or her physical, physiological,
psychological, economic, cultural or social identity.
Article 25 regulates data protection, with paragraph 1 first addressing the provisions laid
down by the 1981 Council of Europe Convention for the protection of individuals with
regard to automatic processing of personal data. Paragraph 2 sub a allows the processing
of personal data, but only for the purposes stated in Article 1 paragraph 1 of the Naples II
Convention. The term ‘processing’ is defined with reference to Article 2 sub a and b of
72 Council Act 98/C 24/01 of 18December 1997 drawing up, on the basis of Article K3 of the Treaty onEuropean
Union, the Convention on mutual assistance and cooperation between customs administrations, O.J. C 24
of 23.01.1998.
73 Based upon Article 4 of the Naples Convention 1967. See also the Explanatory Report on the Convention
drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on EuropeanUnion, onmutual assistance and cooperation
between customs administrations O.J. C189 of 17 June 1998.
74 Based on Articles 8 and 9 of the Naples Convention 1967. Explanatory Report on the Convention drawn up
on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on mutual assistance and cooperation between
customs administrations O.J. C189 of 17 June 1998.
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Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal data.75 The receiving Member State is
allowed to forward and supply the information to its customs authorities, investigative
authorities and judicial authorities for the prosecution and punishment of infringements
under the Convention without the consent of the supplying Member State. Forwarding
personal data for other purposes or to other authorities requires the consent of the supplying
Member State. It is not must be given specifically prior to or after the forwarding of the
personal data.
Based on the foregoing, the exchange of personal data in support of an administrative
approach can take place when this specifically concerns the prevention of infringements
of national or Community customs provisions. An example is the administrative
enforcement of the Dutch General Customs Act.76
We may conclude that information exchange may take place under the Naples II
Convention for the purposes of an administrative approach, whether on request or spon-
taneously. Restrictions apply when personal data are involved. Personal data can be
exchanged only for the purposes cited in Article 1 of the Naples II Convention, which
could be beneficial for an administrative approach as shown by the example above. For-
warding of received personal data for purposes other than those indicated under Article
1 of the Naples II Convention is only possible when the supplying Member State gives its
consent.
14.3.6 The European Convention on the Service Abroad of Documents Relating
to Administrative Matters
According to Article 1 of the European Convention on the Service Abroad of Documents
relating toAdministrativeMatters,77 the Convention ismeant to facilitatemutual assistance
with regard to the service of documents relating to administrativematters. TheConvention
is not applicable to fiscal or criminal matters, although the Contracting Parties can, by
means of a declaration, extend the scope of the Convention. Article 2 determines that each
Contracting Party must establish a central authority to receive requests and take action
accordingly. This central authority can facilitate in three instances, according to Article 6
of the Convention:
– for the service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its [the
Contracting Party’s] territory (paragraph 1);
75 Article 25 paragraph 3 of the Naples II Convention. Explanatory Report on the Convention drawn up on
the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on mutual assistance and cooperation between
customs administrations O.J. C189 of 17 June 1998.
76 Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 409.
77 Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 24 November 1977. Via http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/
Html/094.htm.
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– by a particular method requested by the requesting authority (paragraph 1);
– the servicing of an addressee who accepts the document voluntarily (paragraph 2)
Article 14 of the Convention sets out the reasons for refusing to comply with a request.
They include (a) when the matter for which a request is made does not relate to adminis-
trative matters as determined under Article 1; (b) when the request interferes with the
sovereignty, safety, public policy or other essential interests of the Contracting Party and
(c) if the addressee cannot be found at the address indicated and his location cannot be
determined easily. The refusal needs to be reported promptly to the requesting Contracting
Party (paragraph 2 of Article 14).
The question is whether this Convention can benefit an administrative approach in
Europe. Only eight countries in the Council of Europe have ratified it,78 which limits its
practical applicability.
14.3.7 The European Convention on the Obtaining Abroad of Information
and Evidence in Administrative Matters
Articles 1 and 2 of the European Convention on the Obtaining Abroad of Information
and Evidence in Administrative Matters79 are similar to Articles 1 and 2 of the European
Convention on the Service Abroad of Documents relating to Administrative Matters. The
Convention discussed in this section regulates the type of document that can be sent in
the scope of administrative matters. What constitutes an ‘administrative matter’ is left to
the judgment of the Contracting Parties themselves, as no positive definition of the term
is given.80 Article 1 paragraph 2 leaves it to the discretion of the Contracting Parties whether
to include fiscalmatters. Criminalmatters are excluded.81 Nevertheless, Article 1 paragraph
2 of the Convention denotes the area of ‘administrative criminal law’ by allowingContract-
ing Parties to extend the scope of the Convention to such proceedings.82 The explanatory
report on the Convention refers to Ordnungswidrigkeit (as applicable in Germany) as an
example of such proceedings.83
78 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=094&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG. These
countries are: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain; Van Daele et al.
2010, p. 434. Klip & Vervaele 2002, p. 9.
79 Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 15March 1978, via: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulez
Vous.asp?NT=100&CM=1&CL=ENG.
80 See the explanatory report on the Convention under 9-11, via: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/
Html/100.htm.
81 See the explanatory report on the Convention under 12, via: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/
Html/100.htm.
82 See the explanatory report on the Convention under 12, via: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/
Html/100.htm.
83 See the explanatory report on the Convention under 12, via: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/
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Article 7 of the Convention lists the reasons for refusing to comply with a request for
assistance. They include (1) when the matter to which the requests relates falls outside the
scope of an administrative matter as defined in Article 1; (2) when compliance would
interfere with the sovereignty, security, public policy or other essential interests of the
requested State; (3) when compliance would interfere with fundamental human rights or
with confidentiality and (4) when the request goes against domestic law or custom.
Under Article 13, Member States may furnish one another with information about the
law, regulations and customs. According to the explanatory report on the Convention, the
requests for information should adhere to a double criterion. First, the request should be
made by an administrative authority as defined as such by the domestic law of the
requesting state.84 The fact that the term ‘authority’ is defined by domestic law allows for
the inclusion of both administrative organs as well as authorities exercising judicial func-
tions in administrative law.85 Second, the request should be made for an administrative
purpose.86 Whether a request is made for administrative purposes is a matter to be deter-
mined by the requesting state’s central authority, as established under Article 2 of the
Convention.87
Article 14 regulates the exchange upon request of factual information and documents
concerning administrative matters already in the possession of the requested Contracting
Party. Again, the request should be made by an authority of the requesting state and for
administrative purposes. These requirements match the criterion set out in Article 13.88
The requests can extend to both nationals and non-nationals of the requested Contracting
Party.89 Article 15 allows the requesting state to ask the requested Contracting Party to
take action to obtain information, i.e. making enquiries, albeit without using coercive
powers, such as visiting premises for information.90 The same double criterion applies as
Html/100.htm.
84 SeeArticle 1 EuropeanConvention on theObtainingAbroad of Information and Evidence inAdministrative
Matters and the Explanatory report on the Convention, under 43-47, via: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
en/Reports/Html/100.htm.
85 Explanatory report on theConvention under 43-47, via: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/
100.htm.
86 Explanatory report on theConvention under 43-47, via: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/
100.htm.
87 Explanatory report on theConvention under 43-47, via: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/
100.htm.
88 Explanatory report on the Convention under 48, via: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/
100.htm.
89 Explanatory report on the Convention under 48, via: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/
100.htm.
90 Explanatory report on the Convention under 49, via: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/
100.htm.
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specified under Article 13.91 Article 16 stipulates that the information requested may not
be used for purposes other than specified in the request.92
Article 19 paragraph 1 of the Convention makes the exchange of evidence in adminis-
trative matters possible by an authority competent in such matters.93 This includes judicial
authorities competent to obtain evidence in administrative matters under specific
domestic laws.94 Evidence can only be requested in the case of administrative judicial
procedures that have already commenced or are being contemplated.95 The requested state
can refuse a request if it is not made for the purposes of administrative proceedings before
an administrative tribunal or any other authority exercising judicial functions in adminis-
trative matters.96 This provision is supplementary to Article 7 paragraph 1 under a in
conjunctionwithArticle 1 of theConvention, thereby limiting the scope of theConvention’s
application.
At first glance, the provisions of this Convention appear to allow for the exchange of
information and evidence between the administrative authorities of theContracting Parties
to the Council of Europe. Their practical value is limited, however; only six countries have
ratified the Convention,97 and commentators have criticized its broad scope as having
‘unduly vague content’,98 inherently limiting its practical applicability.
14.3.8 Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters
The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters99 is a join effort by
the Council of Europe and the Member countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) that arranges for information exchange and
assistance in the recovery and service of documents (Article 1 paragraph 2). In 2010 a
91 Explanatory report on the Convention under 49, via: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/
100.htm.
92 Explanatory report on the Convention under 50, via: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/
100.htm.
93 Explanatory report on theConvention under 59-62, via: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/
100.htm.
94 Explanatory report on theConvention under 59-62, via: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/
100.htm.
95 Article 19 paragraph 2 of the Concention and Explanatory report on the Convention under 59-62 via:
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/100.htm.
96 Article 19 paragraph 3 of the Convention and Explanatory report on the Convention under 59-62 via:
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/100.htm.
97 Namely Azerbaijan, Belgium,Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal. http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=100&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG.
98 Klip & Vervaele 2002, p. 9.
99 JointCouncilOf Europe/OECDConventionOnMutualAdministrativeAssistance InTaxMatters, Strasbourg,
25 January 1988. http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/conventiononmutualadministra-
tiveassistanceintaxmatters.htm.
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Protocol was drawn up amending the substance of the Convention. Relevant for this report
is that Article 4’s scope was broadened.100 The article describes the circumstances under
which information can be exchanged:
The Parties shall exchange any information, in particular as provided in this
section, that is foreseeably relevant for the administration or enforcement of
their domestic laws concerning the taxes covered by this Convention.
According to the Explanatory Note, the article’s meaning is broad, which implies that it
should help the Contracting Parties battle international tax avoidance and evasion to the
widest possible extent.101 However, it is not so broad that it supports ‘fishing expeditions’102
or requests for information irrelevant to tax affairs.103
The Convention gives a non-exhaustive list of five available information-exchange
methods:104
– exchange upon request (Article 5);105
– automatic exchange (systematic sending of information) (Article 6);106
– spontaneous exchange (Article 7);107
– simultaneous tax examination (Article 8);108
– tax examination abroad (Article 9).109
The competent authorities for the exchange of information are determined by each state
and its national laws separately in Annex B to the Convention.110 As the Explanatory Note
100 See for a description on the old provision: Van Daele et al. 2010, p. 435-436.
101 Text of the revised explanatory report to the Convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters
as amended by protocol, p. 9, via www.oecd.org.
102 These are requests by authorities which do not concern a particular issue, which could involve a violation
of Article 6 ECHR. See Funke vs. France, 25 February 1993, application number 10828/84.
103 Text of the revised explanatory report to the Convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters
as amended by protocol, via www.oecd.org.
104 Text of the revised explanatory report to the Convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters
as amended by protocol, p. 9, via www.oecd.org.
105 Text of the revised explanatory report to the Convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters
as amended by protocol, p. 10-11, via www.oecd.org.
106 Text of the revised explanatory report to the Convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters
as amended by protocol, p. 11-12, via www.oecd.org.
107 Text of the revised explanatory report to the Convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters
as amended by protocol, p. 12, via www.oecd.org.
108 Text of the revised explanatory report to the Convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters
as amended by protocol, p. 12-13, via www.oecd.org.
109 Text of the revised explanatory report to the Convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters
as amended by protocol, p. 14-15, via www.oecd.org.
110 For a full list see: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=127&CV=1&
NA=&PO=999&CN=999&VL=1&CM=9&CL=ENG.
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conveys, there are too many differences between states to create a uniform authority in
each country.111 Article 21 under paragraph 4 regulates which types of information can be
exchanged. There are no specific restrictions concerning personal data.112 In total, 22 states
have ratified this Convention, twelve of which belong to the European Union.113
From the above, it can be concluded that for specific cases in which an administrative
approach is applied, information can be exchanged on the basis of this Convention; there
must be a link with tax evasion or avoidance, however.
14.3.9 Legal provisions regarding the exchange of information on fiscal
matters
The TFEU does not regulate the exchange of information between tax authorities. The
existing articles in the TFEU on tax and fiscal matters address the flow of goods in the
internalmarket.114 Articles 28-30TFEUdeal with protectionismvia fiscalmeasures, whereas
Articles 110 to 113 TFEU deal with discriminatory taxes upon imported goods.115
TheOECDprovidesmodel agreements for the exchange of information on taxmatters,
developed by theOECDGlobal ForumWorkingGroup on Effective Exchange of Informa-
tion.116 Many countries both within and outside the EU have ratified such bilateral agree-
ments,117 but they do not seem to include bilateral agreements focusing specifically on
information exchange between EUMember States. TheOECDdoes provide a full overview
of the general agreements that various jurisdictions, both European and global, have made
for tax purposes.118 It is clear that these agreements are bilateral and include provisions on
information exchange between the Contracting Parties.
For example, the agreement between the Netherlands and Belgium on taxation119
includes a provision on information exchange in Article 29. This provision is broad; it
covers any information relevant to the execution of the provisions of the agreement.
Moreover, the information exchange is not limited to inhabitants of the contracting parties
111 Text of the revised explanatory report to the Convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters
as amended by protocol, p. 8, via www.oecd.org.
112 Text of the revised explanatory report to the Convention on mutual administrative assistance in tax matters
as amended by protocol, p. 34-35, via www.oecd.org.
113 http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/Status_of_convention.pdf.
114 Craig & De Burca 2011, p. 611ff.




119 Verdrag tussen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en het Koninkrijk Belgie tot het vermijden van dubbele
belasting en tot het voorkomen van het ontgaan van belasting inzake belastingen naar inkomen en naar het
vermogen, met Protocollen, Luxemburg, 5 juni 2001.
639
14 The potential for information exchange in Europe for the purpose of an
administrative approach to crime
only. This means that information on persons who are not inhabitants of either Belgium
and/or the Netherlands can still be exchanged under the agreement.
It goes beyond the scope of this report to discuss all the relevant bilateral agreements
on taxmatters and the relevant exchange of information. Readers should consult theOECD
database to review the relevant agreements and provisions.120
Overview of instruments for information exchangeTable 14.1
Information exchange supporting an adminis-
trative approach?




Yes, both for information exchange on request
and spontaneous exchange, but with prior con-
sent from the requested contracting party.




Yes, but only on a limited scale under Article 3.
Spontaneous information exchange underArticle




Criminal Matters 7 is impossible. Article 23 stipulates that forward-
ing information outside the scope of the conven-
tion after initial information exchange is possible
with the prior consent of the communicating
Member State.
Two options (1) an administrative approach falls
under the definition of ‘criminal intelligence
Article 3 (upon request)
and 7 (spontaneous)
The Swedish Initiative
operation’ for screening the backgrounds of
applicants for administrative grants, subsidies
etc. (2) forwarding information already
exchanged (on request or spontaneously) is per-
mitted outside the scope of the Swedish Initiative
with the prior consent of the communicating
state.
Yes, under the following criteria of Article 35
Prüm Convention, resp. 26 Prüm Decision:
(1) the administering Contracting Party must
give prior authorization; (2) the national law of
Articles 13 (non-per-
sonal data) 14 (personal
data) Prüm Conven-
tion, 27 Prüm Conven-
Prüm Convention /
Prüm Decision
the receiving Contracting Party must allow thetion, 35 paragraph 1
use of personal data in support of an administra-Prüm Convention
tive approach and (3) use of personal data isrespectively Article 26
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Information exchange supporting an adminis-
trative approach?




Yes. Exchange of personal data is limited to the
purposes of theNaples II Convention as summed
Articles 10 (on request)
and 17 (spontaneous)
Naples II Convention
up in Article 1. Forwarding of information for
other purposes is possible with the prior consent
of the communicating state.
n.a.Article 6TheEuropeanConven-









Yes, if there is a link with tax evasion or avoid-
ance.
Articles 4 to 9, 21Convention on Mutual
Administrative Assis-
tance in Tax Matters
14.4 Applicability of existing instruments on information exchange
in the EU Member States – the organizational framework
The legal instruments providing for information exchange also provide for an organizational
framework for the information exchange itself. We discuss this structure below. First, we
consider the structure inwhich Europol and Eurojust can exchange and share information
in the context of criminal investigations. Even though this structure is currently limited
to information exchange related to criminal investigations, we explore the possibility of
using that information structure for an administrative approach (Sections 14.2.3.1 and
14.2.3.2). Second, we look at the structure for information exchange under the Schengen
Convention and the Naples Convention (Sections 14.2.3.3 and 14.2.3.4 respectively).
Europol and Eurojust can also make use of this information structure. We also discuss the
information exchange structure as regulated for specific topics (Section 14.2.3.5). Last, we
consider the structure regulated by the Swedish Initiative and the Interpol Bureaux as
other possible channels for exchanging information (Section 14.2.3.6).
14.4.1 Potential for sharing information under the Europol Council Decision121
Article 88 TFEU defines Europol’s mission:
121 Brussels 7 December 2012, COM (2012) 735, p. 4.
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Europol’s mission shall be to support and strengthen action by the Member
States’ police authorities and other law enforcement services and their mutual
cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more
Member States, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest
covered by a Union policy.
Paragraph 2 of Article 88 continues by listing Europol’s tasks, which include (1) the col-
lecting, processing, storage analysis and exchange of information, in particular information
forwarded by Member States or third countries or bodies and (2) the coordination, orga-
nization and implementation of investigative and operational action carried out jointly
by Member State’s law enforcement authorities or in the context of Joint Investigation
Teams (JITs).
According toArticle 4 of theCouncil Decision of 6April 2009 establishing the European
PoliceOffice (Europol),122 Europol has beenmandated to support national law enforcement
authorities in the areas of organized crime, terrorism and other forms of serious crime, as
summed up in the Annex to the Europol Council Decision. One of Europol’s core tasks is
to serve as a platform to collect, store, process, analyse and exchange information and
intelligence.123 Article 8 of the Europol Council Decision establishes a system of Europol
National Units (ENUs). The ENUs are found in each Member State and connect the
national law enforcement authorities and Europol.124 They form the link for information
exchange to and from Europol. Conversely, at Europol, at least one liaison officer from
each ENU is assigned to represent the interests of its Member State within Europol.125 The
liaison officers are in place to exchange information to and from Europol and the liaison
officer’s national ENU.126
To communicate information to and fromEuropol, the ENUand liaison officers present
at Europol work via the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA).
This IT network is operational 24/7.127 ENUs can also communicate directly with Europol,
without contacting their national liaison officers at Europol.128 Moreover, in the 27Member
States, not only the ENUs but also designated national authorities have access to SIENA
aswell as third-country partners.129 Europol can use the information in SIENA if authorized
122 2009/371/JHA. Hereafter: Europol Council Decision.
123 Article 5 paragraph 1 under a of theCouncil Decision of 6April 2009 establishing the European PoliceOffice
(Europol); Brussels 7 December 2012, COM (2012) 735, p. 5; Deflem 2006, p. 340.
124 Article 8 paragraph 2 and 4 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office
(Europol).
125 Article 9 paragraph 2 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
126 Article 9 paragraph 3 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
127 Drewer & Ellerman 2012, p. 385-386.
128 Brussels 7 December 2012, COM (2012) 735, p. 5-6.
129 Drewer&Ellerman 2012, p. 385-386. See https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/external-cooperation-
31 for an overview of the non-EU states with which Europol has both operational and strategic agreements.
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by the inputting party. Control over the data is retained by the handling codes used by the
Member States and third parties.130
To share and retrieve information, Europol, the ENUs and the liaison officers use the
Europol Information System (EIS).131 The information in EIS may only be processed in
accordancewith the tasks assigned to Europol under Article 12 paragraph 1 of the Europol
Council Decision, and may relate to:132
– persons suspected or convicted of criminal offences for which Europol is competent;
– persons for whom there are factual indications or reasonable grounds leading to the
belief that they will commit an offence within the competence of Europol.
The personal data resulting from these two categories may include the person’s name,
aliases or assumed names, data and place of birth, nationality, sex, place of residence,
profession and the person’s whereabouts, social security numbers, driving licences, identi-
fication documents and passport data and other characteristics which will assist in identi-
fying the person.133 Moreover, particulars such as actual or alleged criminal offences, the
means that were or may have been used to commit those offences, and information on
legal persons, the departments handling the cases and filing references, suspectedmember-
ship of a criminal organization, and convictions within the competence of Europol and
the party inputting the above particulars.134 Furthermore, additional information relating
to the person as mentioned in Article 12 paragraph 1 may be exchanged between Europol
and the ENUs upon request.135
The data protection framework to which Europol must adhere is regulated by the
principles of the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
regard toAutomatic Processing of Personal Data of 28 January 1981 and of Recommenda-
tion No R (87) 15 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of 17 September
1987.136 It is both a reflection of Directive 95/46/EC and tailor-made to the specific tasks
and mandate imposed on Europol.137 The specific data protection regulations relate to the
See also Article 23 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol). A
detailed discussion of these arrangements falls outside the scope of this report.
130 Drewer & Ellerman 2012, p. 386.
131 Article 11 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol). Drewer &
Ellerman 2012, p. 387.
132 Article 12 paragraph 1 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
133 Article 12 paragraph 2 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
134 Article 12 paragraph 3 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
135 Article 12 paragraph 4 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
136 Article 27 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
137 Drewer & Ellerman 2012, p. 383.
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Analysis Work Files (AWFs),138 the rules governing Europol’s relations with partners,139
rules concerning the confidentiality of Europol information140 and rules regarding the
processing of data by Europol related to its tasks.141 Also, Article 12 paragraph 5 entails
particular data protection concerning persons who are acquitted or whose case has been
definitely dropped; the datamust be deleted in such instances. Data protection is supervised
by theData ProtectionOfficer,142 who is amember of staff taskedwith ensuring compliance
with the provisions of the Europol Council Decision, and the Joint Supervisory Body, an
independent entity consisting of data protection authorities from the 27 Member States.143
Access to EIS data is arranged in Article 13 of the Europol Council Decision. ENUs,
national liaison officers at Europol, the directors and deputy directors, and authorized
staff may input information into EIS as well as retrieve information from it.144 Only the
inputting party can modify, correct or delete data.145 If personal data has been entered,
other parties can add additional data as well.146 Responsibility for the retrieval, modification
or input of data lies with the retrieving, modifying or inputting party respectively. The
partymust be identifiable.147 Communications betweenENUs and the national authorities
is arranged under national law.148 Competent national authorities can also access EIS; the
Official Journal of the European Union reports which authorities are competent.149 However,
these authorities can only see whether the information they request is present in EIS, not
the actual content of that information. Further enquiries regarding the content run via the
ENUs.150 If information on crime in a Member State or criminal connections to that
Member State falling within the Europol mandate becomes available, Europol has a duty
to inform the ENU of that particular Member State.151 At an ENU’s request, the Europol
138 Council Decision of 30 November 2009 adopting and implementing rules for Europol analysis work files
(2009/936/JHA).
139 Council Decision of 30November 2009 adopting the implementing rules governing Europol’s relations with
partners, including the exchange of personal data and classified information (2009/934/JHA).
140 Council Decision of 30 November 2009 adopting the rules on the confidentiality of Europol information
(2009/968/JHA).
141 Decision of the Management Board of Europol of 4 June 2009 on the conditions related to the processing
of data on the basis of Article 10 paragraph 4 of the Europol Decision, OJ L 348/1, 29/12/2009.
142 Article 28 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol); Drewer &
Ellerman 2012, p. 384.
143 Article 34 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol); Drewer &
Ellerman 2012, p. 385.
144 Article 13 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
145 Article 13 paragraph 2 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
146 Article 13 paragraph 3 and 4 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office
(Europol).
147 Article 13 paragraph 5 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
148 Article 13 paragraph 5 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
149 Article 13 paragraph 7 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
150 Article 13 paragraph 6 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
151 Article 17 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
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liaison officers can be informed.152 Information related to other forms of serious crime
may also be communicated.153 Europol can store, modify and use EIS data for the Analysis
Work Files (AWFs).154 The AWFs fall outside the scope of this report, due to the nature
of the aim for which they are meant, i.e. criminal investigations.155
In conclusion, the exchange of information with Member States can only take place
within the legalmandate of Europol, i.e. serious and organized crime. Information exchange
relating to an administrative approach is therefore not directly possible.
In addition to Member States, Europol may also exchange information with third
parties. According toArticle 22 paragraph 1 and 2 of the Europol Council Decision, Europol
has concluded agreements with Eurojust, OLAF, FRONTEX, CEPOL, and the European
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), all European Union
agencies. Both operational and strategic agreements may be concluded.156 Operational
agreements include the exchange of personal information, whereas this is ruled out for
strategic agreements.157 Europol currently has an operational agreement with Eurojust158
that mainly concerns the establishment, support for and training of Joint Investigation
Teams (JITs), as well as monthly staff exchanges. Strategic agreements have been made
with OLAF, the EMCDDA, CEPOL, FRONTEX, and the European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control.159 Other strategic agreements have been made with European
Union institutions, namely the European Union itself and the ECB.160 Europol can only
transmit data fromaMember State to the agencies and institutions of the EuropeanUnion161
as well as third states and organizations162 after prior consent has been obtained from that
Member State.163 If the transmitting entity is not a Member State, then before transmitting
data to a third party as defined under Article 22 and 23 of the Europol Council Decision,
Europol must review whether that data could obstruct the proper performance of a
Member State’s tasks and jeopardize security, public order or the general welfare of a
152 Article 17 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
153 Article 17 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
154 Article 14-17 paragraph 6Council Decision of 6April 2009 establishing the European PoliceOffice (Europol).
155 See for example Drewer & Ellerman 2012, p. 387ff.
156 de Hert & de Schutter 2008, p. 319.
157 See Article 1 under e and f of the Council Decision of 30 November 2009 adopting the implementing rules
governing Europol’s relations with partners, including the exchange of personal data and classified informa-




161 Regulated by Article 22 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
162 Regulated by Article 23 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
A detailed discussion of these arrangements fall outside the scope of this report.
163 Article 24 paragraph 1 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
See also Article 9 Council Decision of 30 November 2009 adopting the implementing rules governing
Europol’s relations with partners, including the exchange of personal data and classified information.
645
14 The potential for information exchange in Europe for the purpose of an
administrative approach to crime
Member State.164 Europol is responsible for the transmission of such data and keeps records
of all transmissions under Article 24 of the Europol Council Decision.165 The recipients of
the data must also guarantee that the data will be used only for the purpose for which it
was transmitted.166 Onward transmission of personal data is only possible when the EU
body guarantees that the transmission is limited to competent authorities and takes place
under the same conditions as the original transmission.167 TheEUbody,withwhichEuropol
has an operational agreement,may not communicate the personal data to other EU bodies
or third parties, except if Europol has given prior consent or if the transmission is absolutely
necessary to safeguard the essential interests of the relevant Member States within the
scope of Europol’s objectives, or if transmissionwould prevent imminent danger associated
with crime or terrorist offences.168 Such a transmissionmay not take placewithout consent
of the Member State concerned.169
The implication of the above is that, when personal information is transferred to EU
bodies, even in exceptional circumstances, Europol’s mandate must be respected. This
means that information exchangewith EUbodies in support of an administrative approach
is currently not possible.
Recently, the Commission has adopted a Europol Regulation proposal that now lies
before the Council and the European Parliament.170 The Europol Council Decision and
Council Decision 2005/681/JHA (establishing CEPOL, the European Police College) will
consequently be repealed. The proposed regulation aims to combineCEPOL and Europol,
which would ideally generate synergies between operational police know-how and police
training.171 The new institution ought to be more effective at collecting and analysing
information and sharing those analyses.172 The proposal seeks to impose a heavier obligation
on Member States to supply Europol with information.173 The proposal does not aim to
broaden the definition of the authorities with which Europol is meant to cooperate:
164 Article 24 paragraph 1 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
165 See also Article 10 Council Decision of 30 November 2009 adopting the implementing rules governing
Europol’s relations with partners, including the exchange of personal data and classified information.
166 Article 24 paragraph 2 Council Decision of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police Office (Europol).
167 Article 17 paragraph 3 Council Decision of 30 November 2009 adopting the implementing rules governing
Europol’s relations with partners, including the exchange of personal data and classified information.
168 Article 18 Council Decision of 30 November 2009 adopting the implementing rules governing Europol’s
relations with partners, including the exchange of personal data and classified information.
169 Article 18 Council Decision of 30 November 2009 adopting the implementing rules governing Europol’s
relations with partners, including the exchange of personal data and classified information.
170 Brussels 27 March 2013 COM (2013) 173.
171 Brussels 27 March 2013 COM (2013) 173, p. 4.
172 Brussels 27 March 2013 COM (2013) 173, p. 5-6.
173 Brussels 27 March 2013 COM (2013) 173, p. 6-7.
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[…] the competent authorities of theMember Statesmeans all police authorities
and other law enforcement services existing in the Member States which are
responsible under national law for preventing and combating criminal
offences.174
The category law enforcement officers is defined as:
[…] law enforcement officers means officers of police, customs and of other
relevant services, including Union bodies, responsible for preventing and
combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and
forms of crime that affect a common interest covered by a Union policy and
for civilian crisis management and international policing of major events.175
It would be difficult to fit administrative authorities under these two definitions, although
‘other relevant services’ could be interpreted broadly. However, the forms of crime for
which the authorities need to be responsible must fall within the framework of serious or
organized crime concerning two ormoreMember States, terrorism, forms of crime reflected
in a Union policy, civilian crisis management and international policing of major events.
None of the above seem to translate directly to authorities mainly concerned with
administrative measures.176
Finally, Europol has hosted the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) since 1 January
2013. While currently still under development,177 the European Commission established
the EC3178 to serve as an information focal point where public, private and open source
data is used to enrich police data.179 This will involve establishing a ‘Data FusionCentre’.180
174 Brussels 27 March 2013 COM (2013) 173, p. 20 (proposed Article 2 under a).
175 Brussels 27 March 2013 COM (2013) 173, p. 20 (proposed Article 2 under d).
176 The proposal defines ‘administrative personal data’ as well. However, this is not personal data related to
administrative measures to prevent crime, but instead means personal data concerning Europol’s own
administration; personal data under the auspices of the objectives of Europol (proposed Article 3 paragraph
1 and 2) are specifically excluded from this definition of administrative personal data. See Brussels 27 March
2013 COM (2013) 173, p. 20 (proposed Article 2 under o), p. 47 (proposed Article 44 paragraph 8) and 50
(proposed Article 48).
177 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 28 March 2012,
Tackling crime in our digital age: establishing a European Cybercrime Centre, COM (2012) 140, p. 8;
https://www.europol.europa.eu/ec3.
178 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 28 March 2012,
Tackling crime in our digital age: establishing a European Cybercrime Centre, COM (2012) 140; The EU
Internal Security Strategy in action: five steps towards a more secure Europe, COM (2010) 67 of
22 November 2010.
179 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 28 March 2012,
Tackling crime in our digital age: establishing a European Cybercrime Centre, COM (2012) 140, p. 4 and 7.
180 https://www.europol.europa.eu/ec3/services.
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The information concerned relates to cybercrime activity, methods and suspects.181 The
Data Fusion Centre will connect law enforcement authorities, CERTs and private actors.182
Since the EC3 is located within Europol, it can make use of Europol’s information struc-
ture.183 Moreover, an EC3 Programme Board has been established, including such stake-
holders as Eurojust, CEPOL, the Member States as represented by the EU Cybercrime
Taskforce, ENISA and the Commission.184 These organizations are also involved in the
EC3 operationally.185
In conclusion, information exchange under the Europol framework can only take place
when the information concerns criminal investigations within the mandate of Europol,
i.e. serious and organized crime. The network structure offered by the ENUs and liaison
officers at Europol as well as the IT structure offered by EIS therefore may not be used for
information exchange in the scope of an administrative approach. However, the current
structure of information exchange would constitute a point of departure for a future
information structure supporting an administrative approach.
14.4.2 The information exchange structure under Eurojust
Article 85 of the TFEU defines the mission of Eurojust:
Eurojust’s mission shall be to support and strengthen coordination and coop-
eration between national investigating and prosecuting authorities in relation
to serious crime affecting two ormoreMember States or requiring a prosecution
on common bases, on the basis of operations conducted and information sup-
plied by the Member States’ authorities and by Europol.
Furthermore, Article 85 determines Eurojust’s tasks, which include (a) the proposed initi-
ation of criminal investigations, particularly those related to offences against the financial
interests of the EU; (b) the coordination of investigations and prosecutions referred to in
(a), and (c) the strengthening of judicial cooperation, including conflict resolution con-
cerning jurisdiction and close cooperation with the European Judicial Network.
181 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 28 March 2012,
Tackling crime in our digital age: establishing a European Cybercrime Centre, COM (2012) 140, p. 4.
182 https://www.europol.europa.eu/ec3/services.
183 https://www.europol.europa.eu/ec3.
184 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 28 March 2012,
Tackling crime in our digital age: establishing a European Cybercrime Centre, COM (2012) 140, p. 6. For a
full list: https://www.europol.europa.eu/ec/ec3-board.
185 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 28 March 2012,
Tackling crime in our digital age: establishing a European Cybercrime Centre, COM (2012) 140, p. 7.
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The objective, competence and tasks of Eurojust are specified in Articles 3, 4 and 5 of
the Council Decision on the strengthening of Eurojust and amending Council Decision
2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious
crime.186 The general competence of Eurojust concerns those types of crimes and offences
for which Europol is competent to act, as well as other offences committed in concurrence
with these offences.187 In other cases, Eurojust may assist investigations and prosecutions
when a Member State so requests.188 Eurojust’s objectives are to stimulate and improve
coordination between competent authorities of Member States in investigations and
prosecutions, to improve cooperation between the competent authorities ofMember States,
particularly in facilitating judicial requests for cooperation, and to support the competent
authorities of Member States otherwise in order to render their investigations and prose-
cutions more effective.189 The previous objectives may be executed in the context of the
criminal behaviour for which Eurojust is competent, as specified above, when two ormore
Member States and investigations and prosecutions are involved.190 Assistance is also
possible for cooperation between a Member State and a non-Member State if a competent
authority of that Member State so requests.191 Eurojust may also assist a single Member
State or competent authority of the Commission, again upon request.192 Eurojust’s tasks
are either fulfilled by the network of national members or by the Eurojust College.193
Eurojust acts either through its 27 national members194 or through its College.195 The
College is made up of all of the national members.196 Delegated national members have a
seat on Eurojust,197 act under and are subject to their national legislation,198 and are either
prosecutors, judges or police officers of equivalent competence.199 Information exchange
between Eurojust and the Member States is directed via the national members.200 Further-
more, under the Eurojust Council Decision, the national member may contact the compe-
tent authorities of his own Member State directly.201
186 Hereafter: Eurojust Council Decision. Brussels 15 July 2009, 5347/3/09, consolidated version.
187 Article 4 paragraph 1 Eurojust Council Decision.
188 Article 4 paragraph 2 Eurojust Council Decision.
189 Article 3 paragraph 1 Eurojust Council Decision.
190 Article 3 paragraph 1 Eurojust Council Decision.
191 Article 3 paragraph 2 Eurojust Council Decision.
192 Article 3 paragraph 3 Eurojust Council Decision.
193 Article 5 Eurojust Council Decision.
194 Article 6 Eurojust Council Decision; Suominen 2008, p. 222.
195 Article 7 Eurojust Council Decision.
196 Article 10 paragraph 1 Eurojust Council Decision.
197 Article 2 paragraph 2 Eurojust Council Decision.
198 Article 2 paragraph 4 Eurojust Council Decision.
199 Article 2 paragraph 1 Eurojust Council Decision.
200 Article 9 paragraph 2 Eurojust Council Decision.
201 Article 9 paragraph 4 Eurojust Council Decision.
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The designation of powers to national members and the access to their Member State’s
information is arranged under the Decision. National members are in any case authorized
to access the following types of registers in their Member State: criminal records, registers
of arrested persons, investigations registers, DNA registers and other registers of their
Member State where they deem this information necessary to fulfil their tasks.202 The
Member States must define beforehand which additional powers are granted to their
nationalmembers as well as the nationalmember’s right to act in relation to foreign judicial
authorities.203
Article 9a paragraph 1 determines the scope of the powers under Articles 9b to 9f; the
national member exercises his powers in his capacity as a competent national authority,
acting in accordance with the national law (of his Member State) and in accordance with
the conditions of Article 9b to 9e.204 He shall, when appropriate, make it known whenever
he is exercising these powers.205
Information exchange with the national level takes place via national correspondents
who are responsible for the Eurojust National Coordination System (ENCS).206 The ENCS
facilitates the input of information into the Case Management System (CMS) at the level
of Eurojust, assists in determining whether a case requires the assistance of Eurojust or
the European Judicial Network (EJN), assists the national member in identifying relevant
authorities for the execution of requests for judicial cooperation, and maintains relations
with the ENUs of Europol.207 To meet these objectives, the national correspondents are208
connected to the CMS,209 but their access is restricted to the index and temporary work
files created by their national member.210 The extent to which the national correspondents
have access to the index at the national level is further determined by the Member States
themselves.211
202 Article 9 paragraph 3 Eurojust Council Decision.
203 Article 9a paragraph 2 and 4 Eurojust Council Decision.
204 Article 9a paragraph 1 Eurojust Council Decision.
205 Article 9a paragraph 1 Eurojust Council Decision.
206 Article 12 paragraph 1, 2 and 4 Eurojust Council Decision. Paragraph 2 of Article 12 assigns four types of
national correspondents, namely: (a) national correspondents for Eurojust, (b) national correspondents for
Eurojust for terrorism matters, (c) national correspondents and contact points for the European Judicial
Network and (d) national members or contact points for the Network of Joint Investigation Teams and
Council Decisions 2002/494/JHA, 2007/845/JHA and 2008/852/JHA.
207 Article 12 paragraph 5 and 16 Eurojust Council Decision.
208 In the case of the national members or contact points for the Network of Joint Investigation Teams and
Council Decisions 2002/494/JHA, 2007/845/JHA and 2008/852/JHA, they may be connected.
209 Article 12 paragraph 6 Eurojust Council Decision. The CMS is established to support Eurojust in assisting
investigations and prosecutions, particularly by cross-referencing information, facilitate access to information
on ongoing investigations and prosecutions and facilitate the lawfulness and compliance with the rules on
personal data processing according to the Eurojust Council Decision. See Article 16 to 16b Eurojust Council
Decision.
210 Article 16 paragraph 1 and 16b paragraph 2 Eurojust Council Decision.
211 Article 16b paragraph 3 Eurojust Council Decision.
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Information exchange is furthermore possible without the prior authorization of the
national members themselves or their Member State’s competent authorities if such
exchange is necessary for the performance of Eurojust’s tasks.212 National members will
be informed promptly of any case concerning them.213 Member State’s competent
authorities exchange information necessary for Eurojust’s tasks, as determined by Articles
4 and 5 and the rules on data protection of the Eurojust Council Decision, via their national
members.214
The data protection rules for the exchange of information as arranged under the
Eurojust Council Decision are laid down in Articles 14, 15, 17, 18 to 25 and Article 27.
Here, we discuss only those rules important for this report. Article 14 determines that
Eurojust may process personal data when necessary to attain its objectives and within the
framework of its competences and tasks.215 Article 15 paragraph 1 determines that Eurojust
may only process personal data on persons who are suspected of, or have committed, or
have taken part in or have been convicted of criminal offences under the national legislation
of Member States for which Eurojust is competent. Paragraph 2 determines the same for
witnesses or victims. In exceptional cases and under certain strict conditions, other personal
data relating to the circumstances of an offence may be processed.216 Personal data
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade
union memberships and state of health or sexual orientation may only be processed by
Eurojust if this is necessary for national investigations and for coordination within Euro-
just.217 Such informationmay not be included in the index of the CMS.218 AData Protection
Officer will be informed of the processing of such information as well as of the exceptional
cases as named above.219 To further enhance Eurojust’s data protection regime, a Joint
Supervisory Body has been established to ensure compliance with the Decision.220
Regarding contact with third parties, Eurojust has a special relationship with the
European Judicial Network (EJN). The national members of Eurojust supply information
to the EJN contact points on a case-by-case basis when it is thought that the EJN is better
suited to deal with a case. Contact with the European Union’s institutions, agencies and
bodies is arranged in Article 26 of the Eurojust Council Decision, and relations with third
states and organizations are arranged in Article 26a. In order to exchange information
with those entities, Article 27 stipulates that a national member must give consent prior
212 Article 13 paragraph 3 Eurojust Council Decision.
213 Article 13 paragraph 3 Eurojust Council Decision.
214 Article 13 paragraph 1 Eurojust Council Decision.
215 Article 14 paragraph 1, 2 and 3 Eurojust Council Decision.
216 Article 15 paragraph 3 Eurojust Council Decision.
217 Article 15 paragraph 4 Eurojust Council Decision.
218 Article 15 paragraph 4 Eurojust Council Decision.
219 Article 17 and 15 paragraph 3 and 4 Eurojust Council Decision.
220 Article 23 Eurojust Council Decision.
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to the transfer of information.When appropriate, he consults hisMember State’s competent
authorities. The data can only be used for the purpose for which it was transmitted.
However, no restrictions on the purposes are mentioned.221
In conclusion, information exchange under the regime of the Eurojust Council Decision
can only take place if it does not exceed the restrictions placed on Eurojust’s objectives
and tasks. These are limited to criminal investigations and prosecutions, with no option
to forward information for other purposes. The situation regarding information exchange
with third parties is peculiar. Apparently, information can be exchanged for ‘purposes’,
but these purposes are not specified further. Crime prevention by means of an administra-
tive approach could thus be considered a ‘purpose’. Information exchange in support of
an administrative approach is therefore not possible within the EU, but it may be possible
with third parties. Even though Eurojust’s information exchange structure is directed –
primarily and exclusively – at criminal investigations and prosecutions, the structure could
provide a basis for judicial authorities to begin exchanging information in support of an
administrative approach to crime. However, this would mean that the scope for which the
structure has been established must be extended to include an administrative approach to
crime.
14.4.3 The information exchange structure under the Schengen Convention
The exchange of data under the Schengen Convention regime is arranged through a
number of different instruments. According to the Commission’s 2010 Overview of
Communications, these were introduced to enhance operations within the Schengen area
as well as to enhance the operation of the customs union.222 First of all, Title IV of the
Schengen Convention introduced the Schengen Information System (SIS). This is a
centralized information system that also has a national section in each Contracting State.
Within the SIS, the Contracting Parties issue alerts regarding various topics. The SIS II
system came into force on 9April 2013.223 This second-generation IT systemhas improved
the SIS in several ways, for example by creating the possibility of linking alerts, introducing
new categories of alerts, and making it possible to store fingerprints, photographs and
copies of European Arrest Warrants (EAW).224 All EU Member States, and some third-
party states participate in SIS II.225
221 Article 27 paragraph 2 Eurojust Council Decision.
222 COM (2010) 385, p. 5.
223 Council Decision 2007/533/JHA; http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-
visas/schengen-information-system/index_en.htm; http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/
news/2013/20130409_01_en.htm#/c_.
224 COM (2010)385, p. 5.
225 COM (2010)385, p. 5. For the third-party provisions, see Regulation (EC) NO 1987/2006.
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SIS II consists of three parts, namely (1) a central system, located in Strasbourg, which
includes a technical support function and a uniformnational interface; (2) a national system,
which allows each Member State to communicate with the central system and (3) a com-
munication infrastructure between the central and national systems.226 Data can be entered,
updated, searched and deleted via the national systems, but Member States cannot search
directly in one another’s national systems;227 they can search the SIS II central system,
however.228 Article 46 paragraph 6 of Council Decision 2007/533/JHA specifically states
that the data may not be used for administrative purposes. SIS II works as follows. When
a Contracting Party searches in SIS, a ‘hit’ is produced when the search data matches an
existing alert in SIS. In that case, the authorities may go through the SIRENE Bureaux229
to request supplementary information from the Contracting Party that issued the alert
making use of the SIS II communication network.230
The data categories included in the SIS II concern persons about whom an alert has
been issued231 and objects.232 Under certain conditions, both Europol and Eurojust can
access the SIS II database.233 The data on persons and objects can only be processed in
accordance with the purposes specified under the Convention.234
For the purposes of data protection, the Council of Europe Convention for the Protec-
tion of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 28 January
1981 is applicable.235
In technical terms, it should be noted that SIS II uses the SecureTrans-European Services
for Telematics between Administrations (s-TESTA).236
Other structures that play a role in the Schengen Area are the following. First of all,
EURODAC is an automated, centralized fingerprint identification system which encom-
passes the fingerprint data of certain third-country nationals.237 Its goal is to determine
which EU Member State is responsible for examination of asylum applications under the
226 Article 4 paragraph 1 of the Council Decision 200/533/JHA.
227 Article 4 paragraph 2 of the Council Decision 200/533/JHA.
228 Article 4 paragraph 4 of the Council Decision 200/533/JHA.
229 Supplementary Information Request at the National Entry.
230 Brussels 7 December 2012, COM (2012) 735, p. 5.
231 When an EAW is lodged against a person or a person is wanted for arrest for extradition purposes (Chapter
V Council Decision 2007/533/JHA), a person is missing (Chapter VI Council Decision 2007/533/JHA) or
the person is sought to assist with a judicial procedure (Chapter VII Council Decision 2007/533/JHA).
232 When an object is sought for seizure, or to use as evidence in a criminal procedure (Chapter IX Council
Decision 2007/533/JHA).
233 Article 41-43 Council Decision 2007/533/JHA.
234 Article 46 Council Decision 2007/533/JHA.
235 Articles 56 and 57 Council Decision 2007/533/JHA.
236 COM (2010) 385, p. 6.
237 COM (2010) 385, p. 6.
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Dublin system.238 The system runs on the s-TESTA network.239 Directive 95/46/EC applies
to EURODAC.240 A new regulation concerning EURODAC is in the making which will
ensure that national police forces and Europol can access the data available in EURODAC
to compare fingerprints in criminal investigations.241 At the time of writing, this regulation
has yet to be published.
The VISA Information System (VIS) is meant to implement a common visa policy
by facilitating the examination of visa applications and external order checks. Its second
purpose is to help prevent threats to the internal security of the EU.242 Mirroring SIS II, it
also has a national section in each participating state and a central data system in France.243
Accessible data includes visa application, photographs, fingerprints, related decisions of
visa authorities and links between applications.244 Visa, asylum, immigration and border
control authorities may access the system in order to verify identities and the authenticity
of visas.245 Moreover, police authorities and Europol have access to the system in order to
prevent and combat terrorism and other forms of serious crime.246 Technically, VIS also
works on the s-TESTA system and is applicable to all EU Member States.247
The Advance Passenger Information (API) regulates the exchange of information
concerning passengers on air carriers (private operators).248 This instrument stipulates
that on request, EU Member States must send passenger details to the authorities of third
countries.249 The purpose of this instrument is to improve border control and combat
irregular migration.250
238 COM (2010) 385, p. 7; Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 (Dublin Regulation).
239 COM (2010) 385, p. 7.
240 COM (2010) 385, p. 7.
241 Brussels 7 December 2012, COM (2012) 735, p. 5; http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/poli-
cies/asylum/identification-of-applicants/index_en.htm.
242 Council Decision 2004/512/EC; Regulation (EC) NO 767/2008; Council Decision 2008/633/JHA; Brussels
7 December 2012, COM (2012) 735, p. 7.
243 COM (2010) 385, p. 7.
244 COM (2010) 385, p. 7.
245 COM (2010) 385, p. 7.
246 Article 1 and 2 Council Decision 2008/633/JHA.
247 COM (2010) 385, p. 8 (it states here that the UK and Ireland are an exception; however, later online sources
reveal thatVIS is applicable for all EUMember States, for instance: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-
we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-information-system/index_en.htm).
248 Article 2 under a Council Directive 2004/82/EC.
249 Article 1 Council Directive 2004/82/EC; COM (2010) 385, p. 7.
250 Article 1 Council Directive 2004/82/EC; COM (2010) 385, p. 8.
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14.4.4 Information-exchange of criminal records between Member States
(ECRIS)
Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA of 26 February 2009 on the organisation and
content of the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record between
Member States forms the framework for the establishment of the European Criminal
Records Information System (ECRIS).251,252
Purpose of Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA
According to Article 1, the purpose of the Framework Decision is to define the way in
which convicting Member States – when the person concerned is another Member State’s
national – should hand over information on those criminal convictions to the Member
State(s) of which the person is a national (sub a); to define the storage obligations of the
Member State of the person’s nationality; to specify how to reply to requests for information
(sub b); and to lay down a framework for an ICT system for the exchange on information
for the purpose of the Framework Decision (sub c). The latter has resulted in the establish-
ment of ECRIS in Council Decision 2009/316/JHA of 6 April 2009 on the establishment
of the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) in application of Article
11 of Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.
Article 2 defines the key terms, namely ‘conviction’,253 ‘criminal proceedings’254 and
‘criminal records’.255,256 Article 3 continues by identifying the Member States’ obligation
to establish a central authority or authorities.
Information exchange under Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA257
With regard to information exchange as discussed in this report, the Framework Decision
first specifies what obligations on information exchange exist for convictingMember States
251 Council Decision 2009/316/JHA of 16 April 2009 on the establishment of the European Criminal Records
Information System (ECRIS) in application of Article 11 of Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA. This was
based on an earlier pilot in which eleven EU countries exchanged information on criminal records electron-
ically: the ‘Network of judicial registers’ – pilot project. See: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/european-
e-justice/ecris/.
252 In 2007, the establishment of a European Police Records Index System (EPRIS) was also proposed.However,
the Commission concluded in 2012 that the current information exchange system works well, and it discon-
tinued development of EPRIS. See Council Document 15526/1/09 of 2 December 2009; COM(2010) 385
final of 20 July 2010; COM(2012) 735 final of 7 December 2012 and Vermeulen 2012.
253 ‘any final decision of a criminal court against a natural person in respect of a criminal offence, to the extent
that these decisions are entered in the criminal record of the convicting Member State.’
254 ‘the pre-trial stage, the trial stage itself and the execution of the conviction.’
255 ‘the national register or registers recording convictions in accordance with national law.’
256 The same definitions apply to theCouncil Decision onECRIS, seeArticle 2Council Decision 2009/316/JHA.
257 Provisions concerning information exchange with third states have been omitted from this report, as they
are outside its scope.
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(Article 4) and then notes the obligations ofMember States of which the person is a national
(Article 5). Furthermore, it regulates which information can be requested (Article 6) and
how one should reply to such a request (Article 7) as well as the deadlines for such requests
(Article 8). It also specifies the regime for using personal data (Article 9).
The Framework Decision supplements Article 13 of the European Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959) and its additional Protocols as well as the
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the
EU (2000) and its Protocol of 16 October 2001.258 The right to rely on the reservations
made toArticle 13 of the EuropeanConvention onMutual Assistance in CriminalMatters
(1959) is waived, which means that reservations regarding the refusal of requests may not
be used to refuse requests under Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.259 The Framework
Decision furthermore replacesArticle 22 of the EuropeanConvention onMutualAssistance
inCriminalMatters (1959), concerning the obligation to informother Contracting Parties
to that Convention of criminal convictions of the latter Parties’ nationals.260 Furthermore,
Decision 2005/876/JHA concerning the exchange of information extracted from the
criminal record has been repealed.261
Article 4 paragraph 1 obliges convicting Member States to report the nationality of
convicted persons when that person is a national of another Member State. Upon request
and in individual cases, a copy of the convictions, subsequent measures and other relevant
information is sent to the Member State of which the convicted person is a national for
the purpose of considering measures at a national level.262 The central authority of the
convicting Member State must send this information to the central authorities of the per-
son’s nationality as soon as possible,263 along with information on subsequent alterations
or deletions of the information contained in the convicting Member State’s criminal
record.264 The central authority of the Member State of which the person is a national is
obliged to store all obligatory information, optional information and additional information
as specified in Article 11 as well as information on any alterations or deletions of informa-
tion for the purpose of retransmission.265 Furthermore the Member State of which the
person is a national notifies the convicting Member State that it has received the informa-
tion.266 The ‘ECRIS Manual for practitioners’ (hereafter: ECRIS Manual) identifies four
258 Article 12 paragraph 1 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.
259 See www.minbuza.nl for a list of the reservations.
260 Article 12 paragraph 3 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.
261 Article 12 paragraph 4 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.
262 Article 4 paragraph 4 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.
263 Article 4 paragraph 2 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.
264 Article 4 paragraph 3 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.
265 Article 5 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.
266 Note from the Presidency to Coreper/Council regarding a Manual for Practitioners –ECRIS of 7 December
2011 Brussels, 17879/1/11 Rev 1, p. 7.
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reasons for rejecting information received from the convicting Member State, such as
death of the person and when the person cannot be identified unambiguously.267
Article 6 of the Framework Decision allows for Member States to request information
on convictions. Important for this report is the following phrase in paragraph 1 of Article 6:
‘When information from the criminal record of a Member State is requested
for the purposes of criminal proceedings against a person or for any purposes
other than that of criminal proceedings (emphasis by authors)’ a request may
be submitted to extract data from the criminal record.
According to the ECRISManual, requests issued for other purposes than criminal proceed-
ings should be replied to in accordance with the national law of the requested Member
State.268 When such a request is submitted for purposes other than criminal proceedings,
the other purpose should be stated in the request.269 The ECRIS Manual specifically states
that requests from an administrative authority are potentially admissible if they are in
accordance with the national law of the requested Member State.270
Article 7 determines how to reply to a requestmade underArticle 6 FrameworkDecision
2009/315/JHA. When it concerns a request for the purpose of criminal proceedings to the
Member State of the person’s nationality, the requested Member State’s central authority
transmits information about:
a. any convictions handed down in the Member State of his nationality as entered in that
Member State’s criminal record system;
b. any convictions handed down in other Member States and transmitted to the Member
State of the person’s nationality after 27 April 2012;
c. any convictions handed down in other Member States and transmitted to the Member
State of the person’s nationality by 27 April 2012 and;
d. any convictions handed down in third countries and transmitted to the criminal record
system of the Member State of the person’s nationality.271
267 Note from the Presidency to Coreper/Council regarding a Manual for Practitioners –ECRIS of 7 December
2011 Brussels, 17879/1/11 Rev 1, p. 7-8.
268 Note from the Presidency to Coreper/Council regarding a Manual for Practitioners –ECRIS of 7 December
2011 Brussels, 17879/1/11 Rev 1, p. 8.
269 Note from the Presidency to Coreper/Council regarding a Manual for Practitioners –ECRIS of 7 December
2011 Brussels, 17879/1/11 Rev 1, p. 9.
270 Article 6 paragraph 1 andArticle 7 paragraph 2 FrameworkDecision 2009/315/JHA;Note from the Presidency
to Coreper/Council regarding a Manual for Practitioners – ECRIS of 7 December 2011 Brussels, 17879/1/11
Rev 1, p. 8-9.
271 Article 7 paragraph 1 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.
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When the request is intended for any purposes other than criminal proceedings, the
requestedMember State of the person’s nationality replies by providing the same informa-
tion as mentioned in the four categories above, but in accordance with its national law.272
Hence, if the requested Member State’s national law does not allow for transmission of
any of the four categories, the information cannot be transmitted under the Framework
Decision.
The Member State of which the person is a national can retransmit information stored
in its criminal records that had been transmitted to it previously by another, earlier con-
victing Member State or third state, provided that the Member State indicates that such
information will only be retransmitted for the purpose of criminal proceedings. If another
Member State nevertheless requests information for purposes other than criminal proceed-
ings, the requested Member State is obliged to inform the requesting Member State about
these limitations and direct the requesting Member State to submit a request directly to
the convicting Member State.273
The request for such information is submitted electronically or by using the form
provided in Annex A of Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.274 In principle, the requests
of other Member States should be answered immediately or within ten working days.275
The information which can be exchanged under the Framework Decision consists of
obligatory information (information on the convicted person; on the nature of the convic-
tion; on the offence; and on the contents of the conviction),276 optional information (parents’
names; reference number of the conviction; place of the offence and disqualifications
arising from the conviction)277 and additional information (identity number; fingerprints;
pseudonym or aliases if applicable).278
With the exception of pseudonyms and aliases, the information received under Article
11 paragraph 1, is stored by the receiving Member State in accordance with Article 5
paragraph 1 for the purpose of retransmission as specified by Article 7 of the Framework
Decision.279
Finally, Article 9 regulates the conditions for using personal data. Paragraph 1 deter-
mines that information exchanged for the purpose of criminal proceedings may only be
used for that purpose. Information requested for any other purposes can be used by the
272 Article 7 paragraph 2 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.
273 Article 7 paragraph 2 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.
274 Article 6 paragraph 4 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.
275 Article 8 paragraph 1 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA. The same paragraph applies a similar provision
when the Member State requests additional information for the purpose of executing the request. The
timeframe of ten days starts when the additional information is received.
276 Article 11 paragraph 1 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.
277 Article 11 paragraph 1 under b Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.
278 Article 11 paragraph 1 under c Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.
279 Article 11 paragraph 2 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.
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requesting Member State in accordance with its national law, but only for the purpose for
which it was requested and limited by restrictions as imposed by the requested Member
State.280 This rule is subject to one exception only: the prevention of an immediate and
serious threat to public security in the requesting Member State.281
TheECRIS ICT systemwas established inApril 2012 based onArticle 11 of Framework
Decision 2009/315/JHA.282 ECRIS is a decentralized information technology system and
consists of two elements, namely interconnection software enabling the exchange of
information between Member States’ criminal records databases and a common commu-
nication infrastructure, more specifically s-TESTA.283 Explicitly excluded is the creation
of a centralized criminal records database,284 as well as direct access by central authorities,
as established in Article 3 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA, to the databases of other
Member States.285 In order to harmonize the various offences as identified in the various
national criminal codes, Article 4 of the Council Decision establishes Annex A, which
consists of a code bookwith the relevant name and legal classifications of offences asmeant
by the Member State.286 A separate Annex B contains information on the nature and/or
execution conditions of penalties and measures, including the parameter ‘non-criminal
ruling’ (added voluntarily).287 The Council can adopt modifications to both Annexes by
qualified majority after consulting the European Parliament.288 There is also a provision
on the drawing up of a non-binding Manual for ECRIS,289 which, as we saw earlier, has in
fact been drawn up and disseminated among the Member States.290
In conclusion, Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA and the subsequent ECRIS ICT
system allow for the exchange of information contained in the EUMember States’ criminal
records for purposes other than criminal proceedings, including the exchange of that
information to administrative authorities. However, this exchange must be in accordance
with the national law of the requested Member State. If exchange with an administrative
authority is therefore ruled out entirely or restricted in the requested Member State itself,
the requestingMember State cannot obtain this information for the purpose of transmitting
it to an administrative authority. The ECRIS Manual permits the inclusion of information
280 Article 9 paragraph 2 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.
281 Article 9 paragraph 3 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA.
282 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/european-e-justice/ecris/.
283 Article 3 paragraph 1 and 5 Council Decision 2009/316/JHA.
284 Article 3 paragraph 2 Council Decision 2009/316/JHA.
285 Article 3 paragraph 3 Council Decision 2009/316/JHA.
286 Article 4 paragraph 1, article 5 paragraph 1 under a and Annex A Council Decision 2009/316/JHA.
287 Article 4 paragraph 2, article 5 paragraph 1 under b and Annex B Council Decision 2009/316/JHA.
288 Article 6 paragraph 1 Council Decision 2009/316/JHA.
289 Article 6 paragraph 2 under a Council Decision 2009/316/JHA.
290 Note from the Presidency to Coreper/Council regarding a Manual for Practitioners –ECRIS of 7 December
2011 Brussels, 17879/1/11 Rev 1.
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on basic national rules and procedures, for example concerning requests for administrative
purposes.291 The Member States have not added such information (as yet), however.292
14.4.5 Information exchange structure regulated by the Naples II Convention
The Customs Information System (CIS) was set upwith a view to preventing, investigating
and prosecuting infringements of national and Community customs regulations.293 The
CIS is part of the Anti-Fraud Information System operated by OLAF294,295 It is a centralized
information system managed by the European Commission. According to Article 3 of
Council Decision 2009/917/JHA, CIS can be accessed via terminals in each Member State,
at the Commission, Europol and Eurojust.296 The data that can be accessed consists of
personal data,297 as well as data on means of transport, businesses, persons and goods and
cash retained, seized or confiscated.298 The system is mainly intended for customs
authorities, but other authorities may also access the system as long as they adhere to the
purpose laid down in Article 1 Council Decision 2009/917/JHA, namely to prevent,
investigate and prosecute infringements of national andCommunity customs regulations.299
Article 20 to 26 Council Decision 2009/917/JHA regulates personal data protection. There
is no indication that the information stored in CIS can be used for purposes other than
the aims as mentioned in Article 1 Council Decision 2009/917/JHA.
ACIS-connected database is the Customs File Identification Database (FIDE), which
enables authorities to ascertain whether authorities from other Member States have
investigated or are still investigating a person or business.300
291 Note from the Presidency to Coreper/Council regarding a Manual for Practitioners –ECRIS of 7 December
2011 Brussels, 17879/1/11 Rev 1, p. 17.
292 Note from the Presidency to Coreper/Council regarding a Manual for Practitioners –ECRIS of 7 December
2011 Brussels, 17879/1/11 Rev 1, p. 17.
293 Based on the Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the use
of information technology for customs purposes. O.J. C316/34, as amended by the Council Decision
2009/917/JHA.
294 The European Anti-Fraud Office.
295 Brussels 7 December 2012, COM (2012) 735, p. 5.
296 Article 8, 11 and 12 Council Decision 2009/917/JHA.
297 See also Article 4 paragraph 2, 3, 4 and 5 Council Decision 2009/917/JHA for personal data protection.
Reference is made under paragraph 5 of Article 4 to the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA regarding
‘forbidden’ information.
298 Article 3 paragraph 1 sub a-h Council Decision 2009/917/JHA.
299 Article 7 Council Decision 2009/917/JHA.
300 Article 15-19 Council Decision 2009/917/JHA.
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14.4.6 The information exchange structure regarding specific relevant topics
in the EU
14.4.6.1 The information exchange structure of the Financial Intelligence Units
Directive 2005/60/EC of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial
system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing (hereafter: Directive
2005/60/EC) imposed the obligation to set up a system of Financial Intelligence Units
(FIUs) for the Member States of the European Union.301 This means that a national central
unit has been established in each Member State with the aim of combatting money laun-
dering and terrorist financing.302 The FIUs are permitted to receive, and (to a certain extent)
request, information, analyse that information and disseminate information to the compe-
tent authorities.303 These activities constitute the core function of an FIU.304 The information
concerns potential money laundering or terrorist financing.305 The FIUs have access to the
relevant financial, administrative and law enforcement information for the proper fulfilment
of their tasks.306 The institutions and persons as covered by Directive 2005/60/EC,
including private entities such as banks, are obliged to supply the FIUs with information
in certain situations involving a suspicion ofmoney laundering and/or terrorist financing.307
Article 38 of Directive 2005/60/EC furthermore provides for international cooperation
between the FIUs.308
Article 36 ofDirective 2005/60/EC requiresMember States to license currency exchange
offices and trust and company service providers. Licences can be refused when the
authority assigned to grant the licence is not convinced that the directors/managers (to
be) or owners are fit and proper persons.
As Directive 2005/60/EC refers to access to information, including financial, adminis-
trative and law enforcement information transmitted to and from the FIUs by competent
authorities, it may very well be possible to exchange information in support of an admin-
istrative approach. However, the exchange would remain purpose-bound, focusing
exclusively onmoney laundering and terrorist financing. TheDirectivemakes no provision
for the exchange or forwarding of information for other purposes.
301 The first FIUs however were established in the mid-1980s. Moreover, the Member States of the European
Union are not the only countries to have established FIUs. For a more detailed historical overview of FIUs
internationally, see Gleason & Gottselig 2004, p. 1-3.
302 Article 21 paragraph 1 Directive 2005/60/EC.
303 Article 21 paragraph 2 Directive 2005/60/EC.
304 Gleason & Gottselig 2004, p. 33.
305 Article 21 paragraph 2 Directive 2005/60/EC.
306 Article 21 paragraph 3 Directive 2005/60/EC.
307 Article 22-24 Directive 2005/60/EC.
308 Article 38 Directive 2005/60/EC.
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14.4.6.2 Information exchange structure of the Asset Recovery Offices
Council Decision 2007/845/JHA of 6 December 2007 concerning cooperation between
Asset Recovery Offices of the Member States in the field of tracing and identification of
proceeds from, or other property related to, crime establishes national Asset Recovery
Offices (nAROs). There is at least one nARO in each Member State.309 The Member States
decides how and in what form nAROs are to be established, as well as how information is
obtained on a national level.310 The nAROs are meant to facilitate the tracing and seizure
of proceeds from crime and other property belonging to criminals by exchanging informa-
tion and best practices.311 For this purpose the nAROs cooperate and can exchange infor-
mation both on request or spontaneously.312 Cooperation is also possible if the confiscation
measures do not fall under criminal law but are equivalent.313 These measures however
must be ordered by a judicial authority in relation to a criminal offence.314 The Decision
specificallymentions that the legal status of a nARO, albeit falling under a law enforcement,
administrative or judicial authority, should not prevent it from cooperating with nAROs
in the other Member States, taking into account the diversity of law enforcement existing
in the Member States.315 Furthermore, the information exchange should adhere to the
regulations and procedures of the Swedish Initiative.316 A nARO or competent authority
in a Member State can request information in writing from another nARO for the purpose
of tracing and seizing proceeds from crime and other property belonging to criminals.317
The requesting nARO or authority must provide precise details on the property targeted
or sought, and on the natural or legal persons involved, or presumed so.318 Furthermore
the nAROs or competent authorities in Member States can exchange information sponta-
neously. This spontaneous information exchange is subject to the limits of the applicable
national law and to the same conditions as an exchange of information on request.319
Article 5 of the Council Decision stipulates that the Member States must ensure the
established regulations on data protection.Moreover, the information exchanged is subject
to the data protection rules of the receiving Member State, as if that information was
gathered in the receivingMember State.320 Data that has been exchanged is protected under
309 Article 1 Council Decision 2007/845/JHA.
310 Explanatory memorandum, Council Document No. 7259/06 Add 1, p. 4.
311 Article 1 Council Decision 2007/845/JHA.
312 Article 2 paragraph 1 Council Decision 2007/845/JHA.
313 Explanatory memorandum, Council Document No. 7259/06 Add 1 p. 5.
314 Explanatory memorandum, Council Document No. 7259/06 Add 1, p. 5.
315 Article 2 paragraph 2 Council Decision 2007/845/JHA.
316 Article 3 paragraph 1 and 2 and article 4 paragraph 1 and 2 Council Decision 2007/845/JHA; Explanatory
memorandum, Council Document No. 7259/06 Add 1, p. 5.
317 Article 3 paragraph 1 Council Decision 2007/845/JHA.
318 Article 3 paragraph 2 Council Decision 2007/845/JHA.
319 Article 4 Council Decision 2007/845/JHA.
320 Article 5 Council Decision 2007/845/JHA.
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the Council of Europe Convention of 28 January 1981 for the Protection of Individuals
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data and, where ratified, the Additional
Protocol of 8 November 2001 to that Convention, regarding Supervisory Authorities and
Transborder Data Flows. The principles of Recommendation No R(87) 15 of the Council
of Europe Regulating the Use of Personal Data in the Police Sector should be taken into
account when handling personal data.321
All EUMember States included in this research have established one ormore nAROs.322
Wecan conclude that, because the nAROs’ scope of application is broader than criminal
law alone, information exchange in support of an administrative approach is possible for
nAROs. However, such exchanges must adhere to the purpose for which the nAROs have
been established: facilitating the tracing and seizure of proceeds of crime and other property
belonging to criminals. Furthermore, the information exchange must comply with the
framework for personal and other data protection for nAROs.
14.4.6.3 Information exchange in the field of cybercrime and cybersecurity
The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)323 was established in
2004.324 Recently, Regulation 526/2013 of 21 May 2013 concerning the European Union
Agency forNetwork and Information Security (ENISA) and repealing Regulation 460/2004
(hereafter: ENISARegulation) re-established ENISA. ENISA ismeant to contribute to and
raise awareness of the need for high-level network and information security within the
European Union.325 For the purposes of this report, we discuss only the relevant ENISA
provisions regarding information exchange.
The ENISA Regulation has a single objective when it comes to information exchange.
Article 3 paragraph 1 under b (vi) specifies that that ENISA assists the institutions, bodies,
offices and agencies of the EU and the Member States in collecting, analysing and dissem-
inating relevant network and information security data. Article 14 furthermore specifies
that the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the competent body of
a Member State may request advice and assistance as long as this falls within the scope of
the objective and tasks of ENISA. Protection of data is regulated in Article 17 concerning
the confidentiality of information upon request, and inArticle 29 regarding the protection
of personal data and the applicability of Regulation 45/2001.
Regarding the information-exchange structure for network and information security,
Article 3 paragraph 1 under b (iv) regulates that ENISA will support the capabilities of
321 Article 5 Council Decision 2007/845/JHA.
322 Brussels 12 April 2011 COM (2011) 176, p. 3ff and http://star.worldbank.org/star/sites/star/files/Italy-Asset-
Recovery-tools-and-procedures.pdf.
323 Drewer & Ellerman 2012, p. 382.
324 Regulation 2004/460.
325 Article 1 paragraph 1 ENISA regulation.
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national/government and EU Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) by
exchanging information to ensure a common set of practices for each CERT, among other
things. Related to this, Article 3 paragraph 1 under b (iii) specifies that ENISA will assist
the institutions and bodies of the EUby supporting the operation of aComputer Emergency
Response Team (CERT). Outside the scope of the ENISARegulation, a network of national
liaison officers has been established.326
Interestingly enough, there are no provisions made to regulate the actual information
exchange, nor is there any reference to other regulatory instruments (such as the Swedish
Initiative) providing a framework for information exchange. One can deduce that infor-
mation exchange under the ENISA framework is broad, limited only by the objective and
tasks of the agency. That means that the exchange of information in support of an
administrative approach to crime might very well be possible under the ENISA regime.
Additionally, as discussed earlier, ENISA is involved in the European Cyber Crime
Centre (EC3), established under the auspices of Europol.
14.4.6.4 Information exchange in the fight against child exploitation and
pornography
Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December
2011 on combating sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children, and child pornography,
replacing theCouncil FrameworkDecision 2004/68/JHA (Directive 2011/92/EU) introduces
several offences concerning child pornography. In addition, Article 10 of the Directive
regulates minimum rules regarding the disqualification arising from previous convictions
in EUMember States. Article 10 paragraph 1 states thatMember Statesmust takemeasures
to prevent natural persons convicted of the offences specified in Articles 3 to 7 of the
Directive from exercising, either temporarily or permanently, professions involving direct
and regular contact with children. In doing so, employers are entitled to request information
when they are recruiting persons either for professional or organized voluntary activities
that involve direct and regular contact with children. National law arranges the way such
a request should be made, e.g. access, on request or via the person concerned, to relevant
criminal conviction records.327 The Directive gives some examples of such a request.328 For
the exchange of information between Member States on previous criminal convictions for
any of the offences listed in Articles 3 to 7 of the Directive, or on other disqualifications
arising from such criminal convictions, the Member States can request information based
on Article 6 of the Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA of 26 February 2009 on
326 http://www.enisa.europa.eu/about-enisa/structure-organization/national-liaison-office.
327 Article 10 paragraph 2 Directive 2011/92/EU.
328 Article 10 paragraph 2 Directive 2011/92/EU.
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the organization and content of the exchange of information extracted from criminal
requests between Member States, which is discussed in Section 14.3.2.4.
In the Netherlands, the screening of persons working in child day care takes place
continuously based on a system of Verklaring Omtrent het Gedrag (VOG). For a detailed
explanation of this system, see chapter 8 of this research.
Schematic overview on the organizational structure on information
exchange within the area of freedom, security and justice
Table 14.2
Information exchange permitted
in support of an administrative
approach?
Information exchange possibly





Not presently.1. Europol National Units (ENU)
2. Secure Information Exchange
Network Application (SIENA)
3. Europol Information System
(EIS), including Analytic Work
Files (AWF)
4. Operational and strategic
arrangements with third parties
Europol
(bodies & agencies EU and third
countries)
Not presently.1.Nationalmembers (at Eurojust)
2. National Correspondents (in
the Member States)
3. EurojustNationalCoordination
System (ENCS), including the
CaseManagement System (CMS)
4. Contact with third parties
(particularly the European Judi-
Eurojust
cial Network, bodies & agencies
EU and third countries)
Subject to the regime of the
Schengen Convention: Yes, both
1. The Schengen Information
System (SIS) and SIS II
2. SIRENE Bureaux
3. EURODAC
4. VISA Information System
(VIS)
5. Advance Passenger Informa-
tion (API)
Schengen
for information exchange on
request and spontaneous
exchange, but only with the prior
consent of the requested contract-
ing party.
Yes, information exchange for





proceedings is possible, but onlyDecision 2009/316/JHA
(ECRIS) to exchange information regard-
ing criminal records andwhen the
national law of the requested state
allows such exchange.
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Information exchange permitted
in support of an administrative
approach?
Information exchange possibly





Within the scope of infringements
of national andEuropean customs
rules.
1. Customs Information System
(CIS), including Customs File
Identification Database (FIDE)
Naples II Convention
1. Yes, but limited to the purpose
of the FIUs (money laundering
and terrorist financing)
2. Yes, but limited to the purpose
of nAROs (asset recovery)
3. May be possible due to its
broad scope
4. Concerning previous offences







tive committed in (other) EU
Member States
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15 Conclusions
A.C.M. Spapens, M. Peters & D. Van Daele
15.1 Introduction
This study aimed to contribute to the existing body of knowledge concerning an adminis-
trative approach to crime in the EuropeanUnion in the followingmanner. First, it explored
the legal options available to national administrative authorities in the selected Member
States to prevent criminals from misusing the legal infrastructure, such as licensing proce-
dures or tender procedures. This resulted in ten separate country reports (Chapters 2-11),
as well as a comparison of those legal options in the ten Member States (Chapter 12).
Second, it considered the practical application of the legal options available in the selected
Member States. The results of this empirical study are reviewed in Chapter 13. Last, it
explored the potential for information exchange between EU Member States in support
of an administrative approach to crime (Chapter 14). Based on the foregoing, the following
conclusions can be drawn.
15.2 General conclusions
A general conclusion is that the battle against serious and organised crime profits from
cooperation between different public authorities and in some cases private partners as
well. In (almost) all of the ten Member States included in this research, we found examples
of coordinated responses to problems perceived as particularly serious. Such responses
mostly referred to ‘working apart together’ in order to repress or disturb problems, and
less to preventing criminals from infiltrating into the legitimate economy for example by
denying licenses. The study shows that an administrative approach as such is nothing new;
the Member States mostly differ in how they apply administrative legislation to reduce or
prevent crime problems.
All Member States have legislation in place to regulate businesses as well as to prevent
public order disturbances, which is suitable in the context of an administrative approach
to crime. Policies (if formulated at all), legislation and underlying structures however,
differ widely.
It is important to stress that an administrative approach to crime does not replace or
present an alternative to traditional law enforcement. Instead, it complements law
enforcement and depends on information from the police and judicial authorities to be
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effective. Therefore, information exchange between administrative authorities, law
enforcement agencies and the tax authorities is a condition sine qua non for any coordinated
response to serious and organised crime problems. Particularly the options for law
enforcement agencies and the tax authorities respectively to share information with
administrative bodies are sometimes limited. Administrative authorities are allowed to
exchange information mutually. The provision of information by administrative bodies
to law enforcement agencies and the tax authorities is usually possible within the context
of a judicial investigation, and inmost other cases. The reverse flow of information ismore
problematic. Only a few of the Member States studied here have platforms to share intelli-
gence. Information may be exchanged informally, but this has its limitations because it
depends highly on personal relations and denies the administrative authorities the use of
information to base interventions on, because it was not ‘officially’ received.
In practice, an (ad-hoc) administrative approach is common to tackle the most serious
and organized crime problems on the local, regional and national levels. However, the use
of administrative measures to prevent that criminals infiltrate in the legitimate economy
is less far developed in most of the countries studied here.
Highly relevant for the EU is the lack of a clear legal and organisational framework for
the exchange of law enforcement and fiscal information with administrative bodies.
Member States such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy already call for action in this
respect andwe expect that others who are now in the process of adopting an administrative
approach to crime will follow. The existing legal and organisational infrastructure does
not provide a clear-cut framework for the exchange of information from law enforcement
agencies or the tax authorities on the one hand and administrative agencies on the other.
This represents a serious blind spot and requires action at the EU-level. First, because
criminals can physically move to another Member State or establish a business there and
thus circumvent effective preventative screening. Second, because it reduces the opportu-
nities for administrative bodies to take repressive action (or to disrupt) an illegal activity
if this requires criminal or fiscal information.
Belowwe present the conclusions inmore detail and formulate a number of recommen-
dations.
15.3 Towards a practical definition of the term ‘an administrative
approach to serious and organized crime’
At the start of this project, there existed no exact definition of the concept of an adminis-
trative approach to serious and organised crime. Therefore, we adopted aworking definition
focused primarily on the prevention of crime. During the project, it became clear that an
672
A.C.M. Spapens, M. Peters & D. Van Daele
administrative approach is equally relevant for the repression and disruption of crime and
this prompted us to amend the definition as follows:
An administrative approach to (serious and organised) crime encompasses pre-
vention of the facilitation of illegal activities by denying criminals the use of the
legal administrative infrastructure as well as coordinated interventions (‘working
apart together’) to disrupt and repress (serious and organised) crime and public
order problems.
As explained in Chapter 1 of this report, the word ‘administrative’ is itself ambiguous
because it has various meanings as both an adjective and a noun. In addition, the concept
of administrative law as such is very broad and grounded by each state in its national law.
Consequently, administrative law is nationally oriented and the same is true for the concept
of ‘administrative authority.’ There is thus no universally accepted definition of the term
‘administrative law’. This is partly because of the difference between common law and the
European continental legal systems. In essence, administrative law under common law
focuses on the administrative authorities, their role, function and supervision of their
actions, i.e. judicial review. In continental legal systems, administrative law also includes
various substantive branches of administrative law, often arranged by theme.
Moreover, the scope of the term ‘approach’ is not clear-cut. This particularly complicates
any legal or other comparison, although it does not make it impossible.
In practice, the concept of an ‘administrative approach’ encompasses both the prevention
and repression (or disruption) of illegal activities. First, authorities make use of adminis-
trative regulations to deny criminals access to the legitimate economy, specifically by barring
them from businesses they may use to facilitate illegal activities or acquire a legal income.
Second, authorities apply administrative and fiscal provisions in conjunctionwith criminal
law in order to disrupt and repress illegal activities. In other words, different authorities
‘work apart together’ and coordinate their efforts in tackling different aspects of crime
problems.
Both prevention and repression are a part of what we can define as an administrative
approach. All sorts of administrative rules and regulations can be applied to repress and
disrupt organized and other crime, whereas regulations for preventive screening are
encompassed in specific national legislation. Furthermore, in the context of repression an
administrative approach does not necessarily imply that only the administrative authorities
are involved. Instead, ‘working apart together’ includes other public bodies as well, partic-
ularly law enforcement agencies and the tax authorities, and in some cases private parties.
Our study shows that to some extent, all ten Member States included in our research
use administrative measures to combat crime, although there are many legal and practical
differences. Some of the countries studied explicitly view an administrative approach as
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part of a policy to reduce serious and organized crime, whereas other Member States apply
such measures in a relatively unstructured and ad hoc manner. Particularly countries that
systematically apply an administrative approach, such as theNetherlands, Italy andBelgium,
are confronted with the problem that Member States refuse to submit crucial criminal and
fiscal information to their competent administrative bodies. Thus, from an international
viewpoint, themost pressing problem is the absence of a consistent legal and organizational
framework that regulates the exchange between different countries of, specifically, criminal
information for the purpose of administrative procedures.
15.4 Administrative measures to prevent criminal infiltration in the
legitimate economy
Most of the ten Member States studied here have not adopted a national policy to prevent
crime systematically and structurally by administrative means. Notable exceptions are
Italy, the United Kingdom1 and the Netherlands, which have introduced policies applying
administrative measures to prevent crime. These policies vary greatly and aim mainly to
screen natural and legal persons that wish to start up businesses in specified sectors.
However, only Italy and the Netherlands have adopted overarching legislation governing
the screening of natural and legal persons applying for licences and government subsidies
or submitting tenders for public contracts.
In the other selected Member States, measures to prevent criminal infiltration in the
legitimate economy are a part of sector-specific business regulations. These are meant to
ensure safety and protect the customer and the environment, but not necessarily to prevent
crime.2 In the case of applicants for tenders and subsidies, screening is primarily part of
the process of selecting the most eligible and reliable candidate.
Requirements are usually stricter when the perceived level of risk is higher. A person
who wishes to trade in firearms or operate a gambling company must comply with more
extensive regulations than someone who wishes to open a shoe store, for example. For
many types of businesses, the absence of a criminal record for offences relevant to the
activity suffices. In specific cases, the authorities may also check other sources of informa-
tion, such as police intelligence and fiscal data. Following on from this, in most of the
countries studied, the provisions that might be used to prevent criminal infiltration are
‘hidden’ in a patchwork of business-specific legislation, as discussed in the legal comparison.
1 It must be noted that our study did not include Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, these parts of the
UnitedKingdomhave developed comparable policies to disrupt serious and organized crime, as have England
and Wales.
2 It must be noted that the overarching legislation in the Netherlands and Italy does not cover all businesses,
and that there are separate business regulations that include requirements concerning a person’s criminal
background.
674
A.C.M. Spapens, M. Peters & D. Van Daele
Specific administrative legislation is arranged either by theme (environmental administrative
law, business regulations on economic activities) or geographically (competences of local,
regional or national administrative authorities). The wide-ranging nature of the legislation
gives administrative authorities the opportunity to be ‘creative’ in applying the law for the
purposes of crime prevention. However, it is also difficult for them to oversee the legal
options and apply them in practice, as there are so many different regulations and compe-
tent authorities to work with.
The EU has also contributed to the body of business regulations that include the
requirement of screening. To begin with, it adopted Regulation (EC) No 1071/2009 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing common rules
concerning the conditions to be complied with to pursue the occupation of road transport
operator and repealing Council Directive 96/26/EC. Under this regulation, transport
managers must not have been convicted of a serious criminal offence or have incurred a
penalty for a serious infringement, in particular, of Community rules relating to road
transport. In 2011 the EU followed up with Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating sexual abuse and sexual
exploitation of children, and child pornography, replacing theCouncil FrameworkDecision
2004/68/JHA. This directive states that a person convicted of a number of specific offences
‘must be prevented from exercising employment involving direct and regular contact with
children.’
The conclusion arising from these findings is that all the Member States included in
our study have legislation that can help prevent criminal infiltration in the legitimate
economy. However, the scope of practical application in this context differs widely. Some
of the Member States have already adopted legislation to this end, whereas others have
just started to ‘frame’ business regulations to suit the context of crime prevention.
Increasing economic integration in the EU will undoubtedly lead to a rise of the number
of requests for criminal and fiscal information fromoneMember State to another. Although
the ECRIS-database on criminal convictions is operational, exchange of ‘soft’ information
is equally important and requires further action at both the Member States and the EU-
level.
In the past years, the EU implemented regulations for the transport sector and for those
who are working with children. Part of these regulations are provisions to prevent crime,
for instance from banning persons with a relevant criminal record from working in these
sectors. At the EU-level, such regulations including provisions for the cross-border exchange
of information could also be introduced for other economic activities vulnerable to serious
and organised crime, for example bars and restaurants, construction and waste disposal.
However, such measures do have the risk of leading to complex and fragmented sector-
specific regulation that is difficult for practitioners to work apply in the context of an
administrative approach. In the long term, a structured legal instrument to allow for the
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exchange of information on all types of administrative issues is inevitable when the
Member States increasingly adopt and apply the concept of an administrative approach.
15.5 Applying administrative measures to tackle serious and organized
crime
15.5.1 Applying the competences of administrative authorities
In many cases, the ‘business processes’ of organized crime depend on both illegal and legal
activities, with the latter potentially being subject to administrative regulations. Human
traffickers may, for example, require transport, housing and a business where they can put
the victims to work; an outlaw motorcycle gang usually needs a clubhouse; the production
of synthetic drugs also requires legally available chemicals, such as acetone and methy-
lamine.
In allMember States, local and other administrative authorities have powers tomaintain
public order in their territory. They can inspect businesses, issue and revoke licences,
impose fines, and close premises when administrative regulations are violated. In addition,
in some Member States the administrative authorities may claim forfeited assets in
administrative proceedings. Indications of violations may follow from inspections per-
formed by their own staff, but also from information supplied by law enforcement agencies
or the tax authorities. In addition, private parties may also have a role in this, such as in
the Pol-PRIMETT example. Administrative powers can thus be applied to disrupt criminal
activity as well as to stop criminals fromusing the infrastructure that facilitates their illegal
activities (if they could not be denied access beforehand through preventive screening).
15.5.2 ‘Working apart together’
Instruments based on administrative, fiscal and criminal law may be applied either sepa-
rately or in combination. The latter is usually referred to as a multi-agency approach,
although in practice ‘working apart together’ is amore appropriate term.Different agencies
coordinate their efforts, but use their respective competences independently. The key to
working apart together is information exchange between administrative, fiscal and law
enforcement authorities within a single state. Information exchange is usually informal.
However, the United Kingdom, Italy, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Poland and the
Netherlands have developed permanent and semi-permanent cooperation initiatives at
the national level. The United Kingdom, Italy, Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands have
also established temporary local or regional bodies for multi-agency cooperation and/or
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information exchange, although the range of administrative authorities participating in
these bodies differs per country.
Although coordinated approaches to combating organized crime clearly have added
value, they also require external political pressure. Our study shows that ‘working apart
together’ usually occurs when the authorities consider a crime problem to be particularly
serious. This may be either a local issue, such as a motorcycle gang’s hangout causing
severe nuisance problems, or a national issue, for example the sale of dangerous new psy-
chotropic substances. One important conclusion is that coordinated responses to crime
are not exotic but can be observed in all ten of the Member States covered in our research.
A number of Member States have established (semi-)permanent structures for integrated
cooperation and information exchange in which the local administrative authorities play
an important part, such as the RIEC’s (the Netherlands) and the Centre of Knowledge
against Organized Crime in Gothenburg. Other countries studied here have established
structures at the national level in which different agencies cooperate. However, at the EU-
level a structure for such cooperation is not yet available.
15.6 Information exchange is crucial
Effective application of administrative measures to prevent, repress and disrupt organized
crime, either independently or in coordinationwith fiscal and law enforcement instruments,
involves having both the opportunity and thewill to share information. Specifically, police
and judicial information often offers administrative authorities crucial reasons to justify
interventions. Without such information, it is almost impossible for administrative
authorities to take preventive or repressive actions.
It is important to distinguish between the exchange of a) previous convictions of natural
and legal persons and b) information or intelligence on on-going police investigations
regarding natural and legal persons. In general, administrative authorities have access to
the first category of information either directly, via criminal records databases, or indirectly,
when a request is filed for a certificate of good conduct. Access to the second type of
information is much less obvious, but it can be important in the case of persons who have
been under investigation but have never been officially convicted, such as straw men.
Some countries have legal obstacles that prevent the latter type of information being
shared between government agencies. In Belgium, it is almost impossible for the tax
authority to share information with administrative authorities. In some cases, law
enforcement agencies are willing to share information informally. Although the adminis-
trative authorities cannot use such information for decision-making, it enables them to
scrutinize the personsmore closely. In all theMember States studied here, the administrative
authorities are obliged to inform the judicial authorities if they have information about a
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crime. Conversely, law enforcement agencies are usually not under an obligation to share
information with administrative authorities. Only the Netherlands has introduced a ‘tip
function’ of this kind in its legislation, although it is not an absolute requirement. If the
public prosecutor is of the opinion that legitimate interests would be served bywithholding
information about an ongoing criminal investigation, he or she may do so.
Apart from the legal option of sharing information, trust is also crucial. First of all,
secrecy is a natural part of the work of law enforcement agencies, and they may feel that
sharing information with administrative bodies will endanger their own investigations or
information sources. Second, government agencies may have doubts about the integrity
of their counterparts. If the police suspect that local politicians or civil servants are corrupt,
for example, they will feel little incentive to share information on illegal activities. Finally,
historical aspects are important. Particularly in states that have experienced non-democratic
regimes in the past, information exchange between different government agencies is a
sensitive issue.
In summary: apart from the legal option of sharing information, mutual trust between
government agencies is crucial to the success of an administrative approach.
15.7 Information exchange across borders
We found that there are specific problems when Member States are required to exchange
information with one another to support administrative measures aimed at preventing or
repressing serious or organized crime. From a legal perspective, the main problem is the
lack of a legal framework that clearly regulates the exchange and use of information collected
by law enforcement agencies and tax authorities in one Member State for the purpose of
administrative procedures in another. For future purposes, in this framework attention
should be paid to data protection and privacy, an aspect which was only indirectly studied
in Chapter 14. Only Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA of 26 February 2009 on
the organization and content of the exchange of information extracted from the criminal
record between Member States explicitly allows such requests with regard to the ECRIS
database on convictions. Nevertheless, these requests need to be in accordance with the
national law of the requested state.
Administrative authorities are allowed to obtain and use information exchanged under
the existing legal framework for criminal proceedingswith the prior consent of the requested
state. Such provisions are included in the Schengen Implementation Convention (SIC),
Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA on information exchange (the ‘Swedish ini-
tiative’) and Council Framework Decision 2008/615/JHA (the ‘Prüm Decision’). Judicial
information may be exchanged based on the EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in
CriminalMatters. However, the prerequisite of prior consent leads to lengthy and laborious
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procedures as well as the risk that the judicial authorities will be overloaded with such
requests when administrative approaches to crime become common in the EU.
Furthermore, if the administrative authorities want to obtain such information, it is
unclear whether they should file their request through the channels designed for the
exchange of police information, such as Interpol, or do so directly via the judicial author-
ities. In principle, it is possible to exchange information through these channels for purposes
other than criminal proceedings or for investigative purposes, but this requires permission
from the requested state. The problems are therefore similar to those related to the content
of the information. With regard to ECRIS, the situation is less complicated. For example,
Directive 2011/93/EU refers to ECRIS as an applicable system to exchange information to
screen persons who want to work with children. The range of information that can be
exchanged for screening purposes in fiscal matters is also limited because the Naples II
Convention only allows the use of the Customs Information System in cases concerning
an infringement of national and European customs regulations.
Clearly, the situation outlined above is unsatisfactory from the perspective of the EU
as well. To begin with, every citizen of the Union is free to move to another Member State
and start a business there. If the applicant has no criminal record, but is known to be
affiliated with an organized crime group, for example, the authorities cannot use the
information to withhold a licence unless the judicial authorities of the requested Member
State allow this. The same applies if the authorities intend to use the information to revoke
a licence or impose other administrative measures. The requested party must give its per-
mission to use specific information. Currently, the outcome of such requests remains
unsure.Where onemagistratemay give permission, anothermay reach a different conclu-
sion, even in an identical case.
The problem outlined above raises the question of whether the EU can create new
legislation to remove the obstacles to information exchanges for the purposes of an
administrative approach to crime.Article 84 of theTFEUallows theCouncil andParliament
to create harmonizing legislation under the ordinary legislative procedure. However, only
the Member States can initiate the procedure. An example is the Prüm process. Seven
Member States signed the original Prüm Treaty in 2005, after which the majority of the
provisions were included in EU legislation in 2008. Similarly, the Member States could
decide to amend existing legislation to include provisions for the exchange of law
enforcement information in the context of an administrative approach.
With regard to the problem of the institutional channels through which to exchange
requests for information for an administrative approach, the options are similar. For the
time being, the logical solution would be to expand the existing framework and allow also
information exchanges supporting an administrative approach via the existing channels
for law enforcement and fiscal information-sharing. It is, however, doubtful whether this
‘rerouting’ of information for purposes other than criminal proceedings will suffice if an
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administrative approach to organized crime comes to full bloom throughout the entire
Union. The requests would then overtax law enforcement structures that were not designed
to facilitate an administrative approach.
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16 The road ahead
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In the foregoing chapters, it has become clear that the concept of an administrative approach
to crime has developed at different speeds in the studied Member States. Without going
into depth here,1 the Member States can be divided into three distinct groups. First, partic-
ular member states have systematically implemented a national policy, laws and practice
in the framework of an administrative approach to crime. Second, other Member States
have not systematically implemented a national policy or comprehensive law, but have
gained experiencewith the concept of an administrative approach to crime through (local)
initiatives in practice. Finally, still other Member States have not implemented a national
policy, nor law and have little experience in practice.
Nevertheless, in all studied Member States, the legal potential for an administrative
approach to crime is present. This implies that measures for maintaining public order and
screening and monitoring of applicants concerning administrative decisions are present
and can – in theory – be used for a future administrative approach to crime. Consequently,
implementation of an administrative approach to crime in the studied Member States can
make use of the found starting points; a common ground for an administrative approach
to crime is present in all the Member States. For all Member States the administrative
approach to crime, additional to traditional law enforcement, is a commendable policy to
implement.
Taking the foregoing into account, it is rather evident that the described common
ground present in the Member States for an administrative approach to crime needs to be
strengthened to support all Member States in their different stages of development.
16.1 Recommended steps to develop a EU policy on an administrative
approach to crime
Article 84 TFEU allows the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance
with the ordinary legislative procedure, to establish measures to promote and support the
actions of theMember States in the field of crime prevention, excluding any harmonisation
of the laws and regulations of the Member States. In conjunction with Article 76 TFEU,
the Commission (as well as a quarter of the Member States) can propose legal measures
1 We refer to the legal comparison in chapter 12 in particular.
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to support and promote the actions of the Member States. Based on these articles, the
Commission can develop several initiatives, including the following:
Firstly, the concept of an administrative approach to crime should be actively promoted
towards both policy-makers and practitioners. The EuropeanCommission, in collaboration
withMember States that have developed policies and legislation, should continue to invest
and support capacity building in the Member States less familiar with the concept. This
encompasses the raising of awareness regarding the use of existing business regulations
in the context of (organized) crime prevention. Moreover, when Member States are
interested, the possibilities of developing overarching policies and legislation in this context
should be promoted.
Secondly, the European Union should fund programs and research looking to build
experiences with the concept of an administrative approach to crime and multi-agency
cooperation. All the more since the underlying study focused on only ten Member States.
Hence, it is significant to further explore the possibilities in the other Member States. As
experience with cross-border multi agency cooperation is still limited, in particular
experiments or simulations concerning cross-border cooperation with administrative,
fiscal and law enforcement authorities is recommended. Such research can explore the
possible solutions for the legal and practical difficulties in the field in operational cases.
Lastly, in scope of the legislative competence offered by article 84 TFEU, the European
Union should strengthen the current institutional framework. Here, actions can be
undertaken both in the long and short term. In the short term, the Informal Network on
the Administrative Approach to Prevent and Fight Organised Crime should be further
substantiated to:
– promote the exchange of knowledge and experience on the EU level and;
– support the Member States in their development of an administrative approach to
crime by becoming an advanced ‘EU Governmental Multi Agency Information and
Expertise Centre’.
The foregoing should be supported with an official mandate as well as further financial
support for the InformalNetwork. The opportunity should be seized to further build upon
the existing network of national contact points, knowledge and experience. In doing so,
more advanced Member States can exchange best practices and expertise with other
Member States in the field of policy, legislation and practice. Moreover, information can
be shared regarding occurring crime phenomena across borders, which can be approached
with administrative measures, allowing (advanced) Member States to seize opportunities
to cooperate and prevent displacement effects across the border.
In the long term it can be considered to give the ‘EU Governmental Multi agency
Information and Expertise Centre’ a further coordinating and supporting role for national
administrative and other authorities in cross-border operational cases. This can prevent
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criminals from misusing the national legal infrastructure as well as the open borders in
the Schengen area.
16.2 Recommended steps for implementation of an administrative
approach to crime on the national levels
Save from support and promotion of the administrative approach by the EuropeanUnion,
it is also necessary that the Member States invest in this approach. Here, opportunities
also exist in the present network of contact points of the Informal Network, which forms
the building blocks for stimulating an administrative approach. First, each Member State
has a contact point on the national level. Due to the size and/or governmental structure
of certainMember States, these contact points can be extended to the administrative regions
of the Member States. The contact points will provide in both an internal and external
need. Internally, the national and regional contact points can provide support and best
practices to the vast array of administrative authorities dealing with operational cases in
the Member States. For future purposes, they can coordinate and support application of
administrative measures as well as cooperation between administrative authorities and
other authorities. Externally, these contact points are the link between a ‘EUgovernmental
multi agency information and expertise centre’ and the authorities dealingwith operational
cases, ensuring that the exchange of knowledge and best practices on the EU level would
factually reach the authorities on the ground as well as to communicate issues and best
practices arising bottom-up.
16.3 Recommended steps for international and national information
exchange
Currently, the rising attention and awareness for an administrative approach to crime,
both in the Member States and at EU level, leads to a crucial issue. As has been stressed in
the previous chapters, when applying administrative measures the information position
of administrative authorities is pivotal, particularly regarding law enforcement information.
Information-exchange for the purposes of an administrative approach to crime is critical
in the national context, to prevent criminals from infiltrating in the legal economy. After
all, administrative authorities can only intervene if they have information on a person’s
criminal background allowing them to cancel or refuse an administrative decision. Hence,
nationally, eachMember State can considerwithin its ownnational legal context regulations
providing administrative authorities with themeans to (in)directly access law enforcement
information, information on convictions and fiscal information.
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From an international scope, opportunities for cross-border criminality across the EU,
such as the found displacement effect in the Belgium-Dutch border regions or the EXPO
2015 held in Milan, which attracted many foreign investors, beg for cross-border informa-
tion-exchange for the purposes of an administrative approach to crime. Here, we can dif-
ferentiate between actions in the long term and in the short term to be considered by the
European Union.
First, in the long term, the EuropeanUnion should consider framing a legal instrument
specifically for information-exchange for the purposes of an administrative approach to
crime. Such an instrument should include provisions legally enabling cross-border infor-
mation exchange, address the institutional framework allowing for such an exchange and
deal with relevant questions of privacy and data protection.
In the short term, however, legislative action should also be undertaken regarding the
adaption of current instruments established for the purposes of information-exchange for
criminal matters. As shown in chapter 14, several measures, such as the Prüm Decision,
the Swedish Initiative and ECRIS, allow for the exchange of information for other purposes
than criminal investigationswhen prior consent of the relevant authority has been obtained.
The provisions for exchange of information in these instruments can be extended to also
including an administrative approach to crime, for instance by revising Articles 13 and 14
of the PrümDecision to allow exchange of information for preventive purposes, not limited
to major cross-border events only. Another option could be to revise article 3 or 7 of the
Swedish Initiative to include information-exchange for the purposes of an administrative
approach to crime.
Furthermore, the information-exchange for an administrative approach to crime
deserves an institutional framework in the Member States. The European Commission
should promote and support development of a specific infrastructure for the purposes of
exchange of information in the context of an administrative approach to crime. Currently,
when cross-border information exchange occurs, it takes place via the traditional law
enforcement channels. In the foreseeable future, assuming a strong development of an
administrative approach to crime, a separate infrastructure is necessary to prevent strain
on the current law enforcement channels.
Moreover, as has been addressed in the conclusion of this study, the European Union
currently undertakes actions in several economic sectors, such as working with children
or the transport sector. These instruments focus on the vulnerability of the relevant sectors,
and are not necessarily meant to bar criminals from misusing the legal infrastructure,
albeit in practice the same results can be achieved. These instruments include provisions
addressing cross-border information-exchange of law enforcement information and con-
victions for the purposes of regulating that specific sector. This development should be
further encouraged. The European Commission should explore in what manner these
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business regulations can be utilized in order to facilitate information-exchange between
administrative, law enforcement and fiscal authorities.
In spite of this latter positive observation, it must be addressed that further investment
into sector-specific EU regulations could possibly lead to fragmentation of regulation,
making it difficult for practitioners to work with. Consequentially, in the long term,
implementation of a systematic and structured legal instrument addressing cross-border
information exchange for the purposes of an administrative approach to crime should be
considered.
Lastly, in light of the foregoing recommendations, the issues of privacy and data pro-
tection should be taken into account both within Member States and when developing
instruments for cross-border purposes. This is an important, yet difficult balancing act
between the right to privacy and the possibilities of governmental authorities to intervene.
The underlying scope of this study focused on the potential for information-exchange
rather than on privacy and data protection. Thus, it is recommended that the EU funds
further research in this field.
16.4 Comprehensive approach to implementation of the
recommendations
The recommendations concerning the further substantiation of the present common
ground for an administrative approach to crime should not be seen in isolation. Rather,
it is important to coordinate initiatives in the field of an administrative approach to crime
with those in the context of anti-corruption and money laundering. The foregoing should
be seen in the context of the Commission’s intent to stimulate a horizontal approach to
topics such as crime, above and beyond the vertical competences of the Commission’s
Directorate-Generals. Integrity of governmental bodies is crucial for a credible application
of an administrative approach, particularly in the field of cross-border information exchange
and cooperation between authorities. The EuropeanCommission should therefore consider
the available instruments in these fields when promoting and supporting an administrative
approach to crime.
Concluding, the above recommendations are important, yet non-exhaustive, building
blocks for the development of an administrative approach to crime in the EuropeanUnion.
It is important to implement these recommendations in combination, instead of arbitrarily
implementing one or two separately. A final recommendation it thus to implement the
foregoing in the context of an comprehensive action plan on the level of the European
Union as well as on the level of the Member States.
The Member States, supported by the European Union, need to take steps to prevent
misuse of the legal infrastructure by criminal activities. The use of such instruments will
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be beneficial for the integrity, reliability and credibility of the national and European
authorities aswell as for the legal and bona fide economic activities undertaken by European
citizens. As seen, the concept of an administrative approach to crime in combination with
multi agency cooperation is a commendable instrument for the road ahead.
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DEFINITIONS OF TERMINOLOGY – STUDY ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
APPROACH
The definitions as described below are meant to conduct ‘Study on the possibilities to exchange
information between administrative bodies and traditional law enforcement organizations
to apply administrative measures within EU MS and at EU Level’.
I Definition of the administrative approach1
Please indicate in this form to a maximum of two a4 whether the definition below of
‘administrative approach’ covers instruments to prevent crime in your Member-State and
(shortly) describe these instruments.
Definition of the administrative approach:
The non-traditional approach, also known as administrative approach: preventing
the facilitation of illegal activities by denying criminals the use of the legal administrative
infrastructure. Focus will be on:
1 Helpful other definitions, meant to substantiate the above definition:
Competence: the power of (administrative) government to utilize the tools to deny criminals the use of the
legal infrastructure.
Administrative government: your Member State’s authorities, both on a central and local level, i.e. the
central state organs, but also municipalities, cities, provinces etc.
Legal infrastructure: tools for citizens to perform activities, such as permits, licenses, subsidies, grants,
tenders, etc.
Serious crime: offences committed by one or more persons for a prolonged or indefinite period of time,
which offences are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four
years or a more serious penalty, to obtain, directly or indirectly a financial or other material benefit. (Based
on Europol. (2013 (March)). Serious Organised Crime Threat Analysis (SOCTA): Europol. p. 41-42).
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1. the preventive screening and monitoring of applicants (persons and legal entities) of
permits, tenders and subsidies;
2. the power to close or expropriate premises when public nuisance occurs in or around
those premises;
3. the possibility to seize assets of criminals in the framework of administrative procedure,
outside the scope of a criminal procedure;
4. other regularly appliedmethods open to administrative authorities to tackle and prevent
crime.
II Expert(s) and contact details
Please indicate (a) relevant (academic) expert(s) in the instruments as described by you in













Administrative measures to prevent and tackle crime
Appendix 2
The respondents per country
Belgium (visit: during 2014)
Organisation(Group) interview
City of Genk (BE)Annemie de Boye
Vereniging van Vlaamse Steden en Gemeenten
(VVSG)
Koen van Heddeghem
FOD Binnenlandse zakenRachid Kerbab
PZ TurnhoutRoger Leys
Dienst VreemdelingenzakenTom Kersemans
Federal Police Commissioner General’s Office,












The Czech Republic (visit: week of 31 March)
Organisation(Group) interview
Transparency International – Czech RepublicRadim Bureš








City of Prague, crime prevention managmentMichala Hanova;
Ondrej Prancny
City of BrnoStanislav Jaburek;
Jana Sancova;
Drobromila Machakova;
1 Interview took place upon request of the respondents themselves, in light of the “Benelux Strategisch Overleg
Politie”.
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France (15 October 2014)
Organisation(Group) interview
Groupements d’Intervention RégionauxDenys Marion;
Francis Freyssainge2








Italy (visit: week of 22 September 2014)
Organisation(Group) interview




Prefettura MilanVice Prefetto Dott. Ugo Taucer;
Funzionario di Gabinetto dott.ssa Angela Lorella
Di Gioia;
Vice Prefetto Aggiunto dott.ssa Cecilia Nardelli;
Vice Prefetto Aggiunto dott.ssa Marika Piscitelli
Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (DIA)Allessandro Pulcri3









Ministerie van Veiligheid en JustitieGerard van Rienen
2 On 15 October 2014, during the LIEC seminar, we were able to attend Mr. Freyssainge’s presentation.
3 On 15 October 2014, during the LIEC seminar, we were able to attend Mr. Pulcri’s presentation.
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Organisation(Group) interview








Landelijk Bureau BibobJesse Koning
Ministerie van Veiligheid en JustitieCyril Springveld;
Gaby Laane
Poland (visit: week of 19 May 2014)
Organisation(Group) interview
Ministry of the InteriorMariusz Cichomski;
Miroslaw Kamunek
Prosecutor’s office KrakowJanusz Sliwa and 2 collegues
GIFI/FIU (Ministry of Finance)Piotr Przybylek and collegues
Spain (visit: week of 15 September 2014)
Organisation(Group) interview
Ministry of Finance and Public AdministrationMario Lapena Gutierrez;
Daniel Sanchez Benavente





Guarda CivilJose Maria de las Cuevas
Asset tracing Recovery OfficeFernando Camacho Erranz
CICO/AROAndres Perez Lopez
City of Majadahonda’sNarciso de Foxa Alfaro;
Isabel Conde;
representative of the local police;
representative of the licensing office
District of Tetuan (Madrid)Paloma Garcia Romero;
Catalina Benanceu
National PoliceJorge Rosal Cosano
National PoliceJose Manuel Colodras
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Aklagare (public prosecution)Bjorn Blomqvist
Swedish Transport AgencyMikael Kyller
City of Stockholm.TillstandsenhetenCarina Cutlip
City of Gothenburg, centre of knowledgeHelena Lans
City of Gothenburg. TillstandsenhetenAnnelie Silvander
City of Gothenburg. Procurement OfficeGoran Brunberg












GAIN (national coordinator)Caroline Simpson4
Police ScotlandRonnie Megaughin
NCA Head of Behavioural ScienceSteve Welsh
4 On 15October 2014, during the LIEC seminar, wewere able to attendMs. Simpsons presentation, providing
an update on the workings of GAIN.
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Appendix 3
Topic lists forthe semi-structured interviews
I. TOPIC LIST – NATIONAL POLICY MAKERS
I. The national possibilities of an administrative approach in the relevant
country
NB: the interviewer only needs to focus on the applicable topics for the current practitioner.
Screening/monitoring
1. Which possibilities exist in [COUNTRY] to screen or monitor (legal) persons before
– a for them – positive administrative decision (e.g. license, subsidy or tender) has been
taken?
2. Which possibilities exist in [COUNTRY] to monitor (legal) persons for suspicious
activities after an administrative decision has been taken?
3. Which organisations/units are involved in the screening/monitoring of (legal) persons
in [COUNTRY]?
4. Which kind of information can be used when screening/monitoring (legal) persons?
5. Which infrastructure is used to exchange information between the involved organisa-
tions/units?
6. Which limitations adhere to the use of information when screening/monitor (legal)
persons?
7. Can you indicate any (future) developments in this area in [COUNTRY]?
Closing/expropriating premises
1. Which possibilities exist to close or expropriate premises by the administrative
authorities of [COUNTRY] when nuisance occurs in or around those premises?
2. Which unit(s)/organisation(s) can be involved in this process?
3. What kind of information can lead to the closure or expropriation of premises?
4. Is there a need for information from other EU member-states when closing/expropri-
ating premises? If affirmative: in what way? When does this need arise? How can the
information be used?
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5. Can you indicate any (future) developments in this area in [COUNTRY]?
Forfeiture of criminal assets
1. Which possibilities exist in [COUNTRY] forfeit criminal assets outside the scope of
criminal law?
2. If affirmative, which units/organisations can be involved in this process?
3. What kind of information can lead to forfeiture?
4. Is there a need for information from other EU member-states when forfeiting criminal
assets? If affirmative: inwhat way?When does this need arise?How can the information
be used?
5. Can you indicate any (future) developments in this area in [COUNTRY]?
Possibilities other methods
1. Which other methods – apart from the ones above – do you have to prevent criminals
from infiltrating the legal infrastructure?
II. Sharing of information with other EU Member States
Outgoing requests for information
1. In [COUNTRY] is it possible to request for information regarding administrative





2. If affirmative, which national infrastructure(s) can the involved administrative
authorities utilize to request for such information?
3. If affirmative, which international infrastructure(s) can the involved administrative
authorities utilize to request for such information?
4. Can you identify which authorities/organisations/units in other EU Member States
you approach for the above types of information? (10 research countries).
5. If possible, to which legal limitations must the request adhere?
6. If possible, practical limitations are there for such requests?
Incoming requests for information
1. In [COUNTRY] is it possible to share information with administrative authorities of
other EU Member States upon request when those foreign administrative authorities
need to make a decision (e.g. license/subsidy/tender), concerning:
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2. If possible, which infrastructure(s) can be used by the foreign administrative authorities
to make such a request?
3. If possible, to which legal limitations must the request by foreign administrative
authorities adhere?
4. If possible, practical limitations are there for requests by foreign administrative
authorities?
Future information-exchange
1. Which future possibilities for (further) sharing of information with other EU Member
States can you envision?
2. Which problems can you identify for (further) information sharing with other EU
Member States?
3. Which opportunities can you identify for (further) information sharing with other EU
Member States?
4. In your opinion, how would you enhance information-exchange to and from adminis-
trative authorities in the EU?
II. TOPIC LIST PRACTITIONERS
I. The practical application of the administrative approach in the country
NB: the interviewer only needs to focus on the applicable topics for the current practitioner.
Screening/monitoring
1. In what way are applicants (natural or legal persons) for an administrative decision
screened by (or with help of) your unit?
2. Which information sources are used for the screening/monitoring?
3. Which actors/organisations do you approach when gathering this information? With
which actors do you cooperate? How does this cooperation take form?
4. Which process is used to screen the persons after the information has been gathered?
5. What are the possible outcomes of the screening?
6. Who is notified of the outcomes of the screening?
7. Which organisation decides upon the initial application or revocation of the decision
(see question 1)?
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8. Which best practices can you identify in the screening process?
9. Which problems can you identify in the screening process?
Closing/expropriating premises
1. Does your unit/organisation have to power to close or expropriate buildings when
nuisance occurs?
2. Which (type of) information is necessary before one can decide to close or expropriate
premises?
3. How do you gather this information? Can you give (case) examples?
4. Which (other) actors/organisations do you approach to gather this information? Can
you give (case) examples?
5. Do you find it necessary to obtain information from other EU member states when
applying this power? When affirmative: Can you give (case)examples?
6. Which process is used before and after the decision to close or expropriate premises?
7. Which best practices can you identify?
8. Which problems can you identify?
Forfeiture of criminal assets
1. Does your unit/organisation have to possibility to forfeit (*take away*) criminal assets
outside the scope of criminal law?
2. Which kind of information can lead to forfeiture of criminal assets?
3. How do you obtain this information? Can you give (case)examples?
4. Which (other) actors/organisations do you approach to gather this information? Can
you give (case) examples?
5. While obtaining such information, do you fin dit necessary to obtain information from
other EU member-states? When affirmative: Can you give (case)examples?
6. Which process is used when criminal assets are forfeited?
Possibilities other methods
1. Which other methods – apart from the ones above – do you have to prevent criminals
from infiltrating the legal infrastructure?
II. Sharing of information with other EU member-states
Outgoing requests for information
As indicated above, you’ve mentioned that you need information from other EU Member
States in certain situations. I would like to ask some further questions regarding this issue.
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Administrative measures to prevent and tackle crime
1. In what moments do the need for information from other EU Member States arise?
Can you give (case) examples?
2. What kind of information have you requested (judicial/police/administrative/fiscal)?
3. Which units/organisations in other EU Member States have you in such instances
approached?
4. How have you approached these units/organisations (via the national judi-
cial/police/administrative/fiscal infrastructure or via the international judi-
cial/police/administrative/fiscal infrastructure or directly)?
5. Which best practice can you identify? Can you give (case) examples?
6. Which problems can you identify? Can you give (case) examples?
Incoming requests for information
1. Have you ever been approached to share information with another EU Member States
for administrative purposes?
2. Which unit(s)/organisation(s) have approached you?
3. How have these unit(s)/organisation(s) approached you (via the national judi-
cial/police/administrative/fiscal infrastructure or via the international judi-
cial/police/administrative/fiscal infrastructure or directly)?
4. What kind of information was requested (judicial/police/administrative/fiscal)?
5. Were you able to share this information? Why (not)?
6. Which best practice can you identify? Can you give (case) examples?
7. Which problems can you identify? Can you give (case) examples?
Future information-exchange
1. Which future possibilities for (further) sharing of information with other EU Member
States can you envision?
2. Which problems can you identify for (further) information sharing with other EU
Member States?
3. Which opportunities can you identify for (further) information sharing with other EU
Member States?
4. In your opinion, how would you enhance information-exchange to and from adminis-
trative authorities in the EU?
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